

SOME OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
OF
GEORGE CANNING
VOL. II.

PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON

SOME OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
OF
GEORGE CANNING

EDITED, WITH NOTES, BY

EDWARD J. STAPLETON

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
AND NEW YORK : 15 EAST 16th STREET
1887

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

1826.

DATE		PAGE
Feb 3	Mr Canning to the Marquis de Palmella <i>Relations between Great Britain and Portugal</i> . . .	1
	Editor's Note <i>Do. Do.</i> . .	12
„ 10	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville . <i>Greece, and the Duc d'Orleans</i> . . .	13
„ 10	Do Do. <i>Do Do.</i> . .	13
„ 14	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool <i>Postmaster-General: Lord Morley's claims if vacant</i> . . .	15
„ 14	Mr. Canning to Sir Henry Wellesley . <i>Prince Esterhazy</i> . . .	16
March 6	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville <i>Justification of Disavowal of Sir C Stuart's Treaties with Brazil</i> . . .	16
	Editor's Note <i>Do. Do.</i> . .	19
„ 13	The Duchess of Wellington to Mr. Canning <i>Thanks for News of the Duke in Russia</i>	22
„ 21	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool . <i>Duke of Devonshire, and the Embassy for Czar's Coronation</i>	22
„ 31	Mr Canning to Viscount Granville . <i>King's Health, Despatches from Russia</i>	24
April 1	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool <i>Russian Policy, as disclosed in Despatches</i>	26
„ 4	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville <i>Talk with Polignac on Portugal, and Russia; Comments on Russia</i>	27
„ 17	Viscount Granville to Mr. Stapleton . <i>A Missing Letter</i>	28
„ 18	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville . <i>Duke of Devonshire, and Czar's Coronation</i> . . .	29

DATE			PAGE
April 18	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Co-operation with France, in Mediation between Spain and Colonies</i>	30
	Editor's Note	<i>Canning's projected Visit to Paris</i>	31
„ 25	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Do Do.</i>	32
„ 25	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool .	<i>The Czar and the Garter</i>	33
„ 25	Mr Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>The Porte, and the Depopu- lation of Morea</i>	34
	Editor's Note	<i>Duke of Wellington's Mission to Russia, and Greek Ques- tion</i>	35
May 2	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Corn</i>	47
„ 4	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Depopulation of Morea</i>	49
	Editor's Note	<i>Corn</i>	50
„ 9	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Corn: in either House of Parliament</i>	52
„ 12	Do. Do.	<i>Corn: Results of Divisions in both Houses</i>	53
„ 17	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.	<i>Oregon Question</i>	55
„ 26	Do. Do.	<i>King's Speech</i>	56
June 6	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Holiday Arrangements, and Forecast of Business</i>	56
„ 11	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.	<i>Oregon Question: Informa- tion for Cabinet</i>	58
„ 21	Do. Do.	<i>Greek War, and British Action in Mediterranean</i>	59
„ 22	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Russian Policy; The Laevens; Esterhazy; Apponyi</i>	60
„ 24	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.	<i>Oregon Question: British Interests in Future</i>	62
July 1	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville	<i>Foreign Office Business; Message to Villèle</i>	63
	Editor's Note	<i>Affairs in the Peninsula; Portuguese 'Constitution'</i>	63
„ 3	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville	<i>Sir C. Stuart and the Por- tuguese 'Constitution'</i>	68
„ 7	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool .	<i>Oregon Question</i>	71
	Editor's Note	<i>Do.</i>	75
[May 31]	Mr. Secretary Canning to the British Commissioners	<i>Oregon Question: Statement of British Case</i>	76
[June 29, 1824]	Protocol of British and United States Conference	<i>Oregon Question: State of the Negotiations; Monro Doctrine</i>	85

DATE		PAGE
[May 15, 1826]	Report of Committee of Congress . .	<i>Oregon Question: Statement of United States Case</i> . . . 87
„ 10	Memorandum of British Colonial Office	<i>Oregon Question: Reply to United States Case</i> . . . 110
July 14	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Oregon Question: Language in Congress</i> 115
„ 18	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville .	<i>Deficiency in Information at Embassy at Paris</i> . . . 116
„ 25	Do. Do.	<i>Embarrassment caused by Sir C. Stuart's carrying 'Constitution' to Portugal</i> 116
„ 23	The King of France to the King of Spain	<i>Remonstrances for Misgovernment; Threatened Withdrawal of French Troops</i> . 120
	Editor's Note	<i>The Portuguese 'Constitution,' and its Effects on Spain</i> 121
Aug. 13	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.	<i>Protection of Portugal from Violence</i> 128
„ 16	Do. Do.	<i>Caught Cold; Submits various Despatches</i> . . . 129
„ 25	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville	<i>Russo-British Protocol on Greek Affairs</i> 131
Sept. 20	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.	<i>Submits Despatches and Drafts</i> 133
	Editor's Note	<i>British Diplomacy in Peninsula</i> 134
„ 29	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Proceedings in Paris; Interview with Villèle</i> . . 135
„ 30	Do. Do.	<i>Despatches by hand of Mr. Hammond</i> 139
Oct. 2	Do. Do.	<i>Portugal, and Lord Beresford</i> 141
„ 6	Do. Do.	<i>Where to strike, if War with Spain</i> 144
„ 9	Do. Do.	<i>Portugal, and Lord Beresford</i> 145
„ 11	Do. Do.	<i>Portuguese 'Constitution'; Austrian Enmity</i> . . . 149
„ 11	Do. Do.	<i>Submits Despatches</i> . . . 149
„ 13	Do. Do.	<i>Portugal and Lord Beresford, and Duke of Wellington</i> 150
	Editor's Note	<i>Danger of War in Peninsula, and Duke of Wellington</i> 150

DATE		PAGE
Oct. 16	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. <i>Portugal and Austria ; Greek Question and France</i>	153
„ 16	Do. Do. <i>Portugal, and Lord Beresford</i>	155
	Editor's Note Do. Do.	155
„ 27	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville [Editor's Note] <i>On Spanish Interference with Portugal</i>	157
	Editor's Note <i>Greek War</i>	159
Nov. 14	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville. <i>Greek Question, and Russia, Portugal ; King's Health</i>	160
„ 17	Mr. Stapleton to Viscount Granville <i>Excusing Mr. Canning's Silence</i>	161
	Editor's Note <i>Russian Feelings towards Canning; Greek Question; Persia</i>	161
„ 26	M. Damas to M. de Moustier.	163
„ 26	M. Damas to M. de Beaurepaire. <i>Letter of Recall from Madrid</i>	163
	Editor's Note <i>Spanish Invasion of Portugal : French Instructions to Legation at Madrid.</i>	164
Dec. 8	Mr. Stapleton to Viscount Granville <i>Canning's Liberal Policy ; Invasion of Portugal</i>	164
„ 11	Mr. Canning to le Comte d'Alcudia <i>The reading British Foreign Office Despatches to Villeda</i>	168
	Editor's Note <i>Communicates King's Message as to Invasion of Portugal</i>	169
„ 17	Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. <i>Mr. Canning's Speeches on Portuguese Affairs</i>	169
„ 29	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville <i>King's Views; Recall of Lord Beresford</i>	171
	Editor's Note <i>Delay in Intelligence from Paris</i>	173
	Editor's Note <i>Effects of Speeches</i>	174

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE.

	Anonymous.	<i>Laments Mr. Canning's Dining with —</i>	175
	Sir Harcourt Lees [Editor's Note] <i>Insulting King's Speech</i>		176
Feb. 13	Mr. David Charles Guthrie [Editor's Note]	<i>Commercial Panic and Banking Systems</i>	176
„ 14	The Rev. Sydney Smith	<i>Sends Pamphlet on Catholic Question</i>	178
„ 26	Mr. Canning to the Rev. Sydney Smith	<i>Thanks for Pamphlet</i>	178

DATE		PAGE
Feb. 15	The Rev. S. H. Cassan [Editor's Note] <i>Volume of 'Lives of Bishops of Winchester'</i>	179
„ 27	Mr. J. Ferrand Waddington	<i>Banking Systems</i> 179
March 1	Mr. Pattison	<i>Difficulty of Interviews with a Minister</i> 182
„ 2	Mr. Canning to Mr. Pattison	<i>Do. Do.</i> 182
„ 3	Dr. Perry [Editor's Note].	<i>Scotch Bank Notes for Five Shillings</i> 183
„ 5	Mr. Giffard	<i>Thanks for Help</i> 183
„ 9	Dr. Meyrick	<i>Offers a Volume and support of Mr Canning stood for Oxford University</i> 185
„ 13	Mr. Canning to Dr. Meyrick	<i>Thanks</i> 185
„ 14	M. César Moreau [Editor's Note]	<i>Statistical Tables of Trade</i> . 186
„ 16	Anonymous.	<i>Regent's Park</i> 186
„ 22	Mr. William Turner	<i>Abduction of Daughter; and British Embassy at Paris</i> 189
„ 23	Mr. Canning to Mr. William Turner	<i>Promises redress</i> 189
„	Dr. Chalmers	<i>West Indian Slavery</i> 190
„ 29	Major Denham	<i>Volume of African Travels</i> . 191
April 2	Mr. Canning to Major Denham	<i>Accepts Volume</i> 191
„ 10	Mr. J. H. Frere to Mr Stapleton	<i>Returns 'Denham's Travels'</i> 191
„ 15	Mr. Canning to Mr. Chapman	<i>Master Canning's Amusements</i> 192
„ 17	Sir Andrew Halliday	<i>Volumes on 'House of Hanover': Complaint of Mistake</i> 192
„ 20	Mr. Canning to Sir Andrew Halliday	<i>Explains</i> 193
May 18	William Godwin	<i>For access to old Journals of House of Commons</i> . . 194
„ 25	The Speaker	<i>Grants access for Godwin</i> . 194
„ 26	Mr Canning to Mr. Godwin	<i>Informs of Permission</i> . . 195
„ 27	Mr. James Prior	<i>'Life of Burke'</i> 195
June 1	Mr. Canning to Mr. James Prior	<i>Do. Thanks</i> 196
May 29	Mr. James Dickson	<i>Relations of Brazil and the Argentine Republic.</i> . . 196
	Mr. Charles Pitt	<i>Request to Mr. Canning to stand for Westminster.</i> . 205
June 19	Mr. Canning	<i>Do. Do. Refusal</i> 207
„ 14	William Groves	<i>'Princess Olve'</i> 207
„ 14	Mr. Isaac Dimsdale	<i>Offers Dedication of Song</i> . 210
„ 17	Mr. Canning to Mr Isaac Dimsdale	<i>Declines Dedication of Song.</i> 211
July 10	The Rev. S. W. Cassan	<i>'Lives of Bishops of Winchester'.</i> 212

DATE		PAGE
July 17	Mr Canning to the Rev S W Cassan	<i>Declines Volumes</i> 21 ⁴
„ 16	Dr Adams	<i>Asks for Autograph of Sheridan</i> 21 ⁵
„ 21	Mr Canning to Dr Adams	<i>Cannot supply Sheridan's Autograph</i> 21 ⁵
Aug. 6	Mr. Canning to Mr. Duckett	<i>Declines Personal Interview</i> 21
„ 11	Mr Joseph Wolff	<i>Intelligence as to Persia</i> . . 21 ⁴
„ 22	Mr Canning to Mr Joseph Wolff	<i>Thanks for Intelligence</i> . . 21 ⁵
„ 21	Mr. Kinsela	<i>Asks for Interview</i> 21
„ 22	Do	<i>Do</i> 21 ⁵
„ 22	Mr Canning to Mr Kinsela	<i>Interview declined</i> 21
„ 29	Madame Maquet	<i>Asks to see Mr. Canning</i> . . 22 ¹
„ 24	Mr. E Brine [Editor's Note] . . .	<i>Payment of old debt of King</i> 22
„ 31	Lady Holland	<i>Frere's Health</i> 22 ¹
Sept. 1	Mr. Canning to Lady Holland . . .	<i>Do</i> 22
„ 29	M. Lingay	<i>Asks for intercession with French Government to recover private property</i> . . 22 ¹
„ 29	Mr Canning to M. Lingay	<i>Request declined</i> 22 ¹
„ 29	Madame Adèle Piccini	<i>Wants to sell a Picture</i> . . 22 ¹
Oct. 10	Mr. Barrow of the Admiralty . . .	<i>Telegraphic Communication</i> 22
„ 11	M. Brissault de St. Cyprien [Editor's Note]	<i>Asks Interview</i> 22
„ 20	M Varguin [Editor's Note]	<i>Copy of a French Law relating to Corn</i> 22
„ 23	M Dupin	<i>Note of Admiration</i> 22 ⁵
„ 24	Mr Canning to M Dupin	<i>Thanks for Note</i> 22 ⁴
„ 9	Mr. Canning to Mr Giffard	<i>Returns Byron's MS.</i> 22 ⁵
„ 24	Mr. Giffard to Mr Stapleton . . .	<i>More reading for Mr Canning</i> 22 ¹
„ 29	The Earl of Morley	<i>Recommends Lord Amherst for promotion in Peerage</i> . . 22 ¹
„ 29	Mr. Hugh Hammersley to the Earl of Morley	<i>Precedents for Lord Amherst's Promotion</i> 22 ¹
„ 31	Mr Canning to the Earl of Morley . .	<i>Lord Amherst's claim to Promotion</i> 22 ¹
„ 29	Madame de Mismacre [Editor's Note]	<i>Alleged Claim on British Government</i> 23
Nov 8	Dr. R Lyall [Editor's Note]	<i>Polish Opinion on Corn Question</i> 23 ⁵
Dec. —	Anonymous [Editor's Note]	<i>Mr Canning and Observance of the Sabbath</i> 23 ⁵
Nov 15	Mr Giffard	<i>Sends Books ; Health bad</i> . . 23 ⁵

DATE		PAGE
Dec. 1	Mr. Cocks Johnson Warns Mr Canning of threatened publication of libels at Paris, and offers his services	234
" 2	Do. Explains reasons for Communication	236
" 2	Mr. Canning to Mr. Cocks Johnson Rejects offer	237
" 19	Madame Bourke Sends 'Téte de Foies Gras'	237
" 18	Mr. Bidwell Mr. Canning's 'Canopy'	239
" 23	Quarles Harris Seeks Intelligence from Portugal	239

1827.

Jan 1	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville Intelligence from Portugal; Duke of Wellington	241
	Editor's Note Success, Military and Political, of Expedition to Portugal	241
" 2	Mr Canning to Viscount Granville Invasion of Spain the immediate occasion of the Recognition of Colonies	242
	Editor's Note State of Public Affairs through January; Catholic Question; Duke of Wellington's Political Position	245
Feb 6	The Earl of Liverpool to Mr Stapleton Sends Letter as to Portugal for perusal	252
" 7	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool Instructions for Portugal; Mr Canning's illness	252
	Editor's Note Duke of Wellington and the Franco - British Draft Greek Treaty	253
	Do Turkey and Greece	253
" 8	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool Papers relating to Portugal for Parliament; Mr. Canning's illness	256
	Editor's Note Unpromising Prospects in Politics	257
" 9	Mr. Stapleton to Viscount Granville Mr Canning's illness	257
" 10	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Huskisson Do Do Arrangements as to Corn and Catholic Questions in Parliament	258

DATE			PAGE
Feb. 10	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Prospects of Mr. Canning resuming his place in Parliament . . .</i>	21
	Editor's Note	<i>Mr. Canning's arrangements for Business in Parliament, and Mr. Peel's Claims . . .</i>	21
„ 10	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Prospects of Mr Canning's recovery; Parliamentary Business . . .</i>	21
	Editor's Note	<i>Mr Canning and Mr Peel and the Corn Question . .</i>	21
„ 11	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Mr Canning's health, and the Corn and Catholic Questions . . .</i>	21
„ 11	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Huskisson . . .	<i>Do. Do . . .</i>	21
„ 11	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Peel	<i>Do. Do . . .</i>	21
„ 11	The Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Stapleton	<i>Do. Do . . .</i>	21
„ 12	Mr. Stapleton to the Earl of Liverpool	<i>Do. Do . . .</i>	21
	Editor's Note	<i>Mr Canning; Lord Liverpool and the Catholic Question . .</i>	21
„ 12	Mr. Stapleton to Viscount Granville . .	<i>Mr. Canning's health, and the Corn and Catholic Questions</i>	21
„ 13	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Huskisson . . .	<i>Do Do . . .</i>	21
„ 13	Mr. Peel to Mr. Stapleton	<i>Catholic Question; Corn; Chancery Reform Legislation</i>	21
„ 14	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Peel	<i>Do. Do . . .</i>	21
„ 15	Mr. Stapleton to Viscount Granville . .	<i>Madame de Richemont . . .</i>	21
	Editor's Note	<i>Lord Carlisle and the promotion of the Catholic Claims; Lord Liverpool's illness</i>	21
Feb. 20	Mr. Canning to Sir W. A'Court . . .	<i>Lord Liverpool's illness; Spanish Government . . .</i>	21
	Editor's Note	<i>Portugal; Lord Liverpool's illness; Corn and Catholic Question, Debates and Divisions; effect on Mr Canning's Position; Ministerial Crisis; Negotiations; Duke of Wellington; the King; Tory hostility to Mr. Canning; Whig support</i>	21

DATE		PAGE
April 2	Mr. Canning to the Duke of Wellington	<i>Appointment for Interview</i> . 284
	Editor's Note	<i>Duke of Wellington and the Premiership</i> 284
„ 16	The Earl of Harrowby to Mr. Canning	<i>Ministerial Crisis</i> 298
	Editor's Note	<i>Liberal Demonstration of Support</i> 299
March 26	Mr. H. Brougham to Sir R. Wilson	<i>Do Do.</i> . 300
„ 25	The Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir R. Wilson	<i>Do Do.</i> . 301
	Editor's Note	<i>Grounds for Liberal junction with Canning</i> 302
April 27	Mr. Stapleton to Sir Charles Bagot	<i>Mr. Canning forms his Cabinet; Lord Hastings's Garter</i> 309
„ 30	Sir Charles Bagot to Mr. Stapleton	<i>Congratulations; repudiates knowledge of Lord Hastings</i> 310
May 6	Mr. Stapleton to Sir Charles Bagot	<i>Lord Hastings is believed to be in Holland</i> 311
	Editor's Note	<i>Debates in Parliament; hostility of Tories and Old Whigs</i> 311
„ 5	Mr. R. Ward to Mr. Canning	<i>Lord Chandos</i> 313
„ 25	Mr. Canning to the King	<i>Proposes argumentative letter to Duke of Wellington</i> 314
„ 25	Do. Do.	<i>Withdraws proposal</i> 315
	Editor's Note	<i>Measure of Success achieved by Mr. Canning; Duke of Wellington and Mr. Huskisson</i> 315
„ 31	Mr. Stapleton to the Speaker	<i>As to Signing without Reading</i> 320
June 2	Mr. Canning to the Duke of Clarence	<i>Submission of Paper to Cabinet</i> 320
„ 3	Memorandum by Mr. Stapleton	<i>Mr. Canning's Forecast of Struggle between Property and Population</i> 321
„ 8	Mr. Gordon to Mr. Canning	<i>Brazil and the Banda Oriental</i> 322
„ 17	The Duke of Clarence to Mr. Canning	<i>Recommends Mr. Seymour for employment</i> 323
„ 17	Mr. Canning to the Duke of Clarence	<i>Declines on ground of Lord Hertford's hostility</i> 323
„ 17	Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville	<i>Parliamentary Business; Corn and Mr. Huskisson</i> . 324

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE.

DATE			P1
Jan. 29	The Queen of Wurtemberg to Mr. Canning	<i>Death of Duke of York; George IV's Health; Lord Erskine . . .</i>	
„ 29	Prince Leopold to Mr Canning . .	<i>Death of Duke of York . .</i>	
May 9 to July 30	The D'Albiac Correspondence . .	<i>Attempt of a French Spy named Julian to win Confidence of British Foreign Office</i>	
Jan. 9	Mr. W James to Mr Canning . .	<i>Offers 'Naval History'; Comparison of United States and English Fighting Capacity</i>	
„ 10	Mr Canning to Mr. James . .	<i>Promises to read 'Naval History'</i>	
	Editor's Note . .	<i>Character of Political Feelings in the United States .</i>	
Feb 8 to March 1	The Croy Correspondence . .	<i>The Marquis, an Emissary of the King of Spain, seeks Personal Interview without Success</i>	
„ 27	Sir Robert Ker Porter to Mr Canning	<i>Sends Portrait of Bolivar . .</i>	
„ 10	Mr Turner to Mr. Canning . .	<i>Announces Death of Mr. Canning's Mother . .</i>	
„ 11	Mr Canning to Mr. Turner . . .	<i>Explains Absence from Funeral, and gives directions</i>	
„ 10	Mr Haydon to Mr Canning . .	<i>Picture of 'Alexander and Bucephalus'</i>	
„ 20	Mr Canning to Mr Haydon . .	<i>Declines offer to see Picture .</i>	
	Editor's Note . .	<i>Haydon the Painter . .</i>	
April 8	Mr R Ward to Mr Canning . .	<i>Character of 'Wentworth,' in Ward's Novel 'De Vere,' meant for Mr. Canning .</i>	
„ 9	Mr Canning to Mr R Ward . .	<i>Acknowledges Apologies for the Portrayal</i>	
„ 9	Memorandum by Private Secretary .	<i>Note of Official Income of Premier</i>	
March 31	Mr Mulock to Mr. Canning . . .	<i>Returns former Papers relative to Mr. North . . .</i>	
April 14	Do Do.	<i>Advises Dissolution in case of continued Difficulties in the way of forming an Administration .</i>	

DATE		PAGE
April 17	Mr. Backhouse to Mr. Mulock	<i>Pleads pressure of Business on Mr. Canning</i> . . . 367
19	Mr. Jerdan to Mr. Canning	<i>Asks for an Appointment</i> . 367
May 5	Do Do	<i>Presses his Claims</i> . . . 368
„ 7	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. Jerdan	<i>Mr. Canning cannot help him at present</i> 370
	Editor's Note	<i>Alleged Corruption of the Press by Mr. Canning</i> . 371
April 22	Sir William Elford to Mr. Canning . .	<i>Expression of Confidence</i> . 373
May 1	Mr. Lally-Tolendal to Mr. Canning . .	<i>Expression of Admiration</i> . 373
„ 7	Mr. Jerdan to Mr. Stapleton	<i>Journalistic Intelligence</i> . 375
„ 17	Mr. Willmott to Mr. Stapleton	<i>Ecclesiastical Patronage of Prime Minister</i> . . . 376
„ 17	Mr. James T. Smith to Mr. Canning . .	<i>Promises of Support</i> . 376
June 7	Mr. Stapleton to Mr. J. T. Smith . . .	<i>Acknowledgment</i> . . . 377
„ 12	Mr. James T. Smith to Mr. Stapleton .	<i>Scotch Supporter</i> . . . 378
May 19	Mr. Parker to Mr. Canning	<i>Appeal to save East Retford</i> 378
„ 26	Mr. J. W. Freshfield	<i>Appeal to save Penryn</i> . 379
	Editor's Note	<i>Treatment of Penryn and East Retford</i> 381
July 11	'Princess Olive' to Mr. Canning . . .	<i>A Begging Letter</i> . . . 385
„ 23	Mr. Canning to Mr. —	<i>As to special grant of rank of 'Children of an Earl'</i> . 386
„ 21	Baron de Rosenkamppf to Mr. Canning	<i>Offers Copy of his voluminous Work</i> . . . 386
Aug 10	Mr. Disbrowe to Mr. Canning	<i>Its arrival threatened</i> . . 387
„ 22	Mr. Backhouse to Mr. Stapleton . . .	<i>Effort to prevent it</i> . . . 387
	Editor's Note	<i>The Duke of Wellington</i> . 388
	Do.	<i>Summary of Foreign Affairs at Death of Mr. Canning</i> . 390

SOME
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
OF
GEORGE CANNING.

1826.

MR. CANNING TO THE MARQUIS DE PALMELLA.

Foreign Office: February 3, 1826.

1826
—

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt from his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella, Ambassador Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary from his Majesty the King of Portugal, on the 19th ultimo, of the memorandum of his Excellency the Count de Porto Santo respecting the political engagements subsisting between Great Britain and Portugal. In expectation of that memorandum, the preparation of which has been long announced to the undersigned, the undersigned has hitherto deferred returning an answer to the Marquis de Palmella's official notes of the 6th of October, and of the 3rd and 7th of December.

Apprised that his most faithful Majesty's Secretary of State was employed in putting together all the materials for illustrating, and establishing, the claim advanced by the Marquis de Palmella to the guarantee

1826
—

required from Great Britain, not only of the stipulations of the treaty and convention, concluded between his most faithful Majesty and the Emperor of Brazil on the 29th of August last, but generally of the succession to the Crown of Portugal, the undersigned conceived that no good purpose would be answered by anticipating with the Marquis de Palmella a discussion which might be to be renewed, whether on the same or on different grounds, whenever the result of M. de Porto Santo's labours should be communicated to the British Government.

To begin with the larger question, and that of which M. de Porto Santo's memorandum especially treats—the claim for guarantee of the succession to the throne of Portugal. It is to be observed that the Marquis de Palmella's arguments in support of that claim are cumulative and inferential; derived from a great number of successive undertakings and stipulations, no one of which is contended to carry within itself a distinct and specific obligation of the nature of that, which M. de Palmella is desirous to establish; and all of which must, in reason and equity, be considered as governed and modified by the circumstances, to which they respectively applied.

It is almost needless to add, that no preceding state of circumstances in Portugal bears any likeness or analogy to that, under which the guarantee is at present claimed.

Guarantees of succession have in almost all instances been intended to operate against the attack of foreign force, or the intrusion of a foreign pretender.

But a guarantee of an internal arrangement, which is matter wholly of municipal regulation, was surely never contemplated in any of the ancient treaties between Portugal and Great Britain; nor can any provision therefore existing in those treaties be brought to

bear on a case which grows out of the situation, in which his most faithful Majesty and his eldest son, the Emperor of Brazil, now stand towards each other.

It will not be denied by the Marquis de Palmella that the obligations of the existing treaty between Great Britain and Portugal are reciprocal. If the effect of those treaties, therefore, had been to guard against the giving of countenance by either of the high contracting parties to internal changes of dynasty within the dominions of the other, it would be difficult to justify the Portuguese Government for having concluded the treaty of 1654 with the usurper Oliver Cromwell; and his most faithful Majesty would, on the other hand, have reason to reproach the British Government for having continued unbroken its relations with Portugal, during the revolutionary sway of the Cortes in Lisbon from 1820 to 1823.

But the truth is, that the sound construction, and the one generally received and acted upon, of all such general obligations as are contained in the treaties upon which M. de Palmella rests his argument, is, that they bind each of the contracting parties to deny, and if need be to resist, the pretension of any foreign Power to subvert the reigning dynasty in the other country; but they do not pledge them to an interference with those internal changes or arrangements, which are the result either of civil contest or of legislative policy, and upon which every independent nation rejects the arbitration of a foreign Power.

The Count de Porto Santo appears to be aware of this defect in the course of argument pursued by the Marquis de Palmella (and in part also, it must be admitted, by the Count de Porto Santo himself,) when that Minister rests, as he does, the main stress of his argument upon the secret treaty of 1807. It is by the

1826

stipulation of that treaty alone that M. de Porto Santo evidently believes the whole of this claim to be sustained.

With respect to that treaty two questions arise:—

1. Was not the stipulation applicable to a state of things which is no longer in existence?

2. Has not the treaty itself ceased to exist?

The stipulation of the treaty of 1807 was not, (what is now attempted to be inferred from it,) a general guarantee of the succession to the Crown of Portugal in the right line of the reigning family; it was a specific engagement not to acknowledge a foreign dynasty on the throne of the House of Braganza. This engagement was evidently pointed against the then actual occupation of Portugal by a French force; and against the apprehension of an usurpation of the throne of Portugal similar to that which had already placed a stranger on the throne of Spain. Indeed, it was perfectly well known at the time when that secret treaty was concluded between the undersigned and the Count de Funchal, (then Chevalier de Lousa Coutinho,) that the kingdom of Portugal was destined to be carved out between petty sovereigns selected by choice of Bonaparte, who publicly announced to the world the dethronement of the House of Braganza. Further, this engagement was expressly limited to the period during which the seat of the Portuguese monarchy should be established in Brazil.

The engagements of this treaty would have been literally fulfilled even if Great Britain had done no more than steadily refused her acknowledgment of any new dynasty in Portugal. It is not necessary to ask whether she contented herself with fulfilling it in that narrow and restricted sense; whether, instead of confining herself to the refusal to recognise any usurping Power, she did not strenuously exert herself to regain the dominion of Portugal for the sovereign to whom

it rightfully belonged; whether she did not finally achieve this object; and whether by that achievement the specific purpose of the treaty of 1807 was not fully satisfied, its obligations thoroughly performed, the contingency to which it applied annihilated, and its virtue by consequence exhausted.

By what fair reasoning could a treaty adapted to peculiar circumstances, every one of which has passed away, be construed as surviving not only the occasion which produced it but the evils which it was intended to meet, and which it had successfully extinguished?

But these are questions which it is not necessary now to argue. The conclusion to which fair reasoning must have come, if the letter of the treaty of 1807 had remained unquestioned and unchanged, has been anticipated by the transactions at Vienna in 1815; by which that treaty was distinctly and specifically repealed.

The treaty of 1807 was merged long before, by common consent of the contracting parties, in the Treaty of Alliance of the 19th August, 1810, into the third article of which treaty the sixth article of the treaty of 1807 (the article in question in this discussion) was incorporated.

The Treaty of Alliance of August 1810 was cancelled by the Treaty of Vienna; and as no exception is made in that cancellation of any one article of the treaty so cancelled, the undersigned is at a loss to conceive on what grounds it can be contended that the treaty of 1807, or any part of it, is still in force. It survives only in the memory of the exertions which it produced on the part of Great Britain, and of the benefits derived from it by his most faithful Majesty.

It appears, therefore, clear to his Majesty's Government that no claim to the guarantee of Great Britain to

1826
—

the succession of the throne of Portugal exists in the positive obligation of treaties.

The question more anxiously mooted by M. de Palmella—whether it be not right and fitting, as matter of moral duty and of political expediency, that this country should voluntarily adopt a measure which is not imposed upon her by any specific obligation—is a question of quite another sort, and one which the undersigned is desirous of discussing with M. de Palmella with the utmost frankness and impartiality. We are desired to guarantee the succession to the throne of Portugal. What is the succession that we are desired to guarantee? And against whom are we desired to guarantee it? If it were simply intended that no foreign Power shall be permitted by England to invade Portugal, and to place the crown of Portugal on the head of an alien to the House of Braganza, the only objection to a specific engagement to this effect would be, that it would weaken and impair, instead of strengthening, those general and acknowledged engagements and obligations for the defence and protection of his most faithful Majesty's dominions against external aggressions, which are not only not denied or disputed by Great Britain, but which are incorporated with her settled policy, and have been at all times the rule of her practical conduct.

But what is meant is evidently of another kind. It is meant that we should engage to maintain on the throne of that kingdom his most faithful Majesty's rightful heir. Is it not further meant that we should, by taking or proclaiming this engagement, now indicate our opinion as to that right of inheritance, and in effect prescribe that succession which we promise to defend? Is it not meant that we should guarantee the throne of Portugal to Don Pedro, not against the attempt of any foreign Power to deprive him of it, but against his own hesitation to

accept it? Would such a guarantee be one of which history affords an example? Would such a guarantee be wise, even if the hesitation of Don Pedro is likely to be overcome?

And if that hesitation were insuperable, in what way would such a guarantee be effectual to any good purpose?

That the British Government is far from unwilling to see the crowns of Portugal and Brazil united on the same head, and descending in the line of primogeniture, has been sufficiently proved by the *projet* of a treaty, which the undersigned prepared more than a year ago, for the consideration of the Portuguese and Brazilian plenipotentiaries in London, and which, be it remembered, was accepted by the Brazilian plenipotentiaries, but rejected by the Portuguese. By this *projet*, the Emperor of Brazil was to submit the decision of his succession to the throne of Portugal to a Cortes, or whatever authority in that kingdom his most faithful Majesty might please to entrust with the arrangement of that difficult question; and he was to send his eldest daughter to Portugal, to be educated there, either as the future Regent of that kingdom, if his Imperial Majesty should, on the demise of his royal father, inherit the crown of Portugal; or as its future queen, if, by the decision of the Cortes, his Imperial Majesty's residence in Brazil should be considered an objection to his assuming that inheritance in person.

In either case, hereditary right would have been scrupulously respected, and lineal succession effectually maintained. Portugal, as has been said, rejected this suggestion. Portugal was perfectly at liberty to do so, without assigning her reasons, whatever they were, to the British Government; but at least the recollection of this suggestion renders it extraordinary, and perhaps not altogether reasonable, that Great Britain should now

1826
—

be called upon to guarantee an arrangement of succession which is not explained to her, and with respect to which all that she has the means of conjecturing is, that it is not composed of those elements of which she herself suggested the expediency of composing it. Whatever the elements of the new arrangement are to be, it is surely right that they should be matured, and combined, by Portuguese and Brazilian negotiation before Great Britain is summoned to approve and to uphold them.

In Brazil, it seems pretty evident that some constitutional forms must be observed, and some popular concurrence solicited, before the Emperor of Brazil can venture to pronounce whether he will, or will not, abide by the succession to which his birth entitles him.

The inclination of his Imperial Majesty's mind appears to be more favourable than heretofore to the affirmative decision. But if he should find himself unable, as he was heretofore unwilling, to announce that decision as determined, what would be the value, what would, in truth, be the meaning, of a guarantee that he should be maintained on a throne which he either could not or would not occupy? What would have been the situation of England if she had guaranteed the throne of Russia to the Grand Duke Constantine? And yet who will say that the Grand Duke Constantine's renunciation of that throne was not an event, to all appearance, less probable than the renunciation of the throne of Portugal by Don Pedro?

Again, what are the forms and usages of Portugal in so grave a matter as the arrangement of the succession to the throne? Is the will of the sovereign alone paramount and all-sufficient for such a purpose? or does it in theory require, or would it be wise in practice to

adjoin to that will, some expression of national consent to aid its decisions, or to confirm them?

These questions are put, not as presuming to suggest to an independent monarch the course which he should pursue in the settlement of his domestic concerns, but as indicating the extreme delicacy of any engagement on the part of a foreign Power to maintain such domestic settlement, without any knowledge of the foundations on which it may rest, or of the authority by which it ought properly to be sanctioned.

The testamentary dispositions of the most powerful monarchs have perhaps less frequently been respected, than set aside. That of Louis XIV. was cancelled the day after his demise, and Constantine was proclaimed emperor, in spite of all the precautions of his imperial predecessor.

The power and the right of fixing the order of succession reside in different authorities of the State in different countries; and even in countries where by long habit of constitutional liberty, and regulated power, it might be presumed that all cases belonging to the succession to the throne have long been settled either by direct legislation, or by certain analogy, cases do, nevertheless, arise for which it unexpectedly appears that provision has not been made.

The former of these two propositions is illustrated by what has recently passed in Russia, where the principle of indefeasible hereditary succession, founded upon certain arrangements of the Emperor Alexander, has been proclaimed, and at the same moment has been set aside, according to certain other forms, in virtue of opposite arrangements.

The latter proposition was exemplified in England, when the necessity of establishing a regency in 1789 came upon Parliament and the country unawares.

1826
—

There is, therefore, nothing offensive, either to the dignity of his most faithful Majesty, or to the laws and customs of Portugal, in supposing that much research may be necessary before a rule of succession can be framed which shall be considered as carrying the force of law, and as embodying the opinions and affections of the nation ; and there is nothing unfriendly either to his most faithful Majesty, or to his people, in declining to guarantee beforehand an unknown settlement which is to be established by any authority, the nature of which is not yet ascertained.

The inconveniences, and even the danger, of leaving the question of succession unsettled during his most faithful Majesty's life cannot be felt more strongly, even at Lisbon, than they are acknowledged here. But it cannot be denied, and must not be disguised from his most faithful Majesty, that the alternative lies between either taking no step whatever, and leaving thereby the crown of Portugal to descend in its natural course to the Emperor of Brazil—subject (it must be admitted) to his acceptance or refusal of it at the moment when it shall so descend, and to all the risks attendant upon the uncertainty of that decision—or the braving, on the other hand, at once and without hesitation, all the difficulties of an immediate discussion, and calling in for the sanction of the issue of that discussion, whatever it may be, the sense of the Portuguese nation, and through whatever organs the history of Portugal may show that sense to have been on solemn emergencies legally collected.

As to the other guarantees required by M. de Palmella, of the treaty and convention signed on the 29th August, the answer, happily, lies in a much smaller compass. What is asked in this case is asked as matter not of compact, but of discretion.

The undersigned confesses that he does not see how

1826

either of those instruments as a whole can be considered as susceptible of guarantee. The independence of Brazil is acknowledged by his most faithful Majesty. The new title assumed by his most faithful Majesty has, in like manner, been acknowledged by his Imperial Majesty. We have acknowledged both; but acknowledgment is not guarantee; nor do concessions and assumptions which either Powers are at liberty to acknowledge or not acknowledge, as they may think fit, admit of being guaranteed.

The two points which M. de Palmella specifically points out as susceptible of such a sanction, and as requiring it, are:—

(1) The stipulation by which Brazil takes upon herself the debt due by Portugal for the loan of 1823, contracted in this country; and (2) that by which Brazil binds herself not to attempt to take to herself the remaining colonial possessions of Portugal.

As to the former of these stipulations, M. de Palmella will probably admit that this country knows, by experience, that to guarantee the payment of a debt is generally to pay it—an obligation which the undersigned really does not see that, by any construction of treaty or by any obligation of good faith, Great Britain is bound to incur. With regard to the remaining colonial possessions of Portugal, the undersigned has no hesitation in saying that any attempt of the Brazilian Government to make itself master of those possessions, would entitle his most faithful Majesty to call upon his ally the King of Great Britain for prompt and effectual interposition.

The undersigned requests his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella to accept the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

GEORGE CANNING,

1826

[In the 'Political Life' (p. 169 to 173) may be found some account of the preliminary action of the Portuguese Government, to which this diplomatic note is an answer.

The Count de Porto Santo was the Portuguese Prime Minister, and the Marquis de Palmella Portuguese Ambassador in London. In the interval between the departure of Sir Charles Stuart with Portuguese credentials to Rio de Janeiro to negotiate an acknowledgment on friendly terms of the independence of Brazil, and the news of the result of such negotiations, a new Ministry at Lisbon, friendly to Great Britain, had replaced that of M. de Suberra, hostile to this country, and had demanded from the English Government a revision of the treaty of 1810 between the two countries, and stipulated that the revision must be completed within three months.

Canning promptly repudiated the stipulation as to time. From the argumentative note now under consideration, it appears that the treaty of 1810 had been entirely repealed by the treaties of 1815, as Canning pointed out to the Portuguese Government; but the matter of a revision of recent treaties, and such guarantees as they contained, in favour of Portugal, remained pending, when the treaty between Portugal and Brazil, elaborated mainly by the agency of Sir Charles Stuart, came back to Lisbon and was accepted by the Portuguese Government.

The question of the succession to the Crown of Portugal not being settled by this treaty, the Portuguese Government prepared an appeal to the British Government to 'guarantee' the legitimate descent of the Portuguese crown on the heir-apparent thereto, now being Emperor of Brazil.

The appeal founded itself upon the treaty of 1807, expressly negotiated to exclude a recognition on the part of Great Britain of sovereignty in the case of a violent imposition of some Bonaparte, or other French leader, on an unwilling people. This, being an 'occasional' agreement, became perfectly exhausted in view of the great Peninsular war carried on by Great Britain for the protection of Portugal.

The same stipulation to protect the Crown of Portugal from foreign seizure was continued in the treaty of 1810, and no doubt the stipulation constituted an interference of a specially exceptional nature in the domestic affairs of the country in question—an interference of identical kind with that which excluded a Bonaparte from the throne of France. But as that danger and the exceptional circumstances passed away, no renewal seems to have been deemed necessary, or to have taken place, when the treaty of 1810 was abrogated in the treaties of 1815.

The progressive annulment of these treaties was not allowed to disturb the course of argument, on which the Portuguese Government now based their appeal for a guarantee of the succession of their monarchy, in favour of Don Pedro, Emperor of Brazil. They referred to the lapsed covenants as if still alive and binding, and as if appropriate to the desired object.

It did not require any startling display of genius to upset their position; but none the less Canning's complete and exhaustive analysis of the worthlessness of their arguments can even now be read with pleasure as a model of a state paper.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: February 10, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I have received the note upon Greece, and am greatly obliged to the person by whom you were permitted to communicate it to me; but I can have no hesitation, in the present state of things, in declining the further proffered communication.

I trust this will not be taken as an offence, it is far from being so intended.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This note declines the offer of further communication on the Greek question by 'a person' who had already tendered one such communication. The 'person' was Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, see following letter.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: February 10, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I know not what more or what better I can say about the Greek paper, than I have said in my other letter, which I have made ostensible, in case you should wish to show it.

A communication between the British Government and the D. of Orleans would be an absurdity, if we were disposed to give in to his project. But, having, as you may well suppose, no such disposition, we should only get into a bye-quarrel with him, and give ground of fresh umbrage to the French Government, if, as must be

1826
—

presumed, the proposition is made without their cognisance. If with it, the whole is a trick.

I have no time to-day to pursue this or any other subject further.

It is a critical day in the H. of Commons. Country bankers, and country gentlemen, and city merchants are combined in one grand confederacy against the withdrawal of the small notes; and they are to make a grand push to-day to overthrow the whole plan at its first introduction.

Unluckily, our friends are gone out of town in great numbers, not aware, (any more than, in truth, our wise H. of C. people appear to have been,) of the plan of hostile operations.

Nous verrons.—But of one thing we have satisfied ourselves: that the measure cannot be abandoned, be the consequences of the struggle what they may.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This is a confidential letter covering the foregoing of the same date. The letter being written to be shown to the Duke of Orleans, who was trying to open up private communications with the English Foreign Office.

The latter part of the letter has been printed, and refers to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's resolution for putting an instant end to the issue of all bank notes under the value of five pounds, and putting a stop to their circulation by February 5, 1829. This measure arose in consequence of a recent banking and commercial crisis; but it met with strenuous and dangerous opposition in the House of Commons, almost imperilling the Government; it was, however, successfully carried through in the end.

The first part of the letter explains for Lord Granville's private guidance the reasons why the overtures of the Duke of Orleans must be considered totally inadmissible. If accepted without the knowledge of the French Government, the affair might offend them; if with their knowledge, the affair was a trick.

Judging from the ambitious character of this prince, and from the existing position of the Greek question (the insurrection now

1826
—

getting greatly the worst of the struggle, and an intervention in its favour being expected from the Czar Nicholas,) one is not surprised to find that the Duc d'Orleans meditated an effort to obtain a command of the sovereignty of a new Greek state, by the means of partly conciliating the insurgents and the Liberals of Europe through the medium of Canning, and partly by securing the support of the Absolutist Powers in his character as a prince of the House of Bourbon.

The memorandum emanated simply from Louis Philippe; it is printed at full length at p. 94 of vol. iii. of the 'Wellington Correspondence.' It is unnecessary for the purpose of these notes to reproduce more than the last two paragraphs, which are as follows:—

'Si l'Angleterre consentait à l'élection du second fils de M. le Duc d'Orléans pour roi de la Grèce, on obtiendrait pour l'Angleterre toute la garantie et tous les avantages qu'elle pourrait désirer.

'La Régence même, pendant la longue minorité du jeune prince, serait presque exclusivement à son choix, mais on serait accessible à toute autre communication.'

People may talk of the cunning of the 'wily monarch' Louis Philippe, but there is something almost touching in the simplicity of a too cunning intriguer striving to disguise his ambitious designs in two closely printed pages of rhodomontade, yet in the end betraying his real aim in two short sentences of a few dozen words.

The possibilities of further disturbances in France, ending in an expulsion of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and opening up his own way to the throne, as actually happened in 1830, even at this early date may have entered into the calculations of the Duke; and his chances of success might plausibly be thought to increase if he could appear on the scene already the father of a king, and recommended to the Revolutionary party, not only by hereditary claims, but by a position as parent of the head of a new-born and highly liberalised State.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F.O.: February 14, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—The newspapers announce Lord Chichester's dangerous illness. Remember, pray, that your engagement through me to Morley is positive.

Would it not be well to say a word to the King

1826 — to-morrow, lest his Majesty should have a fancy for some *post* of his own?

Ever sincerely yours,
G. C.

[Reminding the Prime Minister of the Earl of Morley's claims to be Postmaster-General in the room of the Earl of Chichester, supposed to be about to retire.

Lord Morley had been a constant and influential representative of Canning, and supporter of his policy in the House of Lords, and deserved the greatest consideration at the hands of his friend.]

MR. CANNING TO SIR HENRY WELLESLEY AT VIENNA.

F.O.: February 14, 1826.

My dear H. Wellesley,—I am very much obliged to you for your clear and detailed account of the affair of P. Esterhazy. It is plain that the whole blame rests with himself. And you may assure P. Metternich that I will avail myself of your information to set his Majesty's mind entirely at ease as to Prince M.'s share in these transactions.

Ever sincerely yours,
GEO. CANNING.

[Thanks him for his account of 'the affair' of Prince Esterhazy, who was Austrian Ambassador in London.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F.O.: March 6, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I gather from your several allusions to the disavowal of Sir C. Stuart's treaties that you are not yourself entirely satisfied of the necessity of that disavowal.

I will explain it to you.

First, read the accompanying copies of my despatches to S. upon his negotiation of these treaties, and you will see (1) how entirely against my wishes he entered into that negotiation; and (2) how serious are the faults he committed in it. But though these considera-

tions rendered ratification impossible, they did not, I admit, render a public disavowal necessary. That necessity arose from publication of the treaties at Rio de Janeiro. There was no other sure way of avoiding the inconveniences which I had apprehended from the treaties, (or rather treaty, for it is the Treaty of Commerce only that signifies much,) and which the publication would not fail to precipitate. Of those inconveniences, some have actually happened just as I foresaw, and foretold them.

1st. The abolition of the office of Judge Conservator in Brazil has led to a demand for the like abolition in Portugal. I have flatly refused to accede to that demand; but it would never have been made but for Sir C. S.'s treaty.

2nd. Not three days after these treaties appeared in the newspapers, Count Lieven came to me with an application for the surrender of a Russian conspirator in London, who had dined at his (Lieven's) table the week before.

3rd. France has obtained the same terms of fifteen per cent. in a treaty concluded by M. Gestas immediately after, and avowedly on the basis of Sir C. Stuart's, with his precious stipulation of 'most favoured nation.' Sir C. S. will find this work accomplished when he gets back to R. de J. from his tour to the provinces of Brazil.

These things, I say, have happened. It remains to be seen how the publication, if it reached Mexico before my disavowal, will have operated upon our negotiations there. But as both the points on which Sir C. S.'s oversight is the most remarkable—1st, that of 'most favoured nation' (by way of a measure of reciprocity): 2nd, that of the promise to revise the exercise of the right of search—are points in discussion with

1826
—

Mexico, I have very little doubt but that our supposed concession of them to Brazil will, if known, and not timely contradicted, have influenced most unfavourably the success of Morier's negotiations.

I have as little doubt that, but for a public as well as decisive contradiction, the latter of these two supposed concessions would have brought the United States of N. America upon our hands with a proposal to reopen our negotiation—so often opened in vain, and only last year peremptorily closed—for a reconsideration of the right of search, &c. These inconveniences could in no other way have been prevented than by what I have called a public disavowal, admitting for argument's sake a circular disavowal to be a public one. For to have addressed a specific disavowal of each particular point to each Power interested in that point, would have been to betray a consciousness of its bearing and to invite the very discussions which we were interested to avoid. Whether S. was party to the publication at Rio, I do not know.

He remonstrated (as he told me) against the previous publication there of the treaty with Portugal. I therefore put him under no embarrassment, (if he was not party to their publication,) by taking decisive measures against the attempt to force our hands, as those of Portugal had been forced, by such an outrage upon all the forms of diplomacy.

If he was party to this publication, he deserves richly whatever embarrassment the disavowal, and the refusal to ratify, may cause him.

This comes of a man thinking himself cleverer than all the rest of mankind, and believing himself to be protected by the King against the responsible Minister under whom he is acting.

That both those self-delusions conspired to lead

1826

S. to play the usual vagaries in which he has indulged himself since he left England, I have the most entire persuasion. He set out, as you may remember, just after the struggle about S. America, and while the K.'s mind was yet heated with that struggle and was alienated from me in the greatest degree. S. reckoned upon the continuance of this temper.

His whole correspondence at Lisbon betrayed this confidence. It was written in the highest strain of Ultraism; and the alteration which he admitted in his instructions, and which risked the success of the negotiation of Rio de Janeiro (the assumption of the title of E^r by the foolish old K. of P.), was justified on the highest principles of legitimacy; principles as well placed in his mouth or despatches, as piety in Wilkes', or chastity in W.'s. His enmity to me need not be accounted for to you, who are one of the causes of it. But in addition to the mortal offence of placing you at Paris another, perhaps a greater, at least a fresher, cause of grievance was my steady repeated refusal to give him a roving commission to all the New States of S. America.

You have now the whole case before you. The technical diplomatic part you cannot make too plain to your diplomatic colleagues. The rest you cannot keep too closely to yourself.

Ever, my dear Granville,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—You must return the copies of my despatch to S. by the first messenger.

G. C.

See *ante*, letter to Lord Liverpool of November 27, 1825, vol. i. p. 333.

This letter explains to Lord Granville precisely the circumstances, under which it had been found absolutely necessary to refuse ratifi-

1826

cation of the Treaties of Commerce negotiated by Sir Charles Stuart at Rio de Janeiro between Great Britain and Brazil, and justifies Canning for adopting this stringent course.

It shows emphatically what conspicuous errors a trained and experienced diplomatist can commit unawares; and how swiftly and from what unexpected directions penal consequences for such errors present themselves.

Sir Charles Stuart ventured himself on the dangerous hazard of acting when his responsible chief had vouchsafed him no instructions to act; success justifies daring. Here this distinguished diplomatist had failed to grasp that absence of instructions was in itself significant, and that his 'action' moved not in unoccupied space but upon ground already marked out for tactical purposes; consequently, on the separation of Portugal and Brazil, a readjustment of the terms hitherto common to the British trade of both countries became inevitable. But in the former case, our services being more undeniable, British interests were to be more insisted upon; while in the Transatlantic case, a relaxation of British nominal claims was to be conceded. It is obvious that to prevent invidious comparisons and protests, the more stringent measures should take precedence of the concessions; the treaty with Portugal, revised on the separation of Brazil, should be negotiated before the treaty with Brazil.

To attempt to negotiate a treaty with Brazil was not only contrary to Canning's wishes, and therefore presumptuous on the part of a servant of the Foreign Office, but also a diplomatic mistake of the first order.

It would be curious to know how many difficulties since that date Great Britain has encountered owing to want of moral courage and of sense of patriotic duty in her Foreign Ministers, which has restrained them from promptly exposing and neutralising the ill-effects of the blunders of her high Diplomatic Servants.

Canning, neither a coward nor a fool, promptly extinguished, not Sir Charles Stuart, but his unfortunate treaties; and checked, without entirely preventing, the consequences which inevitably followed on their publication.

But not content with taking action when he ought to have been inert, Sir Charles Stuart contrived to commit four capital blunders in the very substance of his treaty.

1. His stipulation for the fiscal protection of British commerce, being merely a comparative covenant, would be reduced to a nullity by a dexterous adjustment of the treatment of Brazilian commerce with other nations.

2. His surrender of the office of 'Judge Conservator' at Rio de

Janeiro compromised the interests of British traders without any equivalent, and endangered the continuance of the important parallel office at Lisbon.

3. His concession of a refusal of protection for, not to say, of an expulsion of persons accused of high treason shook to the root the right of asylum in Great Britain for foreign political offenders.

4. His admission that the mode and manner of exercise of the right of search was matter for further negotiation impaired the grounds for the maintenance of the right.

Grievous as were these errors, the treaties might have been returned for amendment and reconsideration, had it not been for their premature publication in newspapers at Rio.

Canning cannot say for certain whether Sir Charles Stuart was or was not a party to the publication; he regarded the step, whether Sir Charles's or taken by the Brazilian Government, to be a bold attempt to 'force his hand,' to commit the British Government to the terms of the convention, and to preclude disavowal.

And their publication produced all the effects apprehended by Canning. All the foreign Powers interested in the positions abandoned in these treaties, began to appeal to the Foreign Office for equal treatment.

1. France obtained instantly from Brazil as good nominal, and therefore better practical, terms than Great Britain for her trade.

2. Portugal demanded the abolition of the British Judge Conservator at Lisbon.

3. The Russian Ambassador appealed for the surrender of a Russian conspirator in London.

4. The United States was expected to reopen the question of the right of search, only lately a bitter cause of war, with renewed energy.

The rest of the letter is historically curious as explaining the grounds on which Sir Charles Stuart thought it safe to venture so far independently of the wishes or instructions of his responsible chief.

Canning limits his explanation to Sir Charles' self-confidence, and trusts in the protection to be found in the former disposition of the King to befriend Stuart, and to confound Canning. The King's disposition did not constitute a trustworthy support; it had already veered round to Canning. Sir Charles was of course aware of the keen jealousy, distrust, and dislike entertained against Canning and Canning's Liberal opinions by the high Tory section of the Cabinet, led by the Duke of Wellington, the Chancellor, and Peel; and he anticipated at no remote date a change of Ministers at the Foreign Office, which would, as he calculated, probably restore him to a

1826 — European Embassy, if not to Paris ; possibly even a prospect of succession to the Foreign Office was not unknown to his ambition. His violent and (as Canning asserts) insincere professions of Absolutist and Legitimist opinions would, in case of such a change, have probably proved of no small profit to him. And his ambition would have derived great assistance in obtaining its desire, if only his treaties had been maintainable in the teeth of Canning's condemnation.

THE DUCHESS OF WELLINGTON TO MR. CANNING.

Monday, March 13.

A thousand thousand thanks for your most welcome intelligence. I would go to you to thank you in person, but your hint is too valuable. I will not intrude upon you. Again and again I thank you with all my heart.

Your most truly obliged

C. D^s. WELLINGTON.

[Expresses her great thanks for some intelligence conveyed to her. As the Duke was at St. Petersburg at the time, it is an obvious inference that the news was connected with assurance of his safety and good health.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: March 21, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—The King has been always anxious for the D. of Wellington's early return ; but since his Majesty's illness he has recurred to the subject very frequently, and has sent me two or three messages about it.

I so far anticipated his Majesty's wishes as to write to the D. of W. a day or two after he left England the letter of which I enclose a copy, and which, with the D.'s answer to it, (also enclosed,) I laid before the King when his Majesty renewed the subject with me. It is high time now to name to the Embassy for the coronation ; there is nobody whom the King would like so much as the D. of Devonshire, and is there anyone else so eligible ? The only objection that I know to him, is, his having been anticipated by the ' Morning Chronicle.'

1826

How that happened I cannot even guess. His name had never passed my lips (not even to my Under Secretary or Private Secretary) but to the K. [King], or rather, to be quite accurate, through K. [Knighton] to his Majesty in answer to one of his Majesty's messages. And his Majesty of his own accord sent me an assurance that he had never hinted a word to any human being upon the matter, but on the contrary, when questioned in consequence of the 'Morning Chronicle,' had declared (what was true) that I had never spoken to him upon the subject.

Lieven—in consequence, I suppose, of the 'M. Chronicle'—asked me the day before he left London whether there was any chance of a nomination so agreeable to the Emperor? To which, of course, I returned no answer.

I ought perhaps to add that Harrowby wrote to me from London, before the D. of W.'s appointment was known, to suggest the D. of D. for the mission. To him I only replied that the D. of D. was named. It is just possible that he may since (or before) have talked of his suggestion in his family, and that so the D. of D.'s name may have transpired.

Or after all it may only have been a fishing of the 'M. Chron.' or one of the D.'s friends.

The D. of D is now at Paris. If you approve, I would write to-day to Granville to sound him, i.e. (for I hate sounding in the mysterious sense of the word) to let the D. know that, if he is disposed to accept the mission, I will submit his name to the King.

Ever sincerely yours, GEO. CANNING.

[See *ante*, letters to Lord Granville of October 13 and December 26, 1825, vol. i. pp. 297 and 347.

The Duke of Wellington had gone to St. Petersburg on a mission

1826

to congratulate the Czar Nicholas on his accession, and to take up the thread of the negotiations with Russia, broken by a mistake of Lord Strangford, on the settlement of the Greek question.

Lord Strangford, like Sir Charles Stuart, not only transgressed his instructions, but at the same time committed an error of the first consequence in diplomacy. The letter suspending Lord Strangford from his diplomatic functions *quâ* the Greek question is printed at p. 93 of the 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii., dated February 10, 1826.

The Duke of Wellington, by this time absent at St. Petersburg, had in letters to Mr. Canning of January 25, 1826 (p. 72, vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence') and February 19, 1826 (p. 136), declined to extend his special embassy of congratulation to include the special embassy at the Czar's coronation, on account of its impairing his political position at home. So another nobleman had to be selected to take his place for the purpose, and the Duke of Devonshire appeared in every respect a fitting person.

The amusing element in the letter lies in the expression of anxious desire to preserve secrecy for the preliminary steps, and the desperate way in which the intentions of the Government were divined or leaked out. It appears from other papers that Canning secretly believed the King to be 'leaky'; and published records of the time confirm this suspicion.

Canning, no doubt, felt anxious to appoint the Duke of Devonshire. The Duke was a leader of that portion of the Whig aristocracy and party which were attached to Canning and his policy. He was also brother to Lady Granville. His nomination was not without great political significance.

On the same day as this letter, viz. March 21—whence it may be inferred that Lord Liverpool was in town, and was promptly consulted—Canning instructed Lord Granville to sound the Duke of Devonshire as to his willingness to accept the Coronation Embassy to Russia. The letter to Lord Granville and consequent correspondence are to be found at p. 297 *et seq.* vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence.' The Duke of Devonshire accepted the mission.]

TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: March 31, 1826. 6 P.M.

My dear Granville,—I am just returned to town. I took the royal cottage in my way, and had the satisfaction of seeing the King for the first time since his Majesty's illness. He is still in bed; very pale and

1826
—

very feeble, but the latter rather from the exhaustion of the remedies than from any remnant of disease. Upon the whole I thought him better than I had been prepared to find him; and particularly so in spirits, and in tranquillity of mind and manners; which are always in his Majesty indications of the state of his health. On my return to town I find despatches from the Duke of Wellington which I have not yet had time to go through, and which are so voluminous, that I do not venture on a hasty glance to give a decided character of their result.

There is one point, in a despatch not of the D. of W.'s but of Ld. Strangford's, which is indeed the chief occasion of my writing to you in the few minutes that I have to spare before the going out of the post. The coronation is not likely to take place in May, as Madme. Lieven told me, but, Ld. S. thinks, towards the middle of the summer; the precise time, however, will not be fixed till after the funeral, which was to take place on the 26th.

The last date of the despatches is the 16th.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I mentioned Lady Granville's sore throat to the King, and his Majesty, as well as Mrs. C. and I, are anxious to hear a better account of it.

[Canning gives an account of the appearance of the King, now convalescent, on whom he had called at the royal cottage on his way to town.

The arrival of despatches from the Duke of Wellington, the date of the Czar's impending coronation, Lady Granville's indisposition, make up the rest of this slight note.

The Duke's despatches must be those from Berlin of February 19, pp. 136–8, vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence,' and perhaps March 5, 6, and 7, pp. 148, &c. of same volume.

It may be repeated that the British naval authorities in the

1826 — Mediterranean must by this time have been in possession of formal instructions from the Admiralty to call Ibrahim Pacha to account for his alleged scheme of completely changing the nationality, or rather inhabitant races, of the occupants of the Morea.

See 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii. p. 82, War Office to Admiralty, February 8, 1826.]

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: April 1, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—There are despatches from the Duke of Wellington which are perplexing.

They arrived yesterday, but it has taken till now to get them copied before they were sent to the King, who will not speedily return them.

The notion of an occupation of the Principalities is something distinct from war ; and that, of calling upon the Turks to perform particular stipulations of a treaty, leaving the stipulation in their favour unexecuted, and that, of going to war eventually with the Turks for all causes except the Greeks, constitute quite a new policy in the new Emperor, and one upon which it is very difficult either, on the one hand, to endorse or to help him ; or, on the other hand, if he is bent upon following the advice of his present unknown advisers, to restrain him. Let me have your opinions.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

The Lisbon intelligence is satisfactory. Mexico does not take our *projet* just as we sent it, but she sends over her Secretary of State to negotiate here.

[Some of the meaning of the Duke of Wellington's despatches referred to in the preceding letter has now been gathered, and Canning, digesting their contents, sends them to Lord Liverpool, drawing particular attention to the Russian device of calling Turkey to hostile account upon every subject but that of Greece, by which, of course, she would most materially though indirectly assist the Greeks in their struggle for independence, without compromising

the position taken by the late Czar Alexander that the Greeks were rebels, and could not be lawfully succoured by a Legitimist sovereign] 1826
—

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: April 4, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I have talked to Prince Polignac, both upon Russia and Portugal, with some real confidence and with the appearance of more.

As to Portugal, I have told him all that we have learnt from A'Court of the promising appearances of tranquillity in that kingdom; and I have stated to him my opinion as to—1st, the impossibility of Don Pedro's keeping the crown of Brazil if he returns to Lisbon; 2ndly, the improbability of the two crowns remaining on the same head in a succeeding generation; 3rdly, the difficulty in which Don Pedro will consequently be, as to the decision which he must take—whether to retain the crown for his life, or to abdicate it in favour of his daughter. But I have not told him anything in detail on these points, nor said one word of what the D. of W. was instructed to open at St. Petersburg, and Stratford at Constantinople. In all that relates to Lisbon Polignac professed to be of my opinion, and appeared quite satisfied to wait for intelligence from Rio de Janeiro.

In what relates to Russia he saw, as I do, rather less security than both our Governments had been taught in the first instance to feel.

He did not appear to suspect that I kept anything back from him, and that the D. of W. had any other object than to exhort to peace generally, and to observe, and report his observations.

To say the truth, Nicholas puzzles me exceedingly, and seems to have puzzled the D. of Wellington, and perhaps himself.

The policy which he now professes is anything but Alexander's policy, else—that is, if such indeed were

1826
—

Alexander's policy at bottom—why, in the name of common sense, have we been plagued for the last three years with memoirs upon Greece, and obligations to *co-religionnaires*, and were so often reproached by Russia for our apathy in behalf of a Christian people?

There is one comfort, however, in this turn of affairs. It will enable you to plague Werther, stimulate him by coldness and apparent dissent to a high Greek crusading tone, and then see how he will look when he comes to learn from his Court that the Greeks are after all rebels, and not worthy the sympathy of a legitimate Government.

Meantime, however, it is difficult to deal with Nicholas; and as to his advisers, no man knows where to find them.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING

[Gives details of a conversation with Prince Polignac, the French Ambassador, of no great interest, on the topics of the eventual settlement of the crowns of Portugal and Brazil, and of the Duke of Wellington's mission of congratulation to Russia, involving the Greek question.]

The latter part of the letter, which has been already published, relative to the embarrassment of the Russian Government in searching for a policy calculated to harmonise Legitimist principles with effectual aid to Greek co-religionists in rebellion, seems most interesting. And the Russian doubt and perplexity gave Canning exactly the foothold he desired in dealing with the most powerful member of the moribund Holy Alliance.]

VISCOUNT GRANVILLE TO MR. STAPLETON.

Paris, April 17, 1826.

Dear Stapleton,—The D. of Devonshire's letter which you thought you had inclosed in Canning's letter to me, I have never seen since I sent it to London; but do not make yourself uneasy about it, the loss gives me little disquietude.

Yours truly,

GRANVILLE.

1826
—

[The question is as to a missing note of the Duke of Devonshire. The Private Secretary's room at the Foreign Office appears to have been called to account, and to be in trouble. Lord Granville treats the matter goodnaturedly enough as a trifle; but the rather ungrateful minute in pencil outside the note for Canning's perusal runs: 'I must send you this in fairness, but William [Mr. W. Hervey, afterwards Lord W. Hervey] and I both think that Lord Granville must have dropped it.']

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: April 18, 1826.

My dear Granville,—Yesterday's mail did not bring me any private letter from you. I was wondering what could be the meaning of that omission, when the Duke of Devonshire presented himself in person. I was on the point of despatching a messenger to apprise him of the new period announced for the coronation, which I had learnt from Mde. de Lieven on Saturday. I have got no intelligence from the Duke of Wellington; he was to despatch a messenger from Petersburg on the 1st, who ought to have been here before this time. He will now bring me nothing that all the world does not already know; except, indeed, the information whether the note transmitted to M. Minckiaky is according to the original text communicated by the Emperor Nicholas to the Duke, or as altered according to the Duke's suggestions. For many reasons, I hope the former.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[The latter part of this note has been published, but its reproduction will do no harm; the first part, mentioning the visit of the Duke of Devonshire to the Foreign Office, marks the fact that the Duke had accepted the coronation mission to Russia.

As has been already observed, there was great political significance in the fact that the great Whig Duke accepted high diplomatic service from a Tory Government. It emphasised the Liberal character of Canning's foreign policy, and acted as forewarning of the particular shape taken by the Ministerial crisis in the ensuing year.]

TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : April 18, 1826.

1826
—

My dear Granville,—I had yesterday a letter from Decazes, accompanying copies of his speech on the *loi de succession*, and which I must answer in due time, i.e. when I have read the speech. Meanwhile his letter reminds me to talk to you of my projected visit.

We hope to get Parliament up by the end of May. I do not apprehend that my electioneering concerns will require much attention, and my wish would be to come to you as early as possible—certainly (that is to say, I certainly wish that it may be) in June. But is it possible for me to spend a fortnight at Paris, without its being supposed that I go there for some particular political object? Would it be possible to unite with the pleasure of visiting you the accomplishment of such an object?

We have agreed to postpone the consideration of Spain and her colonies, till after the rising of our respective Parliaments. Could we take up that subject in June—you and I—with Villèle, and settle it in substance, leaving the formalities to be gone through by you and Damas after my coming away?

These questions involve another, which may any day become one of vital importance to the good understanding of the two countries. Can we combine with the arrangement of some basis of joint mediation between Spain and Spanish America the withdrawing, or the fixing of a definite period for the withdrawing, of the French troops from Spain?

I am sure that Villèle must allow that I have played him fair upon that subject, and the forbearance of Parliament upon it has been marvellous. But it would be difficult for me to come in contact with him, and

not to seek to bring so unendurable a state of things to a conclusion.

The mediation offered to Spain, whether accepted or refused by her, would afford to France a new and natural opportunity of getting out of the difficulty of the occupation—if it is really felt to be a difficulty—*versus* Spain, and of saving the point of honour, if that be the real impediment to the evacuation. Think of this, and sound Villèle upon it.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I mean Mrs. C. and I.

[Canning notes that the Duc Decazes had sent him a copy of a speech made by the Duc on the French Law of Succession, which is to be acknowledged when read.

He then instructs Lord Granville to explore the state of affairs in France in view of a contemplated visit to Paris in June following.

It must be remembered that only a year and a half previously there had occurred a smart *mêlée* in the Cabinet on the question of visits of Cabinet Ministers to the French Court. Lord Westmoreland had (as it were in unconscious innocence) scored 'one' by an interview with the French King and a subsequent interview with the English King. Canning naturally desired to 'follow on' in the same game, but was successfully baulked by the interposition of the Duke of Wellington. Wellington, somewhat unfairly, considered Lord Westmoreland's move perfectly unobjectionable. It counted, of course, in favour of the Duke's views. But he naturally was of opinion that a counter-move of Canning's was greatly to be deprecated, and fraught with danger to the public weal.

It really is impossible to read the Duke's published letters and doubt his simplicity and integrity in the matter. But as a matter of fair equipoise between the Tory and the Liberal tendencies balancing in the Cabinet, it is now astonishing that the Duke could not recognise the justice of Canning's claim to possess himself of advantages equal in value to those secured by the Tory Ministers in Lord Westmoreland's visit to Paris.

By this time, however, Canning sat surer in his seat, and felt a well-founded confidence of success, but, like a wise man, he none the less strove to avoid all cause of offence.

1826

Canning accordingly desired to assure himself that his visit to Paris might be managed without giving rise to unlimited and malevolent speculations as to the object of his expedition.

He naturally placed pure pleasure first. Next, he sought to seize the opportunity of trying to arrive at a good understanding with the French Government on the current questions of Spanish America, and the continuance of the French occupation of Spain.

To terminate the latter unhappy state of affairs in the Peninsula naturally presented itself to Canning's mind as a leading object of attainment. The occupation itself, without doubt, greatly derogated from the dignity of Great Britain, and from the prestige of Canning. He had entered on his duties at the Foreign Office, only to find that, under whatever shuffling of parties, he had to submit to the presence of irresistible French armies in Spain, by ejecting which, at the sword's point, his military rival, the Duke of Wellington, had, fifteen years before, earned his great renown.

Politically, it was painful ; personally, it was humiliating.

No doubt he was conscious how much he had done to neutralise the credit undeservedly claimed by the French Government for the resuscitation of French military reputation, at one time thought to have irrecoverably disappeared with the disappearance of Napoleon; but still the vexation remained, and few successes promised such glory in his eyes as obtaining a peaceful withdrawal of the French army from Spain.

Lord Granville has accordingly special instructions to sound the French Government as to the probable nature of their treatment of a confidential interchange of thoughts between Canning and the French Prime Minister on the subject.

It may be pointed out that evidence of the degree to which Canning's feelings went with regard to this unavoidable exaltation of French power during his ministry at the Foreign Office may be found in the burst of excitement with which he greeted the opportunity of defying Spain through Portugal, and defying France through Spain, in undisguised menaces of open hostility in his celebrated speeches on the expedition to Portugal in the December following.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : April 25, 1826.

My dear Granville,—You do not say in your report of your conversation with Villèle upon my project of a visit to Paris, whether you touched upon the question of evacuation, as connected with that of a joint mediation

between Spain and her Americas ; and how the touch was taken. 1826

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Referring to his last above-quoted letter, Canning points out to his friend that in reporting on the question of his proposed visit to Paris in the ensuing summer no mention had been made of any attempt to sound Villèle on the subject of a withdrawal of the French forces from Spain, as connected with a joint mediation between Spain and her colonies.

Lord Granville was, no doubt, a safe man ; what he chose to do he did well ; little fear existed of his exceeding his instructions, or displaying 'excess of zeal' ; on the other hand, he hardly seems to have worked 'up to the collar,' and, as we have noticed several times, his friend and chief found it necessary to remonstrate on his apathy.

Canning's mind deeply concerned itself with an evacuation of Spain ; and Lord Granville's *insouciance* may have somewhat irritated him.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O : April 25, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—What do you think of the Garter for the E^r. of Russia? I have not said a word about it to the King, nor has the King hinted a word about it to me.

But as his Majesty comes to town to-morrow, and may possibly speak to me on the subject, I should like to have your opinion beforehand.

I am against it, if it can be helped. My only doubt is whether, after what was done by the K. of France, the omission may be subject to comment. Another doubt is—Granville does not say that the K. of France sends the 'St. Esprit' to Nicholas. But if he were to do so, could we help following the example? and if so, would it be better to send it?

These are public considerations ; there are private

1826 — ones for wishing to avoid the mention of the word
'Garter' on this occasion.

Ever yours, G. C.

[The Prime Minister's opinion is asked as to proposing the Order of the Garter for the Czar Nicholas on the occasion of his coronation.

Canning is against the idea himself; but the honour having been conferred on the French King at his coronation, he fears the omission may excite comment; the more so if it happened that the French Government sent the riband of the 'Saint Esprit' to the Czar on the occasion.

The 'private considerations' for avoiding the mention of the word 'Garter' on the occasion most likely refer to the fact that the Duke of Devonshire, still a young man, was not yet a Knight of the Order, and some conflict of claims might be expected should his name be then brought forward.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: April 25, 1826.

My dear Granville,—My despatch of the 21st will have answered part of your P.S. of the 21st, which will be still further answered by despatches to Stratford Canning that will pass under your eye in a few days, on their route to Constantinople.

Nothing that I have yet heard from Stratford is more than preparatory and provisional. The Porte denies stoutly, or rather the Reis Effendi has, in a private audience, given Stratford to understand that the Porte will deny, the existence of any such plan as that attributed to Ibrahim Pacha. Ibrahim, on his part, gave no other answer to Captain Spencer, (whom Sir Fred. Adam sent to put the question to him,) than that he (Ibrahim) was only the servant of the Porte, and that to the Porte the application must be made if we wished for information. This answer led me to suspect the imputation to be true. We shall see to what extent the Porte goes in its written reply to an official note which Stratford was about to present on the subject.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

1826
—

[Foreign Office despatches on their way to Mr. Stratford Canning at Constantinople were about to pass under Lord Granville's eye, and give him the information he desired as to British policy towards the Porte.

Placed in one, if not *the* most important, of the centres of political action, the British Embassy at Paris found itself kept well informed of the proceedings at headquarters in regard to remoter international problems, by the simple process of arranging that the King's messenger should pass through Paris, and afford the ambassador at that Court an opportunity of perusing the despatches *in transitu*.

The question now uppermost was the action to be taken with respect to the alleged design of the Turkish Government to remove the whole Greek population of the Morea into slavery in Egypt, and to repopulate the vacant country with a Mohammedan colony.

In the memorandum of October 25, 1825 (already given) of Canning's interview with Prince Lieven, will be found mention of the first intelligence of this criminal design reaching our Government.

At pages 477 *et seq.* vol. ii of the 'Political Life' will be found a summary of Canning's instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning, and of the accompanying proceedings in other directions on the subject, including the Duke of Wellington's negotiations with the Czar Nicholas at Petersburg.

Hasty and impetuous statesmen may take example from the extreme caution shown by Canning in making sure of each step of his way, before he committed the nation to a course of action which might at any moment assume a hostile character and end in war.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE GREEK QUESTION.

[The official instructions to the Duke of Wellington on the occasion of his Embassy of, at once, Condolence and Congratulation to the Czar on the death of his predecessor Alexander, and of his own succession to the throne, are printed at page 85 of the 'Wellington Despatches,' new series, vol. iii., and bear date February 10, 1826.

They begin by reciting the refusal of Great Britain to join in recent European conferences on the question of the Greek rebellion, and the failure of the conferences to promote any practical purpose, except that of delay; and that delay, indeed, constituted the real object of Austria; as Metternich hoped that, if time were only conceded, the Turks must eventually crush the Greeks, and annihilate

1826
—

all pretext for Russian military intervention in the Morea (a proceeding fraught with danger to Austria), which would solve the difficulties of the situation by at once confirming the doctrine of legitimate despotism, and avoiding the necessity of succouring a rebel nation.

They go on to recall the discovery by the Emperor Alexander of the real aims of Austria, and of the dissimulation Metternich had practised ; the disastrous effect on the Emperor's mind ; and his return to St. Petersburg resolved on war

Death put an end to Alexander's personal activity ; but Nicholas had proclaimed a policy nearly identical with that of his brother.

The instructions go on to recite that Count Nesselrode, in a recent interview with Lord Strangford, had repudiated any community of feeling with either France or Austria ; and that the Count, while admitting the Emperor's primary disapprobation of British abstention from the recent conferences at St. Petersburg on the question, had now allowed that events justified the abstention.

An observation may here, perhaps, be usefully interposed to explain the meaning of British abstention, and the somewhat abnormal community of feeling between Russia and England on the Greek question.

England desired to be free to take action of a decisive kind instantly on the occasion requiring it, and the occasion appeared by no means unlikely to occur at any moment in Greek affairs.

A conference forms an excellent and plausible machine for escaping from a call to action ; it ties the hands of each conferring Power, who, while the conference is pending, becomes morally deprived of the power to stir.

This disability Canning had not the slightest notion of incurring ; the Great Powers while in conference, apart from Great Britain, were consequently less free than Great Britain, and at a disadvantage under urgent circumstances.

The perception of this truth had come upon the Russian Government, and they had recognised at last the craft of Metternich, the essence of whose policy had been to do nothing himself, to stay action in others, and to disguise useful inaction under empty diplomatic vapourings, and they perceived the value of ' the free hand ' reserved to England by the policy of Canning.

The other point, on which Russia felt drawn towards England, lay in the possibility that the Greeks might obtain succour from England, and protection from the violence of the Turks, without the necessity of Russian intervention. Russian popular sympathy lay keenly on the side of the Greeks, and had continued suppressed

solely by the Legitimist principles of the Russian Government. Any solution of this difficulty in the conflict of these principles would be acceptable ; and by means of Great Britain it seemed possible that a solution might be obtained , besides, as Nicholas (it will appear) observed to Wellington, the intervention of England in Greek affairs must inevitably promote Russian aims in the Principalities.

For these reasons Canning could go on to instruct the special ambassador to the Russian Court that 'perfect confidence' might be expected from the Russian Government.

Starting, therefore, from the assumption of genuine good-will on the part of Russia towards Great Britain, Canning next prescribes the object of British diplomacy at St. Petersburg, to be, '*if possible, to prevent Russia from going to war.*'

The internal impulses towards war were to be found in the pious desire of the Czar Nicholas to follow in the footsteps of his deceased brother ; in the temptation to divert the mind of the Russian army from the perturbing effects upon the mainsprings of the monarchy of the recent transfer of the crown from Constantine to Nicholas ; and in the tendency, which the consciousness of commanding 800,000 armed men never fails to create in the mind of their commander, to employ them.

The instructions proceeded, that without being too sanguine, the British Government thought there was room to hope that the impulse to war might possibly be checked, and that if so (looking at the professions of confidence in Great Britain), an offer of mediation—1st, between Russia and Turkey, 2nd, between Turkey and Greece—might operate to such end.

To prove to Russia the nature and sincerity of the intercession between her and Turkey, she was to be referred to the instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning, framed for the benefit of Turkey, when Russia had temporarily renounced communication with Great Britain on the subject ; whatever the results of the appeal to Turkey might be, the benevolent intentions of Great Britain could thereby admit of no doubt.

The instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning were dated October 12, 1825, and consisted chiefly in pleading to the Porte the undeniable forbearance of Russia in abstaining from war in spite of circumstances, and of the danger of such forbearance yielding under the pressure of the Russian nation seeing their co-religionists in Greece gradually crushed and annihilated by Turkish power ; and, lastly, of the complete isolation of Turkey in case hostilities broke out.

Canning further instructed the Duke of Wellington that, if

1826
—

news of Lord Strangford's unauthorised proposal to Russia of a conference, in which Great Britain should join, had reached Constantinople, it would probably have moved the Porte to reject the British appeal without delay.

If, on the other hand, their inclinations had not been so disturbed, the Porte might possibly accept the proposal for British intervention.

If the British proposal in the first instance met with repulsion from the Porte, the British Ambassador should advise Russia that it would be repeated by Great Britain, if backed by an intimation that this time it carried with it the knowledge and sanction of Russia.

But if the Russian Government, advancing beyond that step, desired at once to join Great Britain in a proposal to mediate between Turkey and Greece, the British Government were not to be committed to the idea unless previous assurance had been obtained that Turkey would accept it.

To protect British diplomacy from an accusation of indirectly manufacturing an occasion of war, England should not be committed to either course unless under assurances from Russia, that a failure should not be worked up into any claim to a right, thereon founded, to go to war with Turkey.

The treaty rights of Russia to intervene in behalf of the Greek subjects of the Porte were limited to (1) intervention in a friendly capacity ; (2) through a Minister residing at Constantinople ; (3) in behalf of Greeks in subjection to the Ottoman Government.

Of other grounds of intervention, those under Lord Strangford's management had all but disappeared ; nothing remained in their respect justifying war. Of the grievances not included in Lord Strangford's negotiation, notably that of the Asiatic fortresses, the right appeared on the side of the Porte.

This being so, it could only be concluded that a war originating with Russia, on any other account than that of the Greeks, must be one of ambition and conquest.

Mr. Stratford Canning, it is true, as has been said, carried warnings of danger to the Porte ; but they were stated to depend on the disposition, not on the rights, of Russia.

The great point involved in Lord Strangford's instructions, viz. a re-establishment of a Russian mission at Constantinople, was not now to be insisted upon.

That point did not now appear necessary for separate British mediation, which had already practically begun without it ; nor for joint mediation ; and, though plausibly suggested in the latter case, it might revive the idea of a conference, and thereby disgust Russia for the whole conception.

The instructions continued by suggesting that the idea of conference might now be considered as provisionally lapsed except with Prussia ; and Prussia possessed the smallest *locus standi* for interference in the matter of any Power in Europe. The Netherlands possessed greater claim to consideration for such purposes, and the Netherlands, for reasons, were at this time in a high state of resentment with Prussia.

Having, as it were, so far argued the Russian cause into a corner in respect of leaving it no just pretence for war, and no superior alternative to that of admitting British intervention with the Porte, Canning perceived a loophole which, if not guarded, might possibly enable Russia to tie the hands of England and keep herself free to fight with Turkey if she chose.

What if Russia revived the idea of a conference ? Therefore, to forearm the Duke of Wellington with defensive weapons, and to stifle the suggestion in its first inception, Canning lays down a series of conditions, perfectly just and righteous, which must be fulfilled before he could admit such a proposal.

1. The complete re-establishment of Russian diplomatic relations with the Porte.

2. An abjuration by all parties of all employment of force in the settlement of the Greek question.

3. An abjuration by all parties of any views of individual aggrandisement and advantage.

4. The admission to the Conference of the Netherlands Government.

5. The holding of it at London.

These conditions, Canning anticipated, would with one or other of the Powers, elicit objections calculated to extinguish the idea.

If all objections were waived, the Conference might be accepted ; but then it would be held only on British terms.

Such a Conference would effect little good ; but it would have a chance over a Conference of the five Powers now standing in the following relations. Russia, all but at war with Turkey ; Austria, all but in open alliance with Turkey ; France, entangled in intrigue with Greece and Egypt, (see the Duke of Orleans' attempts to obtain the Greek Crown for his son) ; Prussia, instigating Russia to violence (no doubt with a view to diminish the preponderance of two powerful neighbours, Russia and Austria, at one stroke) ; and England, paralysed by the universal dissension.

Passing from the idea of the Conference, the instructions proceeded to discuss the attitude of the Greeks.

This, they anticipated, would be favourable, certainly for the

1826 — single intervention of England, possibly for the intervention conjointly with Russia.

Assuming, therefore, consent of Russia and Greece, there remained the question of how to act if the Porte rejected mediation altogether, and what means existed of preventing Russia from going to war with Turkey.

Two courses suggested themselves for this end.

One, in concert with Austria and France, the other, to be taken by England alone.

Both Austria and France dreaded and deprecated a Russian war; so much might be true, but it should be remembered, on the other hand, that if it took place and proved successful, both Powers could be bought off by the concession of territorial indemnities.

If, therefore, Great Britain at first accepted the co-operation of these Powers, she might soon find herself not only deserted by, but even at war with, them, and left the only ally of Turkey; and what chance was there of persuading the British nation to expend her blood and treasure for Turkey, discredited as Turkey was by her cruel and unsuccessful efforts to suppress the Greek insurrection?

But if the road to pacification did not lie in antagonism to Russia and supporting Turkey in her unreasonable refusal to moderate her requirements, and to make fair concessions to Russia and Greece, was there not a way out of the difficulty by transferring the direction of the ultimate resort of force from restraining Russia to bringing the Porte to reason?

The instructions then recited the intelligence, conveyed by the Russian Government to Canning, of the outrageous design of the Porte to depopulate the Morea and re-people it with Mussulmans.

This design Canning suggested might furnish justification and grounds for a forcible interference by Great Britain in behalf of the Greeks, and for the restraint of the Turks, and he instructed the Duke to hold it out to the Russian Government as a procedure which might satisfy their urgency in behalf of the Greeks, and induce them to leave the coercion of the Porte in British hands.

To sustain this position, the Duke was to express unlimited confidence in Russia in respect of terms of peace between the Porte and Greece; also total abjuration of designs of aggrandisement on the part of Great Britain, and a repudiation of any sentiments of jealousy at Russian influence in Greece; which, it was to be hoped, would be exerted towards inducing the Greeks to accept moderate terms from the Porte.

Such is the summary of Canning's letter of instructions for the

guidance of the Duke of Wellington in his negotiation with Russia respecting her differences, real or pretended, with Turkey.

It will be seen that the pivot on which they turned was the liberation sooner or later by some means or another of Greece.

Canning, with far-reaching apprehension of the conditions of success in this aim, had long striven, through the agency of Lord Stratford at first, and now of Mr. Stratford Canning, to extenuate the causes of grievance preferred by Russia against the Porte. His intervention had obtained a great measure of success, and he thought the time had arrived when, assuming the martial attitude of the Russian Government as continued from Alexander to Nicholas to be a permanent characteristic, he might treat as sufficiently remedied other grievances, such as those connected with the Principalities, where Russian military power could operate without practical hindrance in seeking redress, where British naval power could have no weight, and where Russian Legitimist principles presented no disturbing element, and reduce their controversy with Turkey to the question of succouring Greece; where, on the contrary, the military power could have the least possible direct influence, where the British navy could exercise a decisive authority, and where active intervention must needs compromise the lofty claims of Russia to be the mainstay of existing legitimate authority in Europe.

The Duke of Wellington arrived at St. Petersburg on March 2. Count Lieven had been sent for from London by the Russian Government evidently to help to 'tackle' the Duke.

The Russian rejoinder appears in the report of the sayings of the Czar in his interview with the Duke on March 10, as recorded in the Duke's memorandum of the 11th and despatch of 16th March.

Count Nesselrode, who had somewhat lost credit with the Czar Nicholas for a short time on the accession of the latter to the throne, no doubt prompted the Czar in his manner of meeting Canning's onslaught as presented through the Duke of Wellington.

He 'countered' Canning on all his points.

He made light of Greece, and magnified all other grievances, real and imaginary, just or unjust.

Turkish soldiers, Beshlis, acting as officers of justice under magistrates called Bash, Beshli, Agas, were represented by the Turks as absolutely necessary for police purposes in the Danubian Principalities; but they were denounced by the Russians as instruments of cruelty and oppression, and their continuance utterly incompatible with an honest restoration of the *status quo* before the late disturbance in those provinces, for which the Russians had stipulated.

Certain Servian deputies had, it was alleged, been despatched

1826
—

to Constantinople on a quasi-diplomatic mission to the Porte, and had been detained and imprisoned. The facts were altogether denied by the Porte; but the Russians did not cease to call for their release.

Lastly, the Czar demanded that the Porte should send commissions to the Danube to attend to the due fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest; to this it was replied that Russians had not fulfilled their part of the treaty, and consequently could not be considered in a position to make peremptory requisitions on the other party to discharge instantly their obligations.

As regards Greece, the Czar repudiated the idea that the Russian nation were stirred by any sympathy with the rebels, and insisted that he was bound to carry out his late brother Alexander's policy of abstention from interference in behalf of rebels. In this the Czar went much too far, as will be seen, and had to be pulled back by the two counts, Nesselrode and Lieven, on the arrival of the latter at St. Petersburg.

Having inquired the extent of active British intervention to protect the inhabitants of Morea from deportation, he raised no objection, but observed that, conjoined with his projected invasion of the Principalities, it must soon bring the Porte to reason. This view had its sting; though Wellington explained that the British operations would be directed solely against the power of the Pacha of Egypt, to whom the Porte had conceded the Morea.

There is no doubt but that the Duke of Wellington argued bravely and determinately with the Russian Government to prevent the despatch to Count Minckiaky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, of instructions demanding from the Porte a satisfactory answer as to redress of the alleged grievances, or a cessation of diplomatic intercourse and consequent declaration of war; but his Grace's efforts were unavailing.

The ultimatum was despatched, and by a curious piece of *finesse* they assured the Duke it had been sent, while he thought it was still under consideration, to see what he would say. They found that, though he perceived the provocation, he preserved his temper; then they sent it off.

No doubt they were at these pains in order to discover whether the British Government held any card in reserve, which might be disclosed under pressure of extreme measures taken by the Russian Government.

This active defiance of the Duke's remonstrances rather roused his spirit.

On March 21 Count Lieven returned to St. Petersburg, and a

most curious and dramatic diplomatic struggle ensued between the Duke and the Counts Nesselrode and Lieven, as may be seen in the Wellington Correspondence of the date.

The Czar had committed himself orally to the Duke that he abjured all idea of annexing so much as a village, or in any other way obtaining aggrandisement if he made war on Turkey.

When Lieven arrived he revived the old attitude of the Russian Government ; the Czar's contempt of the Greek question suddenly became modified ; both the Russian Counts essayed to obtain from Wellington an admission that, if war broke out against Turkey, the Russians might fairly look to territorial compensation. Wellington, on the other hand, demanded, and adhered to his demand for, a written confirmation of the Czar's oral repudiation of designs of aggrandisement. The Counts then pressed that the British King should give out a similar self-denying proclamation, and that the Russian Government should not be required, in case of yielding on the part of the Porte, to send an ambassador to Constantinople (see Wellington's despatch and enclosures of April 4, 1826, page 224 of 'Correspondence,' vol. iii.) ; but on neither of these points did either party in the least give way.

After much negotiation, on April 6, 1826, Wellington left St. Petersburg, where he had stayed about five weeks, and matters remained unsettled in the end

It must be conceded that, looking at the degree to which the Duke was flattered and caressed by the Emperor and the royal family, he appears, from his own account, to have held his own firmly, and shrunk from no effort to impress his views on the Czar in the most explicit terms, at all hazards.

But we now come to the view taken by the British Foreign Secretary of this diplomatic conflict, and must examine whether he considered himself entirely foiled by the persistency of the Russian Government.

In a despatch to the Duke of Wellington, dated April 11, 1826, Canning summarises the policy propounded by the Russian Emperor in his interview with the Duke on March 10.

The total effect comes out in rather startling colours ; comparing the Duke's memorandum with Canning's despatch, one cannot say there is in the latter any misrepresentation or unfair interpretation cast on the sayings of the Emperor, but it presented none the less a new and most disparaging view to take of his conduct ; but the light in which it seemed the transaction could be placed clearly astonished and angered the Duke, who, having been treated with the utmost military frankness by the Russian authorities, began to

1826
—

suspect that he had been to a certain degree hoodwinked in spite of his efforts to preserve unfailing vigilance ; his first impulse led him to blame Canning for finding in his memorandum materials for such a crushing retort on Russia, and though the terms of Canning's despatch are those of unceasing commendation and concurrence, the bare echo of the Duke's report as arranged and illuminated by Canning's discernment made the Duke feel the whole despatch a censure.

Before noting the different aspects presented by the same topics when viewed by Canning and when viewed by the Duke of Wellington, which turn upon delicate diplomatic phrases, it may be well to mention broadly what the general effect of the Russian policy really came to at this date.

The ultimate aim of Russia was, as it now is, the expulsion of the Turks or of the Turkish power from the European side of the Bosphorus, and the substitution in the place of Turkey of a Greek empire, religiously restoring to honour the Orthodox Church, politically restoring to power the Byzantine Empire of the Cæsars, commercially gifting the Russian nation with unrestricted access to the broad waters of the Mediterranean, and prospectively opening up visions of still wider expansion for these mighty impellents to empire.

Two commonplace difficulties interposed at the threshold in attempts to give practical effect to these dreams. The first was the Turkish capacity for dogged resistance ; the second was the natural jealousy of neighbouring states, who, being of a different type of Christianity, not having the smallest interest in the re-establishment of the honours of the Greek Church or of the Byzantine Empire, and considering it a matter of the highest interest not to permit an unlimited expansion of the Muscovite dominion if it could possibly be stopped, watched with the keenest scrutiny the ingenious proceedings by which the Russian statesmen, led by their Czar, essayed to bring about the objects of their ambition.

From these lofty motives and this illustrious antagonism, we descend in practical politics at once into an atmosphere of dishonest intrigue and shameless deception.

The design of Ibrahim Pacha to depopulate the Morea of Greeks came as a godsend to the Russian Cabinet. The exhausting effect on the Turkish power of the Greek insurrection offered itself as an opportunity, on no account to be wasted, for pressing forward the great Russian movement which was to replace at Constantinople the Sultan by the Czar. But owing to the extreme manner in which Russia had committed herself to the principles of a divine right in

sovereigns, and of the intrinsic guilt of rebellion, she positively could not directly assist the Greeks and thereby promote the national at the expense of the dynastic policy. She had entered into the game of pacification with the Porte in which Lord Strangford had recently played a leading part, where Canning sought to remove all pretenses for Russian intervention in the Principalities, while Russia sedulously strove to keep sufficient grievance open and available for use at any moment. True, she did not want to attack the Porte for the cause of the Greeks; but she did want to benefit by the diversion of the Greek war. She did not want single handed to attack the Porte, but did want the co-operation of another Power.

Austria and France had committed themselves to intrigues with the Greek cause, as much anti-Russian as anti-Turkish in tendency.

England remained free. Consequently on the failure to obtain any useful aid or advice from France or Austria, or even to excite the jealousy of Great Britain by the St. Petersburg conference on Eastern affairs, the Russian statesmen would have been in despair had it not been for Ibrahim Pacha's design.

They knew Canning longed for a decent pretext to assist the unhappy condition of the Greek nation, but felt assured that he was too wise to compromise his attitude of abstinence from forcible intervention in the affairs of independent States for any romantic longing whatever.

The depopulation of the Morea constituted a bait of rare quality to attract the British Minister, if care were only taken to prevent his carrying the bait off the hook and leaving the fisherman empty.

Count Lieven, as has been told, rushed off to Canning full of candid professions of esteem and admiration for him, and proffered the bait. To their immense satisfaction, it was swallowed with the utmost promptitude.

Canning accepted the whole responsibility of stopping the contemplated crime, whatever assistance it might give Russia.

The next step for Russia was to open up the half-closed disputes concerning the Principalities, and arrange so that peremptory demands for redress, which they knew and hoped would be refused, might coincide with the menaces of forcible intervention which Canning was about to address to the Porte.

The death of Alexander, and consequent mission of Wellington to St. Petersburg, threatened to disturb these designs. The natural influence of the great general with Nicholas, even when exercised on behalf of peace, and sustained by the discernment which the Duke could well show in a certain somewhat narrow field of political vision, might cause a delay fatal to the requisite coincidence of

1826
—

Russian complaint and pressure on the Porte, with the British protests against Ibrahim Pacha's designs.

Nesselrode felt alarm enough to take the measure of recalling Prince Lieven for the occasion from London (where Canning's part was considered safe for Russia) in order to help in counteracting the weight of the Duke's wise and noble advice to the new Emperor on the question of the Principalities.

It is most interesting to detect the small byplay of the two Counts (Nesselrode and Lieven). Nesselrode had instructed the Czar to throw aside the Greek cause as incompatible with his principles. This was good enough for Wellington and his known Legitimist principles. But Lieven knew that it was worse than useless to try this on with Canning, with whom he, and not Nesselrode, had personally to deal; and Wellington simply records the change of tone on this point observable on Lieven's arrival.

Again Wellington's soldierlike highmindedness evoked from the natural chivalry of Nicholas a strong self-denying declaration, which the two Counts laboured in vain to annul.

But Wellington's mission or no, the necessity of not losing the chance they had so carefully anticipated, of striking a blow at the Porte simultaneously with the British remonstrances about the Morea, led to that determined despatch of the ultimatum to Constantinople while the Duke yet flattered himself that negotiations were open, and the Counts prevented the Czar from making any attempt to recall a vital and now irrevocable step.

All had been planned beforehand by the Russian Government except Wellington's visit, and that, without doubt, temporarily embarrassed them; but not in the end, for Wellington, taking colour from innate sympathy with the atmosphere in which he moved, allowed a degree of substantiality to the alleged grievances of Russia, and an extenuation of the Greek claims to consideration, that effectually neutralised his honest efforts for peace.

Canning, as a leader of European Liberals and as a Christian statesman, determined that he could not conscientiously refuse to succour the Greeks under the awful threat of transplantation; but he did his best to prevent possible evil consequences, and to debar Russia from taking advantage of his comparatively disinterested intervention to promote her own aggrandisement. His instructions to Wellington were accordingly governed by two principles—to disallow all other alleged Russian grievances, and to magnify Greek claims upon Russia.

At the end of six weeks at St. Petersburg, Wellington, while protesting in detail, nevertheless discovered, by numerous symptoms,

a general feeling of sympathy with Russian claims against Turkey, and also with Russian desire to disclaim all wish for interference in behalf of the Greeks.

Between Wellington and Russia, insurgent Greece became almost effaced. Yet Russia was not at all less in a position to profit by a British intervention to protect the Greeks from transplantation.

The data furnished by Wellington's reports were taken up by Canning in his despatch, one by one, and the real nature of the Russian policy, and the fatal consequences of despising Greece, made so clear that Wellington felt sore all over. On the pretext that the Czar's conversations with him were sacredly personal for himself, and might not be used even in the innermost sanctuary of British diplomacy, he obtained the revocation of Canning's despatch, the perusal of which must have given this straightforward and single-minded soldier a dire feeling of having been overreached by the Government of Russia, and of his proceedings being considered in that light by Canning.

How could Wellington possibly forgive Canning this mortification?

The Duke had arrived at some sort of understanding with the Russian Government in the shape of identity of proposals on either side for a scheme of pacification of Greece, preserving the suzerainty of the Porte, and granting autonomy to the Greeks; but at the end of the Duke's despatch of April 4, 1826, will be found his own summary of the results of his mission: he had *not* stopped the ultimatum to the Porte, but, on the other hand, of the three demands, the last as to the appointment of plenipotentiaries to settle the carrying into operation the treaty of Bucharest had not been made a *sine quâ non*; the Czar had given a verbal assurance, *not* confirmed in writing, repudiating designs of territorial aggrandisement; lastly, the Czar would not, on behalf of the Greeks, demand from the Porte more than the Greeks asked for themselves.

However, Russian ambition received a check, strange to say, from the compliance in every direction of the Porte, signified to M. Minckiaky on May 13; the weight of British intervention disappeared when the design of a depopulation of the Morea was given up.

The Porte cleared the Beshli Agas out of the Principalities, released the Servian deputies, and sent plenipotentiaries to negotiations at Ackermann.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: May 2, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—By what I read of the House of Lords last night and what I hear from the D. of W.

1826

—

and others of the talk of the town afterwards, I fear you will have some difficulty in getting the Corn Measure through that House.

Surely, therefore, you had better lose no time in letting the friends of Govt. know authoritatively that it is a measure of government, which you are determined to force through with all the weight of Government.

It is vitally necessary to do this before a canvass begins against you.

With respect to money—is not the best course this?

Not to say a word about the Corn Duty (which was my suggestion yesterday), but to say that, if a case should occur in which the Govt. should feel the necessity of applying direct relief, it would not hesitate to do so, upon its responsibility, and to trust to Parliament for indemnity. But that if a vote should pass (or an address), there would then be an obligation upon the Govt. to afford relief—the principle of so doing would be admitted—and in each case of application, instead of the applicants having to prove their case, the *onus probandi* that it was not a case for relief would rest with the Government.

Ever yours sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

[The 'Corn' question, as it is here called, better known under its later name of the question of 'Protection,' is more fully discussed in the next note.

The interest of the present letter to the Prime Minister consists in the evidence it affords how Canning at this time practically directed the parliamentary and administrative tactics of the Government, and how neatly and skilfully he guided the most difficult business in the direction he desired.

He reasonably enough anticipated dangerous opposition in the House of Lords. A defeat in the Lords, and consequent failure of the attempt to relieve the pressure on the Corn Market, and the discontent in the manufacturing districts, threatened a more than temporary discredit to the Government.

1826
—

The authority so lost, if not regained before the general election, now due, would remain irrecoverable throughout the duration of the ensuing Parliament; and above and besides, the liberal reputation gradually gathering round the name of Canning would suffer by the defeat.

The whole weight of the Government was therefore to be employed—strongly enough to quell all hope of successful resistance, and promptly enough to prevent any organisation of the recalcitrant Peers.

The manner of affording relief, Canning felt, should remain at the discretion of the Government; and he states briefly and forcibly to Lord Liverpool the reasons why they should prevent any address to the Crown being voted by Parliament calculated to tie their hands and impede their freedom of action.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: May 4, 1826.

My dear Granville,—As sometimes happens, the storm of Parliament arises, like other storms, after a long calm and in sight of port.

Such is the corn question at this moment; which occupies, and will occupy for the next few days, all my thoughts, and more than all the time I have to bestow upon it. I am therefore unable at present to write the letter which I intended you to read to Villèle; my despatch of to-day will, I hope, set his mind at ease upon the Protocol. But what I have yet to explain relates to Ibrahim Pacha, of whose affair, however, there is no appearance that Villèle has any surmise. I should be glad not to speak of it to him till we know the conclusion, which I apprehend will be a disavowal by the Porte of any knowledge of such design as has been imputed to the Pacha. Stratford's next despatches will bring it.

Meantime, however, if you should have reason to apprehend that V. has heard something of this matter, you have the means of explanation in your own power, and you may at your discretion use them.

1826

The connection between this matter and the Protocol is twofold :—

1st. The information upon which we acted in the affair of Ib. Pacha came from Russia in confidence to us ; ergo, we were not masters to impart it to France. 2nd. The way in which we acted upon it put us in some sort in a similar relation towards the Porte with that in which Russia stood towards her, viz. that of requiring something on pain of an understood penalty :— ergo, combination between us and Russia had a distinct and intelligible ground of common feeling.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Canning here excuses himself for temporary inattention to foreign politics, and neglect of his usual care to conciliate the French Government by explaining British policy to M. Villèle. He refers to the absorbing nature of the problem of dealing with the question of the Corn Laws. He led the House of Commons, and discharged the duty of expounding the Government policy in that House, but the policy of the Government had rocked and wavered on this question in a manner which denoted sharply divided counsels and a high degree of perplexity.

Canning's utterances declared the final decisions of the Government, and therefore expressed the compromise of conflicting opinions which struggled for predominance on the question.

But as his views were liberal on foreign policy, and on the Catholic question, so were they liberal on questions of commercial policy.

The policy of free trade, urged on the Legislature by Huskisson, was warmly supported by Canning ; and whatever were the precise steps taken by the Government during the distressful crisis of 1826 to mitigate the restrictions of the Corn Laws, there can be no doubt that Canning's influence tended to relaxation of restrictions, if not to absolute free trade.

No doubt suspicions of Canning's orthodoxy on the point began to spread amongst the representatives of the landed interest, and helped to swell the power and number of the seceders in 1827. It counted as the third leading point on which his views distinctly diverged from those of the Tory members of the Cabinet, like Wel-

lington, Peel, Eldon, and Bathurst, and from the mass of their following ; the other two, of course, being his liberal foreign policy and his advocacy of the Catholic claims.

A general election was immediately impending. Huskisson's free trade measures in silk had irritated employers of labour in all manufacturing businesses. The destruction of credit due to the commercial crisis in the preceding winter, 1825-26, had severely reduced the outflow of capital to the labour market, and thereby thrown multitudes out of work and created widespread distress. The Corn Laws, adapted to encourage the agricultural interest when in difficulties, operated distinctly in an unfavourable direction for the manufacturing classes when circumstances transferred the pressure to them ; but the agricultural interest had smarted too lately under severe and painful distress to have lost the moral influence of their claim to protection. The question of protection of corn growers involved at this epoch a complicated balance of claims, but the position of the protectionists was dangerously weakened by the doubts entertained by friends as well as foes with respect to the soundness and suitability of the fiscal machinery in force for bestowing protection : it oscillated too violently, the markets remained closed when they ought to be open, and open when they ought to be closed.

The two steps actually taken by the Government were merely palliatives. 300,000 quarters of bonded wheat were released for the home market, and power was taken to admit 500 000 quarters additional if necessary. Even these moderate measures were strongly opposed, but they were carried. The thorough revision of the Corn Law machinery was treated as matter not fit for an expiring Parliament, and professedly remitted to the consideration of the Parliament now about to be elected.

But though the real extent of the benefits to the artisan classes suffering under a commercial crisis in yielding slight relaxation, or even repeal of the Corn Laws, may be disputable, there can be no doubt as to the anxiety and apprehension the idea of any such alteration of the law created in the landed interest.

The importance of the Catholic question, which six months before promised to be the crucial test of the new Parliament, now dwindled before the excitement of a problem which stimulated the hopes of the manufacturing classes, and roused the alarm of landlords and farmers.

Twenty years afterwards Peel gave up attempting to solve the problem, threw over the landed interest and protection, and lost power for the rest of his life.

It is, therefore, sufficiently intelligible how Canning found the

1826
—

question capable of withdrawing him for a time even from his beloved foreign politics.

The Turkish menaces of a depopulation of the Morea, which had reached Canning through the channel of the Russian Government, had not, it seems, yet come to the knowledge of the French Government, who at least showed no signs of being aware of them ; and he explains for Lord Granville's guidance the reason why the British Government could not make a confidence to the French Government of what they knew on the subject. He further points out the reasonableness of the community of position taken up in concert by Russia and England towards the Porte, with regard to the several proceedings then pending between Turkey and those Powers.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : May 9, 1826.

My dear Granville,—Corn still monopolises me, and leaves me hardly time to clear away the current business of the day.

I will not, however, let my scolding despatch and letter go without an accompaniment. I suppose you will have heard great menaces of the great things that the Opposition are to do in the House of Lords : backed as they are by our agriculturists, you may be perfectly at ease ; we shall beat them two to one in the House of Lords as surely as I beat the agriculturists and Anti-Liberals (for there the Opposition vote with us) by three to one last night in the House of Commons.

Friday was the day of disaster prophesied in our House, but the combination was so broken and dissipated that they did not even venture to divide. The thing is done in our House, but we may yet have trouble and lose time.

But for the corn question we, the Commons, should have adjourned with all our business done on Friday. As it is, we must look to another week, or perhaps ten days. But we shall still be up (Parliament, I mean, will be up) in May.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

1826

The King is better than he has been known to be for years.

Mrs. Canning, I grieve to say, has been very unwell for the last three weeks. Halford and Warner give me hopes of her amendment.

[The Government continued anxiously looking forward to the prorogation due for the end of this month, and consequent dissolution and general election.

‘Corn’ delays matters.

Canning makes it clear how safe the Government felt of majorities in both Houses in the ensuing divisions.

But the victory in the Commons was ominous. Canning uses the singular personal pronoun: ‘I beat the agriculturists and Anti-‘Liberals (for there the Opposition vote with us) by three to one last ‘night in the House of Commons’!

Winning in victories of this kind, how could he ever expect eventually to draw to himself the allegiance of the Tory following led by Wellington and Peel?

The only strong link with the Tory party of that date lay in his still loudly proclaimed opposition to reform of Parliament. It was a large and important link, not easily broken or dissolved.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: May 12, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I promised you a majority of two to one in the House of Lords. The event has more than fulfilled my expectation; the majority was 5 to 2.

In the Commons we had again, as near as may be, 3 to 1. The coincidence of these two victories on the same night, almost within the same hour, has settled the litigated question, and has further dissipated a thousand apprehensions, and insinuations, and surmises, which the discontent of our agricultural grandees, inflamed by the treachery of Lord Lauderdale, and the miscalculating fury of Lord Grey had been raising, for the last fortnight, in town and country.

It is true, I am afraid, that they had for a time at least the D. of York in their toils. The D. of Y. may

1826
—

unquestionably vote as he pleases, but the King's Government have a right to expect that they shall not be opposed in Parliament by the King's commander-in-chief. H.R.H. did not attend. Up to the last moment, I believe, the Opposition reckoned upon very different numbers; and I, that many pledges, given in the heat of rural anger, were broken, and many votes in the minority disappointed of the support and countenance in the faith of which they were originally promised. I have heard of some most ingenuous avowals of this disappointment.

What think you of Strangford's proxy being given in Opposition by the D. of Northumberland?

I was glad to hear that the D. of D.'s was withdrawn on the day before the debate.

I do not apprehend much more trouble on our Bills, and they are the only business to be disposed of before the rising of Parliament.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Canning reports the result of the divisions in the two Houses on the corn question. The victories proved decisive, notwithstanding the violence of the Opposition. The question only turned on admitting a certain amount of wheat into the market to alleviate the distress apparently caused by the high price of corn, without involving a matter of principle. Nevertheless the 'agricultural grandees' had raged against it. Lord Lauderdale seems to have played false to the Government, and Lord Grey false to his principles, which ought to have led him to support the Government measure, but did not.

The majorities showed a remarkable amount of positive conversion in the voters, involving no small breaking of hasty pledges.

Lord Strangford retaliated for the stab he had received when at St. Petersburg by entrusting his proxy to the Duke of Northumberland in Opposition; while, on the contrary, the Duke of Devonshire showed his sense of the claims of the Government on his forbearance by withdrawing his hostility before the debate.

All form interesting signs of the times.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: May 17, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I send for your consideration a memorandum which Mr. Addington has (at my desire) drawn up, on the question of the territory adjoining the Columbian River.

1826
—

It is a most perplexing question, and there are difficulties both in maintaining and abandoning our claims.

The absence of any producible document on our part respecting the reservation under which Fort George was restored is the principal difficulty in maintaining our claim in argument.

But the real justice of the case, the convention of Hooker, the long date of our occupation, and the encouragement given to our traders, together with the extravagance of American principle, which attaches to the discovery of the mouth of a river (supposing that fact true, which it is not in this instance) a right of sovereignty over all the land watered by that river and its tributary streams—a principle which, while they enforce with respect to the Columbia, they impugn and expect us to cede with respect to the St. Lawrence—all these considerations seem to me to constitute such a mass of difficulties in the way of surrendering our claims, that I know not how to contemplate that alternative.

Ever, &c., GEO. CANNING.

[Canning sends a memorandum prepared in the Colonial Office, where Mr. Addington was Under Secretary of State, on what was known as the Oregon question (see papers of dates of July following) Perhaps Sir Henry Taylor ('Van Artevelde') had some hand in the memorandum, which is remarkably lucid and well reasoned.

Difficulties beset the matter on both sides : against British claims a lack of documentary evidence ; in their favour, prescription and user.

The enunciation by the United States of preposterous principles

1826
—

for general application to the American continent greatly enhanced the natural complexity of the problem ; and the leaders of the administration took counsel together to solve it.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O. : May 26, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I agree in all your suggestions but one, which is the first. The fact that the season of the year ‘is’ so-and-so seems to me too much of a truism. The fact that, the season ‘being’ so-and-so, his Majesty takes advantage to dissolve, is information.

I have suggested some verbal amendments, and I send you a copy as it will stand after all the alterations.

Ever yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[A neat distinction in language is pointed out to the Prime Minister, with a view to amending the draft King’s speech on the conclusion of the last session of the Parliament.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : June 6, 1826.

My dear Granville,—It is a satisfaction to me that I so early foresaw the probability that I should have to defer my visit to Paris, because I might otherwise have stood in the way of your other arrangements. On the same principle I will resist the temptation, which you hold out to me to retrace my steps, by offering to be troubled with Carlo during the holidays. Even on his account I doubt whether this would be expedient. He is now too old to be under the guard of ma’amselle—and he would be exceedingly difficult to dispose of otherwise, especially as last summer holidays in Ireland, where I suspect he had very much his own way, and ruled over Galway (if not over all Connaught) with arbitrary sway, have made him, though a very good and quiet little boy, very impatient of local restrictions and limitations. I do not know whether there is more risk

1826

to be run in roaming about Paris than London. But whatever risk there may be, he would have encountered it all before he had been a week in Paris.

However, independently of his holidays, I think I shall [have] enough to do to get all the work that hangs upon my hands well off of them by the middle or end of August.

Lieven will not be here till towards the end of this month. Turkey and Greece must wait his coming.

There is a Guatemala negotiation just arrived, and a Mexican is expected by the next packet; and Rufus King (who is doating) expects in July instructions *de omni scibili*.

Spain and Spanish America, as you see by my despatch of to-day, are considerably thrown back. Brazil (including Stuart), and Portugal, will cut out work for a month.

Our business cabinets are fixed for the middle of July, in the expectation that those and all other matters will be by that time in a state to admit of my taking the opinions of the Cabinet upon them all. I shall then gladly consent to the dispersion of my colleagues, work alone till I have executed all that is to be done, and by the very beginning of September be ready to start for Paris. Be assured I have nothing more at heart than to keep my engagement, and that I see and foresee nothing to prevent me from doing so.

I hope to take Mrs. C. to Brighton in about ten days or a fortnight.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

Charles is at Seaford, watching over Guss's [Augustus Ellis] election.

[A pleasant letter on personal topics—the postponement of his contemplated visit to Paris; the proceedings and amusements of his

1826
—

son 'Carlo' (afterwards Earl Canning and Viceroy of India); an enumeration of the different office affairs that hang over his head—Turkey and Greece, Guatemala, Mexico, Spain and Spanish America, Brazil and Portugal.

Canning hopes to make his start for Paris by the beginning of September.

Mr. Augustus Ellis, it appears, was preparing for his election.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O. : June 11, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I wish you would send to Planta the queries touching the N.W.C. of America, the answers to which are to constitute the supplement to the printed papers.

Unluckily you said, before Harrowby and others, that the printed papers gave an imperfect view of the case, without the additional information. I protest I do not think so ; and I really do not know what information to add of my own head to complete the case and make it perfect.

That must depend upon your queries. But of this I am certain, that, with the distaste which naturally prevails to the reading of long papers, no one of our colleagues (certainly not Harrowby, otherwise the most likely one to read,) will have read a single page of the printed papers, unless the supplementary information, which it may take some time to copy, or at least to multiply copies of it, shall have been forwarded to them.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This relates to the papers printed relative to the north-west coast of America, and the claims of Russia. Canning seems somewhat put out by Lord Liverpool's doubts as to the sufficiency of the papers already printed, and emphatically asserts his own opinion in their favour, and cannot think what more can be added, unless some further information crops up in the answers to a series of questions put by Lord Liverpool to the Foreign Office (*see* papers printed date of July).]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: June 21, 1826.

1826
—

My dear L.,—These papers are worthy your particular attention. Three points arise out of them.

1st. The expediency of instructing our consuls to avoid partiality, and not to ship Turkish ventures. Of that I will take care.

2nd. The necessity of reinforcing our squadron in the Archipelago.

3rd. The absolute necessity of endeavouring to put an end to a state of things which was bad enough before, but which, now that France has made up her mind to join Austria in a war against the Greeks, will become every day worse.

Upon this last point I can suggest nothing specific till Lieven's return, which I expect about the end of this month. I have fixed to be in town on the 30th in the hope of then meeting him there, if he does not come sooner.

I have strong reason to apprehend that Esterhazy is doing mischief upon the Greek matter.

I sent the enclosed letter of Granville's to Windsor, partly to try the ground. The memorandum with which it is returned satisfies me that I was right in my suspicion.

Nothing can or need be done till Lieven's arrival, but then we have not much time to lose.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—You will see by a second letter of Granville's that I have succeeded in keeping Capo d'Istrias away without affronting him. His importunities, and impudences, would have made all that we have to do (whatever that may be) more difficult.

Return Granville's letters.

G. C.

1826

[Canning sends papers on the Greek war, and calls particular attention to them.

The conduct of a British consul has betrayed partiality, and must be reprov'd. France and Austria appear about to enter into the fray ; and Prince Esterhazy has been taking the usual precautions to bespeak the favour of the British Government by direct representations on the subject to the King.

England was now acting in concert with Russia.

Both Powers were bringing simultaneous pressure for different ostensible objects to bear on the Porte.

England more than contemplated a forcible interference, in the event of Ibrahim Pacha persisting in his projected depopulation of the Morea.

The Foreign Secretary points out to the Prime Minister the necessity of a reinforcement of the British naval power in the Greek waters of the Archipelago.

But Russia and England were directing their influence to limit unrestricted Turkish predominance ; on the other hand, Austria and France would aim their efforts to assist in quelling the movements of the insurgent Greeks.

If the Holy Alliance could have been supposed still to survive, a rift here opened up sufficient to split the combination from top to bottom.

Canning never showed lack of skill in playing off those interests of any one of the Absolutist Powers which might draw it away from following the purpose of the suppression of liberty in other countries, which had hitherto usually inspired the councils of those Powers.

National and religious sympathies with the insurgent Greeks struggled in Russian policy with a desire to uphold a consistent reprobation of rebellion.

The family sympathies of the Austrian Court in favour of the Emperor of Brazil, and consequently in favour of the maintenance of the new-born imperial authority, lent powerful support to Canning in his negotiations to free Brazil by pacific means from the legitimist claims of Portugal.

Nevertheless in the present case we find the Austrian ambassador trying on his old game of personal influence with George IV. to check and embarrass Canning.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Brighton: June 22, 1826.

My dear Granville,—You have managed to bring me off very well with Capo d'Istrias, and to keep him off

1826

without giving cause of offence. Your letter on that subject was such as I could show to Madame Lieven; who had been so very sure of Capo d'Istrias's almost immediate arrival, that she would have apprehended some very harsh prohibition to have been administered to him if I had not been able to prove the contrary. I was somewhat surprised at her eagerness to see and forwardness to recommend Capo d'Istrias, because I was strongly persuaded (though I do not exactly recollect by what means) that the L.'s and all their party were rather quizzers of his enthusiasm and metaphysics. But I was not sorry to see the change (if it be one), because I hope it argues well for the Russian politics as to Greece. Lieven has not written to me (which by agreement with the D. of W. he was to do); but he has sent me abundance of messages through her, promising to come soon, and to come provided with the most satisfactory communications, and imploring only a continuance of confidence and of good opinion, as the price and the return for dispositions to unbounded and exclusive confidence on the part of his master. This tallies with what you report of Pozzo's language. *Nous verrons*. In these circumstances, though time is running on, I must hold to my determination not to break ground on the Greek question till after Lieven's arrival. I foresee that it will even then be a question of some difficulty; the best mode of obviating which difficulty is to found what I shall have to propose on what Lieven brings me.

Esterhazy has, I suspect, been doing much mischief. I wish you had him, and me Apponyi. Would Apponyi like to come?

I am almost certain that Esterhazy would like to go; his wife, (whose possible dislike to return to England formed one ingredient in his wish to stay here,) having

1826

conquered all obstacles to join him here, to their infinite mutual annoyance. . . .

[The latter part of this letter has been printed at p. 476 of 'Life and Times.'

The expected arrival in London of Count Capo d'Istrias is mentioned. This distinguished Greek statesman naturally advocated a warlike policy in the East—not from desire of Russian aggrandisement, but from enthusiasm for the cause of his struggling fellow-countrymen under the heel of Turkey.

Russia, being now desirous, from jealousy of France and Austria, to preserve cordial relations with Great Britain, had instructed her ambassadors, Pozzo di Borgo at Paris, and Prince Lieven at London, to do whatever might be conducive to sustain the *entente cordiale*. We here find Canning acknowledging these signs of good-will on the part of Russia.

Canning recurs to the trouble which Esterhazy's intrigues with the King gave him, and asks Lord Granville whether he thought a change could be brought about, and Esterhazy removed to Paris and Count Apponyi transferred from Paris to London.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: June 24, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I will take care of your memorandum for information respecting trade and the Columbia.

But it is not from what our trade is now, that the question is to be estimated. It is when China shall be open to English as well as American commerce that the real value of settlements on the north-west coast of America will become apparent.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[On the topic of the frontier line to be drawn between British and United States territory at the river Columbia on the north-west coast of America, Canning looked farther ahead of the present than did his chief: the value of the Pacific coast in case of an opening up in the trade with China gives the importance to the question, which the then state of trade did not appear to justify. Yet now,

sixty years afterwards, notwithstanding the immense development which railways afford for facilitating commerce, the China trade has not found its way across British Columbia to the Dominion of Canada.]

1826
—

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : July 1, 1826.

My dear Granville,—Here is the messenger for Madrid. I retain the one for Vienna till Monday, thinking it as well to send him on to Constantinople, though merely to tell Stratford that I have nothing yet to say to him.

Lieven, we understand, was to set out from Petersburg about June 20. He may be expected here about the 14th or 15th inst. I have already kept Stratford too long in a state of daily expectation, and it is but humane to let him know that he has another month (for it will be nearly so much, supposing Lieven to keep to his day) to wait for instructions.

The same reasons, (in part), which oblige me to put off one of my messengers to-day, (the influx of business that insists upon being done, though of little comparative importance, and of persons who insist upon being seen, though they have very little to say,) oblige me also to put off my intended private letter to you in rejoinder to yours respecting Spain.

Do not put off, however, beyond the first opportunity that may occur, assuring M. de Villèle that I am infinitely sensible of the frankness and straightforwardness with which he has pursued our discussion, and that I trust we may bring it to a good end. I leave to your discretion to communicate to him as much as you think expedient of what I have written to Lisbon and Madrid.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The usual arrangements are here referred to in respect of the movements of the King's messengers to admit of the Paris embassy

1826

being perfectly informed of what the Foreign Office was doing in other countries

This letter accompanies despatches to Mr. F. Lambert at Madrid, and to Sir W. A'Court at Lisbon. The despatches must have been written on the impulse given by the news just received through the French Government of Sir Charles Stuart's approaching return to Portugal, carrying by commission from Don Pedro a Charter for the Portuguese nation. Only the bare fact so far was known, but Canning lost no time in deprecating any interference on the part of Austria or Spain.

Lord Granville is empowered to reveal as much of the contents of these despatches to M. de Villèle as he may think proper ; and Canning sends a handsome complimentary message to the French Premier, which it will be seen was intended to operate, in lieu of formal communications, to encourage the French Government in a policy of non-interference in Portugal, and from its terms suggests that Villèle did not at first feel disposed to deny that the embarrassment likely to be caused to Canning by Sir Charles Stuart's proceedings was really undeserved, and that he had, in private communication with Lord Granville, allowed it to be perceived that he discriminated between Canning's real policy and the false effect given to it by the unlucky chance of Don Pedro's gift of a Constitution to Portugal, both in itself and in the person of the bearer of the act of grace.

It may be as well here to mention the state of affairs in the Peninsula since the date of the note (given in the preceding pages) of Canning to the Portuguese Government, declining to comply with their request to guarantee the succession in the event of the death of the King.

On March 7 of this year the King of Portugal, being seriously ill, appointed a regency under the presidency of his sister, the Infanta Donna Maria Isabella, of a complexion so conformable to British wishes that Sir William A'Court was suspected of contrivance in the matter : this, however, was generally disclaimed. On March 10 the King died. The Queen, who had in past times given most trouble by her Absolutist intrigues, being herself in a dangerous state of health, signified her wishes for tranquillity.

There being a regular regency in operation, Don Miguel absent, a British squadron in the Tagus, and Sir William A'Court having promised to Count Porto Santo (the Prime Minister) every support to the existing legal Government, no disturbance of the peace took place.

Don Miguel even wrote tranquillising letters, in accordance with

the influence exercised upon him by the Austrian Government, which continued desirous to uphold the interests of Don Pedro, on account of his alliance with the imperial family of Austria.

Somewhere in April (the dates not being precise here) Canning determined to take advantage of the track of Lord Ponsonby's journey to Buenos Ayres, to which new State his Lordship had been appointed British Minister, to send a despatch of timely counsel to the Emperor of Brazil on the subject of the dynastic emergency.

He advised Don Pedro's abdication of the Crown of Portugal in favour of his daughter, and the tranquillisation of the disturbing element in Don Miguel by marrying that prince to the Infanta, his niece

Here, however, Canning found the intended effects of his counsels much disturbed by the proceedings of the irrepressible Sir Charles Stuart. After his successful effort in obtaining a treaty of recognition and friendship between Portugal and Brazil, which was in due course fully ratified, Stuart had taken upon himself, as has already been explained, to negotiate commercial treaties between England and Brazil. To these the British Government had at first refused ratification, with permission to Sir Charles Stuart to negotiate new treaties; but on news of the premature and unwarrantable publication of the repudiated treaties, they had withdrawn the permission, and recalled Sir Charles Stuart.

Before, however, Sir Charles Stuart started on his return home, the news of the death of the King of Portugal had reached Rio de Janeiro, and the Emperor Pedro, having made up his mind on the line of action to be taken towards his European inheritance, appealed to Sir Charles Stuart to carry over to Portugal the instruments by which he proposed to give effect to it. Don Pedro, first assuming the sovereignty, next proposed to grant to the Portuguese people a constitutional Charter; and, anticipating a favourable reception of the Charter by the nation, he further proposed to give his daughter in marriage to his brother and her uncle, Don Miguel, and finally himself to execute an act of abdication in her favour.

With the exception of the grant of a Charter, the points of this scheme were identical with those which Lord Ponsonby was authorised to suggest in behalf of Canning.

But this exception altered the whole complexion of the proposed settlement of Portuguese monarchy. The motives of Don Pedro may be surmised: he could not govern Portugal from Rio, nor Brazil from Lisbon, so he elected to abide by Brazil. But his Brazilian throne rested upon a popular basis; as Canning argued, the mere title of 'emperor' implied election; and as this condition of empire

1826
—

was plainly irreversible, his best and obvious policy lay in conciliating the popular voice ; he sacrificed, in truth, nothing, in bestowing a Constitution on the nation from the sovereignty of which he withdrew ; while the proceeding gave great appearance of sincerity to his acceptance of the popular basis of his Brazilian throne ; the Constitution might keep Don Miguel in check, and possibly act as a protection for his daughter when surrendered to the keeping of her unpopular uncle.

On the other hand, the Austrian Government saw the legitimate access for interference in the affairs of the Peninsula, opened up by the alliance with Don Pedro, by Don Pedro's Charter about to be closed against them ; and the gift of free government, which they might have viewed with complacency as a necessary condition of Don Pedro's retention of the Crown of Portugal, assumed a different aspect when it could only operate as an objectionable restraint on the powers of an Absolutist prince like Don Miguel. Austria, hitherto acting in concert with England to reconcile differences between Portugal and Brazil, and exclude the interference of other Powers, now lost the motive for the continuance of such policy, and resumed her natural aspect of extreme jealousy of any extension of free institutions in Europe ; and the means of mischief were at their disposal : they need only release Don Miguel from his residence in Austria, and despatch him to Lisbon, to revive in Portugal a civil conflict between the two parties as before.

France also could not but be greatly disturbed by an establishment of free institutions in close proximity to Spain. She had occupied Spain to suppress 'the Revolution,' and, that object being accomplished, circumstances now made it most expedient for her to withdraw her forces ; but the operation required judgment in performing it. To evacuate Spain at the earliest opportunity, with the least possible prospect of seeing the fruits of the expedition lost, constituted the difficult problem working in the mind of Villèle ; but a Constitution in Portugal, even one *octroyée* by its lawful sovereign, at once formed a basis from which Liberal ideas might at any moment be expected to spread into Spain, and renew the state of affairs which France had staked her credit to put down.

The Spanish Government likewise could not help feeling seriously apprehensive as to the secondary effects on the Spanish nation of free institutions in Portugal. A revolutionary movement in Spain might not only compromise the continuance of the anti-Liberal party in power, but possibly overthrow the dynasty. The immediate danger of contagious disturbances pressed more heavily on Spain than on any other Power, and urged her Government, at this time

under singularly unwise guidance, to allow of proceedings as futile as ill-judged.

So much for the untimeliness of the proposed Portuguese Constitution, at the existing conjuncture of affairs in the Peninsula. Canning, no doubt, aimed at this moment, before all things, at getting the French out of Spain at the earliest possible opportunity, and for that purpose sought to encourage their disposition to withdraw, and strove to remove all obstacles in the path of their return. A Constitution in Portugal instantly raised a whole host of difficulties in the way of effecting this object. It was precisely *the one* Liberal move which must inevitably operate in an anti-Liberal direction. What, therefore, must have been Canning's feelings, when he found not only that this critical step had been taken by the absent sovereign of Portugal, which alone, considering Canning's reputation for favouring Liberalism, might be thought to originate with him, and to compromise his professed abstention from meddling with the internal government of an independent nation, but that a British diplomatist of the first rank had consented, without waiting for instructions from home, to be the bearer of the firebrand to Portugal?

Stuart, no doubt, having been previously permitted to accept diplomatic powers in behalf of Portugal accrediting him to Brazil, had thereby acquired a certain independence of the British Foreign Office, and could scarcely be publicly called to account if, in turn, he accepted representative powers from Brazil to Portugal.

In each case his powers were not, strictly speaking, diplomatic, but might be described as those of a High Commissioner bearing a message from a sovereign to a remote section of the subjects.

Canning, though fully appreciating the nature of the crisis, at once decided to accept without demur the action of Don Pedro, and to use all his influence to shelter the Portuguese Charter from unfair treatment at the hands of the European Powers.

He accordingly exhorted the Courts of Vienna and Madrid to abstain from any attempt to obstruct the execution of the Charter; he appealed most urgently to the Austrian Government, which had the power, to refrain from releasing Don Miguel, and thereby raising active opposition in Lisbon. He deemed it unnecessary to press any exhortation on the French Government, which had only recently committed itself to moderate professions.

At pages 185 to 189 of the 'Political Life' will be found extracts from the despatches to Sir William A'Court and Sir Charles Stuart, which were passed through Paris for Lord Granville's perusal, as appears from the letter of July 1.

Their general tenor was to abstain from censuring or disallowing

1826
—

Sir Charles Stuart's conduct, while taking measures to minimise its effect on the formation of public opinion as to the policy of England, and to withdraw Sir Charles from the service which he had made so embarrassing to the British Government, of acting as High Commissioner and intermediary between two widely separated portions of a foreign monarchy.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: July 3, 1826.

My dear Granville,—You wish ‘to know what I think of Stuart’s proceedings at Rio de Janeiro and of his mission to Lisbon.’

First, I am far from believing that these proceedings are Stuart’s. His personal opinion has always been strongly pronounced against the abdication of the crown of Portugal by the Emperor of Brazil.

He has fought this battle over and over again with the Emperor when, in moments of difficulty or pique, during the negotiation, H.I.M. was disposed to cut matters short by abdication: and no longer ago than when they were at Bahia, and when the K. of Portugal’s illness was known, though not his death, Stuart enforced his former arguments against renouncing the succession, by a new one from a presumed accumulation of treasure which H.M.F.M. would leave behind him in his coffers at Lisbon. There is no such treasure, but Sir C. S. was persuaded of its existence.

Sir C. Stuart’s remonstrances against the abdication were approved in the first instance: that is to say, when there was no apprehension of the K. of Portugal’s death, and when the eventual separation of the two crowns would only have given rise to unnecessary discussion both in Portugal and with the allies.

Lord Ponsonby’s instructions contain the first exposition of the British Govt. in favour of that

arrangement, as consequent upon the demise of H.M.F.M.

There is no reason, therefore, to suppose that Sir C. S. would have changed either his opinion or his language upon this subject; and if he did not advise the abdication, it is highly improbable that he should have been taken into counsel by the Emperor, as to the new arrangements by which it was to be accompanied.

Another reason has been suggested to me by Palmella (but of a nature not to be quoted to any one else) for believing S. not to have had to do with the constitution. It is this. The peers created by the Emperor are all from the *grandesse* of the kingdom, and of that class almost all are included in the creation. The omissions at least are rare. Subsera is one omission, against whom the Emperor is naturally ill-disposed. Villa Real is another who is understood to have given the Emperor particular cause of offence by an imprudent expression, which he let fall during our negotiations here in 1824, and which was hastily reported to H.I.M. by the Brazilian plenipotentiaries.

But among the omissions is also (as P. tells me) that particular family, with which S. had, and, has still, the most particular relation at Lisbon, which would not have happened had he had to say to the selection.

Stuart's mission to Lisbon proves nothing. He must have gone there in his way home at all events, to see to the execution of the treaty and convention of August 1825.

The intelligence that he was going there to execute the decree relating to the constitution, is as likely to be the guess of M. de Gestas, as is the notion that he advised the abdication, or had a hand in the constitutional charter. I may be wrong. But nothing has yet

1826

—

appeared which induces me to lay what has been done at Stuart's door, be it for good or for evil.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Read in the light of the events summarised in the preceding note, this letter contains much highly interesting matter.

It details the precise reasons why Canning acquitted Sir Charles Stuart of any active part in the elaboration of Don Pedro's scheme for the settlement of Portugal.

It must be borne in mind that Canning's public friends and enemies alike felt impelled to ascribe the scheme to his Liberal genius ; while, for the reasons already explained, the intrinsic nature of the scheme, and its promulgation at the particular juncture, actually crossed his plans in several most important directions. His particular interest, therefore, at the moment suggested such repudiation of responsibility on his own part, and imputation of responsibility to Sir Charles Stuart, as might clear the British Foreign Office from the charge of disingenuous intrigues at Rio de Janeiro.

Notwithstanding the existence of these motives to lay the blame of a mystification on his somewhat troublesome subordinate, Canning, without retreating from the attitude of covert censure contained in his public despatches to Sir Charles, in respect of his accepting without sanction from home the compromising commission of carrying a Constitution to Portugal, does in the present letter clear the diplomatist of the responsibility of assisting in the devising of the Portuguese Constitution.

It is true that in clearing Sir Charles Stuart of this intrigue Canning *à fortiori* cleared himself of complicity ; and, as the letter is only marked 'private,' and not 'private and confidential,' it was possibly written for the eye of Villèle. Therefore a certain amount of presumption may at first sight be admitted to exist against its perfect sincerity. But no one, on examining the grounds alleged for the exoneration of Sir Charles Stuart, can doubt for a moment that they are most reasonable and well-founded, dependent on notorious facts, and carrying conviction to the mind of the reader.

His very acceptance of the commission proved nothing so far as regards responsibility for the nature of the commission ; but it may be observed that this verdict does not extend to acquit him of error in judgment in respect of undertaking a service for a foreign sovereign, in which his high rank in the British diplomatic service inevitably compromised the credit of his own Government

1826
—

The charge brought against Canning of being accessory before the fact, and therefore acting in concert with Sir Charles Stuart in extracting from the Emperor Don Pedro a charter for Portugal, was revived in 1829, towards the end of the Wellington Administration, in a pamphlet entitled 'Observations on the Papers lately submitted to Parliament as to Portugal,' which sought to show that Sir Charles simply acted as a British agent throughout, and that the offices to which he had been appointed—firstly by the King of Portugal, and secondly, on his return from Brazil, by Don Pedro—were unreal shams, invented to conceal Canning's intrigues for establishing a constitution in Portugal. The pamphlet was written by Sir F. Lamb, afterwards Lord Beauvale, and finally Viscount Melbourne. The object in accusing Canning of this intrigue and secret intervention in the affairs of an independent country was to prove that he was a thoroughgoing Liberal, capable of any incidental moral obliquity in the cause of Liberalism, and that therefore his policy was really irreconcilable with any Conservative foreign policy—of course, in particular, with the policy of Wellington. It therefore aimed at cutting off the Canningites from the Conservatives, and drawing them into the Whig camp, but, as it involved a thorough contradiction of all his public utterances, besides the discredit of deception and falsehood, it became of great importance to those who defended his character and principles to refute the whole of this accusation.

A pamphlet was accordingly composed by the representatives of Canning in reply to this attack, in which the utilised portions of the letters now published afforded a very conclusive refutation of the accusation brought against him.

It was in the nature of the politics of 1829–30 that the pamphlet should reproach the Wellington Administration for inconsistency on the Catholic question; but at the date of 1826 the political value of that taunt lay still in the future.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Fairlight: July 7, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I earnestly recommend to your particular attention the printed papers which you will receive, herewith, which are supplementary to those already sent in circulation respecting the N. W. Coast of America, and perhaps more important than they.

1826
—

I had quite forgotten that I had received this letter from Mr. Pelley and had employed Addington upon the consequent inquiry. The truth is, that all our difficulty in argument upon this case arises from our own blunder. I am glad to be able to say our own. I have always hitherto felt a delicacy in urging the question as strongly as I think it deserves from apprehending that the blunder to which I refer had been made when I was not a member of the Cabinet. I thought the restitution of the Astorian settlement had taken place immediately after the peace. But I find that the date of that unlucky transaction was 1818, when I was a member of the Cabinet; and as the Cabinet must have been consulted upon such a measure, I am entitled to my full share of responsibility for it.

As such I do not hesitate to say that our decision on that occasion was absolutely unjustifiable, and will not bear the light of discussion.

Compare the Bill of Sale by which the settlement, or blockhouse, of Astoria was made over for a valuable consideration, by a company half British and half American, to a wholly British company, with the first article of the Treaty of Ghent, stipulating the restoration of places 'taken' in war; and read Lord B[athurst]'s despatch directing the surrender to the Yankees of the settlement so bought and sold, under the article which relates only to places so taken; and observe, further, that this instruction is determined upon by the British Cabinet not only with the full knowledge that the Yankees have sent a ship of war to take possession of the settlement, without a shadow of right thereto, but that this fact, (the preparation of the Yankees to invade and wrest from our N.W.C^y. a settlement theirs by purchase,) is put forward as a motive for surrendering it under a forced construction of the Treaty of Ghent: and then

think what a task it will be to justify this transaction to Parl^t, if upon this transaction we rest our justification for abandoning the whole N.W. Coast of America to the Yankees. I feel the shame of such a statement burning upon my face by anticipation.

But it is not by any means necessary that we should come to this. I admit the transaction to constitute a great difficulty, a great awkwardness. But I do not despair of getting over it, now that I can take my share of the blame. If by no other way, it is always open to us to say that we did wish to avoid a collision—that a blockhouse was not worth it; but that it is one thing to give up a settlement which nobody used, and another to abandon half a continent. In truth, though we ought not to have withdrawn, as we did, from Astoria, to withdraw from it was not ill policy. It lies on the south side of the Columbia, to which we are not unwilling to abjure all claim, keeping the north to ourselves, staking the midstream as our boundary. The cession of Astoria was therefore in furtherance of our present proposition. It now makes our present ground stronger by showing how willingly we departed from that part of it which we thought untenable.

But this is only true, if we maintain our present ground immovably. If we retreat from that, the cession of Astoria will have been but the first symptom of weakness, the first of a series of compliances with encroachments which, if not resisted, will grow upon success. There are two points—one of a political, the other of a commercial character—which I anxiously desire you to bear in mind in the discussion of this question.

1st. That the ambitious and overbearing views of the States are becoming daily more developed, and better understood in this country.

2nd. That the trade between the Eastern and Western

1826
—

Hemispheres, direct across the Pacific, is the trade of the world most susceptible of rapid augmentation and improvement. Between China and Mexico, it is now going on largely. Morier has brought me some specimens of China manufactures imported into Mexico, which vie with what we get through India in England.

We cannot yet enter into this trade, on account of the monopoly of the E. I. C^y. But ten years hence that monopoly will cease; and though at that period neither you nor I shall be where we are to answer for our deeds, I should not like to leave my name affixed to an instrument by which England would have foregone the advantages of an immense direct intercourse between China and what may be, if we resolve not to yield them up, her boundless establishments on the N.W. Coast of America.

At the same time that I press upon you the danger of concession, and the benefits of holding out on this question, it is a satisfaction to be able to present to you some prospect of more facility in the negotiation than probably you venture to expect, or than I expected before yesterday, when the enclosed paper No. 1 fell into my hands.

That paper was not wanted to make me feel assured either that our case is good, or that we have an interest of the deepest importance and heaviest responsibility in maintaining it. But I derive from it a hope which I had not before—that the goodness of our case is felt in the quarter in which it is most useful that it should be felt; and I have thought it advisable in that hope to let it be understood, that we are impressed with the duty of maintaining it. Hence the other enclosure, No. 2, which commits nobody but me, but which may prepare the person for whose warning it is written, either to obtain a modification of the instruction, which he may already

have received from his Gov^t, before he sails, or to prepare them for expecting to be called upon to modify it hereafter.

1826
—

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[One or other of the two Americas continues uppermost in the correspondence.

We now find Canning lamenting the unjustifiable surrender of Astoria, on the north-west coast of America, to the United States in 1818 ; and, with the peculiar courage and discernment of his genius, rejoicing in the fact that as it took place at that date, and, however unconsciously, received the sanction of the Cabinet, of which he was one, he found himself, while taking his own share of the responsibility of the transaction, therefore free to condemn it as a mistake.

Apart from the calls of policy, requiring a firm attitude of resistance to the encroachments of the United States, he insists on the prospect of future benefit to British trade from the existence of an opening by which the commerce of the Pacific Ocean might find its way across the vast continent of North America.

The fire which Canning shows even in private correspondence when discussing these remote and prospective questions, and omitting no point of value in the discussion, gives one an astonishing insight into the practical working of a mind inspired with what is popularly known as 'genius.'

The daydream of the United States was then, and is now, the dominion of the whole of North America ; with forethought, sending a ship of war before the conclusion of negotiations, she had grasped at the 'blockhouse' settlement of Astoria on the Pacific coast ; and the aim of her present diplomatic strife with the British Government was, if possible, to shut out British sovereignty, and consequently British trade, from access to the Pacific Ocean.

Fortunately for British interests, they were under the care of Canning.

The 'person' referred to in the last paragraph is probably Mr. Rush, the United States Minister in London. A print of the papers, recording the proceedings as far as they had gone, accompanied this letter to the Premier.

Out of the tangled skein of these diplomatic papers a few leading letters and memoranda are here printed. It is believed that they have been already published somewhere in the boundless ocean of

1826
—

past Parliamentary Papers; but they illustrate so well the real bearings of one of Canning's great negotiations, that they deserve reproduction

The question, as a matter of international jealousy, has been long dead; and the territorial covetousness of the United States at this time is either entirely dormant, or of too vast an imagination for open profession.

The first is an extract of the instructions of Canning to the British plenipotentiaries at the Conference in London on the Oregon question in 1824.

It controverts the whole of the United States position; and particularly rejects the 'Monro doctrine.'

The second is a short paper by the British plenipotentiaries reporting how they presented to the Conference the arguments with which Canning had furnished them.

A period of two years is passed by; and the next document is the greater part of a report of a committee of the House of Representatives of the United States on their claims to the territory comprised in the basin of the river Columbia. It is interesting as containing the 'case' of the United States on the question; it will also reward perusal by the remarkable reproduction which it contains of the various accounts by old travellers of their explorations of this part of North America; and, lastly, it will interest by reason of the eloquent peroration in which Great Britain is accused of aspiring to a universal dominion over the maritime commerce of the globe.

The last paper is Mr. Addington's memorandum of British claims as understood in 1826; much about the same date as the report above mentioned, and parallel to Canning's instructions to the British Plenipotentiary at the Conference in 1824.

No. 4.

MR. SECRETARY CANNING TO THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office; May 31, 1824.

THE same motives which dictated the preceding Instructions, have equally prevailed with His Majesty's Ministers in forming their Decision on the Article proposed to you by Mr. Rush, with respect to the Territory West of the Rocky Mountains. The American Plenipotentiary appears to be sensible that there is no immediate necessity for entering upon this Question, as

the Treaty by which it is regulated, for the present, will still be in force for more than Four Years, and the Pretensions of Russia on the Shore, and in the Waters of the Pacifick Ocean, are already in a course of Adjustment by separate Negotiations with that Power. Yet far from receiving the Overture of The United States, on this Subject, with indifference, there is a cordial disposition on our side to embrace any opportunity which it may afford to complete the designation of the Boundary through the whole extent of the American Continent.

The Terms, however, offered by the American Government, are little calculated to satisfy the Claims of Great Britain, even when those Claims are reduced within the narrowest compass prescribed by the honour and just Interests of the Country.

The Article presented by Mr. Rush, is the more exceptionable, as it is accompanied with indications of Reserved Pretensions, not less extravagant in regard to Territorial Sovereignty, than those which were previously advanced by Russia, with respect to Maritime Jurisdiction. Nor would the temporary character of the Article, if accepted, prevent its being, in a great measure, decisive of the Question of Territorial Rights, as between Great Britain and The United States, on the North-West Coast of America. With The United States on their side, as well as with Russia, on Hers, we are willing to treat for a delimitation of the respective Frontiers in that Quarter, on the joint principles of Occupancy and reciprocal Convenience. Far from carrying our own Title to any extreme lengths, we readily admit, that an early Settlement of conflicting Claims might well be purchased by a reasonable concession on either side. But it would be the very reverse of reasonable, to expect that we should bind

1826

ourselves by Stipulations which, without removing the grounds of dispute, or destroying the seeds of future collision, would have a direct tendency to shut us out from the prosecution of our Claims, and to deprive us in times to come, of the fairest fruits of British enterprise in a Region of growing importance.

By engaging to abstain from making Settlements to the South of the 51st Degree of Latitude, while The United States remain unfettered by any such Engagement, it is clear that Great Britain would virtually surrender Her title to the whole extent of Coast between that Parallel and the 42d, which forms the Northern Boundary of the Spanish Territory, as acknowledged by The United States. Within that space is Nootka; and we may well be allowed to ask, under what pretence the American Government can expect that Great Britain should, in their favour, surrender Her Claim to a part of the Coast, from which, when Spain attempted to exclude her, in 1790, She maintained Her Right in opposition to that Power, at every risk, and maintained it successfully. Within the same space is situated the Mouth of the Oregon, or Columbia River, the only great Navigable Communication, hitherto ascertained to exist, with the Interior of that part of the Country. The entrance of this River was surveyed by British Officers, at the expense of the British Nation, many years before any Agent of the American Government had visited its Shores, and the Trading Ports of the Hudson's Bay Company are now, and have been for some time, stationed on its Waters.

To counteract the force of these circumstances, the title of The United States, as opposed to that of the British, must stand on the most solid and indisputable grounds. But what, on examination, do we find those grounds to be? The United States must be understood

1826
—

to claim, either as Successors to France, in the possession of Louisiana ; or as Representatives of the title of Spain, in virtue of their last Treaty with that Power ; or, Thirdly, in their own underived character, as Discoverers or Occupants of the Territory in question. No other ground of Claim can be imagined on their behalf ; and in taking a view of those which I have enumerated, you will readily perceive that the American Government, in arguing their Case, can be at liberty only to select from amongst them, the title which is deemed susceptible of the easiest proof. The titles are, in fact, incompatible with each other. The French title, if good, must be good exclusively as French ; the Spanish, as Spanish ; and the American, as American ; but it never can be tolerated that either the French, or the Spanish, or the American title, should be exhibited at the same time under a three-fold aspect, or that the defect of any one of these titles should be supplied by arguments deduced from the other two.

It is the more important to keep this distinction in sight, as the assumption of the Spanish title to the North-West Territory on the part of The United States, and an attempt of the latter to identify the nature of the Possessions claimed under that title, with the contiguous Territory before acquired by them, would afford the only possible solution of the very extraordinary declaration made by the President of The United States, on opening the present Session of Congress, with respect to any further establishment of Colonies in America by the Powers of Europe. Adverting to that Declaration, I avail myself of the opportunity to observe, that without going out of your way to provoke discussion on the subject, it will be advisable for you, should the American Plenipotentiary himself bring into view the Policy of his Government on this head, to give him distinctly to

1826

understand, that the principle is one which His Majesty's Ministers are prepared to reject in the most unequivocal manner, maintaining, that whatever Right of Colonising the unappropriated portions of America has been hitherto enjoyed by Great Britain, in common with the other Powers of Europe, may still be exercised in perfect freedom, and without affording the slightest cause of umbrage to The United States.

But, to revert to the examination of the grounds of the American Claim, I am aware that The United States, in obtaining the Cession of Louisiana, received that Province in the utmost extent with which it had previously held by France. I am also aware that before it was transferred to their Dominion, some uncertainty prevailed with respect to its Boundary on the West. But The King of France is known to have acquired the Sovereignty of Louisiana, in Right of certain of His Subjects, Adventurers from Canada, who, gradually following the Course of the Mississippi, either formed Settlements at convenient intervals on its Banks, or, with a praiseworthy spirit of enterprise, explored the Forests and immense Savannahs in its neighbourhood. Such being the origin of the French title, it is manifest, that even under favour of a Principle so sweeping as that put forward by the United States, in their own name, with respect to the Columbia River, Louisiana could only have been coextensive with the Region watered by the Mississippi, and its tributary Streams. That such an extent, though comparatively limited, was not universally assigned to the Province, must, however, be admitted by every one who recollects that the sources of the Mississippi were, for some time, supposed to be within the British Frontier, Eastward of the Rocky Mountains. The Spanish title is next to be examined. The Spaniards having formed no Settlement on the

1826

Western Coast of America, to the North of San Francisco, in nearly the 38th degree of Latitude, the title devolved from them to The United States, whether valid or not, can be only one of Discovery, as to any part of the Coast above that Parallel. Now, in this respect, there is no Country so justly entitled as Great Britain, to contest the Priority with Spain. Not only did her Vessels advance along the Coast to the North of the Spanish settlements in California, at as early a period as 1573, but it is notorious that Sir Francis Drake, their Commander, acting at the time under Royal Orders, received from the Native Authorities in that Region, to which he gave the name of New Albion, a voluntary submission of the Country to the reigning Sovereign of England. All question of title derived from Spanish Discoveries to the North of San Francisco was, however, set at rest by the Treaty concluded with Spain in October 1790. And allowing, for the sake of argument, that The United States have really succeeded to the Claims, whatever they may be, of Spain, on the disputed parts of the North-West Coast, the American Government must at least be content to take them, with all such Engagements and qualifications as the Crown of Spain had previously annexed to them under Treaty with other Powers. As to The United States themselves, if we were prepared to recognise the title of Discovery, independent of Settlement, or of actual Occupation, I am well convinced that We should be able to substantiate, on that ground alone, a Claim undeniably preferable to theirs. The casual arrival of a Trading Vessel on an intermediate point of the Coast, other parts of which on both sides, if not the particular spot so visited, had been long before known, examined, and frequented, can surely not be put in competition with the expensive operations and laborious surveys executed at

1826
—

the charge of the British Nation, in the Years 1777 and 1778, under the direction of Cook and Clerk, and in 1793, under that of Vancouver. It was not till Ten Years, at least, after the Mouth of the Columbia had been surveyed by Lieutenant Broughton, by order of the last-mentioned Navigator, that an Exploring Party, commissioned by the American Government, penetrated to the Shores of that River.

Approaching the more distinct and practical question of Occupancy, as between Great Britain and The United States, we meet with two separate branches of inquiry. First, to what extent of Territory can the respective Parties make good their Claim of Possession, in virtue of that Principle? Secondly, does the Territorial Possession, when ascertained to be vested in one of the Parties, carry with it a Right to enforce the complete exclusion of the Other?

In reference to the former of these Points, it is believed that the Citizens of The United States have never formed any Establishment to the West of the Rocky Mountains, save one which is situated on the Left Bank of the Columbia, at no great distance from the Ocean. It may be doubted whether their Trading parties from the interior have ever been in the habit of frequenting that remote Region. The private Traders, who, in 1811, took post near the Mouth of the Columbia, giving to their Station the name of Astoria, which has been changed to Fort George, arrived there by Sea, and subsequently, when War broke out, made over their Property, by voluntary Agreement, to the British North-West Company, fearing to be attacked by a Naval Expedition, which was reported to have been fitted out from England for that purpose. Not long after the restoration of Peace, this Port was nominally given back to the Americans by order of His Majesty's Government, on a liberal con-

1826
—

struction of the First Article of the Treaty of Ghent, but under an express Reservation of the Territorial Claim. The Agents of the British Trading Company are still, however, in actual possession of it ; a circumstance of no small moment, as shewing not only that the Americans have no present use for the station, but also that the British associated Merchants keep up a regular chain of Communications between that distant Point and their Establishments in Canada.

The Trading Posts of the latter are in fact to be found at several Points between the Rocky Mountains and the great upper Branch of the Columbia, as far down as the 48th or 47th Degree of Latitude ; and the adjacent Regions, bounded on the one side by those Mountains, and on the other by the Pacifick Ocean, are continually frequented by their exploring Parties.

These circumstances appear to indicate, with sufficient precision, considering the remoteness of the North-West Country, and our imperfect acquaintance with it, the direction in which the Boundary between our Territory and that of The United States might be continued from the Rocky Mountains to the Ocean, with convenience and satisfaction to both Nations. You are therefore authorised, in conformity with the Principles already laid down, to propose that the Boundary Line shall be carried due West across the Rocky Mountains, along the 49th Parallel of Latitude, until it strikes the main North-Eastern Branch of the Columbia, designated in the Maps as M^cGillivray's River, and thence down along the Middle of the said River, through the whole of its Course to where it empties itself into the Pacifick Ocean. By adopting this Boundary, His Majesty's Government will renounce all Claim to any Territorial Possession or Right of Settlement on the Coast between the Middle of the Entrance of the Columbia, and the Spanish Terri-

1826
—

tories to the South. They will also give up to The United States a portion of the Interior Territory already occupied by British Traders. But I conceive that we shall obtain a satisfactory Return for these Concessions, by securing the only Points of substantial interest to us. I mean the undisputed Possession of the whole Country on the Right Bank of the Upper Columbia, and a free issue for its Produce by the Channel of that River. In executing my present Instruction, you will be careful to provide effectually for this Object.

The Question of Boundary being thus disposed of, a few words will suffice as to the Views of His Majesty's Government on the Subject of exclusive Possession by each of the Two Powers within the Limits respectively assigned to them.

The objections which, in this instance, lie against any Limitation of the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty, and of its accompanying Rights, would not apply in any material degree to a special Stipulation for allowing reciprocally the Subjects of each Government, during a fixed Term of Years, to have access to the Territories of the Other, with permission to Fish, to Navigate, and to Trade, Duty Free ; but subject in other respects to local Regulations, and especially prohibited from furnishing the Natives with Fire-arms and other exceptionable Articles. A principal object of settling the Boundary being to avoid Collision between the Two Parties, it is desirable that each Government should ultimately have it in its power to exercise the full Rights of Sovereignty within its Territorial Limits. But at present, His Majesty's Government, far from refusing their Consent to a temporary Arrangement of the above description, if acceptable to The United States, would willingly enter into Stipulations to that effect, provided they were limited to the Term of Ten Years, and that

any Posts now occupied by Agents of the Hudson's Bay Company, within the proposed Limits of The United States beyond the Rocky Mountains, should be retained at the will of the Occupants during the same period. An Agreement founded on mutual convenience will naturally supersede the necessity of recurring to first Principles.

Proposals so reasonable in themselves, though greatly differing from those presented by The United States, ought not to be lightly rejected; but if, nevertheless, they should be declined by the American Plenipotentiary, His Majesty's Government will be content to observe the Stipulations of the Third Article of the Convention, concluded in 1818, during the Remainder of the Term for which they are valid, rather than surrender, for no adequate reason, the just Claims and fair interests of the Country.

(Signed)

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. William Huskisson, and
The Right Hon. Stratford Canning,
&c. &c. &c.

PROTOCOL OF THE TWENTIETH CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES, held at the Board of Trade on the 29th of June 1824.

Present—Mr. HUSKISSON, Mr. STRATFORD CANNING, Mr. RUSH.

The Protocol of the preceding Conference was read over and signed.

The British Plenipotentiaries stated, and explained at length, the sentiments of their Government, with respect to the conflicting Claims of Great Britain and The United States to the Territories in North America lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. They declined the Proposal made on this Subject by the American Plenipotentiary, and annexed to the Twelfth Protocol, because it would substantially have the effect of limiting the Claims of their Government, to a degree

1826

inconsistent, as they thought, with the credit and just interests of the Nation. After much discussion and mutual explanation of the Claims on each side, when taken in their full extent, it was agreed that, following the example given by the American Plenipotentiary in his Proposal, it would be advisable to attempt a Settlement on terms of mutual convenience, setting aside for that purpose the discordant Principles on which the respective Claims were founded. Whereupon the British Plenipotentiaries stated in general terms, that they were ready either to agree on a Boundary Line to be drawn due West from the Rocky Mountains, along the 49th Parallel of Latitude to the North-Easternmost branch of the Columbia, or Oregon River, and thence down the middle of that River to the Ocean, or to leave the Third Article of the Convention of 1818 to its natural course. The American Plenipotentiary, in remarking upon this Boundary, declared his utter inability to accede to it; but finding that the Line offered in his former Proposal was considered wholly inadmissible by the British Plenipotentiaries, said that, in the hope of adjusting the Question, he would so far vary his former Line to the South, as to consent that it should be the 49th, instead of the 51st Degree of North Latitude.

In the course of the Conference the American Plenipotentiary stated that he was instructed to insist on the Principle, that no part of the American Continent was henceforward to be open to Colonisation from Europe. To explain this Principle, he stated that the Independence of the late Spanish Provinces precluded any new Settlement within the limits of their respective Jurisdictions; that The United States claimed the exclusive Sovereignty of all the Territory within the Parallels of Latitude which include as well the Mouth of the Columbia as the Heads of that River, and of all its tributary Streams; and that, with respect to the whole of the remainder of that Continent not actually occupied, the Powers of Europe were debarred from making new Settlements by the Claim of The United States as derived under their title from Spain.

The British Plenipotentiaries asserted, in utter denial of the above Principle, that they consider the unoccupied Parts of America just as much open as heretofore to Colonisation by Great Britain, as well as by other European Powers, agreeably

to the Convention of 1790, between the British and Spanish Governments, and that The United States would have no right whatever to take umbrage at the establishment of new Colonies from Europe in any such Parts of the American Continent. 1826

The British Plenipotentiaries added, that they felt themselves more particularly called upon to express their distinct denial of the Principle and Claims thus set forth by the American Plenipotentiary, as his claim respecting the Territory watered by the River Columbia, and its tributary Streams, besides being essentially objectionable in its general bearing, had the effect of interfering directly with the actual Rights of Great Britain, derived from Use, Occupancy, and Settlement.

(Signed) W. HUSKISSON,
STRATFORD CANNING,
RICHARD RUSH.

SECOND REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.

NORTH-WEST COAST OF AMERICA.

May 15, 1826.

THE Committee trust that they will be excused for laying before Congress a long and, they fear, somewhat tedious narrative of the progress of Discovery, Occupation and Settlement of all Nations on the North-West Coast, for the purpose of illustrating the Title of The United States.

Ferdinando Cortez, the Conqueror of Mexico, discovered California in 1526, which was the first discovery made on the Western Coast of North America by any Civilised Nation, and preceded the discovery and conquest of Peru by Pizarro. He did not, however, penetrate to the Ocean. In the year 1540, Mendoza, then Viceroy of Mexico, under the Crown of Spain, despatched an Expedition by Sea and Land, under the command of Coronado, for the purpose of exploring the Western Coast of North America as far as 53 deg. North; but the Expedition having penetrated as far as 36 deg. returned.

In 1542, another Expedition was sent out under Cabrillo, a Portuguese in the service of Spain, who saw Land in 42 deg. North, which he named Capo Mendicino. He continued his

1826
—

voyage as far as 44 deg. North, without seeing Land again, when the sickness of his crew compelled him to return.

In 1578, Sir Francis Drake, an Englishman, took possession of a Harbour North of California, in 38 deg. 30 min., and named the Country New Albion. His voyage by Sea was continued, according to some authorities, to Latitude 40 deg. North, according to others to 43 deg., but it is not certainly known; but he discovered no Land beyond the Harbour which perpetuates his name.

In 1582, Francisco Gualli, or Gali, in the service of Spain, first discovered the Country which is now called the North-West Coast of America, in Latitude 57 deg. 30 min. North.

In 1592, John De Fuca, a Greek, in the service of Spain, was despatched by the Viceroy of Mexico, on a voyage of discovery. 'Between the Latitudes of 47 deg. and 48 deg. North, he discovered an inlet, into which he entered and sailed more than 20 days.' The account of this voyage he related to an Englishman, who published it, but, for nearly 200 years it rested on his own authority, and was generally deemed to be fabulous; but the investigation of modern Navigators has ascertained its truth, although they place the entrance of this inlet at a short distance North of the Latitude which had been assigned to it by De Fuca.

In 1602, another Expedition under the patronage of the Count de Monterey, Viceroy of Mexico, was prepared at Acapulco, the command of which was given to Sebastian Vizcaino. In Latitude 36 deg. 40 min. North, he entered a convenient and secure Harbour, which he named Monterey, in honour of the Viceroy. He continued his voyage and descried Cape Mendicino, as he says, in Latitude 41 deg. 30 min. North. A boat's crew belonging to his Ship saw a promontory in Latitude 43 deg. North, which they named Cape Blanco. This expedition then returned.

In 1640, De Fonte, a Spanish Admiral, discovered a Strait on the North-west Coast, in Latitude 54 deg. 35 min. North. The account of De Fonte's voyage, like that of De Fuca's, was, for a long period, discredited, but it is now ascertained to have been correct. From this time, for a period of more than 130 years, the genius of Spain seems to have slumbered in inaction. That spirit of active enterprise which had pervaded the world, and which contributed a full 'share of mind, of labour, and

expense, to geographical and astronomical science,' was prostrated under the paralysing influence of political despotism and religious bigotry, and the flag of a people scarcely deemed worthy to be admitted into the family of civilised Nations, was the first which reappeared on this Coast under the auspices of an illustrious but savage Monarch.

It was in the reign of Peter the Great that the Russians attempted some voyages of discovery in the North Pacifick.

In 1728, Beehring made his first voyage, during which he discovered the Strait which separates America from Asia, and now bears his name.

In 1741, during the reign of the Empress Anne, a second voyage of discovery was attempted under the same Commander, in which he discovered the Aleutian Islands, the Peninsula of Alaska, and Mount St. Elias and the Continent. The Coast was first discovered in Latitude 55 deg. 30 min. North, and although high pretensions, on the part of Russia, have been recently asserted, yet no farther discoveries were made by her Subjects until the North Pacifick became thronged with the Vessels of all the Commercial Nations.

In 1774, a voyage was made to this Coast by the Spanish Captain Perez; he was the first who visited Nootka Sound, in Latitude 49 deg. 30 min., and he saw Land in Latitude 55 North.

In 1775, another voyage of discovery was projected by Orsua, the Viceroy of Mexico. By his direction a Squadron was despatched on this object, under the command of *Heceta*, *Ayala*, and *Quadra*. In 41 deg. 7 min. North, they ran into a Harbour, which they named De la Trinidad. Continuing their course North, they came into the vicinity of the Island *de Dolores*, where they had a hostile encounter with the savages. The next Land which they saw was in Latitude 57 deg. 2 min. North. They entered the Port of *Guadaluppe* in 57 deg. 11 min. North, and the Harbour of *Remedios* in 57 deg. 18 min. Here they erected a Cross, and took formal possession of the Country. In 55 deg. 17 min. they saw the Harbour of Buckarelli. In 38 deg. 18 min. they entered a Harbour, which they called *Bodega*, in honour of one of their Commanders, and which is now, by the permission of Spain, occupied by the Russians.

In 1778, Captain James Cook, then on his third voyage of

1826
—

discovery, under the patronage and direction of the British King, leaving the Sandwich Islands, first made the Coast of New Albion, in 44 deg. 33 min., at the distance of ten or twelve leagues; 'the Land formed a point at the Northern extreme, which Captain Cook named Cape Foulweather.' Being baffled by the winds, he stood off and on, and gained another view of the Land further South, 'the North point of which Captain Cook called Cape Perpetua, Latitude 44 deg. 6 min. The Southern extreme he named Cape Gregory. It lies in Latitude 43 deg. 30 min.' A gale of wind coming on, no choice was left to Cook; he was obliged to 'stretch to the Southward, and get clear of the Coast.' Being arrested in the progress of his voyage by adverse winds for several days, he made no further progress. Favourable weather succeeding, he continued his course North, and again descried the Coast in Latitude 47 deg. 5 min. He then stood to the North, with a favourable breeze, and, after proceeding some distance, he reached Nootka, on Vancouver's Island, where he landed, and called the place King George's Sound. This place is to the North of 49 deg. and South of 50 deg. While his Ships lay in the Sound, he explored a small part of the neighbouring Country. When he left Nootka, he bore N.W. and soon discovered Mount Edgcumbe, in 57 deg., and afterwards, in 58 deg., a large Inlet, which he named Cross Sound; and some days afterwards he discovered a long range of Coast, and named a point Cape Suckling. He landed at an Island, where he left a bottle, in which he deposited coins, and papers containing the names of his Ships, and the date of his discoveries. Afterwards he reached an Inlet, and anchored under a Cape, which he called Cape Hinchinbroke. He partially explored the Inlet, which he named Prince William's Sound; it was situated in Latitude 60 deg. 30 min. North. After he had left the Inlet he passed a high promontory, which he named Cape Elizabeth. Still keeping near the Coast, he discovered a large River, or rather a narrow Inlet, which he partially explored. This Inlet was afterwards very properly called, by Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Cook's River. Here another bottle was buried, with British coins, &c. This Inlet was situated in about 59 deg. North. He continued to run down the Peninsula of Alaska, *meeting occasionally with*

1826

Russians, until he doubled the Cape and reached Cape Newenham, in about 58 deg. North, of which he took formal possession by again burying a bottle with coins, &c. Continuing on his Northern course, he discovered many Islands and Headlands, and reached Cape Prince of Wales, the most Western Land of Continental America, in about 66 deg. North, forming the American side of Beehring's Strait, which he penetrated, and reached the Icy Cape, supposed to be the extreme North Point of North America, in Latitude 72 deg. After coasting the Continent of Asia for some distance, he returned to the American Coast, and anchored at Norton's Sound, from which he commenced his homeward voyage; and, after passing Oonolashka, and some other Islands, amongst which was Samganoodha, where he had another interview with the Russians, who were then settled upon all the principal Islands between Oonalashka and Kamschatka, for the purpose of collecting furs. He then ran for the Sandwich Islands, which he reached in thirty days, where he was unfortunately killed.

Some of Cook's crew having purchased furs at Nootka, disposed of them at an immense profit at Canton. Captain King, who published the last volume of Cook's Voyages, after stating this fact, suggested that this traffick might become very lucrative. In consequence of this suggestion, the British Merchants were induced, soon after the termination of the American War, as early as 1784, certainly as early as 1785, to adventure largely in this traffick. Ships were despatched to this Coast, whose principle rendezvous was at Nootka, and places further North. Nor were the Merchants of The United States backward in availing themselves of the commercial advantages of this remote Coast, and Boston has the honour of having opened the way to this Region as early as 1787. Captain John Kendrick, in the Ship 'Columbia,' and Captain Robert Gray, in the 'Washington,' both owned in Boston, were the first of the Anglo-Americans who explored those Seas, so full of wonders and of wealth. In 1789, Captain Gray, in the 'Washington,' entered the long-lost Strait of De Fuca, which he explored for 50 miles. Many voyages were subsequently made, both from England and from Boston. Some British and Mercantile adventurers in the East Indies, possessing both sagacity and enterprise, fitted out two

1826
—

small Vessels, for the purpose of supplying the Chinese Market with furs and ginseng. The traffick proving advantageous, in 1788 they determined to form a permanent Settlement at Nootka; their Agent, Mr. Mears, purchased some land of the Natives, and built a house, which was secured and fortified; in the next year more land was purchased, and a permanent Settlement was commenced. In May 1790, two Spanish Ships of War arrived in the Sound. An English Vessel was seized, and the Captain and crews were made prisoners. Possession was forcibly taken, both of the lands and the buildings. The British Flag was torn down, and the Spanish Flag was elevated; and a Declaration was made that all the Lands between Cape Horn and Latitude 60 deg. North were the undoubted property of The King of Spain. Another Vessel was subsequently captured, and the cargo sold. The Spanish Minister at the British Court demanded that British Subjects should be forbidden to frequent the North-West Coast, and complained that the Fisheries there pursued were in violation of the Rights of The King of Spain. The King of Great Britain demanded instant satisfaction for this insult; but Spain asserted a positive Claim to exclusive Sovereignty, Navigation and Commerce in the Territories, Coasts and Seas of that Region. This Claim the British Government refused to admit, and renewed the demand for satisfaction. The King of Great Britain communicated by message an account of the whole transaction to Parliament, and the Parliament, by an Address unanimously adopted, pledged themselves to support him, and voted £1,000,000 to carry into effect such warlike preparations as might be necessary; but war was prevented by negotiation, and a Convention was signed in October 1790, 'by which the restoration of the Buildings and Vessels, and the reparation of the losses sustained by the British Subjects were secured': the right of Navigation and Fishery was equally conceded to both Nations; those parts of the North-West Coast of America which were to the North of those *occupied* by Spain were left free, and those to the South of the Spanish Settlement were declared to be the exclusive property of Spain.

To this period, that long range of Coast, stretching from 44 deg. 33 min. to 47 deg. 5 min. was wholly unknown; it had not even been descried.

On the 11th day of May 1792, the Oregon, or Great River of the West, was discovered by Captain Robert Gray, then on his second voyage, and commanding the Ship 'Columbia'; he entered the River, and gave it the name of his Ship.

From Captain Gray, Vancouver, who had been sent out by the British Government to receive possession of Nootka, gained his first knowledge of the existence of this River. He sent his Lieutenant there, who made a partial survey of its mouth.

In 1793, Sir Alexander M'Kenzie, in the service of the North-West company of Canada, crossed the mountainous ridge which separates the North American Dominions of Great Britain from this region, and embarked on a River which he supposed to be a branch of the Columbia, or, as he calls it, the Great River of the West, North of Latitude 55 deg., and after proceeding some distance, abandoned the River and proceeded to the Pacifick Ocean by land. The course which he pursued over land was generally between 52 deg. 30 min. and 53 deg. 30 min., varying occasionally, however, about a degree of Latitude from either line. He reached an arm of the Sea, at a place which he called the Village of Rascals, in 52 deg. 23 min.; to the South of this point he did not explore. He mistook the River Tacoutche Tesse, for the North Branch of the Columbia, with which it is now discovered to be unconnected. It is said this River discharges itself about Birche's Bay of Vancouver, in Latitude 49 deg.

In 1799, Baranoff, a Russian, effected a settlement at Norfolk Sound, in 56 deg. North Latitude. This settlement was destroyed in 1802, and re-established in 1804. It will be recollected that Russians had been previously settled at the Aleutian Islands, and other places North of Norfolk Sound.

In 1803, an expedition was ordered by the Government of The United States, to explore the Waters of the Missouri to their Sources, and those of the Columbia from their Sources to the Pacifick Ocean. This expedition was placed under the command of Captain Meriwether Lewis and Captain William Clarke. The object of the expedition was completely achieved; the Missouri was explored to its several Sources in the Rocky Mountains, and two great branches of the Columbia, from their Sources to the Ocean, on which the exploring party wintered in

1826 1805-6, and built a small work which they called Fort Clatsop.
— The great Northern branch, upon which the name of the River is continued, was not explored for any great distance, and the Multnomah, the great Southern Tributary River, was explored by Captain Clarke for about 20 miles.

The result of the labours of these enterprising and intelligent men is now before the publick, which exhibits a lucid account of the most extraordinary inland voyage ever effected by man, not even excepting that of Orrellana, who explored the Amazon. The consummate prudence, intrepidity, patience, fortitude, and success which distinguished this party has no parallel in the narratives of veracious history, and scarcely in the fictitious tales of romance.

So flattering were the accounts of Lewis and Clarke, 'relative to the resources of the interior' of this Country, that, in the year 1810, John Jacob Astor, an enterprising merchant of the City of New York, was induced to send out a Company by Sea, 'well supplied with provisions and seeds of every description, necessary in a permanent occupation of the Coast,' which was contemplated.

'This little Colony consisted of one hundred and twenty men when it arrived in the Columbia; and after ascertaining its soundings, they removed some miles above Fort Clatsop, and built the town of Astoria, where a portion of them cultivated the soil, whilst the others engaged in the Fur Trade with the Natives. The soil was found to be rich, and well adapted to the culture of all the useful vegetables found in any part of The United States, as turnips, potatoes, onions, rye, wheat, melons of various kinds, cucumbers, and every species of peas. In the course of a year or two it was believed their interest would be promoted by cultivating and securing the friendship and confidence of the tribes inhabiting the Waters of that great River; to which end the Town of Astoria was maintained by about thirty men, whilst the rest established themselves at five other points, to become fixed stations, to raise their own vegetables, trade with the Natives, and receive supplies of merchandise from the general depôt at Astoria, and return to it the fruits of their labour. One of these subordinate establishments appears to have been at the mouth of Lewis's River, one at Lanton, a

third on the Columbia, 600 miles from the Ocean, at the confluence of the Wantana River, a fourth on the East fork of Lewis's River, and the fifth on the Multnomah.¹

This Colony continued to thrive until the commencement of the late war with Great Britain, when, apprehending the danger of their situation, they were induced to transfer to some of the Agents of the North-West Fur Company of Canada the whole amount of their stock in trade for an inadequate consideration. It was, nevertheless, a fortunate transfer, as the British Sloop of War 'Raccoon' appeared soon after in the Waters of the Columbia, and they were compelled to surrender the Fort, of which the enemy took possession, and retained it until — when it was surrendered, in pursuance of a provision in the Treaty of Ghent, to Mr. Prevost, the authorised Agent of the Government of The United States.

Although the Partners of the North-West Company continued to occupy the Posts which had been established by Astor's Company, yet the sovereignty of The United States over the Territory was asserted and acknowledged by all the Subjects of Great Britain in that Region, as well as by the British Government; but the Question of Boundary is not yet settled between the two Nations.

From a celebrated literary work² the Committee have gained some knowledge of the extent of the British Claim on the North-West Coast of America, and of the progress of Discovery and Settlement in a Region, the length of which is estimated at 550, and the breadth, from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, at 350 geographical miles, and to which the name of *New Caledonia* has been assigned. This information is contained in the Review of the Travels of a Mr. Harmon, who was nineteen years in the service of the North-West Company, eight and a half of which were spent Westward of the Rocky Mountains. This Company, rivalling the East India Company in enterprise, perseverance, energy, and grasping ambition, and almost emulating them in their pretensions to a power almost sovereign, in a few years after the return of M'Kenzie, penetrated the Rocky Mountains in another, and more Northerly direction,

¹ Report made to the House of Representatives, January 1822.

² *Quarterly Review*.

1826

by a passage in 56 deg. 30 min. where the Peace River descends towards M'Kenzie's River, through a chasm, and flows by that channel into the Polar Ocean. Its current is represented as 'not very rapid,' and obstructed by few falls. The portage is but 12 miles. 'Two branches, one from the North, the other from the South, unite at the mouth of the passage; the latter having held its course along the foot of the mountains 200 miles; the former, or Finlay's Branch, having its sources in the Great Bear's Lake, nearly West from the junction 150 miles. This Lake has not yet been visited, but is represented as of immense extent, stretching far away to the Northward and Westward.

'The whole of this vast Country is intersected with Rivers and Lakes. Harmon thinks one-sixth of its surface water. The largest of the Lakes is named Stuart's Lake, 400 miles in circumference. A Post has been established on its margin in 54 deg. 30 min. North, 125 deg. West.¹ Fifty miles to the Westward of this is Fraser's Lake, 80 or 90 miles in circumference. Here, too, a Post was established in 1806. A third, of 60 or 70 miles in circumference, has been named M'Leod's Lake, on the shores of which a Fort has been built, in Latitude 55 deg., Longitude 124 deg. West. The Waters of the Lake fall into the Peace River; those flowing out of the other two are supposed to empty themselves into the Pacifick, and are probably the two rivers pointed out by Vancouver, near Port Essington. The immense quantities of salmon which annually visit these two Lakes leave no doubt whatever of their communication with the Pacifick; and the absence of this fish from M'Leod's Lake makes it also equally certain that its outlet is not into that Ocean.'

With respect to the extent of the British Claim on the South, the reviewers say that a River called the *Caledonia*, 'holding a parallel course to the *Tacoutche Tesse*, falls into the

¹ 'Distant about 180 miles from the Observatory Inlet of Vancouver, the head of which lies in 55 deg. 15 min. North, Longitude 129 deg. 44 min. West, where, by this time, the United Company of the North-West and Hudson's Bay have, in all probability, formed an Establishment, and thus opened a direct communication between the Atlantick and Pacifick, the whole way by water, with the exception of a very few miles across the Highlands which divide the Sources of the Rivers, and give them opposite directions.'—(Same work.)

Sea near the Admiralty Inlet of Vancouver, in Latitude 48 deg., and forms a natural boundary between the new Territory and that of The United States, falling in precisely with a continued line on the same parallel with the Lake of the Woods, and leaving about two degrees of Latitude between it and the Columbia.' In this assertion, however, they have fallen into a mistake. The parallel of Latitude established as the line of boundary between The United States and Great Britain, between the Lake of the Woods and the Rocky Mountains, is the forty-ninth, and not the forty-eighth.

The Committee have deemed it expedient to place before the House of Representatives this minute, but they fear tedious, narrative of the progress of discovery and occupation on the North-West Coast, that the entire history (so far as they are informed) of the claims of all civilised Nations to any portions of this Coast should be fairly presented for their consideration.

They have come to the conclusion that The United States have an incontestable claim to this Coast, from the forty-second parallel of latitude, North, nearly to the Mouth of the Strait, called on the map the Strait of *John de Fuca*, uniting on the East with our Territory West of the State of Missouri, and including a Part of the Region called New Caledonia, extending on the North beyond the forty-ninth parallel of Latitude; and that they have a better title than any other Nation to the Countries watered by the Strait of De Fuca, and the Waters themselves.

It is a principle which has sometimes been operative in the adjustment of the Boundaries between Nations who claim Sovereignty in a Country inhabited by savages only, that an actual occupation of the Subjects of any civilised Nation on the Waters of a River, shall give to that Nation a preferable right to purchase of the Aborigines all the lands which are watered by such River and its Tributaries, and beyond such waters to a point equidistant between them and other Waters which may flow in a different direction. This principle, it is said, governed Great Britain and France in the formation of the Treaty of Utrecht. The Committee do not know that it has become an absolute rule in the decision of questions concerning controverted boundaries, but experience has proved it to be a safe rule, and well adapted, not only to the interest, but to the peace and happiness of Nations.

1826
—

By the Treaty made with Spain in 1819, The United States acquired all the rights of that Nation North of the forty-second parallel of North Latitude. It is, therefore, important in this discussion to inquire whether Spain had any rights there: if she had, they were acquired by discovery, for Spain acquired no title by occupation, unless, after the forcible dispossession of the British, the temporary occupation of Nootka should have imparted it. The North-West Coast was unquestionably first discovered by Spaniards, or by Navigators in the service of Spain. Gualli, in 1582, De Fuca, in 1592, De Fonte, in 1640, Perez, in 1774, and the expedition under Heceta, 1775, all preceded the English Navigators.

The discussion of the Russian title cannot throw any additional light on this subject; Russia has expressly renounced by Treaty all claim to Territory South of 54 deg. 40 min., except her Settlement in California.

The only controversy respecting the title to this Territory to be apprehended is with Great Britain.

The discoveries of Sir Alexander M'Kenzie are entirely unconnected with this Region. There is no evidence that the North-West Company, or any other Subjects of the British King, occupied any Post on the Pacific Ocean or its Waters (previous to the occupation of the Columbia by Astor's Company, in 1810).

The American title is founded on occupation, strengthened (as the Committee believe) by purchase, by prior discovery of the River, and its exploration from some of its Sources in the Rocky Mountains to the Ocean. Great Britain can have no title so strong as this. The occupation, it is true, was not authorised originally by the Government of the United States, but they subsequently sanctioned it by demanding and receiving the surrender of the Fort: and the Posts of the United North-West and Hudson's Bay Company, for all national and legal purposes, are now, and have been for several years, in possession of The United States.

Upon the principle assumed, to what limits can the Claim of The United States be extended? As the Waters of the Oregon and the Mississippi almost unite in the chasms and valleys of the Rocky Mountains, no difficulty exists in ascertaining

the extent of this Territory towards the East. On the South, some of the branches of the Lewis River are believed to have their sources South of the forty-second degree of Latitude; the sources of the Multnomah, the Great Tributary Branch of the Oregon, are still further South. The length of the Great Northern Branch of the Columbia River is not ascertained; probably it extends to 52 deg., possibly to 54 deg. 40 min.; if it does reach 54 deg. 40 min., on the principle already assumed, a long extent of the boundary of The United States would be on the line already established between them and Russia, which would include a large part of New Caledonia.¹

After completing their examination of the American title to Domain and Sovereignty over this Region, the Committee proceeded to the examination of the Claim of Great Britain which the Correspondence discloses.

Mr. Adams, in his letter to Mr. Rush, dated July 22, 1823, asserted the positive right of The United States to all the Lands watered by the Columbia, certainly as far as Latitude 51 deg., and concludes, 'As, however, the line runs in Latitude 49 deg. to the Stony Mountains, should it be earnestly insisted on by Great Britain, we will consent to carry it in continuance, on the same parallel to the Sea.'

Mr. Rush writes August 12, 1824. He says when he made propositions for the adjustment of the boundary of the North-West Territory, 'The British Commissioners "totally" denied that any right existed on the part of The United States to Territory there.' 'They said that Great Britain considered the whole of the unoccupied parts of America as being open to her future settlements as heretofore. They included within these parts, as well that portion of the North-West Coast lying between the 42nd and 51st degrees of Latitude, as any other parts. The principle of colonisation on that Coast, or elsewhere on any portions of those Continents not yet occupied, Great Britain was not prepared to relinquish.'

¹ Captain Kendrick purchased of the Natives of this Coast a tract of land extending though several degrees of Latitude. The deeds were deposited in the Office of the American Consul at Canton. In 1796 this land was advertised for sale in the City of London, by Mr. Barrell, the Agent of the Owners of the Ship 'Columbia.'

1826

We do not propose to enter into the discussion of the principle asserted by Mr. Monroe, that no part of the Continent of North America is now to be considered as open to European colonisation. For ourselves we can only say that we are not disposed to quarrel with any Nation for colonising any portion of the American wilderness without the limits of The United States.

The British Commissioners denied that any right was acquired in this country in consequence of the original discovery of the Columbia River by Captain Gray.

Perhaps a mere discovery, which was not followed by occupation, might not impart a positive title to a country held by its aboriginal savages. But where there are conflicting and adverse claims, prior discovery ought to incline the balance in favour of the Nation by whom the discovery was made. Supposing there was a simultaneous occupation on the same Waters; in that case, the original discoverers would have the best right to occupy.

The Committee have investigated the British claim to this Territory with some care and attention.

In the first place, the Commissioners, in their Conferences with Mr. Rush, asserted the superiority of the British claim over that of all other Nations to that part of the Coast which was situated between Latitude 37 deg. and Latitude 48 deg. on this ground, that it had been originally discovered and explored by Sir Francis Drake, that he had made a formal claim to all the Territory comprehended within those limits in the name of Queen Elizabeth.

2nd. Purchase from the Natives, before The United States were an Independent Power.

3rd. That upon the River Columbia, or upon Rivers that flowed into it, West of the Rocky Mountains, her subjects had formed Settlements coeval with, if not prior to the settlement by American Citizens at its mouth. These, if we understand the Correspondence, are the evidences of title on which Great Britain rests her claim to this Territory. And never was a great Nation driven to such miserable expedients to cover that inordinate ambition which, not satisfied with half the world, seeks to add this little Territory to her unwieldy Colonial Empire.

Hackluyt, who made the first English collection of voyages, who lived in the time when Sir Francis Drake circumnavigated the Globe (while some of his Crew were yet living), informs us that he reached no higher point than 43 deg.

Purchas—we take his words from the London edition of his voyages, published there in 1617, thirty-eight years after Drake's return from this famous Expedition, and twenty-one years after his death (he died in January 1596)—says, 'Sir Francis Drake sailed on the other side of America to 40 deg. of Northerly Latitude.' And again, 'This our English Knight landed on this Coast in 38 deg.'

In Lediard's Naval History of Great Britain, published in 1735, there is a compilation of all the authentick accounts of voyages then made. Speaking of the Voyage of Sir Francis Drake, he says, 'He, therefore, boldly resolved to attempt finding a passage by North America, and sailed to the North Latitude of 2 or 3 and 40 deg. on that Coast, to discover if there were any Strait on that side, by which he might return the nearest way home. But then meeting with nothing but severity of cold, thick clouds, and open shores covered with snow, though it was then the beginning of June, he came back.'

I now come to the most minute and best written account of this voyage which exists; it is from a collection of voyages, published by John Harris, D.D., F.R.S., published in London, in 1744.

Sir Francis Drake (he says), after sailing up the Coast of South America, attacking many Towns, and making many prizes, reached the Haven of Guatulco (on the West Coast of Mexico), and attacked and captured that Town.

The Account continues—

'The Admiral now thinking he had in some measure revenged both the publick injuries of his Country, as well as his own private wrongs, upon the Spaniards, began to deliberate upon his return home; but which way he should take was the question to be resolved: to return by the Straits of the South Sea (and as yet no other passage had been discovered) he thought would be to throw himself into the hands of the Spaniards, who would probably there wait for him, with a far greater strength than he could now cope with; for he had at

1826
—

this time but one Ship left, not strong, though it was a very rich one. All things considered, he resolved to go round to the Moluccas, and so follow the course of the Portuguese, to get home by the Cape of Good Hope; but being becalmed, he found it necessary to sail more Northerly, to get a good wind; upon which design they sailed at least 600 leagues, which was all the way they made, from April 1 to June 3. June 5, being got into 43 deg. of North Latitude, they found the air excessive cold; and the further they went, the severity of the weather was more intolerable. Upon which score they made towards the land, till they came into 38 deg. North Latitude, under which height of the Pole they found a very good bay, and had a favourable wind to enter the same.'

He then describes the people, their habits, manners, customs, his transactions with them, and then says, 'These circumstances, though trivial in themselves, are of consequence in asserting our first discovery of *California*.'

He then describes an interview with people from the interior, 'King, lords, and common people.' 'The King (says he) made a solemn offer of all his kingdom, and its dependencies, to the Admiral, desiring him to take the sovereignty upon him, and professing that he himself would be his very loyal subject. And that this might not seem to be mere compliment and pretence, he did, by the consent of his nobles there present, take off the illustrious crown of feathers from his own head, and fix it upon the Admiral's, at the same time investing him with the other ensigns of royalty, did, as much as in him lay, make him King of the Country. The Admiral accepted of this new offered dignity as Her Majesty's Representative, in her name, and for her use; it being probable that from this donation, *whether made in jest or in earnest*, by these Indians, some real advantages might hereafter redound to the English Nation and interest in these parts.' He describes their adoration of him and his people by the offer of sacrifices, which were rejected with abhorrence. 'The Admiral and his people travelled to some distance up in the Country.' He describes the animals—the multitude of deer and rabbits. 'The earth of the country (says the writer) seemed to promise very rich veins of gold and silver, there being hardly any digging without throwing up some of

the ores of them. The Admiral called it *Nova Albion*, partly in honour of his own country, and partly from the prospect of white cliffs and banks which it yields to them that view it from the Sea. At his departure hence, he set up a monument with a large plate, upon which were engraven Her Majesty's name, picture, arms, title to the country, time of their arrival there, and the Admiral's own name. In this country the Spaniards had never set footing, nor did they ever discover the land by many degrees to the southward of the place.

'Sailing from hence, they lost sight of land till October 13, upon which day, in the morning, they fell in with certain Islands, in 8 deg. of North Latitude.'

From these accounts there is no evidence on which the British Nation can claim a prior discovery of this Coast.

Hackluyt says Drake reached	43.
Purchas,	40.
Lediard, between	42 and 43.
Harris,	43.

Even Great Britain would not attempt to wrest from us, on such problematical evidence, any Territory North of 42, on the ground of prior discovery.

Admitting the whole to be true, yet Cabrillo, in 1542, thirty-six years before, while in the service of Spain, penetrated to 44, and saw land in 42.

The claim of prior discovery rests wholly on the account of Francis Fletcher, Drake's Chaplain: and he is the only person who pretends to say that Drake's discoveries were extended to Latitude 48; and this is his account:—

'From Guatulco we departed the day following (viz. April 16), setting our course directly into the sea: whereupon we sailed 500 leagues in Longitude, to get a wind, and between that and June 3rd, 1,400 leagues in all, till we came into the forty-second degree of latitude.'

The night following, June 3rd, he says, 'We found such an alteration of heat into extreme and nipping cold, that our men in general did grievously complain thereof, some of them feeling their healths much impaired thereby; neither was it that this chanced in the night alone, but the next day (June 4) the ropes

1826

were stiff, and the rain which fell was an unnatural frozen substance; so that we seemed rather to be in the frozen zone than any way so near unto the sun, or these hotter climates.' He says further that 'the meat, as soon as it was removed from the fire, would become in a manner frozen up, and our ropes and tackling, in a few days, were grown to that stiffness, that what three men before were able with them to perform, now six men, with their best strength and utmost endeavours, were hardly able to accomplish.'

'The land (he says) in that part of America, bearing further out into the West than we before imagined, we were nearer on it than we were aware, and yet the nearer still we came unto it, the more extremity of cold did seize upon us. The 5th of June we were forced by contrary winds to run in with the shore, which we then first descried, and to cast anchor in a bad bay, the best road we could for the present meet with; where we were not without some danger, by reason of the many extreme gusts and flaws that beat upon us, which if they ceased and were still at any time, immediately upon their intermission there followed most vile and thick and foetid fogs,' &c.

'In this place there was no abiding for us, and to go further North the extremity of the cold (which had now utterly discouraged all our men) would not permit us, and the winds being directly against us, having once gotten us under sail again, commanded us to the Southward, whether we would or no; from the height of 48 deg. in which we now were, to 38 deg. we found the land by coasting it to be but low, and reasonably plain: every hill (whereof we saw many, but none very high), though it were in June, and the sun in the nearer approach unto them, being covered with snow.'

'In 38 deg. 30. min. we fell in with a convenient and fit harbour, and, June 17, came to an anchor therein, where we continued till the 23rd of July following; during which time, notwithstanding it was in the height of summer, and so near the sun, yet we were continually visited by the like nipping cold we had felt before.' He even says that had it not been for their necessities they would have kept their beds on account of the cold; neither, says he, could we at any time in the whole

fourteen days together find the air 'so clear as to be able to take the height of sun or star.'

The account of this Reverend Gentleman deserves some examination. On the 3rd of June, he says, they were in Latitude 42, and on the 5th of June in 48, for they were then compelled by contrary winds to alter their course, and proceeded no farther North, so they must have run six degrees of Latitude, and several degrees of Longitude, in two days or less, with a crew diseased and disheartened by excessive cold, so much that six men were required to do the common work of three.¹ The men were paralysed by the frost, the rigging frozen stiff, the rain an unnatural and frozen substance, and the meat frozen as soon as it was removed from the fire, in Latitude 42, on the third day of June!

Captain Cook, when on the same spot (March 1), says 'such moderate and mild weather appeared to us very extraordinary when we were so far North, and so near an extensive Continent at this time of year.'

On the 18th of April, Vancouver was on the same spot; he says 'the weather was delightfully pleasant.' Speaking of the hills which he descried on shore, he says 'they were beautifully green, with a luxuriant herbage. At night the Northernmost land in sight was Cape Mendocino, Latitude 43.'

Again, after having run to the Port of Sir Francis Drake, in 38, Fletcher says 'they found the weather from the 17th of June to the 23rd July so cold, that they would have kept their beds had not their necessities required exertion!'

Vancouver, who travelled a few leagues in the country surrounding this Port in November 1792, speaking of the mountainous ridge which lay between his path and the sea, says, 'As we advanced, its sides and summits exhibited a high degree of luxuriant fertility interspersed with copses of various forms and magnitude, verdant open spaces, and enriched with stately forest trees of different descriptions.' About Noon he arrived at 'a very pleasant and enchanting lawn, where he rested. It required some resolution to quit so lovely a scene, the beauty of which was greatly heightened by the *delightful serenity of the weather*.' He continues, 'We had not proceeded

¹ Fletcher says they sailed 1,400 leagues, the other accounts say 600.

1826
—

far from this delightful spot when we entered a country I little expected to find in these regions. For about 20 miles it could only be compared to a Park which had originally been planted with the true old English oak; the underwood that had probably attended its early growth had the appearance of having been cleared away, and left the stately lords of the forest in complete possession of the soil, which was covered with luxuriant herbage, and beautifully diversified with pleasing eminences and valleys, which, with the range of lofty rugged mountains that bounded the prospect, required only to be adorned with the neat habitations of an industrious people to produce a scene not inferior to the most studied effect of taste in the disposal of grounds.'

Yet in this delightful terrestrial paradise, thus seen and thus described by Vancouver, under a November sun, this buccaneering Parson almost perished with the cold in the middle of July!

Father Charlevoix deemed the whole account of the discovery of New Albion by Sir Francis Drake to be fabulous, by reason of the errors, absurdities, and falsehoods of Fletcher.

Pinkerton wholly discredits Fletcher's account of Drake's voyage, and says that his real design was to discourage all hopes of finding a passage by this way into the North Sea.

And yet, on this miserable tale of this miserable Priest, a tale discredited by their own Historians, by contemporary Authors, by subsequent Authors, Great Britain attempts to set up a claim of Territory; and to strengthen that claim they urge as a purchase, the ridiculous surrender of the Country in Latitude 38, 4 degrees S. of the American Line, by the Natives to Sir Francis Drake, who could not tell whether they were in jest or in earnest! and contend that it applies to the whole tract of country between 37 and 48!

Great Britain denies that The United States acquired any right whatever to Territory on this Coast from discovery, purchase, or occupation; yet she founds a claim to the same Territory, because she entertains a fancy that in 1578, Sir Francis Drake made a purchase of Territory around the Port which perpetuates his name; and a purchase which they do not even pretend was followed by occupation. Of whom did he purchase? If the purchase was made at all, it was made in 1578.

Since then, centuries have rolled away. The Indian tribes are constantly migrating; wave succeeds to wave in melancholy succession—they rise and disappear, and leave no trace of former existence. For aught we know, the Creeks or Cherokees might then have kindled their council-fires on the shores of the Pacifick. For aught we know, their places may now be occupied by the remnants of the Mexicans. The Shawnees of Lake Michigan once inhabited the banks of the Floridian Suwanee. The Tuscaroras of Lake Ontario once dwelled in North Carolina. New Tribes may have succeeded to the old. New rights may have been acquired which not even English Laws can impugn.

The other fact upon which the British Commissioners rested the claim of their Nation, might, if true, be material, viz.: ‘a settlement of their Subjects upon the branches of the Columbia, coeval with, if not prior to the settlement by American Citizens at its mouth.’

This fact we deny. Great Britain never had a Settlement on that River, or any of its branches, prior to Astor’s settlement in 1810.

Where was it? Who asserts it? Who knows it? What document proves it? What book of travels, geography, or history relates it? It is stated, indeed, in the ‘Quarterly Review,’ that there was a trading post established on some of the Lakes as far North as 55 deg., and North of the Line, established between Russia and The United States, as early as 1806; but the Reviewers do not even pretend that this establishment was on the Waters of the Columbia or its tributaries.

After a careful examination of the British claim, the Committee have unanimously come to the conclusion that it is wholly unfounded; and that the Navigators of Great Britain were not the original discoverers of any part of the Region which is included between the Mexican and Russian boundaries; nevertheless, the minute examination which has been made by them, of parts of this Coast, ought, perhaps, to secure to the Nation who patronised them, something more than could be claimed as a positive right; but we think the offer of Mr. Rush, to continue the boundary along the forty-ninth parallel of Latitude, from the Rocky Mountains to the Ocean, was as great

1826
—

a concession as would be compatible with our interests, our honour, or our rights.

It is a question, at first, somewhat difficult of solution, why Great Britain should have become so extremely anxious to wrest from The United States a Territory comparatively of limited extent, and, considering the vast Domains in Asia, Africa, Australasia, and America, which she has yet to populate and to reclaim, comparatively of little value. Yet a little reflection will suggest the answer.

Great Britain adopts no plans of policy from caprice or vanity; her ambition is developed in a system of wise and sagacious projects, to check, to influence, and to control all Nations, by means of her Navy and her commerce; in prosperity and in adversity, in peace and in war, she has pursued this grand design, with an energy and perseverance which does infinite credit to her political sagacity and foresight.

Great Britain and Ireland may be assimilated to huge fortifications on the Western frontier of Europe. She sends forth her fleets. Every 74 is a floating fort, which can move rapidly along the whole extent of the European Coast.

At the Strait of the Mediterranean Sea, the Southern extremity of Europe, she holds an impregnable fortress, from which she can act either upon the Southern Coasts of France and Italy, or the Coast of Barbary, near the Eastern extremity of the Mediterranean. The Ionian Islands, and Malta, will enable her to act with a controlling power upon Egypt, the Grecian Archipelago, Greece, and a great part of the Turkish Empire. In a single week she can annihilate their commerce, and destroy their maritime cities. From Gibraltar, she can also act upon the North-Western, and, from St. Helena, upon the South-Western Coasts of Africa.

The extreme Southern part of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, now in her possession, will always enable her to control the Southern part of that vast Peninsula, and its whole Eastern Coast, from Cape Town to the Red Sea.

From the Isle of France, her operations upon the African Coast can be effectually aided; and the possession of that Island establishes firmly her power to control the whole commerce of the Indian Ocean. Her continuous Settlements and Fortifica-

tions, on both Coasts of Hindostan, flanked by Ceylon, in the same manner as she flanks Europe, will always render her invincible in that Quarter.

Neither has she neglected North America. Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and Trinidad are almost in line. From the two first, she can act with powerful effect upon the whole Coast of The United States. Trinidad is almost connected with the Continent of South America, at the very point where the Caribbean Sea, which washes the whole of the North Coast of South America, unites with the Atlantick, a point equally formidable to the Republic of Columbia, the Dutch and French Possessions on the Continent, and the Empire of Brazil.

These front Stations afford her, at all times, the means of concentrating all her flying artillery of the deep, upon any selected point. These Stations enable her in war to strike with a thousand arms; and if not to annihilate, at least to controul and check the whole commerce of the Atlantick and Indian Oceans.

Always alive to her great interests, she early discovered the importance of the Pacifick Ocean to her commercial projects.

Holding the vast Island of New Holland and Van Diemen's Land, she is already possessed of the naval empire of the South-Eastern Pacifick; no long period will elapse before the Burmese Empire will fall before her arms; and the possession of Cochin China will advance the Flag of St. George to the shores of the Northern Pacifick, and sooner or later will enable her to controul the commerce of China, which exists only at Canton, to which she will be a near, a dreaded, and a dangerous neighbour.

She now claims the sovereignty of the Sandwich Islands. Taheita is obedient to her power. What then remains to enable her to encompass the globe? Columbia River and De Fuca's Strait! Possessed of these, she will soon plant her standards on every Island in the Pacifick Ocean.

Except the Columbia, there is no River which opens far into the interior, on the whole Western Shore of the Pacifick Ocean. There is no secure Port or naval station from 39 to 46.

The possession of these Waters will give her the command of the Northern Pacifick, enable her to controul the commerce

1826
—

and policy of Mexico, Central America, and South America. These rich Nations will be her Commercial Colonies. ‘She will then gather to herself all Nations, and her ambition will span the earth.’

The Committee entertain no disposition to seek a controversy with Great Britain, on a question of doubtful right; neither have they any disposition, in defence of an incontestable right, to avoid it.

The indifference of America stimulates the cupidity of Great Britain. Our neglect daily weakens our own claim, and strengthens hers; and the day will soon arrive when her title to this Territory will be better than ours, unless ours is earnestly and speedily enforced.

MEMORANDUM OF H. U. ADDINGTON, ESQ.

COLUMBIA RIVER.

May 10, 1826.

The first discovery of the Columbia River and Territory is involved in such obscurity as to render it impossible to state with precision what Nation has the fairest title to that honour.

The Claimants to it, originally four in number, namely, France, Spain, Great Britain, and The United States, are now reduced to two,—the rights of Spain and France having been conveyed *in toto* by Treaty to The United States. The latter, therefore, now assert their claim on threefold grounds:—

First, on that of first discovery, as a right derived from Spain; secondly, on the same right derived from France; and thirdly, on the ground of first occupation, in their own proper right.

These three grounds the Government of The United States represent as each perfect in itself, and as all contributing to confer a collective validity on the sum total of the claim.

The fact is, however, exactly the reverse. The three titles are in truth incompatible the one with the other. One alone can be valid, and that one it is at the option of the Americans to select. If, for example, the French or Spanish title to the Country, by first discovery, be good, then was the occupation of it by the Americans, during the existence of that title, unlawful. If, on the other hand, the American title by possession be

admitted, then were the prior claims, by discovery, of France and Spain, unsound. The one necessarily invalidates the other: all three could not, and cannot, co-exist; nor can they be admitted by Great Britain as authorised to bring each its individual weight to eke out the deficiency of its fellow.

The Claim of The United States, as Successors to the Spanish right, is founded upon the alleged prior discovery of the Coast on which the River Columbia disembogues; and in support of this claim are adduced the names of *Cortez*, who, in 1537, discovered California, of *Alarçon* and *Coronado* (1540); *Cabrillo* (1542); of *Fuca*, who is asserted to have explored that Coast, in 1592, as far North as 48 deg. Latitude; of *Aguilar*, who, in 1601, explored it to 45 deg.; of *Perez*, in 1775; and of *San Blas*, in the same year; which latter Officer is stated to have visited the Coast from Latitude 45 deg. to 58 deg.

It is, however, nowhere pretended that any of these Navigators either took possession of the Country, or formed any Settlement, permanent or temporary, publick or private, on any part of the Coast; nor is their exploration of it affirmed to have been more than general, or applicable in any particular way to the specifick point in question.

To the above formidable array of names, Great Britain contents Herself with opposing that of Drake, who, in 1578, explored the same Coast from Latitude 37 deg. to 48 deg., and made a formal claim to it in the name of his Sovereign, giving it the title of '*New Albion*.'

It would, however, seem to be superfluous to enter further into the merits of these respective Claims, since, by the Convention of 1790 (Art. V.) between Great Britain and Spain, the latter relinquished all exclusive title to the possession of any portion of Country on the Western Coast of America, beyond that already occupied by Her, that is beyond the 42nd deg. of North Latitude; and The United States, having succeeded to the Spanish title, can assert it but with all the restrictions with which She found it burthened at the period of Her succession to it, namely, in 1819.

The American title *proper*, on which by far the greatest stress is laid, is founded on the expeditions of *Gray*, and of *Lewis*, and *Clarke*, to that Country; but more especially of the first, *Gray*,

1826

a *private trader*, and sailing in a private Merchant Vessel; he, it is affirmed, arrived in 1789 at the Mouth of the Columbia River, opened a traffick with the Natives, and took possession of the River and Territory in the name of The United States.

By the word '*Territory*,' the American Government distinctly state that they understand every foot of Country watered by the Columbia and its tributary Streams, that is, from Latitude 42 deg. to 51 deg., and as far East as the Rocky Mountains; and over this extent of Country the simple dictum of a private Speculator is gravely represented as having conferred an exclusive right of Sovereignty on his own Nation.

After, in the first place, denying the validity of this private act of occupation, and, secondly, rejecting the American doctrine, that the occupation of one point on a River gives, *ipso facto*, to the Occupant an exclusive title to the whole extent of Country watered by that River and its Tributaries, Great Britain proceeds to oppose to the names of the Adventurers above-mentioned those of *Meares*, *Cook*, and *Vancouver*, all sent out on publick expeditions fitted out by their Government; but especially the latter, who, in 1792, explored most minutely every part of the Coast in question, and took formal possession of it in the name of Great Britain.

His account of that proceeding is as follows (Vol. 3, p. 109): 'Previously to Mr. Broughton's departure, however, he formally took possession of the *River* and the Country in its vicinity, in His Britannick Majesty's Name; having every reason to believe that the Subjects of no other civilised Nation or State *had ever entered this River before*:—*in this opinion he was confirmed by Mr. Gray's Sketch*, in which it does not appear that Mr. Gray either saw, or was within five leagues of its entrance.'

In addition, therefore, to the objection derived from the private character of Gray's expedition, may be adduced the doubt of his ever having reached the *River*, the attainment of which point could alone, according to the American doctrine, give a title to so extensive a right of Possession as that claimed by the United States.

The Country on the Northern branch of the Columbia had, as far back as 1793, been frequented by the Agents of the British

North-West Company, who had established trading-posts there, and were daily extending their researches along the Columbia in the direction of the Coast; but no settlement was ever made either by them, or any other persons, on the main Stream of the Columbia, until the year 1810, when a party of Americans, who had formed themselves into a Fur-trading Association at New York, established a post on the South side of the River, which they called '*Fort Astoria*,' since changed by the English into '*Fort George*.'

In 1813 the North-West Company's traders established themselves on the same spot, close to the Americans.

In the same Year, the two Countries being then at war, and the Americans at Fort Astoria being apprehensive of an attack by the British, which was reported to be in contemplation, that Establishment was voluntarily made over by them, as a regular Commercial transfer, *by a regular bill of sale*, to the North-West Company, in which bill of sale it is expressly stated that the transfer takes place of the free-will and consent of the American Company.

After the conclusion of peace, application was made, in 1815, to the British, by the American, Government, for the restitution of the above Fort, in conformity with the alleged stipulations of the Treaty of Ghent (Art. I.), and to this demand, after a long and most natural demur, the British Government acceded. Instructions were accordingly despatched, in February 1818, by Lord Castlereagh to the British Minister at Washington, directing him to acquaint the American Government with the very liberal intentions of His Majesty, but at the same time enjoining him, in the most express and explicit terms, *to reserve to Great Britain the Territorial Claim to the Tract of Country in which the Fort was situated*.

Of this valuable and important Instruction unfortunately no record exists as available authority in any appeal, on the subject of it, from Great Britain to the American Government, for its contents were imparted *verbally* by Mr. Bagot to Mr. Adams, who has since profited by this deficiency of written evidence to assert, in an instruction to Mr. Rush, dated July 22, 1823, 'that about the time of the conclusion of the Convention of 1818, some *vague* intimation was given by Mr. Bagot of British

1826
—

Claims on the North-West Coast,' to which he adds that 'the restoration of the Place and the Convention of 1818 were considered as a final disposal of Mr. Bagot's objections.'

By an equal fatality, the reservation of the Territorial Claim enjoined by Earl Bathurst on those appointed to deliver up Fort Astoria (Fort George) to the Americans, in 1818, was omitted in the Publick Act passed on that occasion between the Parties. It is true that that Act contains a reference to Earl Bathurst's Despatch, but it does not contain a tangible and *nominatim* reservation of the Claim to Great Britain, by which its value as a document of appeal is materially diminished.

Whatever advantage, however, the Americans may take in argument of these omissions, they cannot, in the smallest degree, affect our Claim to that part of the Country, at least, which lies on the North Side of the Columbia River, nor our right to the unrestricted Navigation of the River itself, which are all that Great Britain desires to insure the possession of, having distinctly signified Her willingness to abandon, on certain conditions, all Her pretensions to the Territory South of the River.

Since the restitution, in 1818, of Fort George, no Americans have ever shown themselves in those parts. That retrocession was, in fact, merely a matter of form; the Fort was delivered up on paper, but retained possession of by the British, in whose hands it has remained ever since. Latterly, however, in consequence of a recommendation from the Foreign Office, the Hudson's Bay Company have withdrawn their parties from that Post, and transferred the whole Establishment to the North Bank of the River.

In brief recapitulation, therefore, it appears that one title alone can be admitted on the part of The United States to the Tract of Country in question: that if the Spanish Claim, that is, the claim of prior discovery, be insisted on, Great Britain can shew a superior right to that advanced by The United States, inasmuch as a commissioned Navigator of her own first made formal claim to the Country in question, in the name of his Sovereign. She can also shew that the Spanish title has been annulled by the Convention of 1790, by which Spain virtually renounced all exclusive right of Sovereignty over any Tract of Country on the Western Coast of America, North of the forty-

second Parallel of Latitude. If the American Claim *proper* be insisted on, Great Britain can equally shew a superior right to The United States over the same Country, inasmuch as a commissioned Navigator of her own, fitted out on the publick account, first took actual possession of the River and Territory in dispute, in the name of his Sovereign; Her Traders first frequented the vicinity of that Country, and She has, without interruption, continued in uncontested possession of it since 1810, thereby adding to the right of discovery and possession, that derived from Use, Occupancy, and Settlement.

(Signed) H. U. ADDINGTON.

1826
—

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Fairlight: Friday, July 14, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I cannot forbear selecting the enclosed despatch of Mr. Vaughan's from a mass which I received last night, and requesting your attention to it and its enclosure.

After such language as that of the committee of the H. of Representatives it is impossible to suppose that we can tide over the Columbia, or can make to ourselves the illusion that there is any other alternative than either to maintain our claims or to yield them with our eyes wide open.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[In the conduct of the affairs of a free republic like the United States the Government must needs depend for its policy on the determinations arrived at by the mass of the nation; these determinations are ascertained from deliverances sometimes on the platform, sometimes in the Legislature. But nations, no less than individuals, when in danger of being carried away by passion, may be held in check by firmness; and retrocession before the noisy 'spread-eagleism' of the United States, at that time, would have encouraged a display of swagger and bounce, alike deplorable for the great republic, and intolerable for those who had dealings with her.

In the present note Canning fortifies his position with Lord Liverpool by calling attention to the language in the Report of the

1826
—

Committee of the House of Representatives above printed, declaratory of the exclusive objects of the ambition of the United States.

Lord Liverpool, who had shown in the last session some symptoms of mental worry, apparently advocated a submissive line of policy towards the States.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: July 18, 1826.

My dear Granville,—We have from Lamb the same account which I sent to you in my private letter of last week—of the doings of Pozzo and his conference at Paris. Surely you might find some channel of information as to those proceedings. See how awkwardly the knowledge of them coming from other sources contrasts with your contemporaneous reports of Pozzo's confidential professions.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I do not believe much in the instructions to be furnished to——; at all events, I hope he will not think of coming without them.

G. C.

[Here we find the Foreign Secretary transmitting intelligence derived from Mr. Lamb at Madrid confirmatory of intelligence previously received, and already sent before to Lord Granville, as to proceedings of the Russian Ambassador, M. Pozzo di Borgo, at Paris, not only unknown to our Ambassador at Paris, but conveying a sense entirely contrary to the communications imparted to Lord Granville, and forwarded unsuspectingly by the latter to Canning.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: July 2, 1826.

My dear Granville,—I can hardly blame Villèle for his distrust of my assurances respecting Sir C. Stuart.

Unquestionably if a French agent had arrived in Mexico, the bearer of a Constitution for that country from Ferdinand VII., I should have found it very difficult to believe and impossible to inspire in my

colleagues, or any other inhabitant of this island, the belief that the French Government had nothing to do with such a mission.

1826
— —

It is nevertheless strictly true, not only that Stuart had no authority to act in any matter of this kind, and that his having done so is not only without my instructions, but against my wishes. I cannot, however, justly disapprove of what he has done (so far as I am yet acquainted with his proceedings, and with the limits he may intend to put to them), although you see how anxiously I labour to cut them short, and to bring him home. I cannot justly disapprove, because I did permit him, advisedly, to become the negotiator of the treaty of Separation and Independence as plenipotentiary of his most faithful Majesty.

This I did because I was morally certain that no native Portuguese would either venture to sign what, I knew, must be signed on behalf of Portugal, or would be able to obtain tolerable terms from Brazil—the presence of a Portuguese plenipotentiary at Rio de Janeiro would have been a source of endless suspicion and intrigue, and would finally have spoiled the negotiation.

As a counterpart to this undertaking for the behoof of Portugal, Stuart was at liberty to charge himself, on his return to Europe, with any communication which Don Pedro might wish to make to his father or his Government.

It is hardly necessary to say that the present state of things was not in contemplation when my instructions were given. It was therefore not included in them; but neither was it excluded.

I have therefore thought it best at once to exonerate him from all blame on this account, and doing so I have thought it right further to defend what he has

1826 — done (so far as I yet know what he has done) to other Governments.

I do not mean to say that I should not have been much better pleased if he had declined the mission altogether—nor have I the least doubt that he perfectly well knew that such was the conduct which would have best pleased me. But for that very reason, and because he flatters himself that he has embarrassed me by what he has done, I have the more readily approved of it, coupling only that approbation with his recall.

All these details are not for Villèle, you will easily understand; but the knowledge of them will enable you to assert to him the fact that I never authorised,—and that I regret though I cannot condemn (as at present advised),—Stuart's agency in this affair.

As to his Portuguese title, that grew out of the negotiation between Portugal and Brazil. His late most Faithful Majesty made him Count de Machico so long ago as March last. The present King has raised his countship to a marquisate. In that there is nothing extraordinary. The Portuguese are always giving titles to our people, much against my liking.

As to the Portuguese peerage, I know nothing of it. It may be so, but it has not been announced to me.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This must be read in the light of the note on the preceding letters to Lord Granville of July 1 and 3. Sir Charles Stuart accepted a commission to carry the Charter of a Constitution from Don Pedro in Brazil to his Portuguese inheritance. The recognised character of Canning's policy, and Sir Charles Stuart's high rank in the diplomatic service, inevitably gave rise to the idea that the British Government secretly connived at the stroke of policy, either by instigating Don Pedro to adopt it, or by lending the sanction of the service of a British Agent of the highest quality in giving effect to it

The idea must have presented itself in plausible colours to reflective minds. Canning favoured, without active interference, the general tendency to the establishment of Liberal institutions for the government of foreign nations. The King of France had laid down the principle that such institutions could legitimately emanate only from the spontaneous free-will of the sovereign. It was clear, therefore, that in the case where a sovereign could be persuaded to bestow a Constitution, an advantage of a very marked kind would be obtained over the irreconcilable partisans of absolute monarchy ; they would be disabled from reasonable protestations, on the very grounds of their own especial political theories.

As a fair and open move above-board, it is conceivable enough that Canning might have taken advantage of the peculiar situation of Don Pedro to obtain from him the grant of a legitimate Charter for Portugal, if Don Pedro had not already accepted the notion on his own behalf.

But looking at the whole situation in the Peninsula and on the Continent generally at this time, it is only reasonable to acknowledge that a Constitution for Portugal was of less European importance than the evacuation of the Peninsula by the French ; and that, whether this turbulent little state possessed Liberal institutions sooner or later, must needs have formed an incomparably less important element in Canning's calculations, than the never-ceasing disparagement to the success of his policy implied in the presence of the French army on the south of the Pyrenees.

Nevertheless, either because it suited him to affect to believe in the reality of Canning's intrigues at Rio de Janeiro, or because of the vehement insistence of the hostile courts on the Continent, Villèle appears to have begun to exhibit marked distrust of Canning's assurances respecting Sir Charles Stuart.

Nothing can exceed the firmness with which Canning allows to Villèle the plausibility of the appearances against himself, while calmly disclaiming their reality ; nor does he seek to cast undue blame on Sir Charles Stuart. He appreciates the pleasure the latter must have taken in embarrassing his chief ; but feels no rancour when reflecting that Stuart's conduct, whatever might be his private feelings, could be honestly defended on the score of the actual nature of the situation.]

THE KING OF FRANCE TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

Copie d'une lettre de S. M. T. C. (Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne) à S. M. C. (Sa Majesté Catholique).

St. Cloud : 23 Juillet 1826.

1826
—

Monsieur mon Frère et Neveu—Le Duc de Villa Hermosa m'a remis la lettre que V. M. (Votre Majesté) m'a écrite le 4 Juin, et par laquelle Elle me témoigne le désir de voir prolonger, pour quelque tems encore, le séjour de mes troupes dans la Péninsule.

V. M. connaît l'intérêt que je porte à sa personne, et à la prospérité de son Royaume.

Le Roi, mon frère, avait donné la mesure de ce double sentiment quand il chargea mon fils de repousser la révolution, qui avait envahi l'Espagne, et de vous rendre à l'amour de vos loyaux sujets. Il n'a pas hésité à faire les sacrifices qu'exigeait l'accomplissement de cette noble tâche. J'ai imité son exemple, et je les ai continués ; mais, comme lui, j'avais l'espoir qu'ils tourneraient au profit réel de V. M., et qu'en garantissant la tranquillité intérieure et extérieure de l'Espagne, la présence des troupes Françaises permettrait à son gouvernement de rétablir l'administration, les finances et l'armée, ou, de préparer du moins les élémens de l'amélioration, que les circonstances avaient rendue nécessaires.

C'est avec une vive peine que j'ai vu tromper cet espoir : la situation de l'Espagne, je dois le dire, s'est plutôt aggravée qu'améliorée ; les conseils transmis par mon ambassadeur sont restés sans effet ; et les efforts du gouvernement de V. M. n'ont point été proportionnés aux difficultés, qu'il s'agissait de vaincre.

La prolongation d'un tel état des choses est du plus grand danger pour l'Espagne.

Celle du séjour de mes troupes dans la Péninsule devient pour mon Trésor une charge trop pénible, et l'intérêt de mes sujets m'obligerait à la diminuer.

Si néanmoins, déférant à votre désir, je me décide à ajourner le rappel du corps d'occupation, V. M. ne s'étonnera pas que j'y mette aujourd'hui des conditions, que je crois être dans son intérêt.

Je continuerai donc à laisser mes troupes dans les positions

1826
—

qu'elles occupent maintenant jusqu'au mois d'avril 1827, si je puis acquérir l'espérance fondée—que V. M. suivra avec énergie l'impulsion de son cœur en s'occupant de relever l'administration de son Royaume—de concilier les haines de parti, de ressaisir les nombreux élémens de prospérité, que l'Espagne possède encore, de rétablir l'ordre et l'économie dans les finances.

En appliquant ce principe à sa propre maison, S. M. fera une chose dont l'influence sera salutaire.

Je ne puis, sur ce point, lui citer un plus noble exemple que celui de mon auguste prédécesseur, qui, en 1815, et quand tant de maux pesaient sur la France, réduisit sa Liste Civile d'un tiers, au profit de l'Etat.

Qu'elle donnera des ordres précis à ses ministres pour que les réclamations nombreuses de mes sujets, dont la plupart se fondent sur l'exécution des traités, et qui toutes sont, depuis trop longtemps, ajournées, soient examinées sans délai, et pour que le compte des avances de mon trésor soit arrêté de manière à en assurer le remboursement.

J'engagerai aussi V. M. à prendre la résolution de régler par un arrangement sa position définitive à l'égard de ses colonies insurgées.

Je sens combien un si grand sacrifice est douloureux ; mais au point où en sont venues les choses, je dois dire avec franchise que je le regarde comme indispensable.

Je donne à mon ambassadeur l'ordre de développer à vos ministres les idées que je me suis borné à vous indiquer.

Je répète à V. M. que j'ai la ferme conviction qu'en les suivant Elle rendra le bonheur à ses peuples et se montrera digne de sa glorieuse destinée.

Je saisis avec empressement l'occasion de renouveler à V. M. l'expression de la haute estime, et de l'inviolable amitié, avec laquelle je suis, Monsieur mon Frère et Neveu, de Votre Majesté

Bon Frère et Oncle

(Signé)

CHARLES.

[The foregoing letter is endorsed as having been 'communicated to Mr. Canning by the Baron de Damas, October 23, 1826, at Paris.'

It is possible that Canning had seen a copy before that date ; it is most probable that Villèle had informed him of the existence of

1826 — the letter, and of its purport at the time, particularly as the remonstrances embodied in it deal with Spanish affairs in a manner entirely in harmony with Mr Canning's own tone with regard to them. In fact, the letter might have been drafted in the British Foreign Office for the signature of the French king without materially altering its tenor.

It dwells on the familiar topics of the extravagance of the Spanish Court, the confusion of the public finances; the unredressed grievances of French subjects; the unchecked prevalence of party bitterness; the disorganisation alike of the Spanish army, and of the administration of the civil government. It then exhorts to economy on the Civil List, to a settlement of the finances, to efforts at softening the party feelings in the nation, to a reorganisation of the army, to reform of civil administration, and lastly to instant redress of the grievances of French subjects according to the treaty stipulations in that behalf. The letter then makes a personal favour of the continuance of the French occupation—their withdrawal had been fixed for October 1826; the French king will extend it for six months, to April 1827; but the King of Spain is warned that the continuance of the burden of garrisoning Spain, and preserving order in the Peninsula, is more than France can bear financially, and his Majesty must prepare himself for being left to his own devices.

But the main point of the letter lay in an apparent concession to Spanish exigencies, but in reality a new political move of the continuance of the French occupation for a further period of six months. The news of Don Pedro's Constitution for Portugal had been in possession of the French Government for nearly a month: that Sir Charles Stuart carried the instruments of Government, and that, on his arrival in Portugal, he actively co-operated with the Portuguese Government in giving full effect to their provisions, created a conviction, though an erroneous one, in the minds of the French Government, that Canning originated and was guiding the whole proceeding.

The continuance of the military occupation was expensive, and inconvenient; but this stroke in behalf of constitutionalism demanded instantly a counter blow, and the prolongation of the time of the French evacuation was the reply of the French Government to what they thought was the 'Liberal' challenge of Canning.

This letter proves that the relations between the two Bourbon monarchies were becoming highly strained, and that France had been seriously contemplating an evacuation of Spain at a very early opportunity.

What between the Carlists and the Revolutionists, matters looked

badly for Ferdinand's monarchy if he lost the support of the French army.

If the Portuguese Constitution could have been postponed for only a twelvemonth, until the French had retired behind the Pyrenees, it might have floated in calm waters, without danger from any side except its own untrustworthy constituents. Spain assuredly would have been, as she actually became, by that time powerless for foreign aggression.

Meanwhile the Portuguese regency under the Infanta, sister of Dons Pedro and Miguel, acting in behalf of Donna Maria di Gloria, Don Pedro's daughter, the latter being, on his abdication, now Queen of Portugal, paused at first, for a time, before acting on the instruments of government brought over by Sir Charles Stuart.

The news of the grant of the Constitution (p. 194 of vol. iii. of the '*Political Life*') reached Europe by a French frigate, and the French Government published the telegraphic despatch containing the intelligence; and this, being copied into newspapers, became known in Lisbon on July 1, seven days before the arrival of Sir Charles Stuart. Such an interval somewhat embarrassed the regency, who, having nothing as yet to announce corresponding to the newspaper reports, became suspected by the Liberals of suppressing the charter of their liberties.

On July 7 Sir Charles Stuart, bearing Don Pedro's instruments, arrived at Lisbon, and proceeding to Caldas, where the regency was established, duly delivered over the instruments of government. He explained at the same time that, after accepting from the late King the character of a plenipotentiary to negotiate the terms of the release of Brazil from allegiance to the Crown of Portugal, and thereby placing his services at the disposal of the Sovereign of Portugal, he could not well refuse when the reigning King of Portugal, though in Brazil, desired to continue to retain his services for the purpose of carrying a message to his Majesty's ancient dominions in Europe, for the purpose in his turn of releasing his European subjects from allegiance to their legitimate sovereign.

Notwithstanding some professions of abnegation, it appears clear from Sir Charles Stuart's despatches that he lent the aid of his counsels to the Portuguese regency in their proceedings to give effect to Don Pedro's decrees.

This he did, as the dates show, entirely on his own responsibility; and, being beyond the limits of his authority from Don Pedro, it necessarily bore the complexion of an interference of a British diplomatist, under instructions from his own Foreign Office, in the affairs of an independent country.

1826

Sir Charles Stuart's action greatly committed Canning's political position, not only at the moment, but years after, when Canning was in his grave.

As regards the end and object, Sir Charles's conduct coincided with Canning's principles, and could not well be repudiated. As regards the means, an active intermeddling in the concerns of an independent state, it deviated widely from those principles, and provoked incessant warnings and disclaimers from London.

On July 12 the regent issued a kind of preparatory proclamation explaining the intention of her royal brother, and commending his proposals to the good-will of the nation. On the next day, July 13, the Decrees and Charter were published, and orders given out for the taking the oaths of obedience to its provisions, by the separate estates of the realm in the several provinces, before the meeting of the estates under the new Constitution.

Some signs of discontent appeared ; some slight manifestations in favour of absolutism and Don Miguel broke out in the garrisons at Lisbon and Oporto, but the mass of the troops remained steady, and suppressed the movements of the disaffected ; nevertheless the greater part of the Ministry—all but two—retired, and the Infanta, and her Council of Regency, had to compose a new administration.

On August 1 the Authorities generally throughout the kingdom swore fidelity to the Charter, and its provisions were considered to come into force.

The Council of Regency consequently dissolved, and the Infanta became sole regent in behalf of her niece. She appointed a new Ministry, of which Don Francisco d'Almeida was Foreign Minister, and General Saldanha War Minister.

Though the fact was known that Sir Charles Stuart's action in the matter originated with himself, and had not received any antecedent authorisation from the British Government, still, as the British Government did not disavow it in any way, the Portuguese nation looked upon the new order of affairs as agreeable to the general wishes of Canning ; and this consideration lent great strength to its establishment.

Now, however, that the Constitution was launched, the oaths taken, and deliberations entered upon as to the details of its working, in respect of elections and the like, the time had come for its enemies at home and abroad to begin to bestir themselves.

No time appears to have been lost ; a few days after the ceremony of swearing to the Constitution, a body of Portuguese troops on the Spanish frontier mutinied, and proclaimed Don Miguel king.

The continued presence of the French army in Spain allowed a

certain amount of apparent freedom of action by the Spanish Government, which the real state of affairs did not warrant.

The truth was that Ferdinand's Government, besides being intrinsically rotten, found itself beset on both sides by jealous and excited partisans, representing political opinions, mutually opposed, but alike in operating destructively on the position of the existing occupant of the throne. The British Government, on principle, urged counsels of toleration, comprehension, and good administration; the French Government, fearing to see the fruits of their military occupation utterly lost, likewise advised, as may be observed in Charles X.'s letter above given, a widening of the basis of public opinion to which Ferdinand should appeal, and the pursuit of a policy of pacification and conciliation towards the Liberal party. Impelled no doubt by this double pressure, Ferdinand's Government turned from the harsh counsels of the bigoted Absolutists, and essayed to win the support of the Constitutionalists. If Ferdinand had been the sole representative of legitimate monarchy in Spain to whom the Absolutists could look, no doubt they must have made the best of their leader's trimming policy; but Ferdinand's brother Don Carlos, like Don Pedro's brother Don Miguel, professed a political and religious character more bitter and aggressive than his milder senior; and a deviation in the succession from one brother to another did not appear to the Legitimists more than their conscience could bear. They therefore, deserting their natural position as supporters of the reigning monarch, began to form dangerous and treasonable combinations with a view to transfer the government to Don Carlos in the place of Ferdinand. These combinations broke out into open rebellion in the course of a short time.

Between the opposite attacks of Liberals and Carlists, the French army offered the only trustworthy support for Ferdinand's throne.

With the example of Don Carlos before him, Ferdinand and his supporters could scarcely regard Don Miguel's pretensions to sovereignty in Portugal with any great complacency; on the other hand, they could hardly view with indifference the establishment of a contagious centre of constitutionalism within the narrow limits of the Peninsula, within which both monarchies of Spain and Portugal are effectually cooped up together.

There could be no doubt that any formal and undisguised attack upon Portugal, to destroy the Constitution by external violence, must bring Spain into immediate collision with Great Britain. No need existed in such a war, once pronounced and declared, that terrestrial operations should be undertaken on the part of Great Britain; her naval supremacy could alone annihilate Spanish com-

1826

merce, destroy all hope of tolerable terms with the separated colonies, and wrest Cuba and other stray remnants of the western empire from the hands of Spain. The conclusive effect of such a blow on the ill-balanced political situation in Spain might easily be calculated : either Ferdinand must have accepted Constitutionalism, and lost all he had so far striven to retain ; or assuredly, between the two contending parties, he would have lost his crown.

The support afforded by the military power of France promised small aid in a struggle with Great Britain. In a war with Great Britain, France, unless sustained by a singular unanimity of French popular opinion, could expect little but disaster and discredit. French popular opinion had sanctioned the successful effort of the Spanish expedition by way of reviving her depressed military energies, and recovering some portion of her lost prestige ; but a war, only as auxiliary to Spain, to assist in perpetrating violent outrage on a neighbour's independence, could commend itself neither to the large and formidable Liberal party in France, nor to any section of the commercial community in that country, whose interests must suffer with peculiar severity from the maritime nature of the struggle.

M. de Villèle had been particularly addressing the energies of the Government to various financial adjustments, calculated as they supposed to lighten some of the terrible burdens left by Napoleon's wars. A political catastrophe, originating only in unpopular views of monarchical theories, would probably have paralysed the resources of the Government at once, and handed Charles X. out of the kingdom four years earlier than actually happened.

We arrive, therefore, at the double conclusion that France could not assist Spain for purposes of aggression, and that Spain could not venture herself into open war with Portugal.

But the Spanish Government were suffering under a latent fever of 'Carlism' or 'Apostolicism,' and the idea of finding a vent for this feverish sentiment in the direction of Portugal, by permitting its advocates without authority to co-operate with and encourage the dangerous elements of discontent in Portugal, offered some prospect of upsetting the Portuguese Constitution without at the same time committing Spain, as a nation, to any act of unmistakable hostility, which it might be impossible subsequently to disavow.

Such is a rough sketch of the political situation of the Peninsula at this time, and from it may be learnt the precise forces at work, which, expressed in concrete terms, are described as the most vehement intrigues of the Absolutist party or 'Apostolics' at

Vienna, at Paris, and at Madrid, to foil what they falsely imagined was a device of Canning's, and what was unquestionably, when legitimately born, supported by him, the new Portuguese Constitution.

The hostile feeling of the Spanish court towards the constitutional form of the Government in Portugal took shape in petty diplomatic insults to Portugal, and in the more questionable and provocative policy of ignoring the conduct of Spanish officers on the frontier, who harboured and maintained large bodies of Portuguese military deserters, and let them loose to invade in hostile manner their native country.

By creating artificial and illusive diplomatic difficulties the Spanish Government succeeded partially in avoiding the necessity of taking cognisance of the complaints of the constitutional and *de facto* Government of Portugal with regard to the conduct of these deserters, and the undisguised maintenance afforded to them by the frontier Spanish authorities.

On the very days on which the Portuguese authorities were swearing fidelity to the new Constitution, namely, August 1 and 2, certain regiments, severally stationed towards the northern and southern extremities of the Spanish frontier, crossed the boundary, and met with a friendly reception and entertainment by the local Spanish authorities.

In default of the power of the Portuguese representative, Don Gomez, at Madrid, to prefer complaints in behalf of his Government in consequence of his refusal to swear fidelity to the Constitution, Mr. Lamb, the British Minister, undertook to bring the complaints of this intolerable behaviour of Spanish officials before the Government at Madrid, and succeeded in obtaining a kind of apology from the Prime Minister, the Duc del Infantado, and a disclaimer of sanction for such conduct.

Slight and evasive as was this apology, it proved too much for the clerical and apostolical party, and the Duc retired from office in the course of August, while Don Manuel Gonzalez Salmon took his place.

Most of the irreconcilable conduct of the Spanish court at this time was traced to M. de Moustier, the French ambassador, who showed by his conduct a certain independence of Villèle, and of his ostensible instructions, which no doubt establishes in effect the reality of the belief that the French court secretly directed the diplomacy of the country over the heads of its responsible Ministers.

The Portuguese Government now accredited the Count de Villa

1826 — Réal as likely to prove an acceptable person to the Spanish court, with a view to restore diplomatic relations; but Spain refused to accept the count's credentials, on the false pretence that France and Austria had not recognised the constitutional Government at Lisbon. As it happened, France had actually done so.

Meanwhile, in the interests of peace, Canning was counselling Portugal to put forward the least possible amount of demand for satisfaction in the matter of the succour and entertainment of her deserting troops]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: August 13, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a letter which I have received from the D. of W., and a copy of the answer which I return to it.

I desire Howard to send you at the same time a letter which I received yesterday from Palmella, and of one which I wrote in consequence to Sir W. A'Court.

He will also send to you (if you have not already seen them) the drafts to Sir William A'Court, to which Palmella's letter to me and mine to the D. of W. refer.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Sends copy correspondence just passed with the Duke of Wellington, also a letter from Palmella, the Portuguese Prime Minister, and of despatch to Sir W. A'Court, also draft despatches to Sir W. A'Court, to which all the foregoing refer.

Of the correspondence with the Duke, the Duke's letter will be found printed p. 375, vol. iii. of Wellington Correspondence, under date August 11, 1826. To prevent cause of provocation being given to Spain by the licence of Portuguese language in their Chambers and press, Wellington wished Canning to recommend to the Portuguese a prohibition of publication of the debates, and a temporary suspension of the freedom of the press.

The Duke considered the Portuguese powers of resistance to be too feeble to be able single-handed to withstand Spain, and that England would be obliged to succour Portugal if attacked by Spain.

Lord Liverpool, in a letter of August 16, 1826 (p. 381, Wel-

lington Correspondence, vol. iii.), stated he had been impressed by some one with the idea that Portugal, for defensive purposes, could withstand Spain 1826
—

The Duke, on August 18, replied that he must have been the some one, as indeed he held such opinion ; but then it depended upon the proper organisation and readiness to bring into play all the resources of Portugal.

Canning's reply to the Duke's letter of August 11 is not printed, but we may gather its tenor from the Duke's rejoinder of August 21 (p. 384) ; and it appears to have met the Duke's suggestion by a reference to the rule against interference with the internal affairs of another country. Wellington's rejoinder is couched in his most curt and emphatic style. He dreaded another Peninsular war, possibly involving another French war : confident in the goodness of his motive and rectitude of his purpose, he treated all means as lawful for the end. He thus urged a measure profoundly injurious to liberty in Portugal ; utterly inconsistent, if insisted upon by England, with British professions of abstention from interference in the internal concerns of independent states ; and lastly, signalling a triumph of Spain over Portugal, of France behind Spain over England behind Portugal, and of the spirit of absolutism over the spirit of freedom in the world.

But Wellington could never see more than the field of battle, ulterior consequences and invisible principles of conduct made little perceptible impression on his mind.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: 8 A.M., August 16, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I was very much afraid that I should not be able to keep my appointment with you to-day.

I caught a blast of cold on the Chain Pier on Sunday night, which fell upon the bowels and kept me in bed all Monday, and a great part of yesterday. Sir M. Tierney would not allow me even yesterday to make sure of sitting out to-day, so I thought it best not to write to you at all ; but finding that Stapleton had written to the F. O., I think it possible that you may have heard of my being unwell ; and I therefore send this messenger by Combe to Windsor, to tell you that I shall set out shortly

1826

after him ! The only difference in my plan will be that I cannot be with you quite so early as I intended.

The messenger carries a box of despatches just arrived from Lord Ponsonby, which you may like to see, and two other boxes, one containing some of Lieven's communications, and the other a private letter from Granville and one from Lord Ponsonby. They are all addressed to the King, lest you should not be in the way when the messenger arrives ; but he will give them to you on your asking for them. Be so kind as to replace the directions, and send the messenger on.

Ever yours,

G. C.

[Canning being obliged to despatch a messenger early, and fearing that Lord Liverpool may have heard of his indisposition, takes advantage of the messenger to send word that, his indisposition notwithstanding, he means to get from Brighton to Lord Liverpool's place at Combe, that very day ; which he accomplished, as Lord Liverpool writes on August 16, 1826 (Wellington Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 381), that ' Canning is here.'

The King's messenger carried a box of despatches received from Lord Ponsonby, who was employed in South America in endeavouring to terminate the war between Brazil and Buenos Ayres.

Prince Lieven's communications must have referred, as usual, to the complications of the Greek question.

It has been related that the result of the Duke of Wellington's negotiations with Russia in March and April of this year had, so far as the Greek question was concerned, taken the form of a protocol dated April 4, 1826, declaratory of the terms on which Russia and Great Britain concurred in recommending to the belligerents a pacification.

Roughly speaking, the terms included a release of Greece from all obligations except an acknowledgment of the suzerainty of the Porte, and a payment of a moderate fixed tribute to the suzerain ; they proposed to stipulate for local self-government, liberty of conscience, and freedom of commerce for the Greeks, and an expulsion of the Turkish inhabitants of the Greek territory, apparently subject to the condition of their property being purchased by the Greek Government.

The diplomatic operation now engaging the attention of the several Foreign Offices of the Great Powers seems to have been the formal communication, by Russia and Great Britain jointly, of their Protocol of April 4 to France, Austria, and Prussia.]

1826
—

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Brighton : August 25, 1826.

My dear Granville,—So far the affair of the Protocol goes on swimmingly. Pozzo has taken his part in it fairly and honestly. He wrote a private letter to Lieven (before your conference with Damas), which Lieven has shown to me, and which is in the best tone. Lieven is at the York Hotel, where, as he may not perhaps have received his despatch from Pozzo, I shall have the pleasure of making him acquainted with the particulars of your conference as soon as I have despatched Clanricarde with my day's post to the F. O.

I shall return to town on Monday. We begin Cabinetting on Tuesday—a week sooner than was intended (on account of the sad accounts of threatened scarcity in Ireland).

I cannot fix a day for my arrival at Paris, but I see no reason why it should be later than I last announced, about the middle of next month.

Lieven and I have another *livraison* of Protocol nearly ready—indeed, quite so except the transcription. But L. rather wishes to put off making the second communications until we can at the same time make the third and last. I am not quite sure how this will be decided. The second is merely narrative, and requires no answer. The third will be prospective, but will give time for answering.

I incline rather to the separate stages. Lieven's difficulty seems to me only about multiplying messengers to his court. If he has none other ; I shall hardly give

1826

way. But the third stage cannot be gone till after Cabinets.

I hope to find your gout gone and forgotten. I am promised an escape from that visitation in virtue of two attacks of bile, under one of which I am at this moment suffering.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning was now back at Brighton.

We find him expressing himself with great approbation of Count Pozzo di Borgo's straightforward behaviour in the matter of the notification of the Protocol on Greek affairs to the French court. Pozzo's good conduct only sprung from his well-known natural sympathy with the Greek cause, which, in effect, Russia and England were now united in promoting by their respective diplomatic proceedings.

Count Pozzo's note to Count Lieven, to which Canning refers in this letter to Lord Granville, will be found printed, with a note sending it to the Duke of Wellington, dated August 23, at page 389, vol. iii., of 'Wellington Correspondence.'

The conference referred to in the second paragraph must be the interview which Lord Granville and Pozzo jointly had with M. de Damas, the French Foreign Minister, mentioned in Pozzo's note to Lieven.

A failure of the potato crop threatened distress in Ireland (see the correspondence between the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel, at pages 390-1, vol. iii., *ibid.*), and required a meeting of the Cabinet to consider of means to mitigate the effects of the misfortune.

The rest of the letter discusses, firstly, the further communications, partly historical and partly prospective, to be made to the court of France, in continuation of the notification of the Protocol on the Greek question; and secondly, the state of health of the two distinguished correspondents.

Canning now departs on his long-contemplated visit to Paris, and the series of letters to Lords Liverpool and Granville intermit for nearly four weeks.

There is a somewhat similar gap in the 'Wellington Correspondence,' between the end of August and beginning of October.

These intervals may be presumed to represent a period of general holiday time and repose.

The distrust and dislike entertained towards Canning by the

Tory section of the Cabinet, exactly when the outer world believed Canning to be nearly at the zenith of his power and influence, may be perceived by the discerning eye in the very style of the Duke of Wellington's private letters to the Foreign Secretary, and betray themselves still more undisguisedly in the letters written to and received from the Duke's more congenial colleagues. The correspondence with Lord Bathurst, at pages 402-5, vol. iii. of 'W. C.,' shows the ill-dissembled rage with which they watched Canning's Liberal policy: the Tory Minister looked to the Duke to check it; which it seems he succeeded in doing to some degree; but Lord Bathurst felt he was writing to a safe correspondent when he spoke of the 'Foreign Office attempting to slip' from the position of 'the Protocol' on Greek affairs; and he told a story of Canning's saying, 'We might do what we like about it,' which Lord Bathurst, to give the full effect of an imputation of slyness on Canning, supposes was not meant to be overheard.

The wonder is, not that they separated from him in 1827, but that they submitted so long to his unquestioned predominance in the Cabinet.

It must have been peculiarly mortifying to the school of politicians to see Russian power, naturally the mainstay of legitimist principles, induced by the cogency of circumstances to follow suit in a strongly marked liberal policy in favour of Greece, and even of Portugal; for the Russian Government openly held the opinion that a constitution bestowed voluntarily by a sovereign was a sound and valid constitution; and so great was the ascendancy attributed to Canning that Lord Bathurst firmly believed that the British Foreign Office induced Count Lieven to adopt, in the teeth of the professed views of Nicholas and Count Nesselrode, the tone friendly to the Greek cause noted on Lieven's arrival at St. Petersburg, when the Duke of Wellington was there in the previous March.]

MR. CANNING, AT PARIS, TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: September 20, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—A messenger arrived here late on Monday night, with these despatches from Madrid.

I have detained him till to-day that I might send by him, at the same time with the despatches—I, a draft of a despatch to Granville, directing him to communicate with M. Damas on their contents.

1826

—

1826

2. Granville's despatch reporting his conference.

3. A draft of a despatch which I send to-night to Lamb, by a French messenger ; who will, I hope, carry orders to M. de Moustier to act a little more frankly in the spirit of his government.

4. I send also (in another box) four drafts of a despatch to Mr. Temple at Berlin, on Count Bernstorff's reception of the communication of the Protocol.

5. Draft of a despatch to Granville, enclosing copy of my despatch to Mr. Temple and some other despatches of no importance from Lamb, and one from Forster.

Be so good as to forward all to Planta by the messenger, who will wait your orders.

You see I am not idle here ; and, upon the whole, perhaps time would be gained by moving the Foreign Office hither during the summer—one is so much nearer every field of diplomatic action.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

I add the copy of a private letter which I write to Count Lieven, and a copy of a private letter from Lamb.

[This note accompanies despatches received from Mr. Lamb at Madrid, and also a number of draft despatches on current Foreign Office business, which Canning desires to submit to Lord Liverpool on their road to the Foreign Office, to be copied for signature and despatch.

The substance of Mr. Lamb's despatches is contained at pp. 202–204, vol. iii. of 'Political Life' ; they seem to have reported the negotiations carried on, or attempted to be carried on, between Portugal and Spain, relative to the harbouring and favouring of legitimist or 'Apostolical' Portuguese deserters by the Spanish authorities.

The Spanish Minister, the Duc del Infantado, having promised some partial redress, as has been said, suffered dismissal at an early date ; and Don Manuel Gonzalez Salmon succeeded him.

M. Gomez, the Portuguese Minister at Madrid, having declared himself an 'Apostolical,' withdrew from his diplomatic function.

The Count de Villa Real, sent to take the place, could not obtain recognition of his quality from the Spanish Government, but nevertheless found means to lodge a demand for the surrender of the deserters.

Mr. Lamb supported the Portuguese demands.

By Canning's advice the Portuguese reduced their demands to a surrender only of the arms and accoutrements of the deserters, and not of their persons.

The Spanish Government argued that to comply with these demands would amount to acknowledgment of the Portuguese regency, which they did not intend to acknowledge.

M. de Moustier, the French ambassador at Madrid, avowedly held one language, in his official capacity, favourable to Portugal, and another language, in his private capacity, favourable to Spanish views of hostility to the Portuguese constitution.

Such must have been the topics of Mr. Lamb's despatches.

At page 205 of the 'Political Life' will be found the substance of Canning's despatch, dated October 4, 1826, to Mr. Lamb in reply—this being the despatch of which the draft is sent in the above letter to Lord Liverpool—by which Mr. Lamb was authorised to quit Madrid, if the Spanish Government persisted in refusing reparation.

At p. 417 of the 'Wellington Correspondence' appears printed the Duke of Wellington's letter to Lord Liverpool, pointing out that the execution of these instructions to Mr. Lamb amounted to a signal for war, and complaining of such a decisive step being taken without consulting Wellington himself, or the Cabinet at large. We must admit that the importance of the measure justified these complaints, and can only suppose Canning's excuse to be the extreme urgency of the occasion.

Fortunately, Mr. Lamb, by his unassisted remonstrances, extracted the desired orders from the Spanish Government.

Nevertheless, Metternich, without actually going so far as to release Don Miguel, did not hesitate to intrigue actively against the Portuguese Constitution, and to encourage the Spanish Government in their petty hostilities.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris : September 29, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I take for granted that Planta sent you a copy, taken by Stapleton, of my letter to the King by the last courier ; but lest he should have

1826
—

failed to do so, I enclose one (No. 1) made here by Clanricarde, which you will be so good as to return to me by the same messenger who takes it to you. This messenger is not going on to London, but will return with the bag by the packet on Wednesday morning.

I had yesterday my first talk of near three hours with Villèle. Hitherto we had only met at great dinners, and I resolved to wait till he should propose a private interview, as I feared that any appearance of eagerness on my part would conspire, with the twittings of the two Oppositions, to make him apprehensive of the inferences which might be drawn from our meeting in private. However, the proposition was made by him after his own great dinner on Monday last, and I was with him yesterday by ten o'clock in the morning. Our conversation is recorded in the enclosed copy of a letter to the King (No. 2).

I am to see him again at the same hour to-morrow, when I intend to lead the conversation to the affairs of the Peninsula.

I enclose (No. 3) a secret bulletin from the quarter which I have often mentioned to you, but which I do not recollect whether I have ever had occasion to mention as in communication with some one who has communication with Windsor as well as with P. P. [Prince Polignac, French ambassador in London]. With respect to the intelligence derived through his 'correspondent,' I have had no such means of verifying it. But the 'correspondent' himself I know to be the person who conveyed to me anonymously the fact that Hobhouse was the writer of the letter to me in 1819. He is a frequenter of Ridgeway's, and I suppose a writer in newspapers; but of that I am not sure. What is said of S——k is curious. The interview I cannot believe, but it is not the first time that there has been something

1826
—

of an intercourse or understanding with Windsor, arising out of transactions respecting the Queen, in which somehow or other S——k had made himself serviceable: of the particulars I am not informed; but it is well as S——k is at war with the Treasury, you should see what is said about him.

The enclosed papers (No. 4) prove satisfactorily that we need not go to war for Persia, nor pay him the 200,000 tomauns. But was there ever such a treaty as this, for signing which Sir Gore Ouseley enjoys a pension of 2,000—not tomauns, but pounds sterling a year!

This is all I have to say to you in the way of business. I expect messengers every hour, from Vienna and Constantinople, Madrid and Lisbon; and Pozzo expects one from Moscow by the end of the week. The fire at Constantinople is said to have been still raging on the third. Stratford's last despatch is of the thirty-first ult., on which day the fire had broken out. We are going to-night to a private play at St. Cloud, the first act of gaiety which Charles X. has committed there. It is in honour, not of Michaelmas Day, but of the birthday of the Duc de Bordeaux.

To-morrow the Yankee minister gives me a great dinner, at which I expect to meet Gallatin, who is coming here for a frisk of three weeks.

Sundays we are quiet.

But Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday in next week are full; after which I hope to have done with these convivialities, at least till Pozzo's dining-room is ready, which he is preparing with the utmost activity.

I hope the little Jesuit arrived safe. I sat next his patron, the Bishop of Hermopolis (*ministre des cultes*), the other day at dinner, and contrived to get him near

1826
—

me on purpose. He is a worthy old man, not a Jesuit, I think, nor a lover of Jesuits himself, but deeply impressed with the importance of bringing some religion back into France, and thinking the Jesuits the best instruments for effecting that object. I was much amused with one part of his conversation respecting the slave trade. I wanted to persuade him to suggest to the Pope to issue a bull to put it down. He listened to me with great willingness on the ground that such a bull might do good to the Catholics of Ireland; but so little feeling had he upon the matter of slave trade itself, that when, after describing its Antichristian character, and all its horrors in practice (most eloquently, as I flattered myself), I ended with saying, 'And it is now with Catholic countries only that the shame and criminality of this monstrous traffic rests,' my convert (as I hoped to find him) answered with the greatest mildness and simplicity, 'Apparement, ils en ont plus de besoin;' thus clearly indicating that he believed the whole question of abolition to be one of mere policy on our part, and that an anxiety to see other nations follow our example arose (in his opinion) only from our being able to do without the slave trade, while other nations could not afford to give it up.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The greater part of this letter has been already published (see p. 516 of 'Life and Times').

The part there omitted, and here printed, contains speculations as to the identity of a well-informed but anonymous correspondent, who had for some time kept Canning supplied with tolerably trustworthy information as to transactions in London. Ministers profit by these contributions, but, with all their knowledge, do not always succeed in identifying their volunteer informants.

The political part as to M. de Villèle confirms the inference from past incidents that the French Prime Minister privately

1826
—

entertained views far more liberal than those of Charles X. and the French court ; that Canning exercised considerable influence over Villèle, but was held in check by fear of compromising his credit with Charles to a fatal extent, and thereby losing him altogether.

In view of the accord between Russia and England on the Eastern question, French intrigues with Greece signified little ; but in the Peninsula the French, by encouraging the Apostolical party in Spain, could exercise a decisive influence either towards war or towards peace as they chose.

The Absolutist *Party* in Europe, whether at Vienna, Paris, or Madrid, were more and more working themselves up into the conviction that, if they permitted the Portuguese Constitution to survive, they would be committing an error fatal to the credit and success of their principles ; and the responsible *Ministers* strove hard, but in vain, to avoid the mischief which the irresponsible partisans of Absolutism threatened to bring down upon Europe.

Hence Canning felt that the battle of the Portuguese Constitution must at this stage be fought out in Paris ; and his interviews with Villèle formed an essential part in this bloodless but important campaign.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: September 30, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I take advantage of the return to England of Hammond (our old Hammond's son), a clerk in the F. O. who has been passing his holidays on the Continent, to forward to you in the first instance, and to the office after you, despatches received last night from Vienna and Constantinople.

The next arrival from both will be very interesting.

You can either send Hammond on, and send the despatches after him by post, or keep him till you have read them, as may best suit your convenience.

I have not time to-day to go on with my report of Villèle's conversation, having had the best part of my morning taken up with a second interview.

I will write again in a few days.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1826

[The Mr. Hammond here mentioned became afterwards Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and on retirement Lord Hammond.]

The despatches from Vienna must have referred to two topics : (1) the reception by Austria of the joint communication by Russia and England of the Protocol on Greek affairs of April 4 ; (2) the question whether Austria, already intriguing against the Portuguese Constitution, should or should not let Don Miguel loose.

Those from Constantinople need not, fortunately, deal much with the relations between Russia and Turkey, now settled for some time by the treaty of Ackerman, but probably reported full details of the domestic troubles of the Porte, where the Sultan employed himself in completing the destruction of the Janissaries, and in reorganising his army, while (as a kind of byplay) Constantinople had been desolated by fire.

As regards Greece, Lord Cochrane awaited in Italy the arrival from England of the squadron, which he was to command in behalf of the Greek Government. And the Greek islands became the headquarters of various and daring gangs of pirates.

The state of affairs in the Peninsula continued unsatisfactory ; Spain had yielded to the threat of withdrawing Mr. Lamb, and orders had been given for the dispersion of the bodies of Portuguese deserters, but this did not prevent both Austria and Spain from secret intrigues to disorganise the Portuguese army, and to encourage continued desertion from its ranks.

Much oppressed by the activity of its domestic foes, the Portuguese Constitutional Government appealed to Lord Beresford, who still received pay in their service, to come over and take command of the army, to restore its discipline, and to put an end to the desertions.

Lord Beresford's sympathies without doubt did not lie in the direction of the Portuguese Constitution—though he could not refuse the call of duty when the Government, whose pay he was receiving, demanded his services to repel the hostile machinations of its neighbour—and his military instincts naturally prompted him to accept as a congenial task the reorganisation of a demoralised army.

Wellington likewise felt no sympathy with the Portuguese Constitution ; Canning emphatically fostered its tottering existence.

When, therefore, the question of allowing Lord Beresford to accept the call of the Portuguese Government came before the British Minsters, we perceive both statesmen favoured the idea : one hoped to see the Constitutional Government as a whole strengthened with the rehabilitation of the army ; the other hoped

1826
—

to see the Constitutional element of the Government weakened and modified by the increased predominance of military power under the skilful hand of Lord Beresford. The former desired to limit Lord Beresford's efforts to purely military aims ; the latter wished to see his lordship not debarred from exercising on civil affairs a decisive influence founded on military reputation. Canning, therefore, strove to restrict the field of Lord Beresford's duties to military matters ; and Wellington, not displeased to see an old soldier after his own heart taking a situation of great authority in Portugal, resisted these efforts at limitation, and advocated a wider discretion of conduct for Lord Beresford.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris : October 2, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—The enclosed despatch from Sir W. A'Court contains matter for serious deliberation. That deliberation, however, must be confined to ourselves and to the Duke of Wellington ; for whatever the decision of the question may be, nothing is of such vital importance as that no notion of it should transpire if that decision should be in the negative at all ; if affirmative until the moment of its execution.

I am perfectly willing to put the judgment entirely into your hands and those of the Duke of Wellington, with these two reservations only. 1st, that Lord Beresford, if he goes, goes only as, what he now is, Commander-in-Chief of the army ; but not with an expectation of holding, or with permission to accept, a seat in the Cabinet, or Council of State, or House of Peers, or any political situation or employment whatever. 2ndly, that he is to be considered by Sir W. A'Court as to all intents and purposes a Portuguese subject, and not to be entitled to call upon the British ambassador for support in any personal contests, if such should arise, with the Portuguese Government. Unless these two lines are distinctly drawn before he goes, depend upon it he will both aim at every honour that the Portuguese

826

Crown can bestow, and expect at the same time that he shall be supported by the ambassador as a British subject in his Portuguese objects and discussions.

With these reservations, I am inclined to think that it may be desirable that Lord B. should accept the invitation, or rather the summons ; for being (as Sir William A'Court says) in the pay of the Portuguese Government, he is undoubtedly amenable to their orders.

His departure ought to follow instantly upon the decision. His arrival in the Tagus would, I doubt not, operate salutarily upon the counsels of Spain, as well as upon the tranquillity of Portugal.

You will see, perhaps, that I more than incline to an affirmative decision ; but at the same time I am so entirely convinced of the mischief which would result from any misunderstanding of Lord B.'s position at Lisbon, either by himself or others, that I would rather forego all the military and moral advantages of his presence there, than risk the consequences of his being placed in a political situation.

I have no doubt of the King's wish that Lord B. should accept the service offered to him. His Majesty has always been disposed that way, even at moments less favourable to the object.

I enclose a few lines to the Duke of Wellington, which you will be so good as to forward with the despatch, and with your own opinion. You will see that I refer him to you for an explanation of my reservations, which I have stated perhaps too freely in this letter for the Duke of Wellington's, and consequently Lord B.'s own perusal.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Mr. Canning encloses the despatch from Sir William A'Court, signifying the demand of the Portuguese Government to be allowed to avail themselves of Lord Beresford's services.

The letter explains itself.

1826
—

It is hard to guess from Lord Liverpool's letter to the Duke of Wellington (given page 409, vol. iii. W. C.) whether he enclosed to the Duke the whole of this letter of Canning's, which appears at one view certain from the words used, or whether he only enclosed as Canning's letter what follows on the same page as the 'enclosure,' which simply states the two conditions which Canning proposed to attach to any permission to Lord Beresford to accept his call : (1) to limit his lordship's duties, honours, and offices to matters exclusively military ; (2) to withhold from him any prospect of British aid, as such, in fulfilling a service strictly domestic to Portugal.

Canning's confidential remark that Lord Beresford would aim at all attainable honours as a Portuguese public servant, without surrendering his pretensions to support as a British subject, appears most pertinent to the question, and no disparagement to the natural ambition of an able soldier, not greatly enlightened on matters of delicate political discrimination ; and it explains Canning's view of the business.

Wellington agreed to debar Lord Beresford from right of appeal to British resources to enable him to execute his Portuguese functions, but not inconsistently demurred to the prohibition of political duties, honours, and offices, which might be most essential to enable him to deal with the army.

The necessity of consulting the Duke of Wellington without delay on the matter gave his Grace an opportunity of speaking his mind as to the neglect of the Foreign Office to keep him supplied with information, whereby, when called upon, he was not prepared to give an unconditional opinion on a crisis ; it seems, looking at the Wellington correspondence, that, as a rule, Canning took great care to keep the Duke well *au fait* of what passed, and that the present defalcation was due only to a casualty ; but the truth was, the Duke, as may be seen from his letter, felt highly indignant at Canning taking upon himself, without consulting the Cabinet, to direct the extreme measure of authorising Mr. Lamb's withdrawal from Madrid, in case the Spanish Government persisted in refusing satisfaction about the harbouring of Portuguese deserters ; which no doubt, if the Spanish Government had proved obstinate, might have led to war : that the Spanish Government gave way, and that Canning had grounds for confidence that they would give way, before he sent these instructions, was owing to the circumstance that Canning, being at Paris, had assured himself of the abstinence of the French Government from promising any material support to the Government of Madrid in case of hostilities between Spain and Portugal ; and

1826

—

though Villèle could not check the covert intrigues of the Absolutists he had the superior power of saying that the French armies should not be allowed to aid the Spanish Government in discreditable and inarticulate menaces of violence to its neighbour. This appears perfectly clear from what Canning writes in his letter to Lord Liverpool of October 5, 1826, printed at page 522 of 'Life and Times.'

But, however redounding to Canning's credit, the move was assuredly not agreeable to the Duke's mind ; and he made the most of the minor but genuine matters of grievance against the Foreign Office in their proceedings.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: October 6, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—One single word I must add in the deepest secrecy. God forbid war ; but if Spain will have it, ought not we to think of the Havannah ?

Where else can we strike a blow ? and what other blow would be so effectual ? It would settle all better than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.

Ever yours,

G. C.

[Canning suggests a seizure of Cuba as a telling move in case of war with Spain.

Canning no doubt at this time revolved in his mind the military position if war broke out between Spain and Portugal, and England found herself forced to take active measures to protect Portugal. He knew the Duke's opinion of the helplessness of Portugal, as expressed in the Duke's letter to Lord Liverpool in the previous August, and his opinion of the impotence of British military efforts in operations against Spain, most probably laid down before, but expressed decisively enough in paragraph 2 of a letter to Canning of October 13, 1826 (p. 419 of vol. iii. of Wellington Correspondence).

The idea of seizing Cuba as a counter blow to any Spanish violence very likely originated in a memory of Sir de Lacy Evans's able memorandum detailing the military movements necessary for the purpose, already referred to in these pages ; but the idea was tolerably obvious on its own merits.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: October 9, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I received last night your letters of the 6th and 7th, the latter enclosing the one from the D. of W. to you, which I return. I have, as I understand you to intend that I should do, retained a copy of it.

Of the two conditions which I specified as desirable (in my opinion) to be annexed to Ld. B.'s acceptance of the command of the Portuguese army, I consider the second (to which no objection is made) as the more important to us; and I admit with the D. of W. that the necessity and the justification of it become more clear in proportion as we relax the former. If Ld. B. is to be a Minister in Portugal, it would obviously be preposterous that the British Ambassador should have any more to say to him, than to any other member of the Portuguese Government. But will the Portuguese Regency venture, and will the Chambers agree, to the appointment of a foreigner and a heretic to a seat in the councils of the kingdom? I am sure I hope they will, if it were only for the sake of the Catholic question; but I confess I doubt it. Would it not be awkward to make the demand and then to recede from it? Would it not be awkward to refuse Ld. B.'s services, if really wanted in a moment of such emergency on such a ground? What if France, hearing of the offer and refusal, were to tender one of her generals without any such stipulation? The real cordiality with which France has acted almost from the beginning in the affairs of Portugal would make it difficult for us to object to such an arrangement. And then we might lose our preponderance in Portugal by throwing her army into other hands, as our Foreign Enlistment Bill has thrown the navy (that is to be) of

1826

Mexico into the hands of the United States through the medium of Commodore Porter.

No apology is requisite to other Powers for Ld. B.'s resumption of his station at the head of the Portuguese army. He is the paid servant of the Portuguese Government; and it has a right to call for his active service. But a stipulation that he shall be a Portuguese Minister is quite another thing, and would require, I think, more explanation than I well see how to give it. However, I beg you to understand me as stating these considerations rather as those which suggested the proposal of the first condition than as those which would induce me to adhere to it, without modification, if the D. of W. should concur in thinking some relaxation of it necessary, in order to give some efficiency to Ld. B.'s military administration. In any case, however, I hope that the political situation will not be required as a previous stipulation; that it will be rather suffered to grow out of the military one; and that if Ld. B. declines the latter it will not be declined by him on the ground, that the political situation is not offered at the same time.

So much in reference to my former letter and the D. of W.'s answer.

I have received within these three hours a further despatch from Sir Wm. A'Court upon the same subject, from which I transcribe the following passage.

'It is right that you should know, and that Ld. B. should know also, that the Regent's invitation to his Lordship to resume his station at the head of the Portuguese army has not been discussed in the Cabinet, but has been given by the Regent in concurrence with a part only of the Ministers.

'H.R.H. will not announce what she has done, until

she is apprised of the determination of the British Government. 1826

‘The Minister of War (Saldanha) and the Minister of Grace and Justice (Guericiro) are the two Ministers who are not in the secret. It has not been thought prudent, in the present state of the business, to make the former acquainted with what has taken place ; because though personally attached to Ld. B. he now entangles himself so completely with the Ultra-Liberals, and is surrounded by such a staff, that no doubt can be entertained of his endeavouring to throw difficulties in the way if time were allowed him for that purpose. M. Guericiro represents the Liberals, the greater part of whom are opposed to Ld. B.’s return, from the notion that he (Ld. B.) is personally attached to Don Miguel ; and because all Ld. B.’s friends in this country are decidedly hostile to anything in the shape of a constitutional form of Government.’

Sir Wm. A’Court then goes on to state his own decided opinion, notwithstanding, in favour of Ld. B.’s return.

I may, perhaps, as well add also that M. Pinheiro, a Liberal of 1821, of acknowledged talents, but sent out of the kingdom as dangerous in 1824 on a pretended commercial mission, and now appointed to a real mission of that nature to Rio Janeiro, has sent a message to me by the Brazilian Minister here requesting to see me for the purpose of representing to me (as he says) the expediency of sending a British officer to take the command of the Portuguese army ; but not Ld. B. This tallies with Sir Wm. A’Court’s report of the feelings of the Liberals. It does not alter my opinion of the expediency of sending Ld. B., nor, I dare say, will M. Pinheiro’s have more effect than the mere statement of his opinion. I am to see him to-morrow ; but there

1826 is no time to lose in waiting for his reasoning. The fact
— is material only as confirming Sir Wm. A'Court's report. I send Sir Wm. A'Court's despatch, in original, to the D. of W.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

I have written so fully to the D. of W. that you need not send him this letter.

[On October 6 the Duke wrote to Lord Liverpool promising to submit the matter to the King, and intimating his own opinion in favour of leaving Lord Beresford free to discharge political as well as military functions in Portugal, and for the occasion entirely divested of his character as an Englishman ; quoting Lord Beresford's view that he could properly execute the service required of him in reorganising the army only if he held the political post of Minister of the War Department.

Canning's conditions were negative in their nature, and the Duke's proposed modification does not appear positive, but merely permissive. However, Canning, in this letter to Lord Liverpool, argues, somewhat unaccountably, on the assumption that Lord Beresford's appointment to the War Department of Portugal would be treated as a positive stipulation in the consent of the British Government, and expresses his hope that, if the political authority must be permitted, it may reach Lord Beresford in the natural course of proceedings, and not be the subject of stipulation.

In his letter to the Duke of Wellington (p. 412, vol. iii. 'W. C.') of this date, Canning discusses the question of political office as a matter for Lord Beresford to formulate in his conditions ; but he points out that, Lord Beresford's 'retaining fee' being military in nature, his lordship could hardly consider himself free to refuse to render military service on the plea that he was not entrusted also with political office.

In both letters he dwells on facts, as reported by Sir William A'Court, which proved the existence of a strong political antagonism on the part of the Liberal elements in the Portuguese Government against Lord Beresford, whom they credited with personal friendship for Don Miguel and with a mind hostile to the continuance of the constitution.

No doubt this feeling was not insurmountable. While Canning continued at the head of the Foreign Office, people had every reason

to anticipate that no British subject who had any regard for his own interests would venture to depart from the line marked out for him by the British Government.

1826

Canning in the letter to the Duke above referred to has the pleasure of informing him of the Spanish Court promising to give way on the point of the Portuguese deserters.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: October 11, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—Here are Lamb's despatches, which, having read, be so good as to forward to Planta.

One storm is dispersed. But I still dread that which is brewing at Vienna. It is high time that I should hear from there; and the delay bodes no good.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I enclose two private letters from Lamb, which you may also forward to Planta.

The messenger who carries this box goes on to town, not to return, being unwell.

G. C.

[Mr. Lamb's despatches from Madrid reporting the concessions of the Spanish Court, with some other papers, accompany this note; but great as was the danger to Portuguese liberties from the foreign aggression of Spain, it could hardly be greater than the domestic danger attending Don Miguel's return, if Austria allowed him to return, equipped with instructions, and means, to attempt the overthrow of the Constitution.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: October 11, 1826. (6 P.M.)

My dear Liverpool,—At the instant of packing up the other boxes for the messenger arrives Planta's messenger of Monday; bringing—what do you think?—a copy of No. 1, and an abstract of No. 2 of the enclosed despatches.

Voilà tout! They were worth the trouble of a messenger, however, and so I will not detain this

1826 — messenger to answer them, as I shall have to send back the other in a day or two.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This really tells nothing, but is inserted by way of keeping the series complete.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris: October 13, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I return the D. of W.'s letter and enclosures. You will have received in due time my relaxation of the first condition, so that (if that alone were wanting) Ld. B. may be by this time well on his way to Falmouth.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The Duke of Wellington's letter to Lord Liverpool returned herewith is printed p. 414, vol. iii. 'W. C.' Its enclosure was the Duke's letter to the King, taking his Majesty's pleasure on Lord Beresford's appointment. It suggested to Lord Liverpool that the Admiralty should have a ship ready at Falmouth to carry Lord Beresford to Portugal; hence Canning's reference to Lord B. 'on his way to Falmouth.'

This note is also a reply to Lord Liverpool's letter to Canning of October 10, parallel to Lord Liverpool's note of the same date (printed p. 415, *id.*)

In the letter of the Duke to Lord Liverpool (p. 416, *id.*) of October 10, the three chances of avoiding the misfortunes of Don Miguel escaping to Portugal are described as being: (1) Don Pedro formally excluding him; (2) Austria retaining him within her dominions; (3) his being persuaded to go to his brother in Brazil. The last chance alone, in the Duke's opinion, would give Lord Beresford the requisite facility for forming and disciplining an army for Portugal.

Meanwhile the most alarming circumstance appeared to be an admission that Don Miguel would have a right to the Regency in October 1827. This claim, said Lord Liverpool, in reply, on October 11, was a doubtful and perplexing question, fully argued, but apparently not settled, in one of Canning's drafts; but Don Miguel up to this date

had not taken the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, and thereby maintained an attitude of menace to his own country; though it is true he also, thereby, failed to qualify himself for exercising any legitimate function under the Constitution.

This letter of the Duke's was forwarded to Canning, and elicited a reply, addressed on October 16, to Lord Liverpool, printed at page 526 of 'Life and Times,' in which Mr. Canning discusses several most important political topics: (1) The right of Don Miguel to the Regency to accrue in 1827. This he strongly denies to be 'admitted'; the opposite view depended on a clause in the Charter which made Don Pedro's consent or sanction necessary for his brother's regency. (2) The Duke's complaints of receiving his intelligence from the Foreign Office after it had been published in the newspapers. This was simply owing to the French line of telegraphic stations (not electric), whereby news from the Peninsula reached, and was published, in Paris, and thence republished in London, long before British despatches could get round by sea to London. (3) The Duke's discontent with the conduct of the business of the Government.

The notice in 'Life and Times,' p. 526, that this letter 'accounts for the separation which took place six months later between' the two statesmen, is hardly a correct description of the state of affairs, of which this letter only marks a symptom, but which in the previous pages has been traced in operation for a long period.

The Duke's tie to Lord Liverpool had become most seriously loosened by the correspondence in August and September on the subject of the question of promoting the Duke's brother to a bishopric, which Lord Liverpool firmly refused. Lord Wellesley's somewhat unscrupulous conduct in the matter (see the correspondence printed in Lord Liverpool's 'Life,' vol. iii. pp. 380-395) had materially enlarged this breach. The last paragraph of Arbuthnot's letter of September 5 (p. 395 *ibid.*) indicates the channel in which the Duke's wrath, much restrained in the direction of Lord Liverpool, sought relief.

Wellington, having won his laurels, most probably entertained a cordial dread of another Peninsular war, in which he might be forced to take a command. Mere hatred of the horrors of war was not the only element in this feeling. No one can read the history of the great Peninsular campaigns without perceiving the extraordinary distresses to which the British general was subject. Bad and undisciplined troops, hostile operations conducted in an only half-friendly country, unceasing deficiency in pecuniary resources, misery and distress all around him, withering abuse at home: these miserable embarrassments and anxieties were hard enough to bear and encounter at the age of forty, and with all the excitement of conflict with Napoleon

1826
—

in the background ; but a renewal of these dismal experiences at the age of fifty, without any prospect of real glory to add to vast secured renown, presented an intolerable aspect. It is not difficult to appreciate Wellington's 'horror of war' ; besides, he knew that the public had not recovered from the exhaustion of the great war, and would prove a very unstable support for efforts to increase and reorganise the army for active operations. In a military point of view, a new Peninsular war promised no glory, and unlimited vexation.

Another obvious element in Wellington's extreme aversion to such hostilities, no doubt, was the fact that they would be waged in behalf of Constitutional or (as he would have called it) 'revolutionary' Portugal, against Legitimist and Conservative Spain and France.

The difficulty of the problem of conducting operations in the Peninsula with any chance of success, discussed by Lord Liverpool in a letter to Canning of October 10, led the Prime Minister to propound three steps —

1. A seizure wherever possible of the Spanish mercantile marine.
2. An appeal to the great Powers to intervene to prevent Spanish aggression.
3. If all failed, an open declaration of war on Liberal principles ; a retaliatory appeal to Spanish Liberals, which might divide the counsels of Spain, and protect Liberal Portugal by a restoration of Constitutional Spain.

Lord Liverpool apprehended one great danger all through—that the Portuguese might upset their own Constitution.

Suggestion No. 3 seems to have 'sung in the ears' of Mr. Canning as embodying the only real alternative of telling weight in the event of hostilities.

But it is unnecessary to say more than that this ultimate resort would have disgusted Wellington more than ever with a Peninsular war, as being utterly contrary to his political opinions and sympathies.

No doubt Wellington's visit to and complimentary reception by the Russian Czar and the Prussian King, and Metternich's flattery, all contributed to make him like what these potentates liked, and hate what they hated : and they hated Canning.

Besides, Canning's mastery over foreign affairs, his unexpected success in controlling by the power of his pen, and by the skill of his combinations, those who hated him most, his European renown amongst the Liberals of all nations, overshadowed in successful predominance for the time being the Duke's political influence, which, being mostly allied with the Courts alone, at this time became less conspicuous for practical purposes in the world. Wellington must have

1826
—

appeared to himself as one who knowing personally all the Crowned Heads in Europe, and their several Dominions, and, having been the leading actor in the most momentous scenes of recent military events, was really deserving of ascendancy in the Government of his country and of authority in the counsels of Europe. He represented the feelings of the pure Tory party better than any living statesman ; his abilities and station pointed him out as their natural leader, and the most acceptable successor to Lord Liverpool.

Canning, on the other hand, must have appeared in Wellington's eye as destitute of all the foregoing qualifications, and distinguished only by cleverness in debate and readiness with his pen ; and the extraordinary success and prestige attending his brilliant and courageous administration of foreign affairs must have struck Wellington as obtained by illegitimate means (*viz.* encouraging ' revolution ') and to be altogether undeserving of admiration. A large measure of simple downright jealousy must, we fear, be reckoned upon as working in the Duke's mind.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris, Oct. 16, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—We have nothing yet from Vienna. The delay is very perplexing ; and it is very unfair. Pozzo has received a courier from his Court, announcing one sent off at the same time to Lieven with complete and satisfactory answers to our last Greek communication. I may expect the rebound of the London courier in a couple of days.

You will see that I have anticipated your views as to a box of pasties of Portugal ; and have told A'Court that we can have nothing to do with it if it should unhappily arise.

I have had a long conversation with Bn. Damas (upon the arrival of Pozzo's courier) respecting Greece.

France is perfectly ready to go with us through all that we propose ; but the French Ministers apprehend that we shall gain little by any measures, from which every species of coercion is excluded.

They suggest, therefore, or rather in the course of conversation it was suggested, as a question worthy of

1826
—

deliberation, whether, every other effort failing, we might not say, 'The war shall not go on.' I asked Damas were they ready to apply that decision to the Pacha of Egypt? He said yes, conjointly with us, if we had no difficulty in applying it to the Greeks. I said, 'You mean, of course, the cessation of naval war, and therewith the prohibition of further supplies of men from Egypt; not the landing in Greece to control operations there?' He said, 'Undoubtedly, I mean that which you would have done to Ibrahim Pacha, supposing the information respecting his plans to have been substantiated; only applied impartially to enforce an armistice, instead of unilaterally to prevent one particular course of warfare.'

The obvious motive—at least one obvious motive—for this plan on the part of the French Government is, that they may have some separate understanding and co-operation with us, to balance the separate understanding and co-operation with Russia. It was in the King's head, plainly, when I had my audience of his M^y. I said I would think of the suggestion and talk with my Govt., but that if adopted it must grow out of the measures now in hand; not be laid down beforehand.

The question of armistice was left completely open; and the interference, if it was put in practice, might be connected with that question.

Damas was very desirous, as Villèle had been, of the conversion of the protocol into a treaty; to which I see no objections in due time. It will merge the difficulty of guarantee.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This is printed at pp. 484 and 526 of 'Life and Times.' It reports a conversation with Baron Damas, French Foreign Minister,

on the question of putting a forcible end to the war between Greece and Turkey.]

1826

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Paris, Oct. 16, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I have very great doubts of the expediency of sending Lord B. [Beresford] to decide for himself at Lisbon.

The anomalous situation in which he would be placed during the time of his inquiry would involve in it all the difficulties which the second consideration was intended to avoid. He would insist upon A' Court's intervention to carry his several points ; and how would it be possible for A' Court afterwards to refuse to enforce the execution of them?

Then again, supposing him not to take the command (which, I confess, I think it little likely he will finally refuse), would not his coming away dissatisfied, and proclaiming the cause of Portugal hopeless, be of a thousand times worse effect than if he had at once declined the proposal?

If you agree with me, and act upon that agreement, do not show this letter.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This answers a letter of Lord Liverpool's dated October 13, printed at page 408, vol. iii. Liverpool's 'Life,' in which it is anticipated, though nothing was yet known of Lord Beresford's decision, that he would not object to the one condition attached to his proposed employment, namely, temporarily divesting himself of English nationality ; but, as to the acceptance of Portuguese offices, honours, and duties, that it might be left to be settled between Lord Beresford and the Portuguese Government on the spot when Lord Beresford arrived out in that country.

Canning is not sanguine of Lord Beresford's abstention from invoking the assistance of the British Ambassador at Lisbon in carrying out his wishes, and also feels apprehensive of the ill-effects on Portugal, should Lord Beresford throw up his appointment as

1826 — hopeless, if his discretion of accepting it or not were deferred until he had examined the state of affairs in that country.

Lord Liverpool replies to Canning in a letter dated October 18, 1826 (printed p. 409, vol. iii. of Liverpool's 'Life'), in which he argues strongly in favour of Lord Beresford being left unfettered in his discretion as to accepting the service, until he had personally examined the situation of affairs on the spot.

In the 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii. pp. 423-5, are printed memoranda by the Duke and by Lord Beresford on the subject of Lord Beresford's errand to Portugal. Don Miguel continued to be the rock ahead. His attraction exercised a sinister influence over the Queen Dowager and the Army; both influences inciting the Public to discontent with the new Constitution. The non-fulfilments of some and uncertainty about other conditions of the Charter gave room for these elements of discord to play in. 'Will Don Miguel take, or has he taken, the oath of fidelity to the Constitution? If he takes it, will he be qualified to be Regent on attaining the age of twenty-five in October 1827? If so, would his assumption of the Regency be legal, with or without the consent of the Emperor Don Pedro? Was it a valid action on the part of the Infanta Regent, Donna Isabel Maria (sister of the Dons Pedro and Miguel), to assume the sole Regency under the Constitution?'

On the whole, the prospect of Don Miguel marrying his niece and becoming King Consort of Portugal in 1827 reduced the Regency to the position of a mere provisional arrangement, to which nobody could look for settled administration. And it is concluded that unless Don Miguel is removed to Brazil, where he can no longer breed sedition and mutiny in Portugal, Lord Beresford's efforts to restore order to the army will prove in vain.

On October 20, 1826, in a letter (printed vol. iii. 'W. C.') of Canning to the Duke, the announcement appears that Don Miguel had taken the oath to the Constitution. The news came in Sir Henry Wellesley's despatches from Vienna, which also notified that it was believed that the Turks contemplated yielding to the Russian demands.

The following are notes of the letters published in the 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii. pp. 438 *et seq.*

On October 22, Lord Beresford (not yet started) writes to the Duke that he has seen a despatch of Canning's, which, different from his previous utterances, favoured Miguel's claim to accession to the Regency when of legal age. This reduced the prospect of permanency for the existing Administration in Portugal, and tended to attenuate greatly the authority of the Infanta's

Regency, thereby materially diminishing Lord Beresford's chances of success.

1826

In a letter of October 29, Canning wrote to the Duke denying a change in his opinion as to Don Miguel's right to the Regency. Canning thinks, on the whole, he has no right to take the Regency out of his sister's hands ; but, on the other hand, the provisions of the charter as to the Infanta's Regency and as to future regencies have a conflicting effect on Don Miguel's claim, the only solution being a reference to Don Pedro.

On October 24 Mr. Planta reports to the Duke the news from Lisbon of a serious military mutiny in favour of Don Miguel in the Algeiros, which, however, had failed, and the leaders had fled into Spain.

On October 28 the Duke writes to Canning noting the malicious devices of the Austrian Government to complicate affairs in Portugal. Don Miguel had taken the oath ; but the Austrian Government first tried to conceal the fact, and, secondly, succeeded in preventing the Prince from going, as desired by his brother the Emperor Pedro, to Brazil ; sending an Austrian in his stead to Rio Janeiro to seek explanation]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE (OCTOBER 27, 1826).

(Printed p 531 of 'Life and Times')

[This contains what Canning had to say when the fateful intelligence reached him of the hostile demeanour of Spain towards Portugal.

He met Sir W. A'Court's despatches from the Foreign Office at Airaines on his way to England, and, being obliged to take them back with him to London, he sent an argued *résumé* of their contents to Lord Granville—the argument for the benefit of the French ministers De Villèle and Damas : (1) Spain persists in refusing to acknowledge the Constitutional Government of Portugal ; in harbouring Portuguese deserters ; in permitting the deserters to remain together ; and in restoring the arms carried off by the deserters in driblets, not all at once, in order to avoid the appearance of yielding to remonstrance.

(2) Spain can allege no plausible grounds for questioning the valid existence of the Portuguese Regency. The Infanta had 'assumed' the Regency as a matter of right during the minority of the Queen. This could not be sustained ; but there existed no manner of doubt of her present temporary right to the Regency, under the terms of Don Pedro's charter and abdication, until Don Miguel com-

1826 ————— pleted his twenty-fifth year ; and this no Power but Spain had challenged.

(3) As to the military insurrections, that in the North had been quelled, and its leader, the Marquis de Chaves, escaped to Spain ; the other, in the South, had likewise been broken, and its leader, the Marquis d'Abrantes, was hiding himself. But the complicity of the latter with Don Miguel in the murder of M. de Loulé in 1820 embarrassed matters, forasmuch as a revival of the memory of this crime might seriously affect Don Miguel's legal capacity for holding the Regency or Crown of Portugal.

(4) More than one excursion of Spanish troops into Portugal had taken place. This was the most momentous fact of the whole, and constituted a definite act of war against Portugal, enabling her, at her discretion, to prefer a demand of right for material aid from Great Britain.

Canning desired that MM. de Villèle and Damas might be earnestly and emphatically warned of the possible consequences if they continued to leave a tacit permission to Spain to act in this way.

He also repeated his firm belief that the intrigues of Metternich representing the authority of undisguised Absolutist theorists of Europe, and of M. de Moustier, the French Ambassador at Madrid, representing the secret influence of the adherents of those views in France and Spain, had together purposely contrived to produce the alarming state of affairs in the Peninsula.

Finally, Canning meant to insist on France recalling M. de Moustier, and withdrawing her army of occupation, unless Spain adopted a more reasonable and temperate line of conduct.

We must next note Lord Beresford's long letter to the Duke of Wellington, of November 8, 1826 (p. 446, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence'). He had arrived, and received on all sides a cordial reception ; his appearance had caused a temporary cessation of party warfare, both sides waiting to see for what he had come, and what he would do ; but he found the general anticipation of Don Miguel's early accession to power effectually prevented the Constitutional Government of the Regency from obtaining a solid position. This uncertainty kept the administration of military affairs in a state of hesitation and confusion, and Lord Beresford decided that it would not be wise for him to undertake the command of the army for the present.

There was much to be said for Lord Beresford's decision ; but it must, nevertheless, be observed that he went out to succour a form of government for which he had little or no sympathy ; and when, on his arrival out, he decided not to attempt to succour it, it cannot be

forgotten that his original dislike may have had much unconsciously to do with his decision.

We may proceed to abstract the main points of Lord Beresford's further report to the Duke of Wellington, dated November 13, 1826.

Lord Beresford praises the Infanta Regent as a most deserving princess, fit for the government of the country; he laments the necessity circumstances have imposed upon her, against her will, of employing as Ministers persons marked as revolutionary, and engaged in the disturbances of 1820. He points out that the whole country looks forward to the return of Don Miguel, and his assumption of power; pending this event, the Infanta's Government appears only as a temporary makeshift, commanding small respect; the army, penetrated with these feelings, would submit to no course of discipline calculated to restore order, but might be expected rather to dissolve, and cross over into Spain. In such a state of suspense, Lord Beresford finds no means to be of any service to the country, and can only say that the suspense is worse than any reality; that if Don Miguel's return can terminate the suspense, the sooner that prince returns the better, at whatever risk to the Constitution; at any rate his return would destroy the excuses made for disaffection in the army and aggression in Spain.

GREEK WAR.

We now turn to make some remarks on the progress of the negotiations contemplated with a view to terminate the war between Turkey and Greece.

In his note to Prince Lieven of September 4, 1826 (p. 396, vol. iii. 'W. C.'), Canning detailed at length the steps that, in his opinion, should be taken, starting from the protocol of the Duke of Wellington's negotiations of April 4 previous, to urge the Porte to concede a sufficient amount of independence as might satisfy the insurgent Greeks.

After discussing the various chances attending the success or otherwise of the then pending negotiations between Russia and Turkey at Ackerman, Canning argued that the terms of the protocol were to be insisted upon; viz. a limited *suzeraineté* of the Porte over Greece. If the Porte proved obstinate, two stages in the subsequent proceedings were sketched out: (1) an arrangement to obtain the concurrence of the Christian Powers in marking their displeasure at the obstinacy of the Porte, by a withdrawal of their representatives from Constantinople; (2) the adoption of a suggestion of Austria to recognise the independence of such portions of Greece as the insur-

1826

—

gents had succeeded in completely forcing from the interference of the Porte.

Canning's letters to the Duke, to which the Duke's letters of November 12 and 13, 1826, are answers, are not printed ; but, judging from Wellington's criticisms, Canning had hurried on somewhat too fast towards a recognition of Greek independence, and Prince Lieven (under the influence of a Greek sympathiser—apparently Count Pozzo di Borgo—and also stimulated by the success of the Treaty of Ackerman, by this time concluded), had likewise pressed on the diplomatic situation ahead of its technical rights under the Protocol, see his note to Canning of November 7 (19). Canning's reply of November 20 (p. 460, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence') shows he accepted the Duke's suggestions, and acted accordingly.

Wellington, apart from anti-revolutionist principles, was not disposed to view Russian aggressive tactics without jealousy ; and he also aimed at baulking, if possible, what he no doubt considered Canning's secret object—a recognition of Greek independence. As far as can be judged, his interference on this occasion was sufficiently justified. Russia, elated by the Treaty of Ackerman, hastened to further humiliate the Porte in Greece ; and Canning, stirred by sympathy with the insurgents and a desire to receive yet more new Liberal states into the family of nations, fell too easily into their views. Wellington's combined aversion to Russian predominance and to Canning's policy proved itself at this conjuncture of genuine service.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Nov. 14, 1826.

My dear Granville,—We have met and chosen the Speaker.

I hope rather than expect to send you your instructions with the 3rd *livraison* of Greece this week. Russia wants to go too fast ; and the D. of W., on the other hand, goes too slow. I am for labouring at an approximation. But it is not easy, though I shall manage it at last. The Lisbon intelligence is all that we could desire. Does Pozzo suspect that we got before him on the 19th ?

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

The King is bent upon coming down to open Parliament in person. I trust nothing will happen to prevent him. But he has been unwell these two days.

1826

[The new Parliament had met, and begun to organise itself, Mr. Manners Sutton being elected Speaker.

The remark about Russia, Greece, and the Duke of Wellington will be understood in the light of the foregoing notes.

Lord Granville is promised his instructions how to deal with the French Court in uniting in a joint appeal to the Porte.

The allusion to Pozzo signified curiosity as to whether Pozzo was aware that England was moving faster towards acknowledging Greek independence than Russia.

On November 21, the King went down in person, and delivered his speech on the opening of Parliament. The main business of the special session was to obtain indemnity for an order in council, issued in September, to open the ports for grain, to alleviate the public distress caused by scarcity.

The Foreign Office contributed two paragraphs to the King's speech : one, that assurances continued to be received from all foreign Powers, of their desire to cultivate the relations of peace and friendly understanding with Great Britain ; the other proclaimed that his Majesty was exerting himself with unremitting assiduity, either singly, or in conjunction with his allies, as well to arrest the progress of existing hostilities, as to prevent the interruption of peace in other parts of the world ; the last item pointing, of course, to efforts of the English Government to prevent Spanish aggression on Portugal.]

MR. STAPLETON TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O. : Nov. 17, 1826 (6.20 P.M.)

My dear Lord Granville,—Mr. Canning desires me to write to you ; he is at present engaged with Prince Lieven, and is likely to be so till too late to write to you by this evening's mail. But he desires me to say that he hopes certainly to be able to send you a messenger on Monday next, the 20th inst.

Believe me always, my dear Lord Granville, most sincerely and faithfully yours,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Explains why Mr. Canning was too busy to write by that evening's mail to Paris.]

1826

The Greek difficulty formed, no doubt, the engrossing topic of conversation between Canning and Prince Lieven on the evening in question, and the results may be found embodied in the correspondence between the dates of November 19 and 20 (p. 459, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence').

Their prolonged talk suggests the idea of feelings in common, and the notes show how much harmony in their views on the Greek question this conversation had developed between them: almost too much so, as mutual encouragement had beguiled them a little too far on the road to Greek independence, as has been already shown.

At page 476 of vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence' is an extract of a despatch from the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Austrian Chancellor (*i.e.* Metternich) at Vienna, reporting some curious observations of the Czar Nicholas, as to Canning and Canning's foreign policy. The Czar appears willing enough to let Metternich think that he contemplates agreement with Canning only where the latter agrees to Russian policy, as in deploring the unseasonable bestowal of a Constitution on Portugal; that where they disagree he hopes to make Canning his 'cat's-paw,' as in the affair of a Greek pacification; and finally illustrates his idea of the 'madness' of Canning by referring to the contest between the latter and the Prussian Foreign Office as to the language in which the intimation of the Russo-British Protocol of April 4 on Greek affairs should be made to the Prussian Government. But this talk of the Czar was not inconsistent with both sides playing the game of astuteness, and victory could only be recognised in the predominance of the principles of the victor.

Another matter, less agreeable, threatened to embarrass the good relations of Russia and England. Russia had been behaving with indefensible violence towards Persia. Persia enjoyed the benefit of an alliance with Great Britain; British liability to be called on to interfere to protect Persia, possibly even by force of arms, against Russia, seriously menaced the *entente cordiale* on the Greek question. We find Wellington, in his letter of November 21, insisting on the misconduct of Russia, and the claims of Persia: and Canning, in reply, execrating the Persian treaty as a whole, and trying to attenuate the right of Persia to call on Britain for protection.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

Meanwhile, the reader can learn from no better authority than Lord Beresford, in his letters to the Duke of Wellington of November 30 and December 1, the details of the invasion of Portugal by a body of Portuguese deserters, under a Portuguese nobleman, the

Marquez de Chaves, all armed and equipped by the Spanish Captain-General of Estremadura, Don Jozé de San Juan.

1826

The invasion had not been effected without some sharp fighting ; but in its secondary effects it tended to dissolve the ties in Portugal attaching the inhabitants to the Constitutional Government ; and, still more alarming for the peace of Europe, Spanish troops were ranged along the frontier, ready to cross, even if some had not crossed already.

Canning at once accepted the challenge, and proceeded to press on the Government instant military action in support of Portugal, as may be seen in his letter to the Earl of Liverpool of December 3, printed in 'Life and Times,' pp. 538-40.

One of the weightiest of his arguments for instant appeal to Parliament, to sustain the Government in the policy of defending Portugal, lay in the urgent expediency of confirming the French Government in the steps they had already taken (too late, as perhaps they knew) to withdraw the encouragement, given by their representative at Madrid, to the Spanish Junta Apostolica, and its irregular designs against Constitutional Portugal, and of bringing a decisive influence in the right direction to bear on the French Cabinet before the French Chambers met, and before Villèle, if unsustained by British action, could swerve from the line he had already adopted.

The two following papers, each endorsed in Canning's own handwriting, as 'communicated by Prince Polignac, November 30, 1826,' prove to what an extent Villèle had committed himself in the way of repudiating any sanction to Spanish aggression on Portugal, and how important it had therefore become to encourage him to persist in the same line of conduct.

DESPATCH FROM M. DAMAS (French Minister of Foreign Affairs)
TO M. LE MARQUIS DE MOUSTIER (French Ambassador at Madrid).

26 Novembre 1826.

M. le Marquis,—Le Roi a pris connoissance de votre dépêche du 22, arrivée aujourd'hui par le télégraphe.

Les instructions qui ont été adressées, et les conseils que S. M. a donnés au Roi Catholique, sont tellement en opposition avec les nouvelles contenues dans votre dépêche, que le Roi me charge de vous expédier ce courrier, pour vous donner l'ordre de revenir sur le champ à Paris.

M. de Beaurepaire restera Chargé d'affaires.

1826 — DESPATCH FROM M. DAMAS TO M. DE BEAUREPAIRE, French Secretary of Legation and Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid.

26 Novembre 1826.

La nouvelle de l'incursion dans les provinces de Tras os Montes des déserteurs Portugais réfugiés en Galice, est arrivée aujourd'hui à Paris par le télégraphe.

Cette nouvelle est tellement en opposition avec les conseils donnés à S. M. C. [Sa Majesté Chrétienne], et avec les instructions adressées à M. le M. de Moustier, que le Roy m'ordonne d'envoyer sur le champ un courrier à Madrid pour rappeler son ambassadeur. Vous resterez Chargé d'affaires.

Vous auriez à répéter à M. de Salmon, ou dire à S. M. C., (si elle vous admet à sa présence), que le Gouvernement Espagnol ne doit attendre aucun appui de la France, s'il néglige les mesures indiquées dans les instructions précitées, et s'il continue à autoriser, ou à souffrir, des actes aussi contraires aux intentions de S. M.

Vous insisterez, de la manière la plus formelle, sur l'éloignement des frontières, et la dispersion des déserteurs Portugais réfugiés en Espagne, ainsi que sur l'éloignement de M. de Silveira, et des autres individus de la même espèce.

Le Gouvernement Espagnol s'était engagé à cette mesure, de même qu'à la remise des armes.

Comment justifiera-t-il son inaction ?

[Canning, in his letter to Lord Liverpool of December 1 (p. 538 of 'Life and Times'), describes De Moustier's peremptory 'recall as all moonshine'; but, though, no doubt De Moustier had been left at Madrid until he had worked apparently irreparable mischief, and though he was naturally coming away on leave of absence just at this date, there does not seem sufficient grounds to suppose that this peremptory action of the French Government would be destitute of weight with the Spanish Government, who, at any rate, had to decide as to following up their irregular aggression, and to whom a public 'slap in the face' at such a moment could hardly be encouraging, or hardly even neutralised by secret counter-advice.]

It has already been shown how the unwilling Czar found himself (though he tried to disguise the reality) playing Canning's game in Greece. We now find the French Government, undoubtedly with equal reluctance, also playing, though tardily, Canning's game in the Peninsula. We see Wellington, the powerful representative of Absolutism, or order, in England, not withdrawing from the Government, as he had threatened in case of hostilities in the Peninsula, but playing Canning's game at home.

Those who can understand somewhat the delicate machinery and exquisite sensibility, with which such a game must be played, when its natural foes are found contributing to its success, may, from what has been here given, arrive at an appreciation of the excitement of the great struggle, which now approached its crisis.

The symbols of the game were not great, and the field of action narrow. A few thousand Portuguese deserters, a few thousand British troops, appeared on the scene on either side. The fighting was trivial, yet enormous was the victory.

In truth, Canning's game was the promotion of national independence, the spread of Liberal thought and Liberal institutions ; and, behind the trenchant weapon of his brilliant and argumentative despatches, lay the tremendous resource of invoking the hidden forces of revolutionary Europe, and of fanning into a flame the fearful passions, then smouldering in the hearts of millions of discontented Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians, Poles, and Germans.

The forces which exploded a few years later in Paris, and other parts of Europe, though at this date latent, by no means escaped the attention of the European Cabinets, and most materially influenced their policy.

These clumsy advocates of 'order' could meet violence with violence, could quell insurrection with cannon ; but they were overmastered when a statesman of the first genius, renowned for his early hostility to 'the revolution,' took the lead of the Liberal party throughout Europe, at once discouraged violence, and insisted only on simple justice ; scrupulously kept within the line of common forbearance, and demanded in turn from the Absolutists an equal respect for the principles of international equity ; never allowed his antagonists the shadow of an excuse for retorting on his foreign policy in any part of the world a *tu quoque* ; and by such steadfastness gained a height of authority not given to those statesmen, who think they may without risk transgress in one part of the world those principles which they are striving to maintain as essential in another.

The following series of dates are taken from the 'Political Life' (vol. iii. pp. 214 *et seq.*)

1826

On December 3,¹ the first report of the invasions of Portugal, by organised bands of Portuguese deserters, reached London through the medium of the French 'telegraph.' The details were not sufficiently authentic to enable the British Government to do more than despatch a small squadron to Oporto; but the Portuguese Ambassador, M. de Palmella, lost no time in addressing on that very day an official note to the British Government, making a formal demand for succour against the aggression of Spain, (which will be found printed in 'State Papers,' vol. xiii. p. 1116). The materials before the British Government were not sufficient to justify official action until the news was confirmed. Canning could only draft a King's Message, appealing to Parliament for support in responding to the Portuguese demand; he could not even obtain on the instant the proper attention of his colleagues to the question, for Lord Liverpool happened to be greatly indisposed; and though it is matter of fact that he answered Canning's first letter of December 3, in some unpublished note, and must have received in reply Canning's second letter of that date, there is no record of the invalid Premier discussing the matter any further in the way of correspondence.

On December 5, the Foreign Office received Mr. Lamb's despatches from Madrid, announcing promises on the part of the Spanish Government to arrest the leaders of the Portuguese bands of deserters, to disperse the bands, and to restore their arms to Portugal. As to the particular action at this stage of the crisis, some idea may be formed from Canning's letter to Lord Granville, printed at p. 541 of 'Life and Times.' There was a respite, and he used it to try and urge on the French Government to withdraw, from the weak and aggressive Spanish Government, the support afforded by the presence of a French army in the Peninsula.

It must here be noted that there were two invasions of Portugal: one, under the Marquis de Chaves, entered *Tras os Montes*, and threatened Oporto; the other, under Magessi, advanced to Villa Viciosa from Estramadura, on the way to Lisbon. Both consisted of organised bodies of Portuguese, equipped from Spanish resources,

¹ How this date can stand is not clear; as the Notes of the French Government to its diplomatic representatives at Madrid, above given, appear distinctly to refer to the telegraphic news of the invasion of Portugal, and are endorsed in Canning's handwriting as 'communicated on November 30, 1826;' at which earlier date it must consequently be inferred that Canning received from Prince Polignac some account of the telegraphic intelligence which had reached Paris; besides, it is improbable that the Portuguese Ambassador should have been able to formulate his 'demand,' within twelve hours of the arrival of the news.

and accompanied by Spanish irregular troops. Both invasions apparently constituted equally sufficient *casus fœderis*, to justify an invocation of aid from Great Britain ; but the news of the northern aggression, which formed the foundation of the first proceedings, above-mentioned, in the affair, did not call for instant action, for the simple reason that the invasion in that part of Portugal did not instantly threaten the security of the seat of government at Lisbon. Canning, embarrassed by his own indisposition, and by his chief's illness, and fortified in delay by Mr. Lamb's latest despatches, could reasonably suspend the immediate execution of the necessary measures to support Portugal, until further intelligence arrived. This pause could not, however, be prolonged when the news of the southern attack reached London. This threatened Lisbon, and the very existence of the Constitutional Government, and admitted of no delay.

On December 8 despatches arrived from Sir William A'Court at Lisbon, reporting the southern invasion, and the imminence of the danger to the existing Government of Portugal ; accordingly no time was lost. Canning finally settled his draft of the Royal Message, and submitted it on the very next day (December 9) to the Cabinet, when it was adopted, and forthwith sent down for the King's approval.

On December 9 Sir Herbert Taylor prepared a memorandum as to the arrangements for assembling an Expeditionary Force for Portugal, of course in the first instance to be submitted to the Commander-in-chief, the Duke of York, and equally, of course, brought before the Duke of Wellington for observations. (It is published at p. 480 of vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence.') The Duke of Wellington, the next day (December 10), supplied the War Office with a memorandum, as to the instructions to be given to the Officer commanding the Expedition.

It is impossible to avoid again remarking that, judging from their letters, nothing would have rejoiced the hearts of Wellington, Bathurst, and their sympathisers than the success of the deserters and the suppression of the Portuguese Constitution, if only it could take place without any accusation of indecent neglect lying at the doors of England ; but, unluckily, the Portuguese Constitution, being *octroyé* by Don Pedro, the legitimate King of Portugal, possessed a legitimate right to existence, which could not be gainsaid, and commanded the unwilling consent even of such a Legitimist as the Emperor of Russia. The provocation offered by the Spanish Government was equally undeniable ; and the demand of the legitimate, 'though, unfortunately,' Constitutional Government of Portugal for succour could not be repudiated.

1826

But the temper of mind in which these distinguished statesmen approached the question of Portugal may be easily gathered by the discerning reader in the tone of Lord Beresford's letters. Lord Beresford, summoned by the unsuspecting Cabinet at Lisbon to assist them in controlling the disaffected soldiery in their army, had gone out to support the Constitutional Government of Portugal. But his Lordship's qualification for this particular duty may be judged by his determination to ignore Canning in his dealings with the British Government, and to correspond solely with his sympathetic friend the Duke of Wellington, and by his entire failure to win the confidence of the Portuguese Constitutional Ministry, without which, of course, his errand could only prove an empty form. His hatred of Canning, partly political, was probably not diminished by a knowledge of the restrictions Canning had placed on his acquisition of further Portuguese honours.

MR. STAPLETON TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE

F. O. : Dec. 8, 1826.

My dear Lord Granville,—Mr. Canning desires me to say that the postscript of his letter No. 57 is to be applied to No. 58, which goes by to-night's post.

He desires me to say this, lest by his omitting to say so you should hesitate to make the same use of No. 58 which the postscript of No. 57 placed you at liberty to do with the last-mentioned letter.—Believe me

Yours most sincerely,
A. G. STAPLETON.

[This letter instructs Lord Granville that the liberty given his Lordship in respect of one letter of Canning's (No. 57) is extended to another letter (No. 58).

The meaning of this may be found in the letters of Mr. Canning to Lord Granville of December 6 and of December 8 respectively (printed at pp. 541 and 542 of 'Life and Times').

The postscript of the former gives Lord Granville liberty to read it to M. de Villèle. Mr. Stapleton's letter authorises an extension of this liberty to the second letter likewise.

The pith of both these letters lies in an insistence on the urgency of a withdrawal of the French troops from Spain, in view of the state of affairs, the entry of the British troops into Portugal, and the dangers to the general peace threatened by the conjuncture, and the great effect such a withdrawal would produce in favour of peace.

It may be noted with interest that, on December 10, with respect

to instructions to the commanding officer of the Expeditionary Force, a correspondence passed between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Bathurst, as to allowing a discretion in attacking the enemy, which it need hardly be said the great general maintained *for* the officer, *against* the notions of the civilian War Minister.

On December 11 there was a correspondence between the Duke and Canning, as to a despatch to Lord Granville, from which, though the details are not published, it may be gathered that the Duke offered wise advice in the sense of desiring to avoid all appearance of provocation with France, and that Canning wisely accepted the advice.

Canning was justly incensed against France at this moment, and was also, probably through illness and excitement, more in an oratorical than a diplomatic frame of mind.]

MR. CANNING TO LE COMTE D'ALCUDIA.

Foreign Office: Dec. 11 1826.

C'est bien à regret, mon cher Comte, que je vous transmets ci-inclus la copie d'une communication que Sa Majesté a jugé convenable de faire à son Parlement.

Cette pièce vous fera comprendre les conseils amiables que j'ai pris la liberté de vous donner hier au soir. Ne croyez pas que cette démarche ferme la porte à toute négociation. Puisse-t-elle au contraire ouvrir les yeux de votre Cour aux dangers dans lesquels elle s'est laissée précipiter, peut-être (et j'aime à le croire) même sans le vouloir, et soyez persuadé que ce sera pour moi un moment bien heureux, quand je pourrai vous annoncer que tout est amicalement arrangé, et que nous vous retenons ici pour bien des années.

[This private note to the Spanish Minister in London communicates to him the King's Message in the affairs of Portugal, and expresses the great regret of Canning at this course being forced on the Government.

On Monday, December 11, the King's Message was brought down to Parliament.

On Tuesday, December 12, the question was fairly debated in the House of Commons.

On this occasion Canning spoke twice, both times well, but, in

1826
—

1826 — his reply, he burst out into some splendid flights of oratory, worthy of the importance of the question.

The part meant to tell with the Absolutist Cabinets of Europe will be found in his menaces of an appeal to the latent democratic forces of Europe, accompanied as his menaces were by the reality of an armed expedition of British troops, to protect the tottering Constitution in the weak and hard-beset kingdom of Portugal.

All perceived the tremendous nature of the threat, people nowadays, ignorant of the condition of Europe at that time, perceive only the rhetorical brilliancy of the orator.

Men of the time felt otherwise: the hostile Cabinets of Europe quailed, and gave way in alarm; the Liberal party in England responded with unrestrained applause; and the Tory party laid it by, to be remembered against the time when they could safely mark their displeasure.

France felt the menaces so keenly that in a speech of M. de Damas she retorted by threats of rousing Irish disaffection into open resistance to England; but this, as a mere retort, might safely be disregarded.

There is a most significant touch in a letter of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Bathurst, which betrayed deep and bitter feelings in respect of the success attending Canning's policy.

‘I don't think the despatches from Paris tell much. I judge from the report of the conversation with M. de Damas, that the King of France would not inform the legislative body that he had been acting in concert with his Majesty, *because we pass in Europe for a Jacobin Club! However, as yet, we have only boasted we are such a body.* Our acts do not yet prove it. I form this judgment from what I see in the newspapers, and from M. de Damas' silence respecting the reason, for which the King of France did not mention his Majesty. I conclude the truth is known in this country by private letters. *But I hope that in future when we come to a question of peace and war, we shall have something to go on besides private letters.*

‘P.S.—I see in the despatches to Vienna and Paris, *that we are now explaining away the meaning of our speeches.*’

There is a world of suppressed indignation in the sentences above italicised.

Metternich expressed his approval of the King's Message; France renewed her exhortations to Spain to desist from tolerating the irregular and unjustifiable aggressions on Portugal; and, when

Spain refused compliance, France withdrew the Swiss Guards from Madrid. 1826

Meanwhile, the band under Magessi, invading Portugal by the Alentejo, and menacing Lisbon, had been successfully repelled by Count Villa Flor and the regular Portuguese troops, and, retiring from Portugal, had marched northwards, inside the Spanish frontier, and joined their forces with those of the Marquis de Chaves in Upper Beira. This enabled the two Royalist armies likewise to unite, and, the latter being the more numerous, affairs began to look better for the Government.

The King's Message reached Sir William A'Court at Lisbon on December 21, and was published on the 23rd.

On December 25 the first detachment of troops arrived in the Tagus; and the whole Expeditionary Force had arrived out by January 1, 1827. This was prompt action.

The story of the organisation of this force will be found in the 'Wellington Correspondence,' and, though chiefly military in its details, will be found not without interest by the general reader.

From letters written at the time, particularly founded on Lord Beresford's highly coloured reports of the disaffection and dissolution of the Portuguese army, and the imminence of a revolution, it appears that the Ministers had prepared themselves to hear that Lisbon was in the hands of a provisional Government, the 'Constitution' having passed away.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: Dec. 17, 1826.

My dear Liverpool,—I return the King's letter. His Majesty seems to have cared more about the matter than I expected; and at all events reviews it very properly and satisfactorily.

I send you a draft of the instructions to Sir Wm. A'Court, which I was obliged to draw during the Recorder's report yesterday: for we were at St. James's from 1 to 7, so that my whole day was gone. They were submitted to the Cabinet together with Lord Bathurst's instructions to Sir Wm. Clinton, before we separated. I trust you will approve of them. If you wish for any alteration it must be sent to Sir Wm. A'Court by another occasion; for it would be a pity to

1826

lose one which the Admiralty offer to me for conveying this despatch to Sir Wm. A'Court. The Cabinet also agreed in the substance of the memorandum, herewith enclosed, about Lord Beresford. I had drawn it up originally as a separate instruction to Sir. Wm. A'Court. And the Duke of Wellington suggested, (and I think wisely), that, as Sir Wm. A'Court had not hitherto come in contact with Lord B., it would be ungracious and inconvenient to set Sir Wm. the task of this communication.

At the same time I cannot now begin writing to him—and the D. of W. says that he has just told Ld. B. that he (the D.) shall write no more, and referred Lord B. to you or to me, as the proper address for his correspondence. The result seems to be that you should write to him, either to the purport of this memorandum, or enclosing the mem. itself—whichever you may think most expedient.

We are all agreed in the opinion that Ld. B. will do more harm than good, if he remains at Lisbon unemployed.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The point discussed in this letter concerns the method of conveying to Lord Beresford the instructions of the British Government to return to England, in case he found it impossible to assume the command of the Portuguese army. Canning desired to avoid addressing Lord Beresford, who had steadily ignored him. The Duke could not comfortably accept the task of recalling Lord Beresford, whose continuance in Portugal, it is possible, his Grace thought might be useful, in case the Absolutists eventually got the upper hand. To send it through Sir William A'Court might be offensive to Lord Beresford, and disagreeable for Sir William. Canning therefore argues that Lord Liverpool must do it.

It appears Lord Liverpool was really anxious that Lord Beresford should take command of the Portuguese army; but the Premier's mind, no doubt, had been failing for some little time, and he could not properly grasp how incompatible with Canning's policy would be the continued presence of Lord Beresford in Portugal, irresponsible, without office, and allied with all the reactionary party.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: December 29, 1826.

1826
—

My dear Granville,—I am sorry to have vexed you ; but be assured there the mischief ends. The only observation of the King when I see him will be, ‘What a good scolding you gave Granville ! It will do him good.’ He knows you just as well as I do, and will have been just as much provoked as I was, and in exactly the same temper of provocation at your failing on such an occasion, in what the philo-Stuarts would be sure to hold up as a contrast to his activity. Depend upon it, it is always better to anticipate blame, when there is real cause for it, than to leave less friendly dispositions to whisper it in secret.

You must make full allowance too for the day which I passed on Saturday. ‘Good God ! what ! nothing direct from Paris ! Perhaps it is a mere stock-jobbing report.’ ‘Perhaps it is a trick of M. Rothschild’s.’ ‘Why don’t you make the messengers ride ?’ ‘I shall never believe Damas to have made such a speech till I see it.’ Such were the *propos* of the morning.

Towards noon messages from the Government newspapers to know how they were to treat the intelligence. ‘Might they confirm it ?’ ‘Might they contradict it ?’ ‘Should they say that Government had no account of it ?’

Towards evening civil inquiries, by note and call, from the Foreign Ministers. I confess I was driven beyond my patience. But no matter. It is all past now. And do not lay it to heart, for the consequences are nothing ; except that I hope you will contrive to establish some communication with the F. O. at Paris, that shall prevent Rothschild from getting official *papers*, (*news*, you cannot help), before you.

Ever, my dear Granville,

Most affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1826

—

[This appears to have been written to pacify Lord Granville, after Canning had administered to his lordship some pretty severe remarks, for not taking care to keep the British Government properly informed, of what had passed in the French Chambers, most particularly what M. de Damas, the French Foreign Minister, had said in his speech in reply to Canning's great deliverance on December 12.

The Rothschilds had managed to diffuse in London valuable news on the subject, far in advance of the official intelligence at Canning's disposal ; hence the trouble he suffered on a certain 'Saturday,' so graphically described in this note.

The 'Saturday' must have been December 23.

This letter is one amongst a series of letters written by Canning, after his speech, to Lord Granville, printed pp. 545-556 of 'Life and Times,' and dated December 14, 19, 22 (2), 26, and 29 (2), all full of the necessity of making the observations he did, but anxious to justify himself for their offensive aspect with France, by referring to the consequences of weakness on the part of England in 1823, by which Villèle was left unequal to resist the pressure then driving him on to a French invasion of the Peninsula, by quoting the interference of Metternich, who had already instigated the French Government, but without effect, to strengthen their forces in Spain, with a view to the destruction of the Portuguese Constitution, and insisting that, however much Villèle and Damas might be hurt in their feelings, no greater boon could be given them, than to interpose a decisive obstacle in the way of the Absolutist party tampering any more with the liberties of the Peninsula.

All this anxiety to justify himself betrays a consciousness on Canning's part that in the heat of debate he had gone further than was quite desirable in the way of disparaging the dignity of the attitude of France ; and his quasi-apologies are, no doubt, what Wellington bitterly referred to—'We are now explaining away the meaning of our speeches.'

In such a crisis of feeling between France and England, it can be well understood how impatient Canning must have been for the latest and most accurate intelligence, of all the utterances of MM. de Villèle and de Damas, and how vexed he must have felt at any oversight in the Ambassador at Paris, by which authentic reports failed to come to hand at the proper time.

Notice may usefully be drawn to the circumstance mentioned by Canning in his letter to Lord Granville of December 22 ('Life and Times,' p. 551), of a correspondence between Metternich and Villèle, soon after the importation of the Constitution into Portugal. It was to this effect.

‘Reinforce your army in the Peninsula, and protect Spain against the contagion of the Portuguese Assemblies, as you protected yourselves against the Spanish Cortes in 1823,’ said Metternich.

‘I cannot march into Portugal,’ answered Villèle, ‘but with *La Charte* on my banners.’

‘Censez que je n’en ai rien dit,’ was the reply of the Austrian Chancellor.

There seems no reason to doubt the correctness of Canning’s information in this particular, and it seems ample to account for his general disposition to trust Villèle, if unbiassed, and to distrust Metternich under all circumstances—a distrust which was freely returned by that prince (see his recently published memoirs).]

1826
—

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE.

ANONYMOUS (placed with papers of) 1826.

‘Causa latet: res est notissima.’

When men hear that of the four persons whom it is ——’s boast to have dined with him on Sunday two were Knights of the Garter and two were Cabinet Ministers, and one of those Ministers was George Canning, surprise and indignation at the abuse of your patronage must ensue. Bathurst, Westmoreland, and such as owe all their consequence to their rank, will not be grudged him; but that the finished gentleman, the accomplished scholar, the illustrious statesman should find any one qualification to recommend —— to his notice and to his society is quite a marvel which the world may turn and twist as they please but which they never will unravel. To subject yourself to the danger of his claims, to all the penalties of intimacy with a needy adventurer who grasps at all the stations of his profession without being willing to submit to the patient issue of labour and time, is not more unwise, in your high official station, than it is astonishing that in your individual character you should associate with a man, half player, half bankrupt, very nearly sent to Coventry on his circuit, not countenanced by the older members of his profession, and sitting in the House by the most barefaced jobbing, who professes to no principle, and who cannot cease to boast that such and such persons are in the habit of visiting him! You deserve that he

1826

— should say, as he did on the occasion of the Welsh Judgeship, 'I'll make Canning get it for me,' and the implication in the answer of the gentleman to whom he said so—'Canning dare not give it you.'

If praise allure thee, think first whose flattery it is, and be above the homage that design and artifice tender to such worth as yours. Be an exception to the axiom of the poet

Nihil est quod credere de se non possit,

and keep your countenance for more unpretending persons.

One who heard of your dinner party in Serle Street.

A. B. C.

[A vigorous remonstrance with Canning for condescending to join a dinner party of host and four guests on a Sunday in a legal quarter, in which the host is so roughly handled that we refrain from giving his name *in extenso*.

The paper is endorsed, 'Lamenting your dining with Mr.—'; Canning minutes it, 'He could not lament it more than I did.'

SIR HARCOURT LEES.

This gentleman sends, with a printed address to the Protestants of Ireland and draft petition to Parliament, both on the subject of the horrors of Popery, a note as follows :—

'A constitutional mode of saving a venerated sovereign from 'the inevitable consequences certain to result from a most flimsy, 'false, and foolish speech reported to have been delivered by some 'royal commissioners on the 2nd instant, unless that speech can be 'neutralised by the enclosed vindication of his Majesty's political 'and religious principles by his steady and unbending friend, who 'will continue to support him so long as he continues a Protestant, 'but not one hour longer.—H. LEES.'

Endorsed by Canning, 'An ass.'

MR. DAVID CHARLES GUTHRIE (FEB. 13, 1826).

This gentleman dates from 9 Idol Lane, Tower Street, London. His claim to attention founds itself on an experience of twenty years as agent in London for Scotch Banking Companies, and of extensive dealings with the manufacturing districts of England and Scotland. He writes in the midst of a time of extraordinary commercial depression, after a severe panic, during which scores of country banks had failed. The policy of the Government, persevered in under extreme pressure, under the guidance of Lord Liverpool and Canning, proposed as far as possible to leave matters to right

themselves, only taking advantage of the general dismay to carry one or two measures, calculated to promote the restoration of the currency to its natural level ; but of course no rectification of the currency could operate to alleviate the immediate distress. The destruction of ordinary credit, and the unwillingness of the Bank of England to trust itself to any remedial action without the support of the Government, prevented the crisis dissipating itself in the usual manner. Desperate efforts were made by alarmed commercial interests to induce the Government by an issue of exchequer bills, and by making advances on the security of actual goods in warehouse, to take upon itself the functions of a banker. The pressure in Parliament was extraordinary. But Lord Liverpool fully meant to retire from office rather than surrender his sound opinion to the unsound clamour of the terrified traders. Canning backed him. Finally, the Bank of England, after being allowed a special extra issue of small notes, consented to set apart three millions, to be advanced on loans of security of merchandise ; but they stipulated for and obtained from the Government a short Act of Parliament, which made the whole difference in the financial nature of the security of the proposed loans. By the common law of England, a factor or agent, in possession of merchandise, and of the documents relating thereto, could sell, but not pledge, the goods in his custody. In consequence of trouble caused by this state of the law, in 1825 an Act was passed providing for an effectual pledging of such goods by the factor. This Act did not come into operation until October 1826. The Bank obtained from Parliament an Act to bring the enactment of 1825 into immediate operation. The ground thus cleared, the Bank sent commissioners down into various parts of the country (Branches of the Bank of England had not yet been established) to administer the loanable capital, on the new legal security, to the traders capable of taking advantage of their terms. Credit is so essentially a matter of trust and imagination that the mere provision of machinery to meet urgent necessity restored confidence, and comparatively small actual use was made of the loanable funds tendered by the Bank of England ; and the crisis passed away like a storm at sea, leaving only the wrecks behind to mark its transit.

Our ingenious Scotchman's letter is not worth reproducing ; but it can claim credit for insisting on the necessity of restoring credit, public funds being provided in the damaged centres of trade, to be advanced on security of actual merchandise, the same being issued under the superintendence of commissioners. All these suggestions came eventually into operation. His mistake lay in recommending that the Government itself should open a national bank, and issue

1826
—

national-bank notes, and make the proposed advances. This popular fallacy spoilt the ideal excellence of his suggestion, while the preciseness with which he indicated the machinery required to set trade again in motion proves the reality of his experience and the soundness of his common sense. His notions found the proper agency for their execution in the Bank of England.]

THE REV. SYDNEY SMITH.

York: Feb. 14.

Dear Sir,—Nothing can exceed the fury and bigotry against the Catholics in this part of the world. I have thought it my duty to do what little I can do on the other side of the question, and I take the liberty (knowing your opinions on these points) to send you my pamphlet. Give me leave to add my honest wishes to those of all liberal men for your health and welfare, and that you may long continue to enjoy that favour, so strongly expressed by the public, and so well earned by you. I remain, with real respect, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

SYDNEY SMITH.

F. O. : February 26, 1826.

Dear Sir,—There are two modes of acknowledging a pamphlet sent to one ‘from the Author.’ The first, and by far the safest, is to ‘acknowledge without delay the receipt of Mr.—’s little work and to thank him for the pleasure and information which, one doubts not, one shall receive from the perusal of it.’

The other, which is the more hazardous, is to defer the acknowledgment until one has read the pamphlet (which by the former method one need not do at all); and unless one can then say that one ‘has read it with very great pleasure’ one is in a scrape.

Now, I am in no such scrape with you; for I really have read your pamphlet, and have derived much amusement from it, and can truly say that I think it calculated to do much good.

I therefore make no apology for not having answered your letter more quickly according to Formula

No. 1, but, on the contrary, take merit for the delay, and remain, dear Sir, 1826

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[This great writer sends to Canning a copy of his pamphlet on the Catholic question.

His letter and Canning's reply are both given.

It marks, amongst innumerable other evidences, the extensive influence Canning was acquiring over the minds of even the most jealous of the Liberal party in the kingdom]

THE REV. S. H. CASSAN (FEB. 15, 1826).

The Vicar of Mere, Wiltshire, having compiled two volumes of 'Lives of the Bishops of Winchester,' and obtained a list of subscribers for his work, including the King, sixteen bishops, and a number of the nobility and gentry of Somerset, Wilts, Dorset, and Herts, now applies to Canning for his name.

It is true Canning was at this time member for Newport in the Isle of Wight; but his renown brought innumerable calls for subscriptions from his very moderate means, and the 'Lives of the Bishops of Winchester' could not fairly be called germane to the life and calling of a Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the House of Commons. It is sad to say he roundly anathematised in good old English the defunct bishops, and declined to send any answer to the applicant.

Mr. Cassan renewed his shot on March 7 following. By that time his list had been swelled by forty or fifty more names of archbishops, bishops, noblemen, country gentlemen, and clergymen.

This likewise seems to have met with no answer, Canning's minute on the paper being, 'I have Cassan's "Lives of the Bishops of Winchester" already. These must be some other (perhaps worse) bishops.—G. C.'

Whether Mr. Cassan had sent his book without first obtaining leave, or whether Canning confused the work with the applicant's previous performance of the 'Lives of the Bishops of Salisbury,' is not clear, and does not signify.

MR. J. FERRAND WADDINGTON.

Horn Tavern, Paul's Chain: February 27, 1826.

Sir,—When I once presumed to address you offering my services at Paris I had an answer, which is good manners of the

1826
—

old school. Not so when on September 12 last, (I wish one of H. M. Ministers had received it), I acquainted Sir F. Burdett that 'the Jews and Christian capitalists were withdrawing into the French and N. American funds, and that before the year was out there would be a convulsion only inferior to the infamous South Sea bubble.' This letter is provable; he may be spoken to; he is already a peer—in imagination. I pray you then, Sir, do not throw this letter into the fire until it is perused; for, however presumptuous such correspondence may appear, there may be circumstances to render it praiseworthy, if not somewhat useful.

Now, Sir, I cannot sleep till I have plainly told you, neither the abolition of country small notes, or issue of London Bank ones, or a five million of exchequer bills, or the bank becoming pawnbrokers, or any two of them, will preserve the internal tranquillity two months longer. I will be as brief as possible; I know the precious value of your time. I will first assume that it is of no consequence whatever whether the circulating medium be specie or paper, because this was proved after the suspension 1797 for twenty-five years; and your great error has been Mr. Peel's Bill, though but partially acted on. What will the future historian say to the derangement of that essay, which for a quarter of century had accumulated glory and prosperity, as far as could be expected under such a ponderous weight of taxation? This is the scrape, and the above-recited measures will not extricate the Government. It is, then, of no consequence now to inquire whether such facilities of credit, as this demi-Bill gave, have led speculators to sink property ridiculously in South American shipments, or silly schemes, or, (which is the resort for genteel and cunning rogues), to send thousands to a thing called the Stock Exchange, where, without honour, or tax, or responsibility, nearly one million per diem in gambling is diverted from the natural channels. It is of lesser consequence now to find, that all nations are competing and more than nibbling from our manufactories. This is not the moment to inquire what new principles this contention, and our rapidly increasing population, do imperiously require. The only point, the *sine qua non* of Ministers, now is, What will temporarily avert

the impending danger? Drilled, as it were, in the revolutions of North America, of Belgium, and of France, and perfectly conversant with their noted paper systems, I will presume to say the rapid declension of trade and confidence since December 1 last is mainly to be attributed to the restriction of the circulating medium, and indeed to which it describes in all cases a parallel line. Your present measures, then, will further curtail it, and therefore greatly add to the general distress, and though county banks are a national evil, one-half of the remainder will break, or close their doors.

H. M. Ministers (may I presume?) 'can yet, and can only effectually, save further destruction by, *first*, suppressing the small country notes; *second*, giving legality and an option for London and all banks either to pay in gold, silver, or paper, as it may suit their convenience; and *third*, if you will, to continue only to October 1.'

In this way, Sir, you will avert the dreadful consequences of a run for cash, and another restriction.

'Tis true there are certainly other modes, or rather a conjoint one, and contemporary, and that is, at once a 'suspension,' and an armed neutrality against the S. East ambition of the Russian autocrat.

On this latter subject I know much; but you are pressed to-day on a more urgent one. Can only presume to add, the tidings of such armed neutrality, (in the first instance), would, I verily believe, operate on the whole country advantageously, far beyond the powers of my pen. I did mean, but there is not time to have demonstrated, that a circulating medium ought to be to the taxation as 3 is to 1—say, 150 millions; but include bills of exchange, exclude bills or India bonds (and all these are part and parcel; some are payable in two hours, some in two months): can you carry ours above seventy or eighty millions?

This a presumptuous letter. But there is another topic I can venture to name to an enlightened scholar. An armed force and hostilities carries six million of Irish Catholics within the pale of our distempered constitution. I am a son of the Church, but I could not presume to define the boundaries of that conscience, which is the foundation and ladder and only

1826 hope for the immortality of the soul.—I have the honour to be,
— Sir,

Your admirer and faithful humble servant,

J. FERRAND WADDINGTON.

No person living shall ever know of this letter.

[This letter deserves careful perusal, though its style may be crabbed and the sense obscure ; but the writer perceived clearly that the restriction of the small-note circulation, consequent on the Government intention to forbid their issue in future, if not the cause of the commercial crisis, powerfully contributed to prevent its passing away ; and this amount of discernment deserved commendation, though it did not affect the reasoning on which the proposed abolition of small notes appeared advisable. His suggestion that the issue of such notes should be continued to October 1, though limited to the Bank of England, actually became law.

The precise effects the writer anticipates from an 'armed neutrality against Russian ambition in the S.-East of Europe' in mitigating the strain on commercial business are rather obscure.

Anyhow, Canning minuted the document, 'A curious letter. Let me see it again. Meantime simply acknowledge.—G. C.']

MR. PATTISON.

Southampton Row: March 1, 1826.

My dear Sir,—Will you favour me with five minutes of your time to-morrow at your own house? I wish to return you my best thanks for your kind acknowledgment of my letter, and to state very briefly a new grievance that seems to be threatened which you, and you alone, can possibly avert. Forgive this trespass, and believe me ever, with the truest esteem,

Yours sincerely,

J. PATTISON.

F. O.: Thursday, March 2, 1826.

My dear Sir,—It is a very great concern to me to be obliged to return an unsatisfactory answer to an old and esteemed friend. But, upon my word and honour, an interview is wholly out of my power.

All the evening in the House of Commons, and with my own official business—the arrears of which since the meeting of Parlt. are overwhelming—I really

cannot find time during the few hours of the morning to receive even the foreign Ministers whom it is my duty to see.

1826

Letters I can read, because I can borrow an hour from my rest at night, or early in the morning, to do so. But I could no more have appointed a time for seeing you to-day than I could expect to take my ride before my dinner, or to dine at all. I must therefore request you to write what you wish, and be assured if it is in my way I will attend to it.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Little appears from these two short notes, but they illustrate the extreme pressure of work under which a Minister like Canning must expect to live.]

DR. PERRY (MARCH 3, 1826).

To prove the existence of notes in Scotland under one pound in value, Dr. Perry sends a specimen of a *five-shilling* note, which the unfortunate holder would find liable to the following disadvantages : being unstamped, it had no pretence to legality ; it necessarily could not be paid by the issuer in gold ; it promised an exchange for legal currency only if four such notes could be presented together, and then the holder could call for his pound in paper only ; if not presented within three months of its date, payment became optional.

Nevertheless Dr. Perry states his specimen, and another like it, had to his knowledge been accepted in payment of an account, which proved the circulation of such notes in the neighbourhood of the issuer.

In this case Mr. Matthew Finlayson, of the Ballindalloch Works, issued the note, addressed 'to the Merchants of Balfroun,' and his notes circulated in the neighbourhood of Glasgow.

MR. GIFFARD.

James St: March 5, 1826.

My dear Canning,—I have been long most anxious to write to you, but had not the power. It is now nearly nine weeks since my old enemy Eurys found me in the park, and sent me home in the custody of a severe cold, that rigidly confined me to my bed-room, and almost to my bed, till Monday last. But

1826

this would hardly justify complaint: the worst is, that the rags and tatters of my poor mind, which was broken to pieces in the more than tropical fires of last summer, and which I fondly hoped were adjusting themselves in some slight measure, became as seam-rent as before, and I could neither write, nor read, nor think, for three minutes together.

When Frere—and I cannot name him without a grateful remembrance of his considerate and affectionate attention—first mentioned the matter to me, it was so unexpected, and altogether so remote from anything that ever entered my thoughts, that in my weak state I am not sure that I fully comprehended him while he stayed. I believe he saw this, and in kindness dropped the subject. After he left me, I recurred to it and was totally overpowered. And now, my dear Canning, what can I say? I did not think that I, who have lived for the last five and twenty years in the pleasing assurance of possessing your regard and affection, could have been so surprised; but I cannot proceed.

I will not deny that your bounty was acceptable; because, for reasons which will not recur, the year had been a very trying one to me. But I earnestly and fervently hope that you will not think of repeating this splendid and costly proof of affection. I solemnly assure you that it is not at all necessary, for with my salary from the lottery (which is regularly paid me, and which, as I am now on the very verge of seventy, will not, I trust, be withheld from me) I am even rich.

The only name given to me besides yours was that of Lord Liverpool; so that I am but imperfectly acquainted with my benefactors. I bless God for such friends, and shall be very careful not to lose them unnecessarily. I experienced, however, a degree of delight not common to my dulled feelings at the mention of Lord Liverpool's kindness, and had I strength I would write to him; but I have not, and I lament it. Will you therefore have the goodness to assure his Lordship from me, that nothing has occurred to me these many years so gratifying as this proof that I still retain a place in his memory and regard. I will not tell you how long I have been about this letter; and yet I fancy myself somewhat improved; but I must have done.

One word more, however, on a subject which is seldom out of my thoughts. Let me beg you to take care of yourself.

Catch, or rather snatch at, every interval of relaxation, however momentary. It is a fearful thing to break down the mind by unremitted tension. Remember what Horace says to Virgil:—

Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem.

for, though the poet is evidently quizzing his poor friend, his advice is not to be despised.—Ever, my dear Canning,

Most faithfully and affectionately yours,

WM. GIFFORD.

[A touching and pleasing acknowledgment of some solid pecuniary assistance, afforded by Canning and others, to his old friend and ally the retired 'Quarterly' editor, who appears to have been in failing health and moderate circumstances at this time.]

DR. MEYRICK.

20 Upper Cadogan Place: March 9, 1826.

Rt. Honble. Sir,—I seek neither place nor pension, therefore trust you will do me the justice of believing this letter sincere; but I do seek the honour of your acceptance of a work, of which I thus take the liberty of sending you the first number.

You once conferred on me a gratification far beyond what you imagined by voluntarily entering into conversation, when attending at Carlton House with the University address, before you filled your present dignified station. Always admiring your principles, I hailed, as the greatest blessing Heaven could confer, the removal of your predecessor, and your own elevation. You have evinced a patriotism far more exalted than even your unrivalled talents, which has obtained for you a popularity, that marks the good sense of the people of England, and urges me to request your receiving the humble token of my feelings.

Should you ever stand forward as a candidate to represent the University of Oxford, I would travel any distance to give my vote towards your success, fully impressed that I could not act more beneficially than by such proof that I am

Most sincerely and respectfully yours,

SAMUEL R. MEYRICK, LL.D.

Foreign Office: March 13, 1826.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your very obliging letter of the 9th inst. I accept with

1826
—

1826 — many thanks the work which you are so good as to send me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[About this time the question whether Canning would stand for the University of Oxford, vacant by the retirement of Mr. Heber, happened to be much canvassed in the world.

Dr. Meyrick seizes the occasion to promote the circulation of his latest literary effort (coming out, apparently, in numbers) on ancient armour, and to bespeak Canning's goodwill by swearing a kind of oath of eternal fidelity to the statesman, particularly in connection with the Oxford University canvass.

Naturally, Canning ordered his private secretary to 'prepare a very civil answer, and accept of work.']

MONSIEUR CÉSAR MOREAU (MARCH 14, 1826).

M. Moreau, the French Vice-Consul in London, appears to have been a laborious and painstaking statistician. He sends to Mr. Canning a curious memorandum, lithographed in a small but clear handwriting, on twelve pages of foolscap paper, containing, bilingually presented (one half of the page being a French translation of the English on the left-hand half), a statement of the produce and manufactures exported from Great Britain during each of the 125 years ending December 31, 1824, most elaborately tabulated. The notions of the Press sent with this paper are highly laudatory of the value of the work.

M. Moreau had previously published a volume of East India Company records which had commanded considerable praise. There is no copy of this former work; and these tables of trade returns cannot be reproduced, but are certainly interesting.

ANONYMOUS.

March 16, 1826.

Sir,—Unwillingness to stand forth in opposition to Government, and set myself up as a volunteer defender of the public rights, induces me to try this method of obtaining my end, before I have recourse to the unpleasant alternative of calling a public meeting, for the purpose of preparing a petition to Parliament. You are probably not aware, Sir, that in the new arrangements for the Regent's Park, (I say new because it was originally

asserted that the interior would be given up to the public), the inner portion is railed off, and keys are sold by the park-keepers, under the authority of the commissioners, to the inhabitants of the houses which skirt the park. By this arrangement the public are deprived of their accustomed healthy walk in the fields, and are essentially losers by, what may be truly termed by the rich, the improvements of that quarter. But, as I remember most keenly the pleasure of my evening walk, the perfect security with which a large family of children could, with but little attendance, enjoy their healthy recreation on that spot, and when I now see that the public are condemned to a hot, dusty road, beset with danger from carriages and horses, I look upon the exchange as one of the worst they could have made. The public, however, are no party to the agreement. They claim their right, which there are no good reasons for withholding from them; but, such as they are, you have them here, with the answers to them. The commissioners say, *first*, that 'if the park is thrown open the property will be deteriorated.' I say it will not; and I refer to the houses which border the other parks (which are as free as this ought to be)—Connaught Place, Park Lane, and Piccadilly—as bearing higher prices than any situations in London. *Secondly*, 'that the young plantations would be injured, and that such numbers would crowd into it that the walks would be spoiled.' To this I reply that the young plantations in the other parks are not destroyed, nor do the numbers who crowd into the parks, and Kensington Gardens, spoil the walks. I know of no other reasons, that can be urged for this unpopular exclusion. And now, Sir, may I entreat that you will mention this subject in Parliament, and get a distinct pledge from the commissioners, that our rights shall be restored to us. Let any man of feeling place himself on the summit of Primrose Hill, and look down on the vast expanse below, unenlivened by the movement of a living creature, except in the dull dusty track of the carriage-road, and say if it does not make his heart ache, to reflect on the unnecessary privation this must be to thousands of his fellow-creatures, who, deprived of this healthy and agreeable walk, are driven to spend their Sundays and the few hours they can snatch from their laborious employments in the heat of a tea-garden, or on the bowling-green

1826

of an alehouse. And for what? For a rent of probably 100*l.* a year. But if any other part be yet for a time reserved, let the portion, which is now completely formed at the top of Baker Street, be immediately thrown open. See the invalid, newly risen from the bed of sickness, with just strength enough to crawl for a little air to the outskirts of the town, casting his anxious eye by turns to the curvetting and bounding of the ill-managed steed in the road, and to the secure path within the railing on which he feebly supports himself, but to which he is cruelly, and I may say unjustly, denied admittance! See the amiable mother charging herself with the care of two or three little children, whom all her attention cannot restrain from straggling on the carriage-way, (who are, indeed, scarcely safe on the footpath), and consider how securely they might take their exercise, and inhale health and vigour in the space, now reserved for the pranked-up promenade of a few fine ladies and gentlemen, who have every means of recreation without it! The injustice of this exclusion is the more flagrant as the houses, for which keys are sold, have (with the exception of about a dozen in Cornwall Terrace) large pleasure-grounds for their exclusive use; so that the comfortable, healthy walk of ten thousand persons is spoiled for the occasional enjoyment of a dozen families, most of whom at the finest season of the year are at their country houses. The Regent's Park is certainly a great ornament to the town; it may become a great comfort; but, as it is, I would to God that all its improvements were destroyed, and our plain, unsophisticated, happy fields once more restored to us.—I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

AN OLD INHABITANT OF MARY-LE-BONE.

[Submits a vigorous statement against the inclosures in the Regent's Park. As the question has recently (1883-4) come again before the public, this early protest may not be without interest.

But the writer is wrong in one allegation. At the present date the crowds actually have spoiled, and are spoiling, the walks and turf of both Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens, simply by dint of numbers.]

MR. WILLIAM TURNER.

Thrigley Park: March 22, 1826.

1826

Sir,—You are doubtless aware of the abduction of my only child from a boarding-school by Mr. Ed. Gibbon Wakefield. Of the particulars you are probably ignorant, and I regret that the departure of the post will not allow me to detail them. I can only say that a more diabolical conspiracy has never before been developed in this country.

Having received every assistance from the different offices of his Majesty's Government to enable me to recover my child—and, thank God, I have fortunately been successful—you will judge of my astonishment when I learned that the villain has eluded justice by the agency of a British diplomatist. I have not yet received my despatches, but the accompanying letters, forwarded to me by my friend Mr. Legh, of Lyme, will put you in possession of the facts. I have not time to say more than that I feel assured his Majesty's Government will not countenance the conduct of their servant, and that they will do everything in their power to bring the villain to justice.—I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM TURNER.

P.S.—When my friends left Calais to bring my child to me at Dover they had the assurance of the Mayor of Calais that he would detain Mr. Wakefield, who had put my daughter's name in his passport himself.

Foreign Office: March 23, 1826.

Sir,—You do me but justice in believing, that I have learnt, with as much displeasure as astonishment, the extraordinary conduct of Mr. — in affording his protection to the seducer of your daughter.

I send off a messenger without delay to Paris, to prevent if possible the ill consequences of Mr. — interference; but at all events to disavow, in the name of the British Government, a proceeding to which Mr. — official character might otherwise occasion a false interpretation to be given. *

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

1826
—

[Mr. Turner complains of the protection afforded by a gentleman high in his Majesty's diplomatic service in France to Mr. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who had abducted Mr. Turner's daughter from a boarding-school in England, and carried her off to the Continent. The enclosures referred to in Mr. Turner's letter are not with the papers. Canning's prompt attention to the complaint is only what might be expected of him.]

DR. CHALMERS.

This singular note, written from St. Andrews, N.B., runs as follows :—

Dr. Chalmers, with much distrust and deference, begs to submit the enclosed bagatelle to Mr. Canning. He most willingly foregoes all credit of novelty of conception in regard to the plan, whose chief practical recommendation is founded on its being destitute even of novelty of execution.

To the Right Hon. George Canning, Esq. M.P.

[The 'distrust' mentioned in the first line can scarcely refer to the same object as the 'deference' with which it is coupled. Moreover, at first sight one does not understand why a pamphlet of sixteen pages on the West Indian slavery question should be called even in modesty a 'bagatelle'; finally, it would have been thought that a man of the world like Dr. Chalmers might have known, that the style of 'esquire' disappears in the superior rank of 'Right Honourable,' i.e. Privy Councillor.

Setting aside these trifling criticisms, and without going deeply into the details of the plan, it may be mentioned that it propounded a scheme for the gradual emancipation of the slaves by enabling them to attain that object by their own proper exertions, and for a coincident process of compensation to the slaveholders.

Reckoning 800,000 slaves of all ages in the British West Indies, and their value, on the average, at 50% a head per annum, the total comes to 40,000,000%, representing six days' slave-labour per week throughout the year. Capitalised on this calculation, about 7,000,000% would express the capital value of one day's labour of the whole slave population per week for the period of one year. This amount the British Government should credit to the planters and thereby purchase one free day per week for the slaves.

With this free day to start with, each slave might by industry acquire sufficient money to purchase, and by law be allowed to purchase from his master, at the same rate of value, a second day's liberty per week, and so on until he should have redeemed the whole six days and acquired entire freedom.

The idea appears extremely ingenious and plausible ; but without insisting on the case of the idle and thriftless, for whom the scheme would bring no benefit, and whose wives and children would consequently never attain freedom, there was such an unlimited prospect of collision between the planters and such half-emancipated hands, as to the free day, and as to the contemporaneous urgency of the requirements for labour on the plantations, particularly if the plan progressed and many hands acquired many free days—as could only end in everlasting trickery on the part of the negroes and illegal coercion on the part of the planters.]

1826

MAJOR DENHAM.

Albany : March 29, 1826.

Sir,—A copy of the narrative of our discoveries in Central Africa was forwarded yesterday to his Majesty, and I was in hopes, through Mr. Planta, to have had the honour of presenting one to you on the same day, had not your absence from town disappointed me.

Permit me, therefore, to lay before you the accompanying volume, and allow me to subscribe myself, Sir,

With the greatest respect, &c.

DIXON DENHAM, Major.

F. O. : April 2, 1826.

Sir,—I beg you to accept my thanks for the very interesting volume which you announced to me in your letter of the 29th ulto., and which I have the pleasure to find on my table on my return to town.

I have &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

[There is nothing particular in this note, and its reply ; except it appears that the volume of the Major's travels was a handsome volume, and obtained the honour of an acknowledgment in Canning's own handwriting.]

Major Denham greatly distinguished himself in the field of African exploration, and deserved especial notice.]

MR. J. H. FRERE TO MR. STAPLETON.

Gloucester Place : April 10, 1826.

Sir,—You will receive herewith the quarto volume of Major Denham's 'Travels in Africa,' which I trust I have not detained

1826
—

beyond the time which was intended to be allowed to me for its perusal. I trust to your official accuracy for expunging the note from the register in which you have charged me with the loan of the volume in question.

I have, &c.,

J. H. FRERE.

[This appears to refer to the very volume of Denham's travels mentioned in the previous letter.]

MR. CANNING TO MR. CHAPMAN.

F. O: April 15, 1826.

Dear Sir,—Charles has sent me a bill from a turner amounting to 14*l.*!

Unluckily I have put it by so carefully that I cannot lay my hand upon it at this moment.

But I recollect that one not inconsiderable item of the bill is 'To a bill delivered——,' of which, of course, there are no particulars.

I should be much obliged to you if you would take the trouble to send to the turner for his account of both bills, and, if you think it right that they should be paid, I will immediately send the money for them. But I think it would be desirable to slacken a little the pace of the turner's machinery for the future.

I do not by any means disapprove of the amusement itself; but it need not be quite so costly.

I am, dear Sir,

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[Mr. Chapman, apparently, was the tutor of Master Charles Canning, afterwards Earl Canning and Governor-General of India. The letter tells its own story.]

SIR ANDREW HALLIDAY.

Hampton Court: April 17, 1826.

Sir Andrew Halliday has had the honour to receive Mr. Canning's note of the 15th, and from its tenor Sir Andrew Halliday conceives that Mr. Canning must labour under some mistake or

1826

that Sir Andrew, in his former letter, must have committed some strange blunder. Sir Andrew Halliday wished as a mark of respect to present Mr. Canning with a copy of his work; and the intention of his writing was to ask if he might be permitted to wait personally upon Mr. Canning and deliver it. More than this Sir Andrew Halliday never had in view; and how Mr. Canning could suppose he expected a criticism of his publication Sir Andrew Halliday must confess he is at a loss to conceive. Sir Andrew Halliday has a very high opinion of Mr. Canning's talents—no man more so—but does not suppose that he is much qualified to criticise a dry genealogical history, even though it is the history of the King's family. Sir Andrew Halliday cannot take offence at Mr. Canning refusing his offered civility, though he has judged it necessary for his own feelings to enter into the explanation.

Foreign Office: April 20, 1826.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Sir Andrew Halliday, and has the honour of acknowledging the receipt of Sir Andrew Halliday's letter of the 17th inst.

Mr. Canning regrets exceedingly the double mistake under which his answer to Sir A. Halliday's former letter was written.

There was nothing in Sir Andrew Halliday's letter to indicate his proper appellation, and as all that that letter proposed was to show to Mr. Canning Sir Andrew Halliday's work, Mr. Canning, who is in the habit of receiving (if not daily) weekly similar proposals from the authors of forthcoming publications, could only answer, as in such cases he always does, by declining such supposed offer of communication. Mr. C. had no intention whatever of hurting the feelings of the proposer.

[This and the reply are certainly of no public importance; the preliminary correspondence does not seem to have been preserved; but Sir Andrew seems to have been misunderstood, and undeservedly snubbed by Canning. Nothing can be better than the dignity and temper of Sir Andrew's remonstrance; and so Canning appears to

1826 have felt it. The work in question is, no doubt, Halliday's 'House
— 'of Hanover.']

WILLIAM GODWIN.

44 Gower Place: May 18, 1826.

Sir,—I am still engaged in diligently prosecuting the work 'the History of the Commonwealth of England,' respecting which I have once already taken the liberty to trouble you. The favour you did me on that occasion—the obtaining for me an admission to the State Paper Office in Great George Street—has been of the greatest advantage to me.

I at this moment labour under a similar difficulty. At the Restoration the Government, that hanged the body of Cromwell on a gibbet, and that tore the remains of Blake from the grave to throw them into a pit, employed themselves in the most arbitrary and capricious manner in obliterating passages in the journals of Parliament during the Interregnum. In particular, some proceedings are erased immediately before the forcible dispersion of the Parliament by Cromwell in 1653, which must be exceedingly important to the historian, and which can in no way be offensive to any man, or body of men, now living. These passages are not so obliterated, but that with some diligence they may be deciphered.

I should say generally, whatever relates to the public transactions of the English nation 170 years ago is fair matter for the historian, and ought not to be withheld from the instruction of the present age.

I saw Mr. Whittam, the Senior Clerk of the Journals, on the subject, who received me very courteously; but, when he understood my business, expressed some doubt whether the superseding an order of this kind, made in the year 1660, did not exceed his powers. If you, Sir, by your kind interference, could remove the obstacle which at present impedes my labours, you would confer an inestimable obligation on me.

I have, &c ,

WILLIAM GODWIN.

THE SPEAKER.

Palace Yard: May 25, 1826.

My dear Sir,—In answer to your letter of the 23rd, which I had the honour of receiving yesterday evening, I beg to say that

I can see no objection to complying with Mr. Godwin's request, under these restrictions : that no chemical process be resorted to to bring out the half-obliterated papers, and that no risk be incurred to the original by any application for the purpose of taking a facsimile.

I have given directions to Mr. Whittam to afford Mr. Godwin every facility in his search, and every opportunity of endeavouring to decipher what is nearly blotted out, short of running the risks I have adverted to ; and I trust you will think I have complied with his wishes as far as my duty will permit.

I have, &c.,

C. MANNERS SUTTON.

Foreign Office : May 26, 1827

Sir,—I have received your letter of the 18th inst., requesting my assistance to enable you to get at the journals of the House of Commons during the time of the Commonwealth.

I am happy in being able to inform you that directions have been given to Mr. Whittam to afford you every facility in your search, short of allowing the documents to be subjected to any chymical process.

I am, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[William Godwin, the well-known author of 'Caleb Williams' and other works, appeals for assistance to obtain close inspection of the Journals of Parliament, for the purposes of the 'History of the Commonwealth' which he was writing. He obtains his request.]

MR. JAMES PRIOR.

Royal Marine Barracks, Chatham : May 27, 1826.

Sir,—Impressed by a sense of the favour I have been told you have done me, of giving a favourable opinion of the 'Life of Burke' which I have presumed to sketch, I beg to offer my sincere acknowledgments for the honour thus done me, and to request that you will do me the further honour of accepting a copy of a new and much enlarged edition of the work, which I herewith transmit. I am aware that in thus expressing a feeling of

1826

obligation towards a gentleman holding so high and influential an office in his Majesty's Government my motives may be mistaken. Permit me, therefore, to say that I have no other favour than that of your continued approbation to solicit. I have the honour to be, Sir, with that unfeigned admiration which splendid talents must ever command from a grateful country, &c., &c.,

JAMES PRIOR.

F. O.: June 1, 1826.

Sir,—I should have less difficulty in saying how well pleased I am that the author of the 'Life of Burke' should have derived any gratification from my opinion of that work, (which appears to have been faithfully reported to him,) if the valuable present, with which your letter of May 27 was accompanied, did not take away the character of disinterestedness from any such expression of my feelings.

I accept with thanks the enlarged edition which you do me the honour to send to me, and from which I have no doubt that I shall derive renewed and augmented pleasure.

I have, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[Offers a new and enlarged edition of his 'Life of Edward Burke,' for Canning's acceptance, which is graciously received.]

MR. JAMES DICKSON.

Buenos Ayres: May 29, 1826.

Sir,—I venture to address you and to offer you my ideas on the nature of the present war between the Brazilians and united provinces of the Rio de la Plata, because I think the real merits of the case lie concealed beneath appearances and pretexts, and because the considerations which should direct Englishmen, and the English Government, appear to me to be as unknown in England as is the true nature of these countries. Had the Banda Oriental possessed a population at all proportionate to its extent, or a respectable Government, or had its revolutionary

Government refrained from insulting its neighbours, it had never been occupied by the Portuguese. The people of that province, who now fight for what they call independence, never possessed such a thing, unless under the Portuguese. To dispossess a handful of people scattered over a great surface, colonists themselves, intruders and dispossessors of the natives, and who could have no right but in proportion to their capacity to occupy and to establish order and civilisation: to dispossess those who have shown themselves incapable of conduct, who were at war with their neighbours and natural brothers, who lived without industry and abused the bounty of nature, who wantonly destroyed the only property they could ever possess—their herds—and which time had bequeathed them: to dispossess these novices in life, these minors, of a right to govern themselves, or rather of an opportunity to do a great deal of scandalous mischief, was no great injustice, whilst in truth the mildness, with which they were treated, and the security afforded them, was their best independence. If the people of the Banda Oriental have been unable of themselves to establish order, or to resist its establishment by their neighbours the Portuguese, what right have the citizens of the united provinces of the Rio de la Plata to interfere to destroy that order which has been established? Is it merely because the agents of this Government speak the Portuguese language? Would they not have as much right to complain though the neighbouring people of the Rio Grande and San Pablo were of Spanish race? The interference of neighbours on the right is just as lawful as of those on the left, whatever language they may speak. And the citizens of the Rio de la Plata, notwithstanding similarity of language, are as disunited by prejudices as those of the Oriental and San Pablo. They have waged a destructive civil war on each other; and now, that that war has wasted itself through fatigue, they are united only in carrying on a war of plunder against the Portuguese, because, forsooth, these have not been reduced to disorder, and because they have presumed to extend an orderly Government over a large space in which was a handful of people speaking the Spanish language, and at war with those whom they now call brothers. If the Banda Oriental possessed any peculiar

1826

properties which made it desirable to the citizens of the Rio de la Plata as a territorial possession, if they intended to migrate from their present settlements, and form more desirable ones there, they would be justifiable in erecting then a new government, on the ground of expediency and pleasure, and not because those who just began to occupy it were of Spanish origin. A Portuguese has as good a right to migrate from San Pablo to the Banda Oriental as a Spaniard from Cordova, and better, because it is cut off from the latter by two great rivers. The truth is, whatever nation has the best means to occupy, and the most natural proximity to the territory in question, has the right to found the government over the future people, as being most conducive to the ends and progress of civilisation. Here it is that a knowledge of the peculiar nature of these countries, and of their peculiar circumstances, is of the utmost consequence to determine this question. If the citizens of Rio de la Plata can show that a Republican form of government is most adapted to the nature of the Banda Oriental and to its rapid prosperity, then they might be justified in restoring the rights, or rather establishing the wishes, of their countrymen. But it happens that Republicanism does not pervade the world, nor is it adapted to the physical circumstances of all countries. If the citizens of the Argentine Republic make war merely to liberate a small number of persons, not their countrymen, but only speaking the same language, not from a yoke, nor from any certain bad form of government, but only from the government of certain persons who speak Portuguese, they certainly take a great deal of trouble about a very unimportant point of pride. And are they rich enough to afford so proud a feeling, or have they nothing better to do? The fact is, they are exceedingly poor, have no resource for industry, and are by their circumstances military adventurers of a dangerous character. Were they rich, their intentions might be good and their feelings might deserve respect. But had they a flourishing industry, it is more than probable they would neglect even real grievances of a remote people, though allied to them in blood and language. The Banda Oriental is a country of the same nature as the provinces of the Entre Rios, Santa Fé, and Buenos Ayres. They are all natural

pastures incapable of tillage, incapable of industry, or of rearing a dense population, having no value whatever but as pastures, and creating no other property than herds. Whatever citizens of the Argentine Republic say otherwise utter a wilful and corrupt falsehood, or are very ignorant indeed. I am convinced of this fact by experience, by observation, and by the expressed opinions of the people themselves. Such a notion could not have been even conceived were it not founded in fact, and the contrary opinion is only the supposition of those unacquainted with facts, or the assertion of fraudulent speculators. 'Tis only some of those individuals who are high enough in the grades of society to become projectors, far enough removed by their mode of life from nature to know nothing about her, and learned enough to draw from books theories and examples that don't apply: 'tis only such persons who pretend that the above-mentioned provinces will admit of every line of industry, and will reward the labours of the agricultural emigrants—an error which has been lately acted upon by misinformed speculators in England, and will shortly be expensively and ruinously ascertained. The wanton destruction of those prodigious herds, which time had created in these pastures, has been one of the results of the emancipation of these people from dependence in Spain. This cannot be argued to be a beneficial one; and yet we see no advantage achieved, no progress made, which can counterbalance the loss of that property for which alone these countries are valuable, which only time had created, and which only time and economy can renew. War is not economical, and the present one may give the finishing-blow to what remains of the stock already so scandalously diminished. It is yet questionable whether these Republicans have gained anything by their independence, more than the pride of the thing; and, therefore, it is not desirable that they should extend the sphere of their experiments, until they prove the beneficial character of them. Their territory, exclusive of the Banda Oriental, is of sufficient extent, whatever be its qualities, whether only pastures, or possessed of every imaginable excellence, to occupy their means and industry for ages to come without crossing a natural boundary, as is the Uruguay. But they do not fight for the possession of vacant

1826

fields—a thing in which they over-abound. Though the mode in which Spain governed her colonies was injudicious and unjustifiable, it does not follow that those colonies, upon becoming independent, are justifiable in carrying their raw ideas into effect through all America, so they would presently revolutionise Guiana and Demerara. On the contrary, it is desirable that the empire of the Brazils should remain entire, and that there should be a marked and natural boundary between two principles, one of which seems adapted to produce prosperity, whilst the other has as yet been unhappy. The cession of the Banda Oriental is no detriment to the Republicans, because they are not in want of territory, and is necessary to the peace of the Imperials, because the Uruguay is a natural boundary.

From the moment that the United States of North America threw off the government of Great Britain, they began, notwithstanding, to prosper rapidly under a democratic form of government; because such a form well suited all their circumstances, the nature of their population, and the nature of their soil; a white unmixed people, deriving their origin from the most enlightened and industrious nation of Europe, and a soil which rewarded labour with ample sustenance, and required no capital for its cultivation. The facility and advantage, with which an agricultural population can spread over the surface of the United States of North America, gives importance and a superior character to the mass of the people; which is necessarily productive of democracy, so long as vacant lands give material and capital to the labouring farmer. A democracy founded on these circumstances is a stable and respectable government, because the mass of the people are too respectable and feel and understand their interests too well to be made the tools of designing men. Had the Spanish provinces possessed a population of a like character, and a soil equally adapted to the sustenance and reward of humble labour, like results would have followed their independence. But disorder and mischief have been the consequences of the removal of that authority, to which they had been accustomed, because their circumstances afforded no permanent source of a new and steady one. A population grafted upon savages, and accustomed not to prin-

1826

ciples but to persons, and a soil everywhere requiring the aid of capital, give rise to an aristocracy which, as it is composed of men who are only half-learned, very conceited, and incapable of serious application, is incapable of governing itself, for it does not understand its true interests, and has the means of resorting to violence on every occasion. Society here is on the simplest principles—patriarchal influence amongst a rude and ignorant people. Every isolated point is a separate interest, jealous of its neighbours, and ignorantly suspicious. Those provinces which are situated on navigable rivers—as the Entre Rios, Santa Fé, and Buenos Ayres—being merely pastoral in their nature, and the others demi-pastoral, demi-agricultural but remotely and disadvantageously situated in the interior, there is no scope, nor the least chance of the introduction of an enlightened and industrious population from Europe, which alone could establish a respectable democracy, or originate an independent government upon principles of reason and justice. What has been done in the United States of North America is physically impracticable here. And the aristocrats of these republics would be very sorry to admit the democratic equality of those; nor would it be proper, because it would occasion disorder and mischief, which it could never repair. Men cannot sustain their animal life on the same food in all climates, nor their social orders on the same principles. In a pastoral country there are only two orders of persons, proprietors and servants; servants ferocious, unaccustomed to civilised comfort, and without self-estimation, fit tools for mischief; and proprietors, vain, idle, dissolute and ignorant. This Southern Republic is not calculated to make any considerable advance in wealth, population, or civilisation for ages, perhaps never, and have no analogy whatever with the United States of North America. The city of Buenos Ayres has been changed by the revolution from being the port of all Spanish S. America, to the being that only of herself; from a forced importance she is reduced to that, which her own productions can give her. These are only what proceed from cattle, and are not likely ever greatly to increase in amount from various unfavourable causes. A population composed of the elements I have described, and doomed to listless idleness, poverty, and conceit, will always

1826

threaten the security of neighbours who may be prosperous. They must always bear a strong resemblance to the pastoral and predatory nations of the Old World. It is therefore the policy of the Brazils, and the cause of humanity, that she holds the Banda Oriental in order to govern and organise the dangerous sort of people, which it is calculated to produce, and that she should have in her interest, and on her frontiers, a people best calculated to resist her neighbours. A country which can only produce cattle is not qualified to stand by itself, if it is to serve the purposes of civilisation. The meadow of the Banda Oriental is naturally attached to the forests of the Brazils, whilst those of the Entre Rios, Santa Fé, and Buenos Ayres belonged to Paraguay, Tucuman, and Peru. But the Portuguese are not only the natural owners of the Banda Oriental, but have the only means by which it can be advantageously occupied. Whoever may govern, the Portuguese alone are able to stock it. For the Republicans have neither cattle, nor money to purchase the cattle of the Portuguese. These last have a considerable quantity of cattle in the Rio Grande, which now wants scope to multiply; and a great number would be driven to multiply on the banks of the Uruguay, if the government of the Empire should remain firm. The *patria* has a bad name; it consists of ferocious shepherds, who have destroyed their own herds, and may now be fairly suspected of hungering to do the like by those of the Rio Grande. This I know to be the avowed motive of the common Gauchos, and I believe the real one of the chief. The empty fields of the Banda Oriental are not worth governing, and it is not to be expected that those, who are capable of stocking it and giving it value, will submit to be ruled by others, because those others were the first proprietors, and have ruined themselves by the vilest folly and misconduct. Either the *ganaderos* of the Rio Grande or of Buenos Ayres must stock, occupy, and govern the Banda Oriental, because they only have cattle. But what a task to transport cattle from Buenos Ayres to Monte Video by sea or land, in comparison to the driving them from the Rio Grande! The case of the ruined proprietors of the Banda Oriental is altogether desperate. If they recover the government of their empty

fields, they will have to seek the expenses of that government from Buenos Ayres, and the means of restocking the country, neither of which would they be likely to obtain on easy terms from so poor a people as the Buenos Ayreans are. This, then, would be the sure cause of new war and intestine commotion, and these are anticipated by all reflecting persons. Nothing can mend the situation of the Oriental to their satisfaction, but the actual spoliation of the Portuguese cows, and nothing can do it so wisely and so safely as submission to the Portuguese Government. Persons of property in the Banda Oriental, and of moderate character, prefer peace and the Portuguese Government. The word *patria* is a factious appeal to the ruffians by the ambitious, a real system of terror, held over the moderate and respectable to mend the fortunes of the desperate. One half the population of the Banda Oriental are vagabonds, attracted from other provinces by the abundance of cattle, which some time ago existed in it. These, having furthered the work of destruction, till checked by the Portuguese, and being now without employment or resources in a country with but few cattle and unfit for tillage, instead of returning to the countries whence they came, and where a moderate exertion would provide them a plentiful subsistence, as in Paraguay, Tucuman, Santiago, &c., call themselves Orientales, and combine to carry on a war of plunder against the Brazilians. Subsisted by beef levied on those who have cattle, and clothed with cloth levied on those who have cloth, their circumstances are sufficiently agreeable to them, who have no principles of pride, or honour, or honesty, or industry; a race of robbers and soldiers, one would not expect to find bred in a colony founded by a civilised power; like the hardy and ferocious shepherds, who have achieved such signal conquests in the Old World.

The Portuguese are accused of having carried off the cattle of the Banda Oriental. What they carried off could not have been missed out of the mass that existed. All the cattle were in a state of nature, and it would have been impracticable to have driven so great a mass of such wild cattle. However, those that were carried off were thereby saved from destruction; it was therefore a justifiable measure—and after the war there

1826
—

remained a tolerable proportion of cattle, whereas in the Entre Rios, Santa Fé, and Corrientes, where the Portuguese never entered, the cattle have been almost entirely destroyed. This shows that the interference of the Portuguese was beneficial. The possible consequence of the present war may be the destruction of the cattle at present existing in the Banda Oriental, and of those of the Rio Grande, in which case it will be reduced to a level with the provinces of the Argentine Republic, and most probably remain a desert for ages. Aristocracy is the natural growth of Spanish and Portuguese Americas, because they can only be cultivated to advantage by capitalists. The warm parts, adapted to agricultural and tropical productions, must be cultivated by slaves under civilised masters, because there is no free and civilised population in the world fit to undertake the cultivation of hot countries. Slave-owners are not fit to be Republicans. Mines cannot be worked without capital; lands that require artificial irrigation neither; and the increase of cattle in a country merely pastoral will render the owners rich, and the people dependent.

Democracy is the growth only of the United States of North America, and during its infancy, during the process of its filling up with people, and never belonged to South America, the aristocracy of which, being conceited and inexperienced, require a strong hand to rule them for their own good, and save their interests from destruction by their own dependents. The population of the Entre Rios, consisting but of 20,000 souls, was very lately divided, and about to shed each other's blood at the instance of two rival governors, two haughty ignorant chieftains, and their savage dependents. What a proof of the anarcical principles inherent in these people!

Paraguay, as a tillage country, and one of various productions, and as being at the head of great navigable rivers, is the natural source of population and power. If she do not relapse into savagism, she must advance and acquire a passage to the sea by the channels of the Parana, whose banks she must desire to command. Paraguay must conquer Buenos Ayres, or Buenos Ayres must conquer Paraguay, because neither are sufficiently enlightened to adjust their interests without violence. Should

the Banda Oriental be attached to the Argentine Republic, it must enter into this war and suffer its consequences. How much more desirable that it should be attached to that power to which it naturally belongs, and which is ready immediately to promote its prosperity, rather than be implicated in the unhappy circumstances in which Buenos Ayres is placed! For it is an awkward geographical circumstance that a country of but secondary capacity, as is a merely pastoral one, should command the seacoast. Because it gives this latter a mistaken idea of its importance, and prevents that harmony which is necessary to the interests of all. Such a geographical awkwardness is not to be met in the United States of North America. But in South America, we observe natural as well as accidental causes of dissension and inequality. Therefore a war, carried on to force equality between unequal and discordant principles, is a war to disturb that natural dependence, which alone can produce harmony and happiness. I take the liberty of referring you to a letter from me to Barber Beaumont, Esq., managing director of the Rio de la Plata Agricultural Association. Perhaps it may assist you in forming correct ideas of these countries.

I remain, &c.

JAMES DICKSON.

[A diffuse but not uninteresting argument in favour of the advantages which the territory of the Banda Oriental would obtain by becoming subject to the Government of Brazil in preference to that of the Argentine Republic.]

MR. CHARLES PITT.

At a meeting of the electors of Westminster held on Thursday evening June 8, 1826, at the Gordon Hotel Piazza, Covent Garden,

It is proposed that a requisition be immediately prepared, signed and forwarded to the Right Honourable George Canning, requesting him to allow his name to be put in nomination as one of the candidates for the representation of the city of Westminster in Parliament.

Carried by a great majority.

CHARLES PITT.

1826

Sir,—In terms of the above resolution, we, the undersigned electors of Westminster, do most respectfully request you to accede to the wish therein expressed.

We have the honour to be—

S. W. HENSLOW.

J. W. BAINBRIDGE.

S. J. H. WAINE, Crown Court, Charles Street.

A. BENG0, 38 Maiden Lane, Covent Garden.

THOS. BUCKHAM, Abingdon Street.

GEO. ANTHER, Lower Belgrave Place.

THOS. TRIGG, George Street, Oxford Street.

JOHN FISHER, cheesemonger, 33 Bennett Street,
St. James's.

JAMES TIVERSDALE, St. Martin's Lane.

THOS. LEEN, Northumberland Court, Strand.

WM. COMYN, 13 Norfolk Street.

WM. REEVES, 7 Bridge Court West.

J. NEWTON, 21 Little Pultney Street.

JNO. PARRISH, 31 Surrey Street, Strand.

C. M. WESTMACOTT, 5 Clement's Inn.

CHARLES GOVETON, 365 Strand.

THOS. CANNFORD, George St., Grosvenor Square.

JOSEPH DAWSON, 20 James Street, Covent Garden.

CHARLES COX, 149 St. Martin's Lane.

R. HART, 55 Long Acre.

R. WALKER, 14 Beaufort Buildings.

JOHN JAGGAR, 2 Armstrong St., St. Martin's Lane.

R. M. PRICE, 1 Kemp Row, Pimlico.

J. M. BRIER, 5 King's Head Buildings, James's
Street.

RICHD. COMERFOOT, 11 Angel Court, Strand.

JOHN WHATLEY, 3 White Horse Street, May Fair.

W. PLATT, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden.

T. W. RICE, 14 Charles Street, St. James's.

[The General Election was now impending. This document is a formal requisition from electors of Westminster for Canning to accept the candidature for that city. It is endorsed by Canning as follows :—

‘June 19, 1826.

‘I saw three of the within-named gentlemen, viz. Mr. Pitt, Mr. Parish, and Mr. Westmacott, on Thursday night, June 8, at half-past ten. 1826
—

‘I told them that, having four years ago taken leave of my constituents at Liverpool, because I could not attend to their concerns while I held my present office, I could not consistently accept the representation of a still more populous constituency.

‘They asked me whether, if elected without my consent and against my wishes, I would not serve.

‘I said no.

‘They expressed regret, but appeared to be satisfied that I decided on right principles, and took their leave with great civility and thanks for my kind reception of them.

‘G. C.’

WILLIAM GROVES.

Kingsnorth, near Ashford, Kent: June 14, 1826.

Dear Sir,—Although I have never been favoured with any answer to the two letters I had formerly the honour to address to you, I cannot resist the pleasure it would afford me to obtain if possible redress for the injured and oppressed; and I hope I shall not fail in prevailing on your benevolence and liberality to aid me with your interest and influence.

The personage to whom I advert, and whose cause I am so solicitous to advocate, is her Royal Highness the Princess Olive of Cumberland, acknowledged as such and created Duchess of Lancaster by his late Majesty. Nothing can possibly be more unquestionably authenticated; and one should suppose that the solemn attestation of his late Majesty to these facts, together with other high authorities, would not fail to meet with their due attention. Why, therefore, this attention should be refused and that this legitimate descendant of his Majesty George II. should be treated with such neglect, (attested, as I have observed her Royal Highness to be,) is to me most irreconcilable; for what, then, becomes, Sir, I would ask, of the liberties of the land and

1826
—

the charter of birthright, the fundamental basis of all our constitutional privileges? and why, Sir, again, if there be any the least reason of doubt relative to her Royal Highness's claims, debar her the unalienable right of the subject, as by law established, to refer these claims to a proper legal tribunal to ascertain whether they be substantially correct or not? Surely, Sir, you must know it cannot be otherwise than a most revolting idea to the English mind, to contemplate the liberties and rights of the subject can be so dispensed with, as her Royal Highness's case appears to speak, at the sole wish and control of Ministers. A power which the constitution does not recognise, for the law of the land, according to the tenor and principles of that constitution, is considered to be the only sovereignty of power. Thus am I obliged to argue after the many appeals I have made to the Prime Minister on the subject; not of annoyance nor of disrespect, but from an honest principle of duty on the part of her Royal Highness as a legitimate princess of the House of Brunswick, with which the throne of England is so dearly in the estimation of a British people connected. Nor am I, I beg to observe, so expressing myself only in my own person but also the sentiments of one who though dead yet speaketh—his late Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, to whose confidence I had the honour to be intimately admitted. And I am confident that nothing but the most unmerited and ill-founded prejudices must obtain somewhere, or her Royal Highness could never have been treated as she has been.

As to those wretched and lamely fabricated libels which have been so assiduously promulgated in the venal Press against her Royal Highness, who is, at the same time, prevented the means of rebutting them by her property being withheld (O England! are thus thy sacred institutions of liberty and constitutional rights, sealed in the blood of thy children, abused!) they are nothing better than mere artifices purposely designed to drown truth and depreciate her Royal Highness's character (than which no female's ever stood higher for virtuous principle, conscientious rectitude, true loyalty, and a sincere devoted attachment to his gracious Majesty) artifices that will soon detect themselves, for the impartial independent liberally thinking mind begins to be awakened and entertains suspicions of them; which was

unexpectedly intimated to myself by a gentleman the other day, who expressed himself to this effect, and added in a tone of astonishment, See what can be done, even in this country, by the self-will of arbitrary power !

I will take upon me to say, Sir, whatever may be and whose-soever may be the dissentient opinion—and I speak also in the voice of my late respected master, his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent—that as soon as his Majesty shall be made acquainted with the truth of her Royal Highness's legitimacy and claims, authenticated as they are, as well the high distinguished character her every moral excellence and loyal affection she has maintained [*sic*], it would gratify his Majesty's most noble, benevolent, and generous heart not only immediately to acknowledge her Royal Highness, but to reward so much and so great worth with every mark of his royal regard, to atone as much as possible for the unparalleled grievances, and injurious treatment, and oppression she has so long had to contend with ; than which nothing can be more obnoxious to the divine principles of our most holy religion, nor more in opposition to the civil privileges of the nation, as by law established of this country.

Permit me, then, to urge it upon you, Sir, to extend to her Royal Highness the benevolence of your support, and influence, in advancing her royal claims of birthright with his Majesty. No offence, I am sure, will occur when the real truth shall be allowed to plead its own cause, for I am persuaded that the event of your taking this part will prove most satisfactory to his Majesty ; and, in saying this, I must again appeal to the mind and sentiments of his late Royal Highness the Duke of Kent on the subject with which I was so intimately acquainted.

Let the glorious honour of this noble act of one of his Majesty's faithful Privy Counsellors be your own. You will not be deceived in thus advocating her Royal Highness's cause ; and entrusted as I have been with State secrets, which I have inviolably preserved, let me press upon your attention another injured lady—not unknown, I apprehend, to yourself, as one of his Majesty's State Ministers,—born within the pale of wedlock, and who, though living, as it were, in oblivion, is yet well known and can be indisputably proved to be of illustrious extraction. This circumstance, I believe, is by no means hidden from neighbouring

1826

Powers; and I should suppose, as the Foreign Minister, you will not permit it to escape your vigilance and consideration.

You will see, Sir, I am addressing you from a faithful, loyal principle; and to close the whole will pronounce of myself, without fear of ridicule or contempt, that a more loyal subject no Minister of State can boast of himself to be.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM GROVES.

[The curious rigmarole in behalf of the *soi-disant* 'Princess Olive of Cumberland' possesses no intrinsic interest in respect of the cause which it advocates; but in respect of the magnificent constitutional principles to which it appeals, and which it declares are involved in the assertion of this claimant's claims, and will be fatally impaired if they do not succeed, it reminds one of similar fustian indulged in by partisans of the Tichborne claimant, and is rather amusing to show how the language used in support of an imposture repeats itself in succeeding generations. It seems as if, the more barefaced the imposture, the more impudent are the appeals made to the elementary principles of justice, and the safety of the British constitution.

It appears Mr. Groves had been in the navy—no very critical profession—and had served at some time or another under the Duke of Kent, to whose opinion he appeals; but we may take with a very large *grano salis*, the appeal of a rhapsodical sailor to the opinions of a deceased commander, no longer alive to contradict, and keep in order his subordinate.

The Private Secretary unkindly endorsed the letter 'Apparently 'a fool'; and Canning shamefully followed it up by minuting the paper,

'Evidently. Find another to answer him; otherwise no answer. —G. C.']

MR. ISAAC DIMSDALE.

Grove House, Hadley: June 14, 1826.

Honoured Sir,—To fill up the vacant hours of a country life during last winter, I pursued my favourite study of music, and, having written a few lines in praise of the land dearest to every true Briton's heart, I composed an air to them with accompaniments &c. in the Bravura style, which has received considerable praise from professors of the science—whether merited or not, of course, it is not my province to determine. However,

urged by repeated solicitations, I have at length decided on publishing it; and the object of the present letter is to request the favour of being allowed to dedicate the song to you. Then, indeed, would the fondest wishes of my heart be realised, and a glow of honest pride would animate my youthful bosom. Should you condescend to allow me to inscribe my humble composition to one, who is the admiration of all who wish well to their king and country, you will, I am sure, pardon the boldness of so young an author, and attribute it to zeal in the cause of loyalty, and attachment to my sovereign. Having taken the liberty of addressing you, whose talents have always commanded my veneration and respect, allow me to take this opportunity of thanking you individually for the exquisite treats of literary refinement, and specimens of oratory, which your brilliant speeches in Parliament have so frequently afforded me. Craving pardon for having taken up so much of your valuable time, should you favour me with a reply will you do me the honour to address me to the care of Exley, Dimsdale and Co., Trinity Square.

Believe me to be, &c.

ISAAC DIMSDALE, Junr.

Foreign Office: June 17, 1826.

Mr. Canning acknowledges the receipt of Mr. Dimsdale's letter of the 14th inst. requesting permission to dedicate to Mr. Canning a song, which Mr. Dimsdale is about to publish.

Mr. Canning is so entirely and notoriously unskilled in everything relating to music, that he fears that the dedication to him, *by permission*, of a musical composition would reflect some ridicule both on himself, and on the composer.

[This young gentleman requests permission to dedicate a song to Canning. Whether his intellectual level differs much from that of Mr. Groves, above referred to, may be judged from his letter; but it must be admitted he was not without knowledge of the value of flattery

Anyhow, Canning neatly escaped the infliction without hurting his admirer's feelings; and that is no mean thing to do under the circumstances.]

1826
—

THE REV. S. W. CASSAN.

Plymouth: July 10.

1826
—

Sir,—Allow me to lay before you, as a well-known friend to literary pursuits, the prospectus of a work I am publishing, under the patronage of the Bishop of Winchester, in which I trust you may feel some interest. Should this be the case, it would afford me great pleasure to have permission to strengthen the list of the supporters of my undertaking by the highly respected name of Mr. Canning.—I have, &c.,

S. W. CASSAN.

Your reply will find me directed Post Office, Sidmouth.

F. O.: July 17, 1826.

Mr. Canning has to acknowledge the receipt of the Revd. Mr. Cassan's letter of the 10th inst. requesting Mr. Canning to subscribe to the 'Lives of the Bishops of Winchester.'

Mr. Canning has already subscribed to Mr. Cassan's 'Lives of the Bishops of Salisbury,' but he confesses he does not take such interest in episcopal biography, as to wish to subscribe to the histories of all the bishops of all the sees in England.

Besides, Mr. Canning really thinks, that the ample patronage and princely income of the Bishops of Winchester must render any other countenance unnecessary.

[This indomitable literary applicant, although no notice had been taken of his two previous attacks of February 15 and March 7, already noted, renewed an application for the third time for Canning's patronage, and on this occasion for a volume of 'Lives of the Bishops of Winchester,' transmitting at the same time a yet more splendid list of subscribers.

Canning's answer is delightful.]

DR. ADAMS.

Cork: 18 Queen St., South Mall: July 16, 1826.

Sir,—In the acknowledged kindness of your disposition, I am free to say I can only look for an excuse in presuming to address a most distinguished statesman, without the formality of a previous

introduction, aware as I am that your elevated station admits of no trifling correspondents.

1826
—

Having been long a collector of the autographs of distinguished persons, I have hitherto but ineffectually endeavoured to obtain the smallest portion, however trifling, in the handwriting of my celebrated but unfortunate countryman, the late Mr. Sheridan. In the compositions called 'Lives' of this remarkable individual, which have from time to time appeared, one acknowledged fact only is manifest: your undeviating solicitude and friendship towards him. Do I, then, Sir, make an improper request in now respectfully requesting you to assist me with any part, be it ever so small, of his handwriting to grace my literary museum?

Trusting you will excuse this application, and with every good wish for the happiness of yourself and the success of that Administration, whereof you form so distinguished a part, I have, &c.,

HENRY ADAMS, LL.D.

Foreign Office: July 21, 1826.

Mr. Canning has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Dr. Adams's letter of the 16th inst.

Mr. Canning is by no means certain that he has in his possession any autograph of the late Mr. Sheridan's—certainly not among papers which he can get at; he very much doubts, indeed, whether he has any at all, as he never was in correspondence with Mr. Sheridan, and he believes that Mr. Sheridan himself had but few correspondents.

[A request for an autograph of Sheridan's, and a civil reply. It is worth noting that Canning says Sheridan had few correspondents.]

MR. CANNING TO MR. DUCKETT.

Foreign Office: August 6, 1826.

Mr. Canning presents his comp^{ts} to Mr. Duckett, and (besides that he is going into the country to-morrow) must, without any intention of disrespect to Mr. Duckett,

1826

decline a personal interview for the purpose mentioned in Mr. Duckett's letter.

Mr. Canning trusts that Mr. Duckett will, upon a moment's reflection, see the reasonableness of this general rule, which Mr. Canning has prescribed to himself on all such occasions.

Mr. Canning cannot charge his memory with all the details of things and persons, which may be stated to him in a conversation with a stranger, who comes master of his subject, of which Mr. C. is necessarily uninformed. His only security against forgetfulness or for recollection is to make a written memorandum, of what passes in such an interview.

This, with the multiplicity of his employments, it may be physically impossible for him to do immediately. When done, such a memorandum is good for little, unless verified by the other party to the interview. The attempt, therefore, to avoid, in the first instance, written communication leads to correspondence, and the only difference is, that the original statement is to be written, not by the person making the communication, but by the person receiving it.

Mr. Duckett may be assured that anything which he writes to Mr. C. and marks 'Private' will be safe from inspection.

[Mr. Duckett's letter is not extant ; but one may infer from this reasoned letter that he had made some rather angry, but excusable, attempt to bring before Canning personally some grievance or another.

This lucid explanation of the general futility of personal interviews with busy men in office requires no comment.]

MR. JOSEPH WOLFF.

Dublin: August 11, 1826.

Noble Sir,—Having returned for a short season to this country from Palestine and Persia, where I laboured for five

years as a missionary to the Jews in those parts of the world, I think it to be my duty of sending to you the enclosed remarks about the relations of Russia with Circassia, and to communicate to you some particulars about the pursuits—I say political pursuits—of the Catholic missionaries in the East. Though a German by birth, I received in England education and patronage, and completed my studies of Divinity and Oriental literature at University of Cambridge. I consider, therefore, England as my native soil, and feel myself therefore bound to communicate to you these circumstances, under the supposition that it might perhaps be for the interest of the country. I say of a country, whose policy consists (as far as my humble opinion is of any weight) in collecting interior moral and physical strength by encouraging commerce and arts, and then break forth with might [*sic*].

When at Bagdad, Monsieur Digeon, the French dragoman—a man of the worst character, but still a man without discretion—told me that despatches of the French Government are forwarded by the Romish missionaries to India, especially by the missionaries of Bagdad, Bussorah, and Bombay, and that the Government of France was now trying to extend their influence in Persia, and Cabul, by sending there emissaries in the shape of missionaries. The same Monsieur Digeon showed to me letters written, in the year 1824, to Monsieur de Chateaubriand by Monseigneur de Coupery, who is missionary, and Archbishop of the Propaganda, and French Consul at Bagdad, in which letters Monseigneur de Coupery states to Monsieur de Chateaubriand, that the English Government made trials to increase her influence in Persia, by sending to Abbas Mirza several officers and sergeants for the purpose of disciplinising the Persian troops; and he proposed therefore to his Government to send people of influence to Persia, and especially French priests, who might counteract the English there. When I arrived at Bussorah I found there several archives in the French church, which is now under the superintendence of a Syrian Catholic priest, who showed those archives to me, in which I found original letters of Monsieur de Nointell [*sic*] and other ambassadors of France at the Sublime Porte, desiring the missionaries particularly to counteract the English in the East Indies.

1826
—

1826
—

I state these particulars to you, not for the purpose of receiving any reward—God forbid! and you would offend me if you would offer it to me—nor for obtaining a political career—I am a missionary for the proclamation of the everlasting Gospel to the Jews, and as a missionary I will die—but I do it for the love and affection I feel towards England, in which I have found parents and patrons and teachers.

I take at the same time the liberty of informing that, although I have always tried to proclaim the Gospel in the East with faithfulness, I still took care not to compromise the interests of British Government. I established schools in Persia with the sanction of Abbas Mirza; and although I had proclaimed the Gospel to his Royal Highness himself, he gave me immediately afterwards the *Rakums* expressing the permission of establishing a college at Jabriz, for which purpose he gave to me a house. As I have travelled likewise in Russia, where I received the enclosed information, I shall be most happy to give you any further information at your command. I shall live at London in the house of my patron, Henry Drummond, Esquire, 49 Charing Cross. I don't dare to ask a reply of you, but, in case you want any further explanation, my direction is Reverend Joseph Wolff, missionary, at Mr. Henry Drummond's, 49 Charing Cross; or you may only desire Mr. Drummond. I take the liberty at the same time of enclosing a copy of a letter of Mr. Stratford Canning, directed to me when at Constantinople; and at the same time I cannot but inform you that it is my intention of establishing an Oriental college at London, in which Persians, Armenians, Turks, and Arabs, might be instructed in the arts and sciences cultivated in Europe, and the English be instructed in the Oriental languages, and then be employed as dragomans and secretaries at the British Embassys in the Levant. His Highness Mahommed Ali in Egypt, he himself told that he would be disposed to send young men to England if such a college should ever be established in England. I cannot conceal from you the wish that such an establishment should be favoured with the sanction of his British Majesty's Government. I never met with any obstacles in my missionary pursuits from the Turks, but merely by Catholics; and the enclosed copy of a letter of Monsieur Lesseps may serve you as a proof. I might send

to you, Right Honble. Sir, likewise several letters I received from my kind friendly Messieurs Willock in Persia, and Colonel Harris at Bushire, in case you desire them.—I have the honour to be, with reverence, &c.,

JOSEPH WOLFF,

Missionary in the East sent by Messieurs
Drummond and Bayford.

Brighton: August 22, 1826.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Joseph Wolff, and acknowledges the receipt of his letter of the 11th inst., with its enclosures, which Mr. Canning now returns, with thanks to Mr. J. W. for sending them for his perusal.

With respect to Mr. Wolff's plan for the study of Eastern literature in England, Mr. Canning is of opinion, that any plan of such a nature would be more properly addressed to the Court of Directors of the E. I. Company, than to any department of his Majesty's Government.

[This distinguished missionary communicates a quantity of information as to French intrigues with Persia, and towards India, which had come to his knowledge. Though German by origin he protests he had become entirely British in feeling, and furnishes his stock of information to the Government out of pure love for the English nation. The papers of details were returned to him, but they are described in his letter. His immediate patron was the well-known Mr. Henry Drummond, the banker; but he sought Government patronage for his scheme for opening a place of education for Orientals in London.

His communicating what appeared to him valuable information, picked up in the course of his missionary career in the East, might easily be defended; his anxiety to repudiate beforehand any ambition of reward for his information was becoming and admirable; lastly, his wish to found a college for Orientals in London was praiseworthy, and an application to the Government for patronage justifiable. Yet, putting the whole together, Wolff does not come out of it with too much dignity. He had projected a plausible scheme, which naturally had a worldly and financial side, where Mr. Wolff might find his profit; and the offer of his information, and entreaties

1826
—

1826

not to be rewarded, possess an amusing *naiveté* when we see what it is evident he tried to purchase, and the manner in which he hoped to profit by his barter of political information.

Some of the phraseology is quaint: how England may 'break forth with might,' and how the French dragoman at Bagdad was 'a man of the worst character, but still a man without discretion,' are good.

There is mention of a Mons. Lesseps; which suggests the idea that the forefathers of the illustrious contriver of the Suez Canal, like their son, had interested themselves in Eastern politics.]

MR. KINSELA.

Royal York Hotel [Brighton]: August 21, 1826.

Sir,—I have been waiting your Excellency's arrival here, to have the honour of making you a communication from the Baron Damas. I should have proceeded to London immediately on my landing here from France, but was informed you were expected here. May I hope for the honour of a moment's audience whenever it suits your Excellency's convenience?

I have, &c.,

J. KINSELA.

Brighton: August 22, 1826.

Mr. Kinsela has the honour of mentioning his grateful respects to his Excellency Mr. Secretary Canning, and begs to assure him, that he has not the slightest objection to adopt the course pointed out by Mr. Canning. Duly appreciating the value of Mr. Canning's time, he should have in the first instance reduced to writing his intended communication, if he had deemed it the more expeditious mode; but as he hopes to be able to explain in a few words what would require pages in writing, he prays Mr. Canning to say, when he will do him the honour to receive him.

Mr. Kinsela ought to have added, that though he had the Baron Damas's permission to repeat to Mr. Canning a conversation, which he (Mr. Kinsela) had with Monsieur Damas, yet it is entirely of a private nature, touching a question of property, which, Mr. Kinsela is persuaded, rests now entirely with Mr. Canning to decide. Such, also, is the opinion of the Baron Damas.

Pavilion Parade : August 22, 1826.

Mr. Canning presents his compts. to Mr. Kinsela, and acknowledges the receipt of his letter of yesterday's date requesting an interview with Mr. Canning, for the purpose of making a communication to him from the Baron Damas.

1826
—

Mr. Canning would very much prefer receiving such a communication in writing. But if Mr. Kinsela cannot so make it, Mr. C. thinks it due to Mr. Kinsela as well as to himself to say, that he (Mr. C.) never receives similar verbal communications but on the condition that the substance of them shall be immediately reduced to writing, and the correctness of the record attested by the individual making them.

Mr. Canning has found himself obliged to adopt this rule from experience of the extreme inconvenience arising from misconceptions, on either side, in important verbal communications.

Mr. Canning therefore, without meaning the slightest disrespect to Mr. Kinsela, can only receive him on this express condition, in the event of his being still unwilling to communicate in writing what he wishes to say to Mr. Canning.

[This slight correspondence only illustrates the ingenious devices, with which men tried to obtain a personal interview with the Minister, and of the method by which, in his turn, the Minister 'took the edge' off the personal freshness, as it were, of a *visd voce* interview, and protected himself from misrepresentation afterwards.

In this case the correspondent first pretended he had 'a communication to make from Baron Damas,' the French Minister for Foreign Affairs ; but, when Mr Kinsela found this alarming announcement failed to stimulate Canning to concession, he admitted that the affair was only a matter of private business, and the Baron's 'communication' to Canning was an opinion that this private business rested with Canning to decide—a considerable falling off from the dignity of the first announcement]

MADAME MARQUET.

1826

Au château de Versailles, Aile du Midi, le 29 Août 1826.

Milord,—Votre arrivée sur le continent est le signal du bonheur des peuples.

Permettez qu'il soit celui du bonheur d'une petite famille qui révère votre nom ; laissez-la vous approcher ; votre influence peut tout pour elle.

Agrérez, Milord, notre respectueuse espérance, et daignez-nous donner vos ordres à ce sujet.

VE. [veuve] MARGUET ET SES FILLES.

[This amusing note, dated from apartments in the Palace at Versailles, is endorsed in pencil by Mr. W. Hervey (in attendance on Canning), 'I don't exactly make out what she wants'; on which Canning writes : 'I suspect you had better offer to see her young 'ladies.']

MR. E. BRINE (AUG. 24, 1826).

[This case illustrates the promptitude, with which Mr. Canning acted, when he thought a small sum of money would relieve distress, and cover the credit of the King.

It is not necessary to give the whole of the letter, but Brine, at this time living at Portsea, had formerly kept the 'White Hart' at Winchester ; and, having become ruined, in looking over his 'book debts,' ('which are very numerous,' we find,) 'a small demand on his 'present Majesty George the Fourth, then Prince of Wales, in the 'year 1783, cald [*sic*] at the "White Hart," at Winchester, with Mrs. 'Fitzerbert [*sic*], and had refreshments, which was paid for at the time, 'and his Royal Highness ordered some of the same kind of cakes 'which he partook of at the "White Hart," to be sent in a box to 'London, which was done. The amount was twelve shillings and six-pence, which never was paid for, and which we should never of taken 'the liberty of applying for had we not been so reduced in our circumstances,' &c., &c.

Canning promptly sent 5*l*. and called for a receipt.]

LADY HOLLAND.

Amphill: August 31.

Dear Mr. Canning,—You must forgive my breaking in upon your time, but I cannot refrain from mentioning my anxiety about our friend Mr. Frere : he is really very unwell. Now he was remarkably the contrary until within these last five days ; but he is so drowsy, flushed, and heavy, that it is impossible not to be

1826

alarmed. He is continually asleep, even in the morning; nor can he be roused. I am sure you have more weight with him than anybody, and I want you to urge his seeing some skilful physician, who may compel him to attend to his health: indeed, something immediate is required. I think he was once half-inclined, if any of his family would have undertaken the journey to Malta to fetch Lady Errol, to have remained himself in England for Lady Errol's return. At present he is most unluckily entangled by an engagement, which arose merely from his kindness and compassion. Last year he inadvertently said, when he returned to the South, he would convey a sick lady with him to Marseilles. This lady he is hardly acquainted with, but she is the daughter of a clergyman distantly connected with his family. She now claims his offer, and seems dying. I want him to give her some money and a physician, and send her by herself, as he is nervous, and quite agitated, at the probability of her death on the journey. In this business I think your friendship might induce him to be advised, and you only could. In his state of health, such a fellow-traveller would be seriously injurious to him, and he already shrinks at the incumbrance, yet feels that his word given must be fulfilled, though he says he would willingly sacrifice any sum to be free from the responsibility of the charge. What shall I say for the liberty of troubling you? Nothing would make me do so, but my knowledge of your friendship for Mr. Frere, and your good heart upon all occasions. Once more forgive me, and believe in my sentiments of regard and esteem,

Yours,

E. V. HOLLAND.

You have been very good and kind in transferring Henry Fox to Naples. He writes full of thanks and gratitude to you for having done so.

I must add that Mr. Frere hardly eats any meat, and upon the whole, lives abstemiously, which rather adds to the alarm about his condition. Cupping and calomel would recover him, I really hope.

F. O.: September 1, 1826.

Dear Lady Holland,—I take very kindly your letter about Frere. My mind had misgiven me for some time

1826
—

that he was seriously unwell. I have written to him—as if from that general misgiving—without saying anything of your hint. My letter will meet him on his arrival in town.

I promoted Henry Fox because he had been doing very well.

Believe me, dear Lady Holland,

Very sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This speaks well for Lady Holland's kindheartedness and regard for Frere ; and Canning's immediate attention to Lady Holland's hint is equally pleasing.]

M. LINGAY.

No. 6 Rue Castiglione : 29 Septembre 1826.

Monsieur,—Jeviensdemander à Votre Excellence un moment d'entretien pour lui soumettre une réclamation, qu'un sujet français présente au gouvernement de S.M. Britanique, relativement à des propriétés qu'il possédait dans l'Ile de Tabago, et du milieu desquelles il fut brusquement arraché en 1793, pour être rendu à la France, en échange de John Pietrie, député de l'Ile à la Convention nationale.

Je prie Votre Excellence de me permettre de saisir cette occasion de lui soumettre copie de différents articles, que j'ai publiés, sur son honorable personne, dans le 'Journal de Paris,' depuis le 24 Novembre 1821, jusqu'au 23 Septembre 1826. En 1821, j'appelais son retour aux affaires ; en 1826, j'applaudis à sa généreuse politique.

Je suis, avec respect, Monsieur, de Votre Excellence,

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

J. LINGAY,

Ancien secrétaire de la Présidence du
Conseil des ministres, aujourd'hui direc-
teur politique du 'Journal de Paris.'

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Lingay. He acknowledges with thanks the obliging communication enclosed in M. Lingay's letter of Friday,

1826
—

and assures Mr. L. that he will be happy, if Mr. L. wishes it, to have the honour of seeing Mr. L. before he leaves Paris. But Mr. C. begs leave, nevertheless, to request that the claim which Mr. L. has to bring forward upon the British Government may be brought forward in the usual course, through the French Ambassador in London. Mr. C. could not receive (for the purpose of acting upon it) the claim of a French subject from the hand of an individual, any more than a British claimant in France could expect to be allowed to pass by the British Ambassador and to go direct to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. Each Government naturally expects that the claims of an individual (British or French) subject shall have been adopted by his own Government before it is called upon to entertain them.

[Asks to see Canning, who was now in Paris, on behalf of a French subject, probably himself, seeking to recover some property lost in Tobago in 1793. He seeks to recommend himself by sending extracts of a dozen articles written by him, and published in the *Journal de Paris* newspaper, laudatory of Canning. As neither M. Lingay nor the *Journal de Paris* made any great mark on the politics of the time, these articles are not reproduced ; but it may be observed that they contain evidence to show what a great reputation Canning had obtained amongst the French Liberals for liberality in politics ; which helps us to understand, if possible better than before, the dislike entertained by Wellington towards the tendency of Canning's policy.]

Canning's reply to M. Lingay, as appears from the Minister on the letter, lays down so clearly a great rule for Foreign Office guidance, that, though generally acted upon, it may not be useless to reproduce it here.]

MADAME ADÈLE PICCINI.

No. 24 Porte St. Denis, rue neuve d'Orléans.
Paris: 29 Septembre 1826.

Monsieur,—Mon nom, qui m'a été transmis par le petit-fils du célèbre Compositeur Italien Piccini, ne vous sera, sans doute, pas inconnu, et sous ce rapport j'ose espérer qu'il pourra rem-

1826 — placer une recommandation auprès de vous et vous inspirer quelque intérêt pour l'objet qui fait le motif de ma lettre.

Je possède une peinture que M. Denon, ancien directeur du Musée français, M. Girodet et d'autres amateurs, et artistes d'un grand mérite, se sont plu à admirer et à me complimenter sur sa possession : en m'assurant que ce tableau était très précieux, et digne de figurer dans les plus belles galeries, (les ouvrages du maître, dont il est, étant fort rares et recherchés,) mais qu'il n'y avait que des amateurs riches et distingués qui puissent en faire l'achat : c'est pourquoi, Monsieur, j'ai pensé m'adresser à vous dans l'espérance que vous seriez tanté [*sic*] de le voir, et d'en faire l'acquisition. C'est le seul bien que je possède, et je désire en jouir.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec les sentimens de la plus haute considération,

Monsieur,

Votre très humble et obéissante servante,

ADELE PICCINI.

[This lady has a fine picture to sell.

Canning minutes the letter :—

'Being neither fond of music, nor a judge of painting, nor rich, 'Madame Piccini could not have addressed herself to an individual 'less qualified to take the picture off her hands.'

It is believed that this absence of taste for the fine arts really characterised Canning : which only shows such an inclination does not invariably enter into the composition of a man of genius, even of a sensitive and emotional genius.]

MR. BARROW.

October 10, 1826.

My dear Planta,—I return Monsieur Favre's letter to Mr. Canning. Like a true Frenchman, of whom we have fifty examples of a similar kind, he offers his discovery to his own Government, who, seeing its inutility, rejects it, when he comes to us as the *pis aller* in the hope of remuneration. Mr. Favre rests the merit of his telegraph on its being able to transmit *une pensée*,—that is, I suppose, one signal,—200 leagues in ten minutes. With our semaphore we can transmit '*une pensée*' to Plymouth (seventy leagues) in three minutes; and in three minutes more '*une phrase de conversation*,' which Mon-

sieur Favre requires two hours to do for his 200 leagues. As to night telegraphs, they would be useless to us, but, if required, we can convert our semaphore with the greatest ease to communicate as well by night as by day. 1826

The fact is, we have a hundred different plans for telegraphs, none of which, after all, possess the simplicity and the certainty of our mast with two arms.

I return the letter of Monsieur Favre.

I am, &c.,

JOHN BARROW.

[Mr. Barrow was Secretary to the Admiralty, and Canning had evidently, through the medium of Mr. Planta, the Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, desired a report from the Admiralty on a system of telegraphy invented by a Frenchman, M. Favre; whether a relation of the illustrious M. Jules Favre of forty years later is unknown.

Mr. Barrow's defence of the existing system, by which the Admiralty communicated with distant seaports, proves that within certain limits, and for Government purposes, a speed of conveying messages by signalling and sight had been obtained not remarkably inferior to the electric telegraph.

One signal transmitted in three minutes to Plymouth, and another signal in three minutes more, intimating in conjunction with the first signal a whole sentence or phrase, is undeniably fast work.]

M. BRISSAULT DE ST. CYPRIEN (OCT. 11, 1826).

[This gentleman asks an interview in order to impart to Canning the political conclusion drawn from his experience of thirty-five years. He got no answer, and most probably deserved none; but his postscript is remarkably good :—

'Mes charmants enfans, au nom desquels j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire hommage d'une petite production, apprendraient avec plaisir que vous l'avez accueillie avec bonté, et qu'ils vous inspirent quelque intérêt. Votre Seigneurie voudrait bien me pardonner cette observation : elle vient d'un sentiment qui m'est tout particulier de tout faire et de tout rapporter à mes enfans, pour lesquels je sollicite sans rougir des bienfaits, en échange de mes faibles travaux.'

Canning naturally asks, 'What "petite production" did this man's "charmants enfans" send, for which he asks "sans rougir" "une récompense"?']

M. VARGUIN (OCT. 20, 1826).

1826
—

[This gentleman 'a l'honneur d'envoyer à Monsieur Canning les 'numéros du Bulletin des Lois qui contiennent toute la législation qui 'régit aujourd'hui le commerce des grains en France. Il le prie 'd'agréer les assurances de sa plus haute considération. Octobre 20, '1826.]

One of these laws is reproduced, to illustrate, to those curious on such matters, the style of French legislative enactment. The law is No. 1,009, and entitled 'Loi relative aux Entrepôts des Grains 'étrangers,' published in the Bulletin des Lois (No. 44).]

BULLETIN DES LOIS.

(N^o. 44.)

N^o. 1009.—Loi relative aux Entrepôts des Grains étrangers.

A Paris, le 15 Juin, 1825.

CHARLES, par la grâce de Dieu, ROI DE FRANCE ET DE NAVARRE, à tous ceux qui ces présentes verront, SALUT.

Nous avons proposé, les Chambres ont adopté, NOUS AVONS ORDONNÉ et ORDONNONS ce qui suit :—

ARTICLE UNIQUE. A dater du 1.^{er} septembre prochain, l'entrepôt réel est substitué à l'entrepôt fictif pour les grains étrangers, dans les ports et villes frontières où la faculté de les entreposer est accordée par les lois.

A dater de la même époque, tous les grains étrangers existant dans les entrepôts fictifs seront mis en entrepôt réel.

Toutes dispositions contraires à la présente loi sont abrogées.

La présente loi, discutée, délibérée et adoptée par la Chambre des Pairs et par celle des Députés, et sanctionnée par nous cejourd'hui, sera exécutée comme loi de l'Etat ; voulons, en conséquence, qu'elle soit gardée et observée dans tout notre royaume, terres et pays de notre obéissance.

SI DONNONS EN MANDEMENT à nos Cours et Tribunaux, Préfets, Corps administratifs, et tous autres, que les présentes ils gardent et maintiennent et fassent garder, observer et maintenir, et, pour les rendre plus notoires à tous nos sujets, ils les fassent publier et enregistrer par-tout où besoin sera : car tel est notre plaisir ; et afin que ce soit chose ferme et stable à toujours, nous y avons fait mettre notre scel.

Donné à Paris, en notre château des Tuileries, le 15.^e jour

du mois de Juin de l'an de grâce 1825, et de notre règne le premier. 1826

Signé CHARLES.

Vu et scellé du grand sceau : *Le Garde des sceaux de France, Ministre Secrétaire d'état au département de la justice.*

Signé C.^{te} DE PEYRONNET.

Par le Roi : *Le Ministre Secrétaire d'état au département des finances,*
Signé J.^b DE VILLELE.

M. DUPIN.

Paris: ce 23 Octobre 1826.

Je regrette bien que mon séjour trop prolongé à la campagne, et le très prochain départ de Monsieur Canning, m'aient privé de l'honneur de le voir pendant son séjour à Paris.

J'aurais voulu saluer en lui l'orateur le plus éloquent et le plus généreux de la Grande Bretagne: l'homme dont l'âme élevée au-dessus des vains préjugés d'une politique rétrécie a voté la liberté civile et religieuse pour les deux Mondes!

Je le prie, du moins, d'agréer l'hommage bien sincère de mon admiration et de mon respect.

DUPIN, avocat à la Cour royale.

British Embassy: October 24, 1826.

Mr. Canning would have been happy if M. Dupin's presence in Paris had afforded him the opportunity of making M. Dupin's acquaintance. He thanks M. Dupin very sincerely for the honour of his obliging note.

[Another French admirer anxious to see Canning while he was at Paris!]

MR. CANNING TO MR. GIFFARD.

Paris: October 9, 1826.

My dear Giffard,—I return Lord Byron's MS., with very many thanks for the entertainment which it has afforded me.

If you have any more such at hand, that you could send me for my journey home, I should be very thankful for it.

Stapleton, my private secretary (worthy of being known to you, if you were well enough to see him

1826 — when he calls), will take charge of anything that you may have to send me. And he will at all events let me know how you are, without your being put to the trouble of writing.

I have been most satisfactorily received here, and, I hope, have done some immediate and more permanent good.

God bless you.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Here he returns the Byron MS., and pays a compliment to his private secretary. He also asks for more mental pabulum.]

MR. GIFFARD TO MR. STAPLETON.

James Street : October 24, 1826.

My dear Sir,—I now send you the precious deposit for Mr. Canning. You ought to have had it on Saturday, but I was then too unwell to write, and am even now 'but feeble'; for though I rally from these frequent attacks, yet, like Goldsmith's dwarf, I always lose something in the struggle. When you write have the goodness to mention me to Mr. Canning in the kindest manner. I would gladly write myself, but at present I have not sufficient strength.

With very sincere regards, I am, &c.,

WILLIAM GIFFARD.

[Sends more mental food for Canning.]

THE EARL OF MORLEY.

Kent House, Knightsbridge : Monday, October 29.

My dear Canning,—In my letter from Wortley I expressed to you a strong opinion of the urgency of something being forthwith done to mark a due sense of Amherst's services.

Since my return to London I have had applications from Lord Plymouth and others of his friends and connections to urge this matter with Government. It is certainly in no way my particular business to do so; but it is evident, exclusively of the obvious unfitness of underrating or neglecting his services, that strong remonstrance will be addressed (I sup-

pose to Liverpool and Wynne) at the meeting of Parliament upon the subject of acknowledging his merits in a proper and unequivocal manner.

1826
—

I yesterday met Mr. Hammersley, one of his nearest personal friends.

He expressed his surprise at no honours having yet been conferred upon him, but said that it could not be delayed beyond the meeting of Parliament. I replied, 'Perhaps Government may think such manifestation of its sentiments best shown upon his return to Europe.' He rejoined, 'That would be against all justice and all precedent.' We then talked about what had been done in former instances; and not having dates in my head, I begged him to send me a memorandum of what had been done in the cases in question. I have this morning received from him the enclosed.

I am going out of town on Wednesday for three or four days, so shall not see you till the beginning of next week. Excuse haste.

Yours affectionately,

M.

Pall Mall: October 29, 1826.

My dear Lord,—With reference to what you mentioned this morning I find that the peace with Tippoo was made by Lord Cornwallis in March 1792, and in August following he was created a marquis. Seringapatam fell in May 1799, and Lord Wellesley had the same elevation granted to him in the month of December following. Peace with the Rajah of Nepaul was announced in the 'Calcutta Gazette' of March 1816, and in December Lord Hastings also was made a marquis. These events were all accompanied by additional territory to the Company; and you will observe that in each case the new dignity to the Governor-General was granted before the close of the year in which they happened.

Lord Minto was created only after his return, but I believe his administration was not attended by any military achievement or acquisition of territory.

I am, &c.,

HUGH HAMMERSLEY.

Walmer Castle. October 31, 1826.

1826
—

My dear Morley,—I did not answer your former letter about Amherst, for the same reason which would withhold me from answering that of Monday, if I did not see reason in that letter to fear that my silence might produce the very evil which I wished to avoid. I see symptoms of a bother. Why is Mr. Hammersley the banker to suppose that he knows exactly what Government ought to do, and when they ought to do it?

‘How are Three per Cents to-day?’ ought to have been your reply to such an interference. His solution of that question might probably have been worth reporting.

But the reward of political or military services, the manner, the time, the combinations of one man’s claims with those of others—these are matters which a Government has a right to expect that they shall be permitted to consider and decide for themselves. And I must fairly say that, as a member of the Government, if anything could counterbalance in my mind the sense of Amherst’s merits and my personal regard for him, it would be an untimely importunity on the part of his friends.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—If it is not the banker Hammersley, I admit my proposed question will not apply. But the reasoning will not be affected by that circumstance.

G. C.

[Lord Morley anxiously presses on Canning the claims of Lord Amherst to special honours in recognition of services as Governor-General of India ; sending a letter from Mr. Hugh Hammersley in which Mr. Hammersley mentions the precedents for a promotion of a Governor-General on the conclusion of a successful war.

Lord Amherst had succeeded Lord Hastings as Governor-General,

1826
—

and filled the vacancy for which Canning had been designated, but which he gave up when the death of Lord Castlereagh left the Foreign Office open ; Lord Amherst had just brought a Burmese war to a triumphant conclusion, the campaign being fought by an army under Sir Archibald Campbell ; and territory had been added to the British dominions : the siege of Bhurtpoor by Sir Stapleton Cotton (afterwards Lord Combermere) also glorified Lord Amherst's 'reign' as Governor-General ; hence his claims to promotion. On the other hand, complaints of mismanagement in the case of a mutiny amongst the Indian troops, on the occasion of which it required all that the Duke of Wellington and Lord Liverpool could do to save Lord Amherst from recall, and a certain amount of feebleness of administration generally, counterbalanced a considerable part of the weight of his claims, and made his friends anxious as to his obtaining his promotion.

Lord Morley enjoyed the credit of a following in the Upper House, besides the reputation of a lifelong friendship with Canning ; hence, when Lord Amherst's friends, and particularly his wife's brother-in-law the Earl of Plymouth, desired to bring influence to bear on the Government, they prompted Lord Morley to write to his friend in power.

But the friend in power, much worried by indisposition of body and tension of mind at this moment, happened to be pretty irritable, and only returned an amusing, but sharpish snub to the suggestion.

It may be added, however, that Lord Amherst's patent as Earl is dated only five weeks later, on December 2, 1826.]

MADAME LA BARONNE DE MISMACRE (OCT. 29, 1826).

[This lady, being in bad circumstances, had preferred, on April 16 preceding, a claim on the British Government for repayment to her of 60,000 florins expended by her husband in behalf of the English in 1814. It is unnecessary to enter into the details ; the poor lady's claim proved on investigation quite baseless, and so she was told officially on June 17, 1826 ; but the reply, sent through Sir Charles Bagot, British Minister at Brussels, failed to find her, on the plea of insufficient address. She then made another appeal on the score of great distress to Canning.

An encounter between Canning and his Private Secretary, in which naturally the latter got the worst of it, is here reproduced.

It seems Madame de Mismacre had written before, and dated her letter only 'Bruxelles' ; her application had been referred to Sir Charles Bagot, who had failed to trace her. It may be concluded

1826

that Sir Charles Bagot's chief did not feel particularly inclined to find excuses for this failure ; what between the means at the disposal of the mission, and the power of obtaining the aid of the Brussels police, he might reasonably insist on the discovery of a poor lady of rank, not disguising her name, alleging pecuniary claims on the British Government, and more especially residing in such a conspicuous locality as 'opposite St. Catherine's Basin' ; the thing was to be done, was not impracticable, and the British agent who failed to do it deserved no mercy.

This rather severe but effective view of the failure had not struck the Private Secretary, who endorses the letter of Madame la Baronne de Mismacre—

'Bruxelles chez Madame Thielmans, march. de Tabac vis à vis le 'Bassin de St. Catherine' ! !'

—subjoining the remark—

'No wonder Sir C. Bagot did not find her out ! Send the last 'answer to Sir C. Bagot with the new address.—A. G. S.'

But replies Mr. Canning,—

'Yes.—G. C. (but not with the admission so liberally made that 'there was the smallest difficulty in tracing her. Every one knows 'St. Catherine's Basin at Bruxelles.—G. C.'

To this, responds the Private Secretary,—

'I have sent back the letter to Sir C. B. without any admission. But Madame la Baronne's former letter address was Brussels. 'It was her letter which came yesterday which gave the full address ;' which draws forth the final retort from the chief in a vein of delicate irony, 'Matter of fact is in itself always laudable, and shows 'a good heart, and no irregular quickness of the understanding.—G. C.']

DR. R. LYALL (NOV. 8, 1826).

[It is unnecessary to give the whole of this gentleman's letter, who professed to desire to submit to Canning the views of 'a Polish 'nobleman' on the subject of the corn trade between Great Britain and Poland ; but it may be thought a matter of interest to discover from his last paragraph what his personal plans were. He says, 'I 'take the liberty of adding that, being baffled in my plans at home, an 'application will be immediately made in my favour to Earl Bathurst 'by some kind friends, as I wish to fix myself and my family in one 'of our colonies.'

Canning in his reply, after acknowledging the letter (but basely ignoring the hint in the last paragraph), says he is 'obliged for the 'offer, but begs Dr Lyall will not trouble himself to send the remarks,

‘as Mr. Canning has no time to inspect them, and would not choose
‘to give any opinion upon them.’] 1826

ANONYMOUS (CARE OF WILLIAM WALLACE, DEC. 1826).

[This letter consists of more than fourteen closely written quarto pages of exhortation to the observance of religious ordinances, particularly of the Sabbath. The writer seems to have been prompted to this ‘screed of doctrine’ by noticing in the public papers an announcement of Canning going out to dinner on a Sunday. A strong feeling of real religion as believed in Scotland runs through the whole performance, but accompanied by such genuine expressions of admiration for the statesman that Canning, apparently after glancing at it, endorsed it—‘I must read this.—G. C.’]

The writer was earnest enough, but he exceeded sound reason in tracing *all* crime and immorality to neglect of the Sabbath.]

MR. GIFFARD.

James Street : Nov. 15, 1826.

My dear Canning,—I send you a copy of Ford—the avowed object is the real one—saving the press from disgrace by anticipating the bookseller’s design of giving a republication of Weber. I feared at one time that I should not be able to get through with the work, trifling as it is.

I am sadly fallen off in strength since you saw me ; but this is in the natural course of things.

aridâ

Pellente lascivos amores

Canitie facilemque somnum.

As for the Loves, why, ‘I humbly gave them leave to de-
‘part’ an age ago, and they went, I suppose ; but the loss of the *facile* slumber (a recent affliction) touches one very nearly. As I have not power to think to any purpose, my nights are as tedious as my days, and I frequently rise more dull and weary than I lie down.

You are now playing into a world of business—but remember the miser.

Ever, my dear Canning, faithfully and affectionately yours,

WM. GIFFARD.

[The veteran sends to his old friend a copy of his last work. The account of his gradual decay, though gracefully and classically mentioned, makes melancholy reading.]

MR. COCKS JOHNSON.

No. 3 New Inn : December 1, 1826.

1826
—

Honourable Sir,—I have had the honour to receive your favour of the 23rd inst., but not until yesterday, owing to a mistake in the address (No. 6 instead of No. 3).

I detest an informer, but not more than I do the conduct of those vile men who are conspiring against your character. I therefore feel myself bound in honour to comply with your request, whatever the ultimate consequence may be to me. Should the information I am about to impart be the means of checking the progress of that abominable plot, the pleasure I shall feel at having it in my power to be of service to you, I shall consider a sufficient reward for any assistance I may have the honour to render you ; for—

Goo l name in man, or womān dear, my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
He who steals my purse steals trash ;
'Tis something, nothing—'twas mine, 'tis his,
And has been slave to thousands.
But he who fetches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.

The principal character or propagator of the plot against you is the Rev. C. C. C., A.M., and rector of K. and P. in Surrey. He is at present an outlaw, and residing in Paris. He took from this country a large sum of money, but lost it at gaming in that city. With the hope of realising more he commenced writing libels on you, which he has completed in a volume of 600 lines, and every line a libel. I have seen it, and must confess I never before read anything half so severe. It is a poem containing several letters represented to have been written by Lord Castlereagh, and called 'Letters from the Infernal Region, addressed to the Right Honourable George Canning, &c. &c.' His Lordship is represented as having had a great deal of conversation with many other great men, who are with him. You will easily judge the motive of the author in adopting this plan to libel you.

Every act of your life, public and private, is twisted or construed into villanous acts of the blackest dye. Even your parents and other members of your family have not been spared.

I shall refrain from mentioning any of the passages, for there is scarcely one in the whole work that is not calculated to hurt your feelings, however strong your mind may be. I hope to God you will never see or hear of its being in print. The author has displayed a wonderful genius. The poem is so desperate that it is to be circulated without the name of the author or writer. Several men (I'll not call them gentlemen) who are now in Paris, and jealous of your fame, and consequently enemies to you, have read the work, some of whom I have heard declare that it will prejudice all your present friends against you, but that is impossible; at all events, it behoves you to prevent it being printed. But I have a great desire for some friend of yours in Paris to see the manuscript; you will then be convinced of the truth of what I have asserted with respect to its severity. I will willingly go to Paris for this purpose without fee or reward. I will undertake to enable your friend to see the work, if he is unknown to the author, after which I will undertake to prevent it being published if I arrive at Paris in time to do so, and if not I will furnish you with sufficient evidence against the author and those concerned, so as to enable you to punish them for their vile conduct; and I think these measures should be adopted, as I myself am about leaving this country for Mexico almost immediately, which would perhaps prevent my appearing in evidence against them; but this I must leave for your consideration. The men who have joined C. in the plot have formed themselves into a committee, and are to pay the author a certain sum for every copy they circulate, as well as paying for the printing and distributing all over England. They have proposed to send a copy to every member of the House of Lords and Commons, the club-houses, the editors of the London newspapers—in fact, a vast number are to be circulated: they are not to be sold, but given away. It is also to be published in French. Directly I had discovered what I have here related I set off for London to give you this information, and am sorry so much time has been lost since my arrival, for delays are dangerous. Begging an answer as soon as convenient, I have, &c.,

COCKS JOHNSON.

P.S.—I have written in great haste, and hope you will excuse all mistakes.

1826

:—

No. 3 New Inn : December 2, 1826.

1826
—

Right honourable Sir,—I did myself the honour to write to you yesterday, and am persuaded that if you knew the disgust I feel towards the author of those shocking libels I have already explained to you, and the desire I have to serve you by thwarting his cruel and detestable efforts, you would excuse my thus troubling you so much by writing to you again to impart what I consider important to you, viz. that I have learned from good authority that when Mr. C. left this country in 1823 to avoid his creditors he went to America, and while there discovered that they had made him a bankrupt and also outlawed him, having proved him a dealer and chapman. He then left that country and landed in France, and went to Paris after imposing on the police by obtaining a passport in a fictitious name, and other false representations. This I have been told by a friend of Mr. Hawley's, jeweller, of the Strand, who is a creditor of C.'s to a large amount. When I went to Paris I was the bearer of a letter from that gentleman addressed to C., by which means I discovered the plot against you.

Now, sir, permit me to observe that he having imposed on the authorities of that country in my opinion will be sufficient grounds for them to arrest him and give him up to his creditors, if you will request Lord Granville to cause them to do so; independent of this I will undertake to procure for you the poem in question, for I know where to find it. By this plan you will gain two important points over your enemies, by getting into your possession that which was intended to have been put into the possession of thousands; at the same time you will be the means of punishing the author without your name being blended with the name of so vile a character. But great caution must be used, or we shall not obtain the book. Before this plan is put in execution I will undertake that some friend of yours on whom you can depend shall see the poem.

Without vanity I beg to say that I am allied to several families of distinction in this country, and that you may rely on my honour and veracity. I have not, nor shall name this circumstance to any person whatever. Had I not have made it known to you I should have been as vile as the author.

I have, &c.,

COCKS JOHNSON.

1826

Mr. Canning has received Mr. Cocks Johnson's two letters of yesterday and to-day. He is much obliged to Mr. C. Johnson for his good intentions and obliging offers, but having all his life been in the habit of despising libels, he will not give Mr. Cocks Johnson any trouble with respect to what he says is in preparation by the Rev. Mr. C. at Paris.

[These two letters, from a gentleman 'allied to several families 'of distinction,' and one 'of honour and veracity,' form a perfectly delightful example of daring ingenuity, though unfortunately not crowned with success.

There appears to have been a clergyman living in Paris at the time, and owing money to some creditors in England. Mr. Johnson suggests that through the influence of the British Foreign Office with the French Government the alleged debtor should be arrested and sent over to England to be delivered to his creditors. This amiable suggestion could only emanate from a creditor, and it may be safely inferred that Mr. Johnson was such a creditor. The extremely black colours in which the unfortunate debtor is depicted may command little credence : as Mr. Johnson describes him as a rogue, most probably he was an innocent victim of misfortune ; but anyhow Mr. Johnson wanted to get him brought back to England as a prey ; and the difficulty of putting the Foreign Office in motion, particularly with such a discerning chief as Canning, for this private purpose, was evidently extremely great.

Then the truly brilliant idea struck this enterprising creditor of inventing the existence of a diabolical libel of extraordinary talent, supposed to be written by the unfortunate debtor against Canning, apparently quite without provocation. The language in which Mr. Johnson describes the supposed libel exhausts every possible method of intimidation ; then he triumphantly offers to go over to Paris to buy off the atrocity if Canning will obtain the surrender of the debtor. One cannot admire too much the ingenuity of the scheme ; and it was very hard on Mr. Johnson that Canning showed a shameful indifference to the threatened attack on his reputation.]

MADAME BOURKE.

Le 10 Décembre 1826.

Comme vous avez, mon cher Monsieur Canning, un peu de repos dans ce moment, je vous envoie une brochure qui vient de paraître et qui fait beaucoup de bruit.

1826

Je vous ai envoyé par Mr. Grosvenor 'La Congrégation ou le Ministre Anglais à Paris,' où vous vous retrouverez. Le nom du Duc est un nom supposé, mais on peut l'appliquer à qui on voudra, la chose est très au naturel.

Je vous avais promis de vous amuser un peu avec la chronique scandaleuse de Paris, mais peut-on y penser ? on ne pense qu'à vous, et on ne parle que de vous. N'en devenez pas trop vaniteux, parce que, s'il y a des personnes, qui, comme moi, voudraient vous envoyer des gourmandises et des bonbons pour petites marques d'amitié, il y en a d'autres qui voudraient vous égratigner un peu pour leurs menus plaisirs, mais—rassurez-vous, ces dernières sont en petit nombre.

Je vous envoie ce jour une petite boîte contenant un flacon de 'Diabolous,' que je vous prie de présenter de ma part à Sa Majesté : ils sont tous frais, car je les reçois de Naples à l'instant.

Pour vous, mon cher Monsieur Canning, je vous envoie pour vos étrennes une petite térine de foies gras que j'ai fait venir exprès d'Agen, où sont les meilleurs : ils vous seront apportés par le cuisinier que je vous envoie, mais en grâce, n'allez pas prendre la goutte : ce serait très mal à propos—savez-vous que j'ai une quantité de gourmandises, et pourvu que vous disiez un mot, vous en aurez la plus grande partie. Autrefois le prince Régent était amateur de friandises : dites-moi si le Roi a conservé ce goût, mais je n'oserai pas prendre la liberté de lui en envoyer. Je me rappelle que mon pauvre mari me disait toujours qu'il ne fallait rien offrir aux souverains en fait de gourmandises, parce que si par malheur il leur survenait un mal de tête, on aurait pu l'attribuer à votre offrande officieuse. Mais le souvenir, que j'ai de toutes les marques de bonté dont votre excellent roi nous a comblés, me porte à lui exprimer mon respect et ma reconnaissance, et de les lui témoigner de toutes les manières qui sont en mon petit pouvoir.

Adieu, mon cher Monsieur Canning, recevez l'expression de ma reconnaissante amitié pour toutes vos marques d'intérêt.

A. BOURKE.

[An amusing letter from a female admirer at Paris. From the manner in which she refers to eatables one would guess the lady kept a restaurant or hotel.

There seem no instructions for or mark of acknowledgment.]

MR. BIDWELL, OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

F. O. : December 18.

Dear Stapleton,—Here at last is some positive information respecting Mr. Canning's canopy of state, and chapel furniture, and the pictures of King George III. and Queen Charlotte.

1826
—

They have been paid for by the Lord Chamberlain, and are now at Bywater's warehouse in Grosvenor Street. There is, however, a demand made by the Lord Chamberlain's office of 31*l.* 1*s.* 6*d.* for fees on the delivery of these articles. Will you ascertain if it be Mr. Canning's pleasure that this sum should be paid, and the things sent to Gloucester Lodge?

Yours very truly,

J. BIDWELL.

Grosvenor Street : May 6, 1826.

Sir,—I beg leave to inform you his Excellency the Right Honourable George Canning's state canopy was provided in the quarter ending July 5, 1815, and paid for August 13, 1816. It consists of a throne, a large chair, two stools, a communion cloth and cushion, Bible and Prayer Books, and surplice (and a Turkey carpet which is entirely worn out).

I am, &c.,

JOHN BYWATER.

[Asks for Canning's order respecting his 'canopy.'

Canning minutes it : 'I will certainly pay the fees and take the things. But I will wait till I see whether I get a house in town.']

MR. QUARLES HARRIS, JUN.

41 Crutchedfriars : December 23, 1826.

Sir,—The Oporto merchants generally are, of course, extremely anxious to know whether any troops were sent direct to the relief of Oporto, or whether orders were given that a part of those despatched to Lisbon should, on arrival there, proceed to Oporto, as well as whether any ships of war finally sailed from Oporto direct. You would very particularly oblige me and the gentlemen at whose request I have the honour to address you if you would be kind enough to inform me upon this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

QUARLES HARRIS, JUN.

Foreign Office : December 26, 1826.

1826
—

Mr. Harris is informed, in answer to his letter to Mr. Stapleton of the 23rd inst., that Mr. Stapleton, as Mr. Canning's private secretary, is not the channel of official applications.

[Inquires of Mr. Stapleton, the private secretary, as to the movement to Oporto of any portion of the British force just despatched to Portugal, and promptly gets snubbed, as seeking information through the wrong channel.

The anxiety of the Oporto merchants was very natural and excusable at this particular crisis.]

1827.

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: January 1, 1827.

My dear Granville,—To show you that my practice is conformable to my precept, I send off without delay a messenger with the intelligence received this morning from Lisbon.

1827
—

In the worry of multiplied arrivals, and in the hurry of going out of town, I will substitute for a letter to yourself the copy of one, which I have just sent off to the D. of W. at Apthorpe—partly for his information, but in great part also to plague his heart, as you will perceive.

Ever affectionately yours,
GEO. CANNING.

[Referring to the recent 'scolding' administered to the noble Ambassador at Paris, Canning points out that he himself acts conformably to the precepts he had been instilling into his friend, and makes no delay in sending him a messenger carrying the news, just received from Lisbon, in copies, or extracts, of despatches from Sir William A'Court.

No doubt the despatches in question reported the arrival of the first instalment of the British expeditionary force at Lisbon, the enthusiasm with which they were received by the populace, also, the printing in the Portuguese language of Canning's speech in the House of Commons on the question, and the instantaneous sale of thousands of copies in a few hours. Canning became thus personally identified with the military succour, and figured in the minds of the Constitutional Portuguese as the deliverer of their country.

If any jealousy of Canning really affected the mind of the Duke of Wellington, reports of Canning's glorification, in the very locality where the Duke had likewise laboured hard for the independence of

1827 — Portugal, must have been singularly calculated to rouse and stimulate the feeling.

But it must not be supposed that Canning's playful wish to 'plague his heart' must necessarily refer to the poorer passions of human nature, but rather to a natural expectation that the success of Canning's policy, of which the Duke disapproved, must needs in some degree displease him. And if we look at Canning's letter to the Duke, (printed at page 512 of vol. iii. of the 'Wellington Correspondence'), of which he here sends a copy to Lord Granville, we find a series of postscripts, each implying a triumph on a different head over Canning's Tory adversaries in the Cabinet. Westmoreland, one of the keenest of his Cabinet foes, was to be shown A'Court's despatches: the ultra-Tories in France had, in a division in the Chamber of Deputies, just exposed their desperate numerical weakness: Prince Metternich, the unflinching foe of revolution, the secret and untiring opponent of Canning and his policy, had yielded so far as to signify entire approval of the King's message to the House of Commons on the affairs of Portugal.

On Greek affairs Metternich, indeed, ventured no opposition to Canning's suggestions. France had it in contemplation, to join in the Protocol; (which, be it remembered, abjured forcible interference between the Turks and Greeks).

All this success, and admitted leadership, in Continental politics reflected the highest credit on Canning; but, as giving weight to a policy of which Wellington disapproved, it must certainly have 'plagued his heart' to read of it. His reply of January 2 (printed p. 513, vol. iii. 'W. C.') carefully abstains from any allusions to, or comments whatever on, Canning's much-postscripted letter—a negative, but probably correct, indication of the extent to which he felt annoyed.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Combe Wood: January 2, 1827.

My dear Granville,—I observe that Villèle and Chateaubriand—concurring in no other point—appear to concur in disputing the assertion, that the French occupation of Spain was the immediately moving cause of our decisive recognition of Spanish America. They are wrong.

What was attempted at Aix-la-Chapelle, was to bring about a European mediation between Spain and her

1827

Colonies ; and it was certainly held out to Spain—not by England only, but by all the Powers—as an inducement to come into an arrangement that sooner or later, some of them, and perhaps England specifically, might be obliged to consider of acknowledging the independence of the Colonies.

But so far was the menace from being serious, that I doubt whether it was ever communicated to Spain. If it was so, Spain never returned an answer to it ; and so far from any steps being taken by England, specifically, towards recognition, in consequence of what passed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the date of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, the step the most favourable to the mother country and the most directly unfavourable to the Colonies, was (if I mistake not) in 1819—the year after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Prince Metternich, as you know, suggested, in 1824, a threat to acknowledge the independence of the Morea, and the Greek islands. But if Russia, and France, and England, should ‘call’ Greece ‘into existence,’ this next spring, does M. Villèle really think, or will Prince Metternich’s friends pretend to say for him, that it was *he*, after all, who decided that point at the conferences of St. Petersburg three years before?

The effect of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle upon the Spanish American question, is stated (if my memory does not deceive me) in my official note to the Count Ophalia in March (1825?).

I have not that paper at hand, (where I am now writing), but you must certainly have it in your archives. I happen to have at hand, however (by mere accident), two papers, the contents of which are decisive upon the point in dispute : the one, a minute which I drew up in December 1824 for the King, containing the advice of the Cabinet to his Majesty respecting the recogni-

1827

tion; the other a separate paper, drawn up by Liverpool in aid of that advice which was known to be mine, and which, as mine, was not at that moment peculiarly welcome to his Majesty.

I enclose to you extracts from both these papers. The French occupation was undoubtedly not the sole reason; nor, perhaps, in some quarters the most potential and reconciling reason for the step recommended to his Majesty, but it was emphatically mine.

I leave it to your discretion, whether to make any use of these papers with Villèle, or not. Of course you must not suffer them to go out of your hands, and must make him feel, that so extraordinary a stretch of confidence is occasioned by my desire to stand clear with him, in point of correctness and truth. It will not be amiss that he should also see how deep a wound the occupation did give to the feelings, at least of Lord L. and myself; and how much we must have disciplined those feelings, and chastened them, by a consideration of the inestimable value of peace to all the world, before we could bring ourselves to forbear a more publick and decided expression. But it was one thing to forbear under a temporary disparagement; it would have been another to have seen it incorporated, as it were, into the system of Europe, and to have been prepared to defend it, as we must have been prepared to do this year, as a very laudable and proper state of things.

In making such a communication, (if you decide upon making it), to Villèle, you will of course take care to let him understand that it is made historically, not controversially.

Ever, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning had proclaimed in Parliament that British recognition of the independence of the Spanish American Colonies followed upon,

1827
—

and constituted a direct response to, the French occupation of Spain, —a measure in behalf of British authority, and of liberal principles, balancing the measure in behalf of French prestige, and of anti-constitutional opinions.

It concerned the French position to show that the two measures were in reality unconnected with one another, the recognition being, as they alleged, founded on the pressure of British commercial interests, and sooner or later inevitable whether the French occupied Spain or not—that the idea of the recognition was not incompatible with, and therefore no protest against, the principles of the Continental alliance, it having been discussed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, as a useful menace to bring Spain to order ; and that England only acted on the sanction conceded at that Congress, when she took the step.

The views thus urged, if not answered in some way, might be anticipated to exercise an influence with the King Charles X. favourable to the bigots, who guided him in so much of his conduct, and prejudicial to the more liberal instincts, which Canning had contrived to infuse into Villèle, and which, through him, had managed to keep the French Government to the lines of moderate conduct

In order to prove to Villèle the truth of the close connection between the two opposing demonstrations in question, Canning sends extracts of two Cabinet minutes to Lord Granville, to be shown in strictest confidence to Villèle, which might convince him of the true motives actuating the British Government, at the time of the recognition.

Lord Liverpool's extremely able memorandum is published *in extenso* at p. 297 of vol. iii. of Yonge's Life of Lord Liverpool. Canning's minute is printed also *in extenso* at p. 407 of 'Life and Times.'

During the month of January 1827 little occurred of a disputable nature to stir Canning and his office, either on the Continent or at home ; at least, nothing appears recorded during this period, whether in the 'Annual Register,' Lord Liverpool's Memoirs, the Duke of Wellington's Correspondence, or the two works of Mr. Canning ('Life and Times' and 'Political Life'), of any great importance, though it is necessary to note the following incidents.

The Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, and Heir Presumptive to the Throne, died on January 5. The anti-Catholic cause thereby lost the valuable degree of support hitherto contributing to sustain it, of a formal promise of the Heir to the Throne of an unbroken continuance of opposition to the grant of the Catholic claims. The succession

1827

would now devolve on the Duke of Clarence, a sailor, with whom the Duke of Wellington's influence was small ; and, as his Royal Highness was childless, the succession in the second degree descended upon a young Princess, under age, as to whose future political opinions it was of course impossible to form any conjecture. In view of these prospects, no doubt the Catholic cause gained in prospect by losing a decidedly formidable item in opposition.

But the Duke of York's demise as Commander-in-Chief operated in another direction, also in favour of Canning and his political prospects. Owing to the strong though suppressed feeling of hostility against Canning, long growing and rapidly coming to maturity in the minds of the Tory members of the Cabinet, the Duke of Wellington had come to be regarded as their leading hope and mainstay : Peel was comparatively young, and out of the innermost secrets of State ; Wellington was the third in the triumvirate, of which Liverpool and Canning were the others. They knew Wellington had been, and was being at present, overborne by Canning : this they attributed to the authority of Lord Liverpool, to whom the Duke was not ashamed to own a most honourable and indefeasible allegiance as the head of the Government, dating from the time when he led armies to carry out the policy of Lord Liverpool, for the maintenance of which armies he owed untold obligations to Lord Liverpool's care and solicitude ; and continuing down to the time of the unstinted rewards, which the Premier obtained for him : hence the Duke's undeviating loyalty to his chief.

There is something noble and touching when, pleading the cause of his brother, Dr. Gerald Wellesley, for promotion, he used the following words :—

‘ I would appeal to all our colleagues, to his Majesty, and even ‘ to yourself in your cool moments, whether there is any man who has ‘ served you more faithfully and zealously than myself.’

It implies not only a feeling of respect, but one of infinite regard, for his old chief.

In fact, the Duke had acquired, by anticipation of his colleagues, and without effort or intrigue on his part, a very high political position, which would inevitably burst into light on the withdrawal of Lord Liverpool from power.

The one element which threatened to hang round him, and to impede his political freedom, lay on the military side of his position. All men agreed that the management of the army should be non-political ; and the Command of the Army, by common consent, could be entrusted to no man but Wellington ; yet, if he accepted it, he received a non-political office, debarring in honour from political action.

Hence we may understand that Wellington, foreseeing, tried to avoid, the shackles this high and unenviable post would impose upon him ; and earnestly, but in vain, desired to escape the honour.

In published papers there is no great amount of direct evidence to show that it was the case ; but if George IV. suggested his impracticable scheme, with regard to himself, of assuming the Command in chief of the Army, by way of being the only alternative, of which he could think, to avoid the necessity of forcing the command upon Wellington, his Majesty may not have been quite so great a visionary as his calumniators have called him on this occasion. Smothered fires were still raging against Canning in the palace, notwithstanding the outward approbation and genuine infusion of cordiality on the part of the King, who, with his Continental Brethren, found themselves constrained to pay homage before the brilliant incarnation of Liberal policy.

In the correspondence between the Duke and Peel on the subject, two particulars may be noted as confirming this view : the first, that Peel referred to the Duke's ' dislike ' of taking the office—and there was no earthly reason why he should dislike it, except for its political disabilities ; the second, that, as appears from Wellington's reply, the King and he had been actually discussing various ways of disposing of the command of the army, to escape, if possible, the necessity of forcing it on the Duke ; and the Duke admitted that the King's plan, which so excited the horror and dismay of Liverpool and Peel, had been talked over, without any especial outburst of rebuke on the Duke's part—which, if the idea had not in some way tended to assist his wishes, it would have assuredly encountered. The course of the conversation reported by the Duke seems significant. The King naturally enough proposed the command for Wellington, in the event of the Duke of York's death. Wellington replied only (so far as his report goes) with some verbiage of the '*nolo episcopari*' kind. The King then discussed different arrangements respecting His Brothers and Himself, still giving the preference to the arrangement respecting Wellington ; nevertheless it is curious to find that Wellington believed that *some other* arrangement (*i.e.* not one respecting himself) was in contemplation.

Much may be read between these lines. It looks as if Wellington omitted to mention some significant remark of his, which led to the discussion of ' different arrangements ' ; and Wellington's unwillingness to hamper his political freedom, by accepting the Command in chief, had no doubt beguiled him to permit a discussion of inadmissible alternatives with the King.

However, Lord Liverpool yet held power ; and Wellington, with

1827
—

immense applause (particularly from his adversaries in the Cabinet), yielded to necessity, and accepted the neutral position of non-political Head of the Army. Canning might well hope his Grace was effectually gagged—and gagged he certainly appeared for the Premiership ; but when the time came, he slipped his fetters, and lost no time in again waging unrelenting war on his splendid rival.

During January the affairs in the Peninsula did not progress altogether favourably.

Yielding to the verbal remonstrances of France, and to the practical remonstrance of the British expedition to the Tagus, Spain actually recognised the Regency in Portugal, and submitted to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Governments. She also professed her intention of stopping the hostile operations of the Portuguese rebel troops within her frontier ; but she failed to carry out this intention.

In truth, the hopes of the Absolutists gained strength, owing to the illness of the Infanta Regent ; which brought Don Miguel's accession to power nearer than before. This prospect produced the usual effect of stirring up dissensions in the Portuguese Chambers, and of loosening the bonds which held the Constitutionals together.

Stimulated by fresh hopes, the deserter bands again invaded Portugal, and Spain again fostered their aggression ; while France failed to act upon her threats of withdrawing the troops, particularly the Swiss Guards, from Spanish territory.

Chaves, and his followers, again crossed the frontier. Fortunately the Constitutional troops proved equal to the occasion. Encouraged by the security of Lisbon, now in the hands of the British division, they, on different occasions, checked, and, after some variations of fortune, in the end decisively drove back the invaders.

Towards the end of January, however, matters again looked so unpromising, that British troops were moved near to the frontier, as far as Coimbra, but their services were not actually called into requisition. The loyal Portuguese troops again defeated and drove out the deserter bands.

These repeated checks, combined with apprehensions of inadvertent collision with British troops in the course of their border skirmishes, induced the Spanish at last to expel the rebel leaders, Chaves and Magessi, and to order that General Longa, Spanish Governor of Badajoz, should be brought to court-martial for aiding and abetting these inroads upon Portugal.

A few remarks may be made on Lord Beresford's expedition to Portugal. The Constitutional Government invoked his aid as that of a distinguished British officer, who had formerly done good service

1827
—

for Portugal. Lord Beresford knew perfectly the political character of the Government which had summoned him ; and, though reserving for himself liberty to accept, or not, this new commission, according to the circumstances he might find on his arrival, still, by responding to their call at all, he without doubt debarred himself from raising objections on the score of their political principles ; coming out, moreover, on their summons, to consider their application, he was also debarred, in honour as a foreigner and a soldier in their service, from lending himself to political intrigues aimed at their overthrow. Now Lord Beresford certainly found the Portuguese army in extreme disorder ; but, as he had come so far to arrive at a decision, whether he should accept the employment of restoring order or not, it seems by itself somewhat unintelligible that he should excuse himself from undertaking the duty on the plea that he found the disorder ‘too great.’ It must have seemed a poor excuse to the Portuguese Government in office.

But not content with deliberately disappointing his unfortunate clients, Lord Beresford condescended to make himself a focus of Portuguese discontent of the Absolutist party, actually conspiring against the *de facto* Government which had invoked his assistance ; and, as appears from his lordship’s printed letters in the ‘Wellington Correspondence,’ he did his best to use his position and information to discredit, and bring into contempt with the British Government, those whom he was bound to treat with respect. The question is not whether Lord Beresford’s views were, or were not, essentially correct—possibly they were sound enough,—but whether *he* was the man, or his position in Portugal such, as to admit of active hostility to be carried on against the Portuguese Government without incurring the very serious imputation of something like treachery.

To gratify the British army, the Portuguese Constitutionalists did not cease to hold out the offer of the command to this dangerous *soi-disant* friend, though he had long trifled with their wishes on the subject ; but it came to pass, that when he did, at last, accept the command in a very magnificent and condescending manner, he found naturally enough the Portuguese officials, as distinguished from the Heads of the Government, so incensed against him that he was powerless in his nominal command ; and finally his services were dispensed with altogether.

His lordship, after creating, by his proceedings, considerable dismay, even in the minds of his patrons and sympathisers (the Duke of Wellington and Lord Bathurst), at last returned to England, and relieved Portugal of his disturbing presence.

A good deal of correspondence seems to have passed with respect

1827
—

to the management of the British contingent in Portugal, which need not be dwelt on here.

Notice may be taken of the successful progress of the Russians in their war with Persia, which, as Persia seems to have held some sort of unascertained claims to aid from Great Britain, caused a certain degree of anxiety in the British Foreign Office.

Meanwhile, Canning, having caught a bad cold at the Duke of York's funeral, far from recovering, had been getting worse and worse ; and one next finds him at Brighton, too ill to transact business, and leaving the correspondence with his colleagues to be carried on by his private secretary, Mr. Stapleton.

Canning could hardly have fallen upon a worse time to become invalided : the Government had before them the first session of a new Parliament ; both the Catholic and the Corn questions were due for early debate, and conflict ; the Cabinet secretly shook under the animosities latent in its composition ; Lord Liverpool's physical powers appeared obviously fading away ; and here was Canning too ill to do anything !

In December 1826, Mr. Robinson had suggested to the Prime Minister that he should be raised to the Peerage, to assist Lord Liverpool in House of Lords work. On the 16th, Lord Liverpool, after mentioning in most significant terms that he had 'been very 'ill,' in the middle of the letter says, without entering into particulars, 'Be assured the Government hangs by a thread. The Catholic question, in its present state, combined with other circumstances, will, I have little doubt, lead to its dissolution in the course of this session.'

At page 462, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence,' there is a memorandum dated November 20, 1826, prepared by the Duke of Wellington for the King, but marked 'Not delivered,' written with a view to bring Royal pressure to bear on Canning, to restrain his public advocacy of the Catholic claims. The mere preparation of this memorandum marks the intensity of the conflict.

At page 432 of Yonge's 'Life of Lord Liverpool' there is a memorandum dated November 9, 1826, handed by the Duke of York to Lord Liverpool, warning him of the strong feelings entertained by the 'mainstay of the present Government' on the Catholic and Corn questions ; on both of which Canning held liberal opinions, unacceptable to the 'mainstay.'

These moves of the two Dukes were no doubt based on the hope and expectation that the well-known anti-Catholic majority in the new House of Commons would sustain the Tory party in shaking off Canning, and the Canningite group, and that the result would be a homogeneous Cabinet, under the Duke of Wellington in succession

1827

to Lord Liverpool at the Treasury, or perhaps rather in succession to Canning at the Foreign Office, and Peel, in the latter case, at the Treasury.

The popularity of Canning's Portuguese expedition, and its success, the death of the Duke of York, and the Duke of Wellington's appointment at the head of the Army, placed serious obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of this design.

At page 560 of 'Life and Times' will be found printed a letter to Lord Liverpool, dated February 4, 1827, containing one of Canning's masterly summaries of the reasons for judging it expedient to retain the British troops for a while in Portugal.

Lord Liverpool's answer, dated February 6 (and printed page 583 of 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii.), is hardly less able in its cautious forecasting of the evil possibilities of the future.

Canning, it appears, desired to retain the British troops in Portugal, until Spain had fulfilled the assurances she had given of abstention from active interposition in the affairs of Portugal, whether through the medium of organised bands of Portuguese deserters, or by the power of her own military resources. If Don Miguel refused to obey his Brother's summons to Brazil, he must needs be always at hand to furnish the pretext, and to accept the result, of a sudden assault in his favour, executed by a Spanish contingent, and sustained and legitimatised by a revolutionary movement in Portugal.

The Spanish monarchy, threatened by intestine commotions, alike on dynastic grounds by Don Carlos, and on political grounds by the Liberal party (which had been by no means altogether extinguished), found itself peculiarly indebted for its existence to the pacifying influence of French troops still present within its territory.

No doubt, the French Government felt the continuance of this occupation embarrassing, and unprofitable, and desired to put an end to it at an early date ; but the liberal and sensible element in the Administration at Paris unfortunately did not possess a leader of the commanding talents of Canning ; nor, if they had, would such a leader have found instruments of power as available in a French Absolutist Court, as Canning found in the free air of a British House of Commons.

Accordingly, Canning, never losing sight of the great end of obtaining an evacuation of the Peninsula by the French, grasped the opportunity which the folly of Spain had given him, and, having British troops in Portugal safely remote from the danger of actual collision with the French in Spain, desired to retain the British division there in such manner as to make their recall unostentatiously reciprocal upon the retirement of the French army.

1827

For supplying a decent pretext for this continuance of the British force in Portugal, the undecided question of a Regency of Don Miguel, and the persistent menace of a Spanish army on the frontier, might be deemed entirely sufficient.

Lord Liverpool's response of February 6 to the reasoning attempted to be abstracted above showed symptoms of counter-representations from the Tory element in his Cabinet; he practically passes over the argument of smoothing the path for the French Government, as not worth particular discussion, as good enough to be taken for granted; but he emphasises the difficulty of the position of the British force, in case of attempts in Portugal at counter-revolution. Its presence was, he asserts, undoubtedly unpopular with a large section of the Portuguese, (no doubt the Absolutist party): if a domestic movement headed by Don Miguel arose, calculated, and likely, to upset the Constitutional Government, what part could the British take? How could they take any part without violating the principle, which forbids forcible interference in the internal concerns of an independent state? And if they did *not* interfere, and Don Miguel and a violent counter-revolution succeeded, how could Britain escape everlasting contempt in Europe?

It is curious that Lord Bathurst's leaning was against too prompt a withdrawal of our troops, (see his letter to the Duke of Wellington, February 5, 1827, p. 582, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence').]

THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL TO MR. STAPLETON.

Fife House: February 6, 1827.

My dear Sir,—I wish you would give the accompanying letter to Mr. Canning, when he is well enough to read it. It is in answer to one of his, which I received to-day. It does not signify whether he reads it a day sooner or later.—Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[This short note encloses Lord Liverpool's letter to Canning of the same date above referred to, and shows Lord Liverpool's thoughtful consideration for his sick colleague.

There is no trace of any reply from Canning, who, about this time, was very ill.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: February 7, 1827 (1.30 P.M.)

My dear Lord Liverpool,—I received your box by the messenger this morning, and I communicated to Mr. Canning that

1827

there was a letter for him from your lordship. He desires me to say that he hopes to be able to read it before the end of the day. Meanwhile he sends back the messenger with a draft of a despatch to Sir William A'Court, covering Lord Bathurst's instructions to Sir William Clinton. Mr. Canning desires me to request you to give the draft over to Howard, when you have read it.

Mr. Canning was a great deal better last night, but at four o'clock this morning he had an attack of rheumatism in the head, which has kept him in great pain ever since. Still Sir M. Tierney says that there is nothing wrong, and that he (Sir M. T.) thinks that he will soon be relieved from the pain in his head.

Believe me to be, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This acknowledges the receipt of the foregoing letters, and sends for his lordship's perusal the draft despatch to Sir W. A'Court, concerning further War Office instructions to Sir W. Clinton, who was in command of the British expeditionary force in Portugal.

Notice may be taken of the Duke of Wellington's letter to Canning (printed p. 582, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence') of February 6, 1827. His Grace had detected in the draft treaty with France, in connection with the French joining in the Protocol of April 4, 1826, with regard to Greece, a provision for sending commercial agents to Greek ports: this, no doubt, would involve a large degree of recognition of Greek independence. Russia, with all her temptations, had taken the apparently noble course of refraining, on principle, from acknowledging Greek independence, as a means of weakening Turkey. Every one could see the magnanimity to be cheap: Greece fighting weakened Turkey, none the less for not being recognised. But the Duke of Wellington followed on the Russian lead, and seems to have thought, (no doubt as Russia intended him to think,) that, if Russia, when tempted, avoided compromising the lofty doctrines of legitimacy, unbiassed Britain might reasonably hold off from committing herself in favour of a people who at least technically were 'rebels.' Hence the Duke lost no time in protesting against the concession to 'rebels' of commercial agents from Great Britain, even though the Absolutist French court had found it politic to make or concur in the proposed measure.

TURKEY AND GREECE.

In May 1826 Mr. Stratford Canning, passing through the Greek Archipelago on his way to Constantinople, received and accepted

1827

authority from the Greek Government to open negotiations, in their behalf, for a treaty of peace with the Porte, on the following terms :—

1. The suzerainté of Turkey to be recognised.
2. A payment of a lump sum, or of an annual tribute, to be made to Turkey.

On the other side—

1. Turkey to be allowed to retain neither property, nor fortress, in Greece.
2. Turkey to be prohibited from all intervention, whether direct or indirect, in the internal administration of Greece.
3. The pacification to extend to all parts of Greece, whatever might be their situation.

As a preliminary step Greece desired an armistice guaranteed by Great Britain, or a declaration of the neutrality of the islands of Patros and Milo.

The Protocol relating to Greek affairs, negotiated by the Duke of Wellington at St. Petersburg on April 4, 1826, pledged Russia and Britain to a joint intercession in behalf of the Greeks with the Porte, and also contained certain self-denying articles.

The notification to the Continental Powers of this Protocol formed the principal diplomatic extension of the situation during the summer and autumn of 1826. The Powers with small hesitation signified concurrence in the views expressed in the Protocol.

The Greek proposals obtained favour with Russia and England, as not inconsistent with the Protocol, but rather in fact affording a sound basis for a course of joint action thereunder.

While these diplomatic proceedings were gradually maturing themselves, the Treaty of Ackerman had been concluded on October 6, 1826, between Russia and Turkey ; it had regard to the Principalities, and the frontier difficulties of the two Powers.

Towards the end of October, and beginning of November, 1826 the Russian Government authorised Prince Lieven to co-operate in bringing pressure to bear on the Porte, in a sense based on the Protocol and the Greek proposals, conjointly.

The two Powers had determined to employ, as means of pressure to obtain the preliminary armistice, the two steps, firstly, of a concerted withdrawal of their representatives from Constantinople ; secondly, a recognition of the independence of those parts of Greece which had actually freed themselves from Turkish control.

The elements of the Greek application, and of the proposed menace of recognising the independence of parts of Greece, furnished Austria and Prussia with sufficient excuse, under the guidance of

1827

Metternich, to advance no further in the same path with Russia and England.

But France cheerfully fell in with these measures, and even went beyond the diplomatic requirements of the situation by advocating the conversion of the Protocol into a treaty.

Canning had now yoked the three Powers, Russia, France, and England, under one bar : not that Russia and France thought so ; but that, whatever the ultimate designs of those Powers, they had at this moment deemed it expedient to come into line with England.

The co-operation of the alliance was regulated by an instrument of concert, abjuring the use of force, and abjuring individual aggrandisements.

Russia most probably regarded the proceedings at this stage as a harmless amusement, out of which might come a favourable opportunity for some signal advantage, to be acquired without resorting to inexcusable violence, and utterly outraging the public opinion of Europe.

France, guided in policy by the Royal Family, quietly kept in view the possible creation of a Greek monarchy occupied by a French prince, which might supply eventually a *tête du pont* for French predominance in the Levant.

The suggestion, originated by France, of the conversion of the Protocol into a treaty commended itself to Canning ; and the British Government accordingly authorised the British Ambassador at Paris to act in concert with Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador at the French Court, to enter into negotiations for the purpose of giving effect to the suggestion.

The only difficulty appeared in the opinion expressed by France, that any arrangement concluded for Greece, in consequence of such treaty, should be 'guaranteed by all the parties to the treaty without exception.'

This further suggestion of France must naturally have given rise to a conjecture that France, or rather the Bourbon dynasty then guiding her course, foresaw some reasonable political advantage from the stipulation.

Assuming, as has already been made evident by documents printed in the early part of this work, that the French Court desired to establish an Orleans monarchy in Greece, it is clear that if the Greeks could be induced, in exchange for material help, to formulate an appeal to the Powers for a monarch (as, in fact, they did later on), and, if successfully managed, to narrow that appeal to an application for a French prince to act in that capacity, it would prove difficult for either Russia or England to reject the appeal, as

1827 — not fairly a part of the settlement of Greece ; and then a guarantee of the Franco-Greek monarchy would furnish an invaluable support to an otherwise somewhat rickety arrangement.

Anyhow Canning, simply and naturally, called upon France to explain her idea of a 'guarantee,' by drafting the treaty to give effect to it.

The draft treaty reached London on January 21, 1827, when Canning was too ill to attend to business.

At this stage of the negotiations, leave must be taken of the subject for the present ; as the negotiations were not effectively renewed for some months, and until the Government had changed, and Canning had left the Foreign Office, and become Prime Minister.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton : February 8, 1827 (12.30 P.M.)

My dear Lord Liverpool,—Mr. Canning has again had a bad night, with violent rheumatic pains in his head. Sir M. Tierney, however, says that there is no cause for uneasiness, and that rheumatism will take its time. He threatens Mr. C. with a blister. Mr. Canning is not in a state to attend to business, and has not yet been able to read your lordship's letter. He desires me to say that he supposes Parliament will expect some communication on the affairs of Portugal ; for which purpose it has occurred to him, as a sort of medium between volunteer explanation on the one hand, and the leaving Parliament to make motions for the production of papers on the other, that your lordship, and Mr. Peel, might lay before Parliament on Monday next, by command of his Majesty, the following papers :—

1. The circular of December 13 to foreign Powers, in which the King's message, and the intention of the Government to send troops to Portugal, are communicated to them.
2. The note of the Condé de la Alcudia to Mr. Canning of February 1, with its inclosure.
3. Mr. Canning's answer to that note. These papers will explain the beginning and the end of the transaction ; the middle speaks for itself.

Mr. Canning also desires me to say that, as (contrary to the predictions of Sir Matthew) he still suffers very much, he begins to fear that there is very little probability of his being fit for duty in the House of Commons on Monday se'night. He desires

me to tell your lordship this, in order that you may turn in your mind what is best to be done. The first moment that he can hold a pen in his hand he will write to you.

Believe me to be, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

1827
—

[The last act of the great drama of Canning's tenure of office is now developing : the hero is in his first struggle with impending fate, but, before the short and delusive gleam of triumph which preceded the end, he finds himself temporarily incapacitated for action, and can correspond only at second hand with his ever-faithful friend and chief ; who himself no doubt felt conscious of premonitory symptoms of the attack which, a few days after, without destroying him on the spot, closed his active career for ever.

The present letter anticipates the question of the papers to be presented to Parliament relative to the Portuguese question ; and also anticipates Canning's incapacity to take his place as leader of the House of Commons, on the approaching debates on the 'burning' questions of the Catholic claims, and of protection of home-grown corn.

It notifies that Canning had not yet read Lord Liverpool's letter already described, on the continuance of the British dominion in Portugal.]

MR. STAPLETON TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Brighton : February 9, 1827.

My dear Lord Granville,—Mr. Canning is still unable to write and to attend to business.

He is, however, I trust, going on well. The danger last Friday was (as I told you) of the inflammation in the external muscles of the loins striking inwards and attacking some vital parts. Two copious bleedings put a stop to that danger, and there has been no tendency since to a recurrence of it. Mr. Canning is at present, and has been for the last two days, suffering from intermittent rheumatism in his head, which, though it occasions agonising pain, is yet not dangerous. The night before last it was at its worst, and yesterday, while it intermitted, was employed in taking bark to prevent its recurrence, or rather to delay it, and to diminish its violence when it did come. That effect has been produced. Mr. Canning slept well till about half-past seven this morning, when the pain returned, but near

1827 — four hours later and with diminished violence. There is every reason, therefore, to hope that the remedies are taking effect. But it will be some time before he is himself again.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This is simply a medical report of Canning's state. 'Bark,' or 'quinine,' as it is now called, was beating down the rheumatic symptoms, and bestowing much-needed sleep on the sufferer. But it may be presumed that, according to modern lights, the 'two copious bleedings' could only yield a temporary and deceptive relief, and must have really delayed the recuperative efforts of nature, and diminished the curative powers of the 'bark.' Possibly, such subtraction of constitutional strength and accompanying impairment of the functions of the heart terribly avenged itself in the August following; and Canning's naturally fine constitution paid by death in the autumn for the false medical treatment of the spring.]

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. HUSKISSON.

Brighton: February 10, 1827.

My dear Mr. Huskisson,—I have found an opportunity to-day of reading your letter to Mr. Canning, who, though against the orders of his physician, insists upon answering it immediately.

He requests, in the first place, that you would be so good as to communicate to Sir F. Burdett his sense of Sir Francis's kindness and considerate attention, and his extreme regret that anything personal to himself should interfere with Sir F. Burdett's wish to bring forward the Catholic question at an early period of the session.

It is unluckily quite impossible for Mr. Canning to say at present on what day he can be present in the House of Commons, although he cannot help flattering himself that the complaint which has confined him to his bed since the day after he left Eartham, and which has assumed every variety of form of which cold and rheumatism are capable, must now be in its last stage. That stage, however, is one which does not seem to admit of being accelerated. It is an aguish intermittent pain in the head, which returns at certain intervals, and lasts for about six hours, during which the torment which he suffers is indescribable, and utterly unfits him not only for business but for thought.

1827
—

This affection, his doctors are now combating, with a particular preparation of bark of recent invention, which is considered a specific in such cases, and by which it is hoped gradually to reduce the duration of the periodical attack, and finally to subdue it altogether. Within the last two days some progress has been made towards this object, but not yet so much as that the remainder of the four-and-twenty hours is more than respite enough to recover from the exhaustion and fatigue of the attack. Sir M. Tierney speaks confidently of the result, and, the specific complaint once got rid of, a very few days will enable Mr. C. to quit his bed, and to return to town. All the more general symptoms of lumbago, and tendency to internal inflammation, (which was the only alarming part of the illness,) have given way.

I have been thus particular in order that you may see, why it is impossible to say when he will be well, although it may be presumed that, when he gets rid of the pain, his restoration to health and strength will be rapid.

Mr. Canning entirely agrees with you, and is much gratified with Sir F. Burdett's concurrence, that corn should maintain its precedence over the Catholic question. To reverse that order would, he is confidently of opinion, indispose a great mass of the House of Commons, whose votes upon the Catholic question are yet unpledged.

Mr. Canning is equally satisfied that Sir F. Burdett adopts the most judicious course in taking the sense of the new House of Commons upon a resolution, rather than embarrassing himself in the first instance with the details of a Bill.

It is a great object that the first vote of the new House of Commons should be calculated to comprehend every description of opinion generally favourable to the question, under whatever modifications.

Mr. Canning is very sorry that you are confined to your house, and was not aware of it till he heard your letter.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Parliament had met by adjournment from the December session on February 8.

Sir Francis Burdett, as leader of the non-official 'Catholic'

1827

party, had been inquiring of Mr. Huskisson how to proceed to obtain Canning's approval in the matter of bringing the Catholic question fairly before the new House of Commons.

Canning approved of both Burdett's ideas, viz. that the debate on the question of corn and protection of British agriculture should, if possible, precede the debate on the Catholic question, and that the Catholic question should be brought before the House in the shape of a general resolution, and not by Bill.

This friendly concert of two nominal opponents signifies much in respect of Canning's credit with the Liberal Opposition.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: February 10, 1827.

My dear Lord Liverpool,—In reply to a letter from Mr. Huskisson which required an immediate answer, and in which he inquired after Mr. Canning's health, Mr. C. desired me to explain very fully his state; and I think that I cannot better make you acquainted with it than by enclosing an extract of that part of the letter which relates to it. By that you will see how very uncertain is the period when he may be convalescent. If this aguish pain goes away completely, in four-and-twenty hours he may be quite well; on the other hand, it may go on for many days, and while it does go on he is totally incapable of business. A few days' delay, therefore, may be of great service to him in enabling him to attend in Parliament for the Corn Laws.

He desires me to say that he has not yet received your lordship's letter, but that he will do so and answer it as soon as he possibly can. I showed him your lordship's letter to me, which I received yesterday about the Duke of Clarence.

Mr. C. is certainly better *to-day*; the pain has been less, and now that it is absent he is more cheerful than he was yesterday.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This letter reports to the Prime Minister the general effect of the preceding communication through Mr. Huskisson to the Whig leader.

The reply to the preceding letter will be found printed at page 451 of vol. iii. of Yonge's 'Life of Lord Liverpool,' dated February 10, 1827.

1827
—

Lord Liverpool, finding that the Liberal leaders were communicating with Canning through the medium of Canning's follower Mr. Huskisson, on the subject of the most important business then coming on in the House of Commons, considered it his duty to remind Canning that, in case of Canning's absence, Mr. Peel must be the Minister to conduct the Government business in the House of Commons.

Huskisson was the head of the Board of Trade; but Peel was the second in the House of Commons. Their political sentiments were antipathetic.

Lord Liverpool concluded with the observation, 'The course adopted with respect to the Catholic question is very provoking.']

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: February 10, 1827 (8.30 p.m.)

My dear Lord Liverpool,—I had, by Mr. Canning's desire, written to your lordship the enclosed letter before I received the box with your letter to him of this day's date. On his sending for me after dinner to-day, and my finding him tolerably comfortable, I thought that it was much better at once to read to him your letter. The object of his sending for me, indeed, was to tell me to write to you a letter precisely in the same sense as the one which you have written to him.

You will see that in the letter which I had already written I had mentioned the service that a few days' delay might be to him, in enabling him to bring forward the Corn question.

Tierney, and Knighton, and Warren (to whom Mr. Canning's case has been accurately stated), *all* agree that, as every other unfavourable symptom is removed, when once the present treatment gets the better of the aguish pain, his recovery will be rapid. Even, however, if Mr. C. were well at this moment, he thinks that he should not be prepared to encounter the fatigue of the H. of C. on Monday se'nnight, but three or four days might make a great difference, and he does not despair of being in a state to go into the H. of C. by the middle of that week.

Would it be possible to put Corn for the 22nd, subject to be postponed till the 26th?

Your mention of the 26th suggests to Mr. C. this idea. He is apprised by a letter from Mr. Lushington to me that Sir F. Burdett has fixed the 22nd for the Catholic question; but

1827 — as Mr. C. had already, in his answer to a communication from Sir F. B. through Mr. Huskisson, stated that, so far as he (Mr. C.) is concerned, Corn must have precedence over the Catholic question, he apprehends that he should have no great difficulty in persuading Sir F. B. to give up the 22nd to Corn, as the price of Mr. Canning's attendance on the Catholic question some day in the following week. What Sir F. Burdett declares he cannot consent to do is to put off his motion beyond March 5, the day on which he says the lawyers go their circuits. Possibly forty-eight hours may enable me to write to you more confidently, as Tierney would consider a lapse of that time without a return of the fit as conclusive.

Meanwhile Mr. Canning has said nothing to Mr. Huskisson about Corn. He quite agrees with you as to the expediency of its devolving into Mr. Peel's hands, if unfortunately he cannot undertake it himself. He would in that case write to Mr. H. himself in that sense, but until the case of necessity arises he thinks it better not gratuitously to stir an unpleasant question.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Canning concurs as to handing the Corn question over to Peel, but he evidently does so with reluctance: he can trust his follower Huskisson; on this question he feels no sympathetic confidence in Peel. The desperate anxiety and annoyance which his illness caused him at this crisis must have been quite indescribable.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: February 11, 1827.

My dear Lord Liverpool,—I am happy to say that Mr. Canning is decidedly much better. The attack of pain returned to-day, but was of shorter duration and of much less violence; so much so that he desires me to say that he feels pretty confident that he shall be well enough for the 22nd; but, if not quite up to the fatigue of the H. of C. on that day, he feels as certain as it is possible to be in such a case that he shall be so on the 26th.

I write by his desire by this post to Mr. Peel to let him

know Mr. C.'s state, and to tell him Mr. C.'s wishes as to the Corn question being deferred to the 22nd, and, (what I told your lordship last night,) that he did not apprehend any difficulty after what had passed in persuading Sir F. Burdett to defer his motion on the Catholic question till some day in the week beginning on the 26th inst.

1827
—

A. G. STAPLETON.

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. HUSKISSON.

Brighton: February 11, 1827.

My dear Mr. Huskisson,—I am most happy to say that Mr. Canning is decidedly better to-day. The access of pain has been of shorter duration and much less violent. He feels confident, therefore, that if the Corn question is deferred till the 22nd he shall be able to be present; but should he be disappointed on that day, he is as certain as he can be that he shall be ready on the 26th.

I write to this effect by this post to Lord Liverpool and to Mr. Peel, and I enclose an extract of that part of my letter to Mr. Peel relating to the Catholic question, which explains all Mr. C.'s wishes and feelings upon the subject. I hope you are better.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. PEEL.

Brighton: February 11, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Mr. C. has deferred desiring me to write to you until he should be able to speak with some tolerable confidence, as to when he should be able to attend to business in the H. of C. You already know how severely he had been suffering for more than a week, previously to the time when I saw you here.

The very day on which you left Brighton the different annoyances under which he had been labouring all concentrated themselves into an intermittent rheumatic ague in the head, from which he has since been suffering. It returns at certain intervals, and lasts for about six hours, during which he suffers very violent pain, which renders him wholly unfit for business or for thought. This affection the doctors hope gradually to sub-

1827
— due by a preparation of bark. Some little progress was made in so doing during Friday and Saturday. To-day the attack has been of shorter duration, and so much less violent that a couple more days at the same rate of improvement would probably free him from this troublesome complaint. Mr. C. thinks, therefore, that he can look forward with tolerable certainty to being ready for the H. of C. by the middle though not by the beginning of next week.

He desires me to thank you for your kind message through Sir William Knighton recommending Mr. C. to call in Dr. Warren. Dr. W. has been consulted, and Mr. C.'s case stated accurately to him. He happily quite agrees with Sir M. T.'s treatment of it. Mr. Canning is aware, when he talks of the middle of next week, that Sir F. Burdett has fixed the 22nd for the Catholic question, but, as Sir Francis has sent very civil messages through Mr. Huskisson about consulting Mr. C.'s convenience, he does not apprehend that there would be much difficulty in persuading Sir F. B. to let Corn be fixed for the 22nd, deferring his motion till the 26th or 27th. It would be still better, indeed, if a latitude could be left for Corn till the 26th, and if Sir F. B. could be induced to fix his motion positively for Thursday, the 1st of March. This, however, is the utmost extent of accommodation that Sir F. Burdett could be expected to assent to, as he declares that he holds himself in duty bound to bring on his motion before Monday, the 5th of March, on which day the lawyers set out on their circuits.

I write by this post to this effect to Mr. Huskisson by Mr. Canning's desire.

A. G. STAPLETON.

THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL TO MR. STAPLETON.

Fife House: February 11, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Since I received your letter this morning I have seen Robinson and Peel. We are all rejoiced to think that Canning may be in a state by a further delay to open the Corn question, but we agree that it would be very unadvisable to put it off only to the 22nd, holding it out that it may be further put off to the 26th. We are of opinion that the House ought to be assured that the question will come on upon the day now

1827
—

to be fixed, and that it would be best, therefore, to announce at once the 26th as the day, upon the ground of Canning's indisposition, but saying that, if unfortunately on that day he should still be prevented from attending by indisposition, it would nevertheless be brought forward.

As to the Catholic question, Robinson was to see or write to Huskisson, in order that he might arrange with Burdett that this question should be brought forward on Thursday, the 1st, or Friday, the 2nd of March.

I saw Sir William Knighton yesterday, and he gave me great comfort as to Canning's case: he seemed to be quite confident that, if the bark continued to have effect, his recovery would be very rapid, and that he would be ready for business much sooner than I conceived possible.—Believe me to be

Very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

MR. STAPLETON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Brighton: February 12, 1827 (quarter before 12).

My dear Lord Liverpool,—I have only this instant seen Mr. Canning, to whom I have communicated the contents of your letter. The paroxysm of pain is very severe to-day, and has attacked his ear more than his face; still he thinks that, as he has slept well and is generally better, its being more severe to-day is accidental, and that twenty-four hours will make a great difference.

He desires me to say that he agrees with your lordship in thinking that it will be best to fix at once the day on which the Corn question should be positively brought forward, whether he is well enough to bring it forward himself or not.

The fixing, therefore, the 26th, which is the most distant day proposed, will give him the best chance of being present. He desires me to say that the so doing, and at the same time the persuading Sir F. Burdett to postpone the R. Cath. question to the 1st or 2nd of March, will be the greatest possible relief to his mind.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Canning accepts with relief the final settlement decided upon by Lord Liverpool in the last letter.]

1827

At page 587 of vol. iii. of the 'Wellington Correspondence' there is printed a letter from Canning to Lord Liverpool, dated February 12, 1827. Canning, on looking again at Lord Liverpool's letter of February 10 above referred to, noticed the observation as to the course adopted with respect to the Catholic question being 'very provoking,' and writes a letter to the Premier inquiring what particular annoyance was in his mind when he wrote it.

This letter concerning the delicate point of the proceedings in Parliament in support of Catholic emancipation, as to which Lord Liverpool and his friend and colleague took opposite views, must have been written by Canning with unusual secrecy, as Mr. Stapleton, in his 'Life and Times,' states his belief that the letter of February 4 was the last which Canning wrote to Lord Liverpool with his own hand, and there is no trace of this particular correspondence amongst the private secretary's papers.

Canning explains that it would have suited him best that the Catholic question should have stood over till after Easter, and also why he approved of the proposed proceeding to ascertain the sense of Parliament by way of resolution.

It may be remarked that he speaks of 'majorities slender and 'ticklish,' which looks as if he apprehended some such majority in favour of emancipation.

Lord Liverpool's reply is printed in p. 588, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence,' and dated February 13, 1827. It explains the word 'provoking' as expressing his sense of the clashing of the claims to public attention of two great controversies debated so closely to one another; and it implies that he laid no blame on Canning in respect of the unfortunate juxtaposition of these severally and separately 'burning' questions. Nevertheless, it stands on record that the advocates of the Catholic party were insisting on a discussion of the claims of their cause before Easter, and that Canning, their most effective supporter from the Government side, was without concealment, through his immediate friends, allowing the propriety of their insistence on this particular of the time of the discussion, and settling with the Opposition leaders as to the precise date, within a few days, for the debate to take place. This concert in action, and this manner of arriving at this concert, being, no doubt, carefully impressed on Lord Liverpool by the Tory chiefs, Wellington and Peel, as exceeding the proper amount of liberty of action allowed to the differing members of the Cabinet on this question, drew from Lord Liverpool this slight but significant mark of discontent.

It is not difficult to infer that Lord Liverpool meant his mild expression of annoyance to come home to Canning's feelings; and

1827
—

Canning recognised the remonstrance and wrote his excuses in a tone calculated to disarm his chief's irritation, by pointing out, that his acceptance of a Catholic debate before Easter was involuntary, and the time suited him ill; that the procedure by way of resolution appeared less embarrassing, and more commendable for obtaining a decisive vote, than bringing on the question by way of Bill; and be it observed that, if successful, a resolution would suffice for the cause in the session before Easter, but nothing less than a Bill would meet the exigencies of Parliamentary procedure if the question came before Parliament after Easter; and finally, by referring to the diminished power of the Catholic vote in the new Parliament (in fact, their majority had become a minority, but the change had not yet been ascertained)—and describing the majority, if it came, as 'ticklish and slender.'

Canning's excuses, being reasonable enough, calmed Lord Liverpool's irritation sufficiently to enable him to explain away his word 'provoking'; which, indeed, had served its purpose in drawing Canning a little out of the somewhat excessive, though natural, preoccupation of his mind at this particular moment, triumphant in the past, distressed by bodily sickness in the present, anxious and depressed with apprehensions for the future.

For, in the future, two heavy blows were imminent on Canning—the loss of the sustaining authority of Lord Liverpool, and the loss of the support hitherto given by the House of Commons to the Catholic claims.]

MR. STAPLETON TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Brighton: February 12, 1827.

My dear Lord Granville,—Mr. Canning still continues much the same as to business, but is, I trust, mending gradually. He desires me to enclose to you two letters which I wrote by his desire, one to Mr. Peel yesterday, the other to Lord Liverpool to-day, which Mr. C. says will explain to you his state as to health, and his wishes as to the time when Corn and Catholics should be brought on in the House of Commons. Mr. Planta will write you word to-morrow if anything has been definitely fixed in the H. of C. on these subjects to-day.

Mr. C. desires me to say that your Excellency cannot too soon ask for leave of absence for a short time on private business.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

1827
—

[This keeps Lord Granville informed of the state of Parliamentary business, and also presses him to take his leave of absence on private affairs as soon as possible. Probably Lord Granville formed one of the most useful links between Canning and the friendly Whigs, particularly the Duke of Devonshire.]

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. HUSKISSON.

Brighton: February 13, 1827.

My dear Mr. Huskisson,—Mr. Canning has passed the day without any return of pain. He still, however, suffers from the effects of illness, and requires rest; but I trust the disease is gone, and that a short time will restore him.

He desires me to write to you to propose to you, if you are quite well enough, to come here on Saturday (if this bitter cold weather goes away before then) and to stay over Sunday, for the purpose of having the whole of Sunday dedicated to Corn. He says that he cannot lodge you, but that he can let you have a comfortable bedroom at a house not 100 yards off, where I and others of his suite are living. You can have also a sitting-room to yourself.

If you want anything copied for the Corn speech for Mr. Canning, any papers that you may think will be useful to Mr. C., Backhouse will call on you to-morrow, or the following day, to render any assistance that you may require.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[The time for action drew on, and Canning being somewhat recovered began to think about the speech he would have to make on the Corn question, and to prepare himself for the effort. He proposed to 'coach' himself for the purpose with the aid of Huskisson, who consequently received an invitation to come down to Brighton to instruct his chief on the facts and arguments of the question. As appears from his speech, it was long since Canning had spoken on the topic; and there was much to be mastered before he would be fit for action.]

MR. PEEL TO MR. STAPLETON.

Whitehall: February 13, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Pray be good enough to tell Mr. Canning that the House entirely acquiesced in my proposal last night,

1827

that Corn should stand for the 26th, with a promise that it should then come on without fail.

Sir F. Burdett fixed the Catholic Question for the 1st of March. Tell Mr. Canning also that on the Sunday before the meeting of Parliament the Chancellor called upon me, and informed me, that he had changed his mind with respect to bringing on the Chancery Bill in the Lords and himself undertaking the conduct of it.

There was therefore no time to be lost; I so arranged it that the Master of the Rolls gave notice last night of his intention to bring in a Bill for the Reform of proceedings in Chancery, founded on the report of the Chancery Commission.

This announcement gave great satisfaction to the House, and I am now confident that it is much better that the Bill should originate in the House of Commons.

Ever very faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

I write to you because it will enable you to take the best opportunity of reading this to Mr. Canning.

A. G. Stapleton Esq.

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. PEEL.

Brighton: February 14, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Mr. Canning desires me to thank you for the letter which you wrote to me yesterday for his information, and to tell you that the three Parliamentary arrangements which you communicated in it, respecting the Corn, Catholic, and Chancery questions, are most convenient and satisfactory to him.

I am sorry to say that Mr. Canning has had a return of the pain in his face and head to-day, though less violent. This return has induced him to consent to other medical aid being called in, that no possible remedy may be left untried to get him well for the 26th. He is not worse certainly, but I do not think that he has gained since the day before yesterday.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

February 15, 1827 (10 A.M.)

P.S.—By a mistake this letter did not go yesterday. Mr. Canning has had a good night, and is free from pain up to this time this morning.—A. G. S.

1827 — [Signifies Canning's concurrence in Mr. Peel's proposed arrangements in the House of Commons respecting the Corn, the Catholic, and the Court of Chancery questions.]

MR. STAPLETON TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Brighton: February 15, 1827.

My dear Lord Granville,—Lord Seaford sent to Mr. Canning with his letter of the 9th inst. a packet from Madame de Richemont, inclosing to Sir Thomas Munro a packet for her son. Mr. Canning desires me to request your Excellency (as Lord S. will have left Paris) to let Madame de Richemont know that he has received it, and that he will take care that it is forwarded to its destination.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[A note of no political signification; but who was Madame de Richemont, on whose account these special civilities took place?

Attention may here be called to a correspondence between Lord Carlisle and Mr. Stapleton, printed at pp. 259–263 of 'Life and 'Times,' respecting the mode of procedure most likely to advance the success of the 'Catholic claims' in the House of Lords; in which any attempt to obtain a favourable vote by way of 'resolution' is earnestly deprecated, on the ground that if the Lords reject a 'Bill' they only reject a particular measure: if they reject a 'resolution' they reject a general proposition; and of course the judgment involved in the latter event covers more ground, and is far more decisive on the question at stake, than in the former event.

At half-past ten o'clock in the morning of Saturday, February 17, 1827, Lord Liverpool was struck with paralysis, while opening his letters as usual at his London residence at Fife House.

It appears that Mr. Peel first received the intelligence, and promptly communicated it to the King, the Duke of Wellington, and Canning.

Peel followed up his letter to the King by going himself to Brighton, where both the King and Canning were residing, where and when it was settled that, out of respect to Lord Liverpool, his illness, though known to be practically incurable, should for a time be treated as a temporary indisposition.]

MR. CANNING TO SIR W. A'COURT.

Brighton: February 20, 1827.

My dear Sir,—The tremendous calamity which has fallen on the Government by the sud and dangerous

1827
—

illness of Lord Liverpool necessarily suspended the consideration of all important questions, and of all that relates to Portugal among the number.

At this distance from town I do not venture to say anything of Lord Liverpool's present state; the bulletin of to-morrow will be inserted in this letter at the office.

I have this morning seen the Marquis de Palmella for the first time since my confinement. I have encouraged the project of his visit to Lisbon, where I agree with you in thinking that his presence, and his information, may do some good. He is quite ready to set out, as soon as he can carry with him the results of poor Lord Liverpool's illness, without which, indeed, he would bring nothing but dismay and uncertainty.

In the meantime he entreats me to exert yourself, all you can, to bring the Count de Villa Real into the Government as Minister at War. I exhort you to do so if you, who must be much better able to judge than I am, think it expedient. But if the Count de Villa Real enters the Government, he must do so with a cordial determination to unite that Government more closely together, and he must not bestow too much of his attention upon a very nice and discriminating definition of his own individual opinions and peculiar position. The broad line of distinction at present in Portugal is between those who support, and those who seek to overthrow, the new institutions. If Count Villa Real is for supporting them, he must direct more of his energy against those who are for overthrowing him, than against the irregular and ragamuffinly part of those who agree with him in the main, although they differ in degree, and perplex him with their exaggerations. As yet it appears to be that he has been somewhat too anxious to prove that he is not as other men are, who are embarked in the same boat with him.

1827 — Let him seize the helm of the boat if he can, and discipline the crew; but he need not call aloud to all the passers by, to observe what a set of fellows he has been obliged to take on board to man his vessel.

Palmella also suggests that the session, which naturally ends with the month of March, might be prolonged another month, otherwise indeed he will arrive only in time to witness its close. I presume it is during the session that he will be most useful. I am mending gradually, and hope to be in town on Saturday, and in my place in the House of Commons on Monday.

Ever, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

[After mentioning Lord Liverpool's illness, this letter explains Canning's concurrence in the projected return of Palmella, Portuguese Ambassador in London, to Lisbon, and in the hope that the Count de Villa Real might be persuaded to overlook minor differences, and effectually co-operate in endeavours to sustain the Constitutional Government of Portugal. About this date the situation of the Constitution, though safe enough from violent extinction at the hands of Spain, had become precarious from internal dissension; the ridiculous lenity with which the rebel prisoners had been treated, and the discovery that the young Queen had been beguiled into a privy in their proceedings to the extent of secretly sanctioning them, proved a most disheartening prevalence of dislike to the Constitution amongst high and low in Portugal; and, as Canning here admits, the Constitution suffered under the discredit of a most 'rag-amuffinly' set of friends.

The agreement to treat Lord Liverpool's illness as a temporary indisposition postponed for the King the evil day of decision, and afforded time to each of the contending parties to reckon up and test its strength: the arrangement could only amount to a private understanding, as the parties to the conflict were colleagues and comprised within the same Government. It need hardly be said that, however much the King and the leaders laid the account of this procrastination on delicacy of feeling for Lord Liverpool, the real grounds lay in the desire of both parties to await the issue of the impending struggles in the House of Commons, on the Corn and Catholic questions. These two debates would be not nearly so much encounters of the Government and the Opposition, as tests by which

to determine whether Canning, or Wellington, should prevail. A striking political pause, except amongst excited underlings, took place for about ten days.

1827
—

The Corn question came on, March 1, and the scheme, settled by Canning and Huskisson and accepted by the Government, was submitted to the House of Commons. The Tory rank and file meant mutiny; but the compromise proposed admitted the principle of protection, though minimising the economic dangers of the doctrine according to the best lights of the time, by the device of a sliding scale. Recommended by the skill and eloquence of Canning, the scheme won favour from the House, discontent became overawed, and the mutiny failed. This result promised favourably for Canning's political prospects.

This temporary success was limited only to the House of Commons, and the present occasion. Later on in the year, when Canning had formed the new Government, the House of Lords, under the guidance of the Duke of Wellington, 'worried' the scheme to such an extent that Canning let it drop.

The Catholic question, on the other hand, on March 5 and 6 met with the opposite fate. In spite of some good debating, and a fine pro-Catholic speech from Canning, Sir Francis Burdett's motion, after two nights' debate, was lost by a majority of four, 272 voting in favour of Catholic emancipation, 276 against. By a curious contrast, the House of Commons in the Parliament last preceding the present had steadily supported Catholic emancipation, while its constituencies had drifted back into strong anti-Catholic dispositions. This discrepancy being well known to the Government as existing in 1825, we naturally found the Duke of Wellington urging on and Canning strongly deprecating a dissolution of Parliament, each influenced by his knowledge of the feelings of the constituencies. Lord Liverpool, though an anti-Catholic, being partly influenced by a desire to satisfy Canning, and partly by private doubts about himself continuing Premier and retaining energy enough to encounter another Parliament, postponed the general election to the summer of 1826.

On the result of the elections becoming known, little doubt was entertained that the Catholic cause had very considerably lost ground in the new House of Commons.

The division in the Commons on the morning of March 7 could hardly have surprised those who had watched the political game of late.

Mr. Stapleton, in his 'Political Life,' vol. iii. p. 306, accounts for the result, and is quite correct in distinguishing in the anti-Catholic majority two elements, both anti-Catholic, but one hostile

1827

to Canning on other accounts, and pleased to gratify at once their political conscience and their political antipathy ; the other friendly to Canning in most respects, and led to think that, in acting on their political convictions on this occasion, they were giving a vote calculated to hold the Government together in its existing shape, and therefore to preserve Canning's predominance.

The truth of the observation justifies the present contention, that the two votes of the House of Commons on Corn, and on the Catholic question, were in reality determining agencies of great weight for Canning's position in the political arena at this conjuncture. And the members of the House of Commons were not altogether conscious of the importance of the situation ; circumstances did not admit of a step, so ostentatiously provocative of open hostilities, as attempting to enlighten them ; and many of Canning's friends, treating the question as an open one, voted against him, where, if they had known the precise value of the decision, they at least might have abstained from voting.

On the whole, these votes, though expected to furnish the King with some grounds for settling his Government, proved unfortunately too indecisive to bring the crisis to an end.

The Corn debate had afforded a remarkable exhibition of Canning's power of providing an acceptable measure on a difficult subject, and of prevailing, by dint of persuasive oratory, on a recalcitrant Tory majority to receive his proposal ; but all his eloquence had availed naught on the Catholic question, notwithstanding the alarming condition of organised and rebellious Ireland.

Meanwhile Canning had been bitterly assailed by Dr. Phillpotts, and the assault repeated in the House of Commons by the Master of the Rolls, on the plea that, with a view to the Premiership, he had courted the pro-Catholic Liberal party by refraining from pressing his former demands for securities against Roman Catholic aggression on the established constitution of Church and State, if emancipation were conceded. These attacks, if not strong enough to extend the area of hostility with the public at large, were at any rate bitter enough to add greatly to the heat, and give point to the abuse, of the anti-Catholic and anti-Canning politicians.

So the King hesitated another fortnight, and it was not till March 22 that he sent for Canning.

The strictest abstention from committing themselves, by any outward symptoms of their otherwise well-known political wishes, was imposed on the leaders at this crisis, alike from fear of one another, from fear of the King, and from fear of the public. The ' Annual Register ' for 1827, p. 95, observes, ' The latter part of February and the whole

‘of March was spent in endeavouring to overcome the various difficulties. If intrigues were going on, they were most noiseless and concealed, for scarcely a whisper reached the public.’

The reality of this suspension from intrigue seems confirmed, as far as the present writer can trace, by the absence, in the correspondence and biographies of the time, of any sign of active political communication between those interested in politics.

It is not affected by the somewhat ill-natured footnote of the ‘Annual Register’ that ‘it subsequently appeared that during this period Mr. Canning was in secret communication with Sir Robert Wilson and Mr. Brougham ;’ for, as will presently be shown, the communications with these two gentlemen took place about March 26 to 28, after the King had sent for Canning, and the pause in political life had therefore come to an end.

As for the Duke of Wellington, the anxious extent of his caution may be judged from his returning to the Duke of Buckingham a letter written by the latter Duke on March 20, offering the support of the Grenville party to a Ministry excluding Canning altogether. This attempt to gain credit with Wellington for the writer’s own purposes, by trying to force the Duke ‘to run’ for the Premiership, met with a sharp rebuff. Wellington appreciated the profound difficulty of the situation better than any man.

Whether the Duke of Wellington saw the King before this date is, singularly enough, not on record : at p. 603 of the ‘Wellington Correspondence,’ vol. iii., there is printed a letter dated March 1, 1827, from Sir W. Knighton, appointing the Duke to call and see the King *in that week* ; but no letter from the Duke to the King or Knighton is given in return. Most probably he did ; and, with equal probability, it may be conjectured that he urged on the King the objections to Canning’s being allowed to become Premier—if we may judge from the way in which the King met Canning at first, his Majesty was most impressed with the idea of preserving his conscience in the matter of the Catholic question, and of settling matters by the appointment of a neutral Prime Minister.

The influence of the Tory chiefs appeared directed to re-establish, as near as possible, the state of things in Lord Liverpool’s Ministry : they knew enough, from experience in 1821–22, that without Canning in counsel, and with Canning hostile or at least neutral in the House of Commons, a pure Tory Government might be considered impossible, or, to use the narrower terms of the period, a pure ‘anti-Catholic’ Government was impossible ; but Wellington, Peel, Eldon, Westmoreland, and Bathurst really aimed at securing some

1827

kind of control over the foreign policy of Great Britain—a control only exercisable at the head of the Government, or at the Foreign Office ; and Wellington was the only man with knowledge and ability sufficient to cope with Canning.

Before further progress is made with the domestic difficulties of the British Government, a few notes may be useful as to the position of the Greek question. When last the question was mentioned in these pages a draft treaty had been received from the French Government on January 21, reducing into terms of international obligation the elements of agreement to be found in the Protocol of St. Petersburg, in the Greek formulation of their conditions of peace, and in the French suggestion of an allied guarantee of Greek 'home rule.'

The draft came before the Duke of Wellington, and in a letter 'dated February 6, 1827, at p. 582 of vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence,' his Grace, with characteristic curtness, pointed out the partial recognition of Greek independence involved in the contemplated appointment of commercial agents by the allied Governments ; he betrayed the irritation such a step caused him, particularly in his reference to the similar step taken in the case of the Spanish colonies in America. His objection appears to be not unreasonable ; the degree and the security of the independence, so far attained by the insurgent Greeks, were incomparably less than that claimed as notoriously assured to Spanish America, when the parallel step was taken in their case.

Canning's severe illness prevented any further advance being made towards a settlement of the question for some time.

At p. 603, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence,' there is a letter dated March 7, 1827, from the Duke to Mr. Planta, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, as to seeing certain despatches to Mr. Stratford Canning at Constantinople. He sums up shortly the futile nature, as it appeared to him, of the proceedings taken under the Protocol. His view might be just, but his manner of expression showed little sympathy with the Foreign Secretary.

At page 609 (*ibid.*) Canning writes, under date of March 19, 1827, to submit to the Duke three 'projets de traité,' the Russian, the French, and the British. Canning desires to settle a final draft in conjunction with the Duke and Lord Granville. He refers to the urgency of France and Russia to conclude a treaty, and points out the great value of the accord of the three Powers in giving 'a lead' to Europe.

The Duke objects that the drafts embraced proposals for forcible intervention in the struggle, which alters the character of the con-

templated mediation, and made the recognition of the insurgents a measure of war.

1827

He also insists on the original idea of the Protocol and of Canning, which was a joint withdrawal by all the Christian Powers of their ambassadors with the Porte ; an insistence aimed at balking the whole design of a treaty, as Austria and Russia had declined to come in under the Protocol at all.

At p. 612 (*ibid.*) there is another letter (March 26) from the Duke on the same projected treaty, pointing out with much truth the danger that, under the article with regard to a guarantee for Greece, Russia and France both, or one alone, might be the guaranteeing Power to the exclusion of other Powers, and thereby acquire a very undesirable influence with Greece : against this the Duke gives a sensible enough warning.

These seem the last communications of an outwardly friendly and confidential nature between Canning and Wellington on foreign affairs.

The calm interval of general inaction ceased when, on March 19, 1827, George IV., having received from Lady Liverpool the final assurance of her husband's permanent incapacity for office, sent for the Duke of Wellington to the royal lodge at Windsor to discuss the situation. This precedent of sending for the Duke at the beginning of a Ministerial crisis was followed by the King, and his successors, upon pretty nearly every subsequent occasion of the kind so long as the Duke lived.

The King says he merely requested his Grace to consult with his colleagues, as to the best mode of readjusting the Government on the withdrawal of Lord Liverpool.

The Cabinet appears to have awaited in London the return of the Duke from Windsor, to hear whether the King had made a decisive communication on the subject, but there was none such for the Duke to report.

To conjecture, where there are no published records, but the surrounding circumstances are known, it may be surmised that the King let the Duke know, that he continued satisfied with Canning's foreign policy, though he disapproved of Canning's ' Catholic ' views ; that consequently his Majesty wished to retain Canning's services in the Government on the former head, without endowing him with the wide superiority of the Premiership to promote his opinion on the latter. The King probably referred to the recent check that Canning and the Catholic question had met with in the House of Commons, and suggested the appointment of a mild anti-Catholic figure-head.

1827
—

All which, if rightly supposed, must have been unsatisfactory to the Duke of Wellington. The Duke secretly cared little about Catholic emancipation : he did care vastly about the conduct of foreign affairs. Canning still at the Foreign Office, and a docile Premier well under the control of the King, and Canning would leave the Duke, as heretofore, an influential councillor by favour, but with no substantive power, and liable to be outvoted by the concurrence of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

This could not be explained to the King in the teeth of his Majesty's approving judgment on Canning's policy, so the Duke was left to emphasise the Catholic question, as a difficulty against Canning, out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance.

In the following week, on Tuesday, March 27, Canning went down for the first time to have an audience of the King ; and on the 28th the audience took place, and the first practical step was thus taken towards solving the problem.

What passed at this interview, as reported by Canning, will be found printed at p. 582 of 'Canning and his Times.'

It appears the King held with Canning's foreign policy, and only objected against Canning his 'Catholic' views in domestic affairs.

Canning expressed himself clearly and unhesitatingly, that if he was to continue in the Government it could only be as First Minister.

It is interesting to observe, how the suggestions of the King's Tory councillors had succeeded in diverting his Majesty's thoughts from a general view of the political situation to an exclusive consideration of one point.

Given an Administration with Canning at the head, formed on a composite basis, on the Catholic side there would be found the Prime Minister, a majority of the Cabinet, and a half—a half only, if so much—of the House of Commons, a small minority in the Lords, and a decided minority in general public feeling out of doors.

On the anti-Catholic side, a large minority of the Cabinet, led by Wellington and Peel, a half, if not more than a half, of the House of Commons, a decisive majority in the Lords, the personal feelings and wishes of the King—all this backed by a general consensus of public Protestant feeling in Great Britain.

The balances remained clearly anti-Catholic, and the weight of Canning's promotion would hardly be felt on the Catholic side, at any rate for a long time to come.

On the other hand, the alarming condition of Ireland (as Canning mentioned in his speech) really called with irresistible urgency for the concession ; but the force of that consideration would clearly be

none the less effective, but, on the contrary, become stronger and more dangerous, as the disaffected Irish perceived the opponents of emancipation predominating in the Government.

However, the Tory appeal to the alarms of the King's conscience succeeded in raising a barrier of ill-founded reality, which it required all Canning's skill and firmness to override.

Canning, however, on the main question of foreign policy, had by this time won the King and defeated the Duke of Wellington.

The King had said, and allowed Canning to record that the King had said, that 'the doubt and mistrust, which he admitted he had felt, of some of the first acts of his foreign policy had given way to feelings of a directly opposite character ; that Mr. Canning had placed this country in a position with respect to Europe in which it had never stood before ; that the maintenance of the country in that situation depended on Mr. Canning's continuance in office, on the personal consideration which was placed in him by foreign Courts, and on their knowledge that his Majesty completely approved and adopted Mr. Canning's system.'

On the question of the King's scruples in respect of being served by a 'Catholic' Prime Minister, Canning had necessarily to expend all his argumentative energy ; and he defended the position that it would exceedingly derogate from his authority, if he permitted himself to be superseded in his just claims to promotion, simply on the score of holding certain views with regard to a question hitherto treated as an open question in the Cabinet.

After arguing at length on a point intrinsically unreal, and only formidable as between the King and himself, Canning concluded with the simple statement of his own terms, which did not specifically include the Treasury, or even nominal Premiership, but were, 'the substantive power of First Minister he must have, and, what is more, must be known to have,' or he must retire from office.

The alternative not excluded by this formula consisted in a repetition of the Liverpool arrangement at the Treasury ; and if no one could be found to take Liverpool's exact place, then, if it would conciliate the pride of Wellington, Canning did not pronounce impossible a nominal figure-head, over whom he should exercise paramount and universally recognised influence.

Any way, Canning, if not the nominal head, was to be invested with the reality of power ; as, with a First Lord of the Treasury under his undisputed control, he could always outvote and overrule Wellington, not only in the Cabinet, but where it was of more importance, in the Committee of Cabinet, which ultimately directed the course of foreign affairs.

1827
—

On March 29, Canning again saw the King, and reading over to him the minute of their conversation, obtained his Majesty's confirmation of its correctness. He then, at the King's desire, prepared a minute in which the King remitted to the Cabinet the duty of suggesting a Prime Minister. Canning summoned a Cabinet to consider this remit for March 31 ; but in the meanwhile Peel had seen the King and brought Canning a message, leaving at his discretion whether he should bring the royal minute before his colleagues. Canning at once perceived that the King, by this move, placed on him the responsibility of appealing to the Cabinet to find a Premier. This would never do : if Canning in the exercise of his discretion appealed to his colleagues to select a chief, he would be bound in honour to abide by their choice ; if the remit came from the King, Canning remained free to act. So he promptly, 'in his 'discretion,' declined to place the King's minute before the Cabinet.

Mention has already been made of the Duke of Buckingham's attempts to persuade the Duke of Wellington to try to form a Government excluding Canning, but the Duke of Newcastle presumed to interfere much further, and to attack the Sovereign ; and his Grace's remonstrances against any Government, except a pure Tory Government, were couched in hortatory language which the King characterised as 'very unbecoming.' The Duke of Rutland also remonstrated against Canning being called to power, but in more befitting terms.

These proceedings, together with the Duke of Buckingham's representation, already mentioned, to the Duke of Wellington, created a general appearance of combination to dictate to the King, which roused George IV.'s just indignation, though the Duke of Wellington had given the King to understand that he had declined to encourage or recognise these irregular, and not very promising, efforts to influence his Majesty. Yet the effect of the incessant Tory remonstrances on the mind of the Duke no doubt stimulated him to something very near open hostility to Canning.

Meanwhile, on March 30, members began to make inquiries in the House of Commons as to the progress that had been made in reconstituting the Ministry ; and as the reply was necessarily somewhat evasive and inconclusive, the House manifested an impatience, which tended to accelerate the King's decision.

Following the account in the '*Political Life*,' vol. iii. page 319, Canning did not see the King between March 31 and April 6, during which time his Majesty had frequent conferences with the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel.

The most desirable arrangement, probably most often discussed at

these interviews, was Wellington at the Treasury ; Peel at the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, but admitted into the inner circle ; and Canning content to remain at the Foreign Office, to carry out so much of his policy as Wellington and Peel might permit. This probably was represented to the King as the administration most nearly adjusted to the lines of Lord Liverpool's Government. On the Catholic question it might not be very far off from the idea, but on foreign affairs such an arrangement could mean only a complete reversal of Canning's policy, and Canning yielding himself a tame and helpless agent for his own discomfiture. In fact, the idea was simply inadmissible.

The next shape in which Tory supremacy might be restored to the Foreign Office, as to Irish affairs, depended on the possibility of forming a Tory Government without Canning's assistance.

The great difficulty Wellington and Peel would experience in giving effect to this appeared in the considerable section of the Tory following who, notwithstanding Canning's Liberal policy in foreign and commercial affairs, clung to him as, by political inheritance and on his own profession of principle, an unchangeable opponent of Parliamentary reform. There is no occasion to defend the holding of this anti-Liberal tenet ; the Whigs willingly forgave it in consideration of sound opinions on other and more immediate topics ; but, on the other hand, many even bigoted Tories inclined to condone his Liberal heresies in view of this saving article of his faith ; while another section of the Tory party shaded into Canning's own professed followers, and, though thoroughly Conservative or Tory for home politics, did not feel themselves thereby prevented from sympathising abroad with the efforts of the various peoples of Europe to lighten the pressure of the stern despotism under which they groaned. Others, again, disapproved indeed of any policy which remotely tended to encourage Jacobinism or the Revolution, but nevertheless had not forgotten the French war, felt no admiration for the ambitious and selfish intrigues of Austria, France, and Spain, and watched with genuine pleasure the progress of a peaceful scheme of policy, before which these despotic monarchies might find themselves compelled to bow.

To expel Canning from power while leaving undiminished his attractions, to operate on so many aspects of the Tory mind, promised to dissolve and break up the Tory majority, without the necessity on Canning's part of any undue confederation with the Whigs.

Canning had won the first round of the battle ; he had advised the King to do his best to form an anti-Catholic Government ;

Wellington and Peel had been forced to discuss the matter with the King, and to retire unsuccessful from the Closet.

Peel's feelings did not extend to any great bitterness on the point of conduct of foreign affairs ; his mind, generally Liberal in tendency, probably sympathised with Canning's liberality ; but his experience at the Home Office had impressed him, not without reason, with profound distrust of the Roman Catholic religious influence, and great anxiety for the state of Ireland. The question came home to him from his official experience with peculiar vividness ; and however much it may be believed that a not dishonourable ambition tempted Peel to lay a somewhat excessive stress upon the point with a view to attenuate the authority of Canning, there was enough left to justify a fair and open opposition to the appointment of a ' Catholic ' Premier.

Wellington, as has already been pointed out, had been appealed to by the dismayed Absolutists on the Continent to check and disable Canning. His sympathies were greatly roused by the depression of monarchical authority in Europe, in consequence of the Liberal party on the Continent manifesting unusual strength and unity under the encouraging hand of Canning. He might possibly have observed, with some tincture of jealousy, the civilian Minister sharing in the honour and public applause of the Courts and Cabinets on the Continent, which his own great military achievements had long led him to regard as peculiarly his own. He must have felt a feeling of disappointment at finding George IV. on Canning's side in foreign politics, and half the Tory party likewise ; and he himself called in, on the recommendation of his rival, and required to attempt the impossible task of putting together a pure Tory and anti-Canning Government.

In the ' Political Life,' vol. iii. p. 320, certain guarded hints are given of Canning being aware of a hostile and not altogether frank line of conduct on the part of the Duke, which was most probably discoverable in his conversations with the King, but of which Canning thought he had just reason to complain.

If the foregoing conjectures of the Duke's state of mind come near the truth, it can easily be understood that, unlike Peel, the Duke could not safely reveal his full mind about Canning. This reticence no doubt unduly embittered in tone what utterances he did allow himself, thereby stimulating the animosity of his own partisans, and exasperating the feelings of Canning.

It is significant that, in the ' Wellington Correspondence,' there occurs a striking omission of any letters written by the Duke at this precise period. His published political letters begin again

after Canning had been empowered to form a Ministry. The principal memorandum in his own defence only begins at the later date.

Taken together, a not unreasonable inference may be drawn that Wellington, under the influence of strong but suppressed feeling, did commit himself to his followers in language of irritation against Canning, hardly justifiable in tenor, and not redounding to his own credit.

It may be freely conceded that this temporary departure from the high standard of disinterested attention to duty, otherwise so consistently maintained by the Duke during a long and illustrious life, is accompanied by much to palliate it, and was involved in a complexity of circumstances of a kind calculated to disguise in the actor's mind the real nature of the action taken.

To return to the guarded narrative in the 'Political Life,' vol. iii. p. 320, it may be safely said that there, or 'between the lines,' is to be found Canning's case against the Duke.

The explosion which took place a few days later, when Canning had politically out-generalled the greatest general of the age, and to which the mutual recriminations, after the manner of skilled statesmen, were limited, may be considered as much the real conflict, as the flare and smoke of a battle at the end of victorious strategy only emphasises for the defeated a foregone conclusion.

It has been attempted in the foregoing observations to show that, with Canning at the Foreign Office, the only possible check on his proceedings would have been Wellington as Prime Minister; but as Canning had professed himself content with a 'dummy' Premier, if only he (Canning) was fully acknowledged to wield the whole power of the Government—not altogether an impossible contrivance,—so Wellington, perhaps deceiving himself, could do no less than profess ideas not less self-denying, and probably advocated an 'anti-Catholic' Premier other than himself, in the full conviction that there existed no 'anti-Catholic' statesman of mark, over whom his Grace could not obtain and maintain sufficient authority for the overruling of Canning. This, however unlike Canning's apparent self-abnegation, happened to be an impossible contrivance, and it seems as if the Duke had managed to persuade himself that there were other alternatives open, and that Canning might possibly be controlled by some other person besides himself.

Acting under this self-deception, Wellington seems to have permitted himself a latitude of expression in his hostility to Canning, which, if he had perceived how closely it was a mere duel between the two, he scarcely would have allowed himself.

1827

—

1827

It may be assumed that Canning discerned the real nature of the predicament easily enough ; but every kind of consideration of tact guided him deliberately to conceal to the utmost of his power the personal nature of the struggle. When his displeasure could be reasonably assigned to public grounds, he manifested his feelings ; but where the private and personal element alone came in, he appears to have usually guarded himself with the utmost caution. His private secretary, Mr. Stapleton, knew much, but he treats as a gradual discovery on the part of Canning what must have been matter of certainty to Canning long before—the direct personal, but not openly professed, rivalry of Wellington.

The performances of the Duke's subordinate Dukes, and his Grace's utterances in the Closet, enabled Canning without compromising himself to mark some just displeasure at the proceedings. This, as he probably foresaw, alarmed the politicians anxious to preserve the union between the two statesmen. Wellington must have felt uneasy as to the proceedings of his partisans, and perhaps of his own proceedings, for he consented to call at the Foreign Office and to 'interview' his great rival.

Canning held the strongest hand, and knew it ; he played accordingly with the cards on the table.]

MR. CANNING TO THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

F. O. : April 2, 1827.

My dear Duke of Wellington,—Arbuthnot tells me that he thinks that about one o'clock to-morrow will suit you for calling here. I shall be most happy to see you as soon as you please after that hour.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[This is simply the note of appointment for the interview for the next day, April 3. The cordial civility of its style may be usefully noted.

He received the Duke at the Foreign Office on April 3 accordingly, talked with his Grace for two hours, and gave him the fullest details of his own audience with the King at Windsor. The Duke offered 'explanations,' on which Mr. Canning remarked that 'everything that had been in doubt had been cleared up satisfactorily, and 'that they parted, all being well.'

This ambiguous record could only mean that Canning had become

temporarily inclined to believe in the *bona fides* of the Duke in his repudiation of seeking the Premiership. It could not possibly refer to the real exigencies of the situation, which might in certain contingencies force the repudiated office on the Duke, and were perfectly independent of the Duke's ideas of his own conduct.

But the incidents of the following six days seriously shook Mr. Canning's disposition to trust the Duke, even as to his inclinations. On the day after the 'satisfactory' interview, the two statesmen saw each other for a few minutes, in which time the Duke expressed a wish that Canning should see Peel. Canning, having all the hard facts of the situation in his favour, had only to wait to win, and in the meanwhile was willing to do anything he might be asked, short of surrendering the proper advantages of his position.

He accordingly wrote to Mr. Peel to propose an interview, stating the Duke of Wellington's wish as his reason for so doing, which was at once quite natural, and yet quite guarded.

If he had, unasked, called Peel to an interview, it would have been incumbent on him to have some reasonable proposition to submit to Peel, as a justification for troubling him.

On the other hand, as the interview came about to satisfy Wellington, with whom Peel was in strict alliance, the burden of accounting for the conference rested with Wellington, or rather with Peel, who must have led the Duke to believe that he (Peel) had some weighty communication to make to Canning.

The interview with Peel, like that with Wellington, was 'satisfactory as to manner and feeling,' but Peel's decision to retire, if a 'Catholic' Premier was appointed, remained the same.

In fact, the interview proved utterly abortive, and Peel delivered himself of no opinion or advice of any practical value whatever.

This could hardly have been the result contemplated by Wellington when he contrived the meeting; and judging from this *manqué* transaction, coupled with what happened a few days later, Canning inferred not that Wellington was secretly anticipating a call to the Premiership, which he must have well known already, but that the conduct and proceedings of Wellington and Peel pointed with sufficient clearness to this conclusion to justify an open assumption of its correctness.

Canning expressed his belief that Peel and Wellington hoped that their civilities to Canning in these conferences would end in Canning proposing Wellington as First Minister. As he did not, Peel had not the courage to make the proposal himself, and the matter fell through.

But it is difficult to account for the blindness of the Tory chief

1827
—

to the strength of Canning's position, or to understand how they could possibly suppose for an instant that Canning would commit political suicide.

It is most probable that the prevalence of extreme excitement amongst their partisans pressed them on, driving them into awkward predicaments, and beguiling them as to the realities of the situation.

Canning again saw Wellington for a few minutes on the same day as he saw Peel, and only acquired stronger available evidence in support of his secret conviction of the precise aim of the Duke's ambition ; which aim, again, may be usefully formulated as not the actual office of First Minister, but the satisfaction of receiving an appeal to him to undertake the office.

On the night of the 5th, after these two conferences, the King came to London. His Majesty saw Canning on April 6. What passed at this interview does not appear to be recorded. Then followed a mysterious interval of two days, during which it cannot be far wrong to suppose that, as the crisis became more acute and a decision more imminent, the agitation of the Tory party of 'the 'inner circle' became more violent, and pressed with greater force than ever on their leaders, and on the King. To satisfy the demands of these overwrought partisans, 'on the 9th, by the King's command, Mr. Canning saw Mr. Peel, who came for the purpose of 'stating to Mr. Canning the name of an individual whose appointment as Premier Mr. Peel conceived likely to solve all difficulties.' 'That individual was the Duke of Wellington.'

There could have been no honest belief, on the part of either the King, the Duke, or Peel, that the suggestion was feasible ; but the outside pressure on the three was of such a kind that they could not avoid at any rate mentioning it to Canning, from whom they received a fully anticipated rejection of the idea.

This last resource being finally closed, the King could be forced no longer to postpone moving nearer to a decision, and on April 10 Canning received the somewhat ambiguous royal commands to prepare 'with as little delay as possible a plan for the reconstruction of 'the Administration.'

The result of all this working backwards and forwards of the conflicting parties had naturally created the bitterest heart-burnings and keenest jealousies.

There seems no reason to doubt the Duke's solemn declaration, that he not only did not wish to occupy the post of First Minister, but had an absolute repugnance to holding it.

But this sort of feeling about a high and responsible post will

not prevent a man resenting in the strongest way an opinion by a third party that he could not be considered qualified for such post.

Not only had Wellington and Peel, when asked, been obliged to acknowledge their inability to form a stable Government, but they had the mortification of proposing Wellington to Canning, and encountering an emphatic refusal.

The Duke's conduct betrayed a certain amount of confusion all through, which no doubt reflected an equivalent degree of mental bewilderment at this crisis. He felt convinced that his opinions, both on foreign and domestic affairs, could not with any honesty of reasoning be regarded as anything but coincident with the judgments of the Tory and Legitimist thinkers of the time ; yet, though a faithful band adhered closely to him and to his opinions, he found to his dismay that the King and a large section of the Tory party failed to accept his judgment, and elected instead to stand by the brilliant and Liberal policy of Canning. This, to his military turn of mind, was utterly incomprehensible ; and instead of looking for some flaw in his own position, which his extraordinarily noble character would no doubt naturally have done, he yielded, under the spur of the moment and his perhaps unconscious jealousy of Canning, to the temptation of attributing to a rival's chicanery what was really the power of unalterable circumstances.

By a curious chance Canning, at the very moment of his triumph, fortunately or unfortunately, contrived to give his rival just sufficient excuse to enable him to retire on a point of honour and self-respect, without referring to the deep-seated animosities concealed behind.

On reading the correspondence, both Wellington's defence and Canning's explanation, one might think that something of infinite State importance was being disclosed, and marvel at the powerful effects of a few words more or less in a note between ostensible friends and colleagues ; but, as before observed, this controversy must be regarded only as the battle at the end of a long strategical campaign.

Now Canning, it has been said above, fortunately, or unfortunately, in 'the battle' gave advantage to his rival, and, though final victory lay in his hands, he appeared to suffer for a time severely for his mistake.

The 'Political Life' contains, in careful language, Canning's case as against that of the Duke at this crisis.

On March 27, in his interview with the King, Canning had not included the Treasury for himself in the terms of his continuance in office. It is so emphatically stated by Mr. Stapleton, vol. iii. pp. 316, 317. There appears no trace in the subsequent negotiations of Canning having varied from these terms. On those terms the post

1827

of First Lord of the Treasury might be considered unprovided for ; that post was not to be considered, *quid* Canning, to carry the Premiership ; but the distinction between a 'dummy' Premier and Canning as before, and Canning as Premier at the Foreign Office, with a secondary First Lord at the Treasury, is almost imperceptible, even to an experienced vision. No doubt this measure of elasticity in Canning's terms formed a permanent text for discussion in all the subsequent interviews between the King and Wellington and Peel ; and it must be carefully borne in mind when we read, as reported by Mr. Stapleton, the nature of the King's command to Canning of April 10, which was not apparently accompanied by the significant ceremony of kissing hands as Prime Minister, nor did it precisely amount to a commission to form a Government radiating from a new Prime Minister as a centre ; but it simply enjoined him 'to prepare a plan for the reconstruction of the Administration.' Canning's original terms had left the Treasury open ; the King's command did not include Canning's appointment to that office, and therefore on both accounts the office of First Lord of the Treasury, or, as some would insist on calling it, of Prime Minister, 'dummy' or not, was not therein provided for.

Under these circumstances Canning returned to the Foreign Office to execute the King's commands.

Now, there was one man of the highest distinction with whom he must unavoidably communicate, a man whose personal and professional merits and performances deserved the utmost consideration ; the trusted leader of the Tory party, far more so than Canning, though the latter had been leading them in the House of Commons for the last five years ; a statesman whose views were known to diverge widely from Canning's ; lastly, a positive rival suggested by the King and Peel as fit for the post of Premier.

If it had been honestly desired to retain his services in the new Cabinet, it may safely be said that Canning would not have treated such a splendid and dangerous rival otherwise than with the most distinguished and punctilious deference. It would not have been sufficient to deal out to such a man the same measure of courtesy as that bestowed on the minor colleagues in the Cabinet. His position called for particular and anxious terms of appeal.

However dangerous had been the rivalry, however much Wellington may have lent himself during the previous few days to countenance the lower intrigues of his partisans, Canning could at any rate now afford to be magnanimous in his bearing, and to disguise his resentment ; and good policy appeared to suggest such a line of conduct. He might have gone personally to call on the Duke, or he

might have written him an especially civil and explanatory letter ; he certainly in his actions should have recognised the fact that Wellington had become distinctly a party leader, and that many statesmen and a large following looked to him for guidance ; and that the affair of his continuance in office was not merely between the Duke, singly, and a new Premier, but between the Duke, as a representative personage negotiating on equal terms, and a rival colleague.

Canning apparently disregarded all these obvious considerations. He wrote a short and off-hand letter, notifying the charge committed to him by the King, announcing his intention to proceed on the basis on which Lord Liverpool's Government had stood, subjoining— ' I need not add how essentially its accomplishment must depend ' upon your Grace's continuing a member of the Cabinet ; ' and winding up with an unhappy variation in his usual style of conclusion. Instead of ' Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, yours ' most sincerely,' he must needs put ' Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, your Grace's sincere and faithful servant.'

The letter contained no information as to the Treasury, if Canning elected to be a ' Foreign Secretary Premier ' ; or, as to who might be his successor at the Foreign Office, if Canning elected to take the Treasury ; the expression of solicitude for the Duke's remaining in the Cabinet is slight and unemphatic ; it would not have been too strong for the smallest Cabinet Minister ; and the ending of the letter, departing from Canning's usual style, was couched in exceptionally formal tones, because it was ' to be shown to the King.'

The particular character of the letter need not be further dwelt upon, but the real sting, which at once roused the keenest resentment in the Duke, lay in the assumption therein, that he would be content to go on as Master-General of the Ordnance in the Cabinet, and that the nomination to the Treasury, or the Foreign Office, whichever had to be filled up, did not concern him, and need not be referred to. That the Duke expected to be allowed to occupy the Foreign Office, under Canning, seems hard to imagine, but that he anticipated an offer of the Foreign Office is far from unlikely, though such anticipation, under the circumstances, is not very comprehensible : but, like many men in thoughts as to their adversaries, he well knew how far he dissented from Canning's policy, but quite forgot the same divergence of opinions presented itself equally clearly to Canning ; and the same difference which prevented him from tolerating Canning's predominance would also prevent Canning from assisting him to an office, where he could balk and disturb the foreign policy there being developed.

To all these provocations, positive and negative, in the letter the
VOL. II.

1827 Duke was able to add the discovery that he had experienced less favourable treatment than most of his colleagues.

For while Canning wrote the commonplace notes to Lords Bathurst, Westmoreland, and Bexley, and the Duke of Wellington, he sent special messages by distinguished friends to Lords Harrowby and Melville, Mr. Wynn, and Mr. Robinson ; and lastly, signalled his communications to Lord Eldon and Mr. Peel by making them in person.

Now, of the whole Cabinet, the Duke was the most important man next to Canning ; and yet Canning contrived to put upon him, intentionally or unintentionally, a series of small slights.

One is therefore led to the conclusion that, setting aside the concomitant defects in respect of proper consideration for the Duke's distinguished position, Canning's letter did not contain a categorical statement of essential information, which the Duke might justly claim to be due to him, and consequently that the Duke was well within his rights when he requested to know *whom* Canning proposed to place at the head of the Government.

Canning's letter in reply did not mend matters ; indeed, from its persistency in withholding any expressions of a warm or cordial nature, and in maintaining a tone of defensive guardedness, one might not unfairly argue that he adopted his attitude deliberately, and not without expectation of its probable effect on the fiery temper of the Duke.

When a person asks another a question ostensibly *bonâ fide*, he can hardly help resenting, as a provocation, to be granted no answer, except to be referred in a tone of surprise to a 'general rule,' and told, that 'the existing occasion will be no departure from it.' The reference to a 'general rule' in such a conjuncture undeniably implies some degree of censure on the question, as unnecessary or superfluous ; and, as has been shown, the special circumstances of the case, even in Canning's own contemplation, had embraced the possibility of a departure from this so-called 'general rule.'

The precaution of submitting the correspondence to the King, step by step, might be advisable, but was certainly somewhat offensively obtruded ; and the conclusion of the letter, again, was formal.

It has been attempted to prove, that there is good reason to think that the Duke had not, (to use a colloquialism), 'been behaving 'himself' well towards Canning, but had sanctioned a virulence of hostility in word and deed on the part of his followers towards the Foreign Secretary not justifiable under the circumstances of their copartnership for years in the same Government. It is not denied that this behaviour, coming to Canning's knowledge, would have

1827

justified, as no doubt Canning thought it *did* justify, treating the Duke in a cool and guarded manner ; but of course, if he marked his sense of the Duke's behaviour in that way, he distinctly adopted a line of conduct least calculated to induce his Grace to remain in office under Canning. Now, if Canning really desired to retain the Duke by his side, it seems impossible he could have written what he did—as it cannot be conceded, as he tried to prove, that his letters were perfectly harmless and inoffensive in style and matter : they should have been cordial and persuasive, and were in fact the reverse. But even if Canning looked upon the Duke's retirement, on some pretext or another, as a foregone conclusion, his letters should, one would think, have been calculated to afford the Duke no decent excuse whatever for resignation on the score of their style, but rather to force him to find his reasons for withdrawal from political considerations exclusively.

The Duke felt considerable difficulty in retiring on political grounds, and gratuitously to offer him a personal slight was simply playing his game, and giving him the excuse for which he was feeling about.

His Grace, in his reply of April 11, admirably worded for tone and temper, intimated his conviction that a Government under Canning could not possibly, with the best intentions, continue in the path of policy followed by the Government under Lord Liverpool's guidance ; that it must inevitably depart from the principles of that Government, losing thereby the confidence of its usual supporters ; and that such an administration would not be 'adequate to 'meet our difficulties in a manner satisfactory to the King, or conducive to the interests of the country.'

What, from subsequent utterances of the Duke, may be fairly described as within the terms of this declaration, appears to be the opinion that Government must be conducted, as far as possible, in conformity with the King's own political views ; that otherwise, a Government would act unsatisfactorily in respect of the Sovereign, and injuriously to the interests of the country.

The statement amounts, as far as it goes, to a simple declaration of want of confidence in *any* Government led by Canning.

The Duke, however, committed himself in enunciating in this declaration, as the grounds for his retirement, opinions equally forcible at the beginning of the Ministerial interregnum, as at this later date, and moreover of such extensive validity, as to have imposed a necessity for separation from Canning directly the Liverpool Government had lost alike its nominal head and its coherency, and when the King had set about the task of constructing another Administration. His

1827

Grace had no right, if he held these irreconcilable views about Canning from the beginning, to conceal them, and to allow a general impression to prevail that it was not impossible for him to work with Canning in the same Government: but here again reference must be made to the theory, that the Duke perhaps hoped for an offer of the Foreign Office, if Canning took the Treasury; and to the Foreign Office he might look as a place, whence to control the liberalism of Canning's Continental policy.

In his letter to the King of April 12 (p. 630, vol. iii. 'Wellington Correspondence') the Duke drew the line between Canning dangerous as First Minister, and comparatively innocuous as Foreign Minister and leader of the House of Commons; but he betrayed his real feelings when he said, 'To act under him is another thing, considering the difficult circumstances, under which the Government is placed.'

It has been here argued that Wellington's objections to Canning were founded on a curious compound of political disagreement and personal jealousy; that this composite feeling really emerged from contemplation of Canning's foreign policy, at once Liberal and successful, yet that, being unable for the reasons mentioned (the King's approbation of the foreign policy for one,) to utilise these objections for the immediate conflict, the Duke, if prevented from professing his genuine opinions, might have found it exceedingly difficult to resist an appeal, if addressed to his greatness and magnanimity, to support Canning in the formation of a strong 'Conservative' Government, leaving the Catholic question open, and tolerating a Liberal foreign policy, if only not exceeding the extent of its past tone of liberality. But the appeal to his personal feelings and dignity never reached him; a shower of small slights poured upon him instead. He could not well refer to his secret annoyance as to foreign policy, nor to his secret mortification at Canning's treatment of him; so we find him falling back on vague political generalities, in his letters both to the King and Canning; salving his conscience, in that his words, ostensibly though not obviously governed by regard for the King's opinions, were not incapable of being taken to comprehend the question of foreign policy, nevertheless conscious that they were universally understood at the time, as referring only to the Catholic question.

Canning perhaps could have justified, against every adverse criticism, each of his movements, had he waited at each step, and 'bided his time'; but, at each step, he took two moves to his adversaries' one, and necessarily encountered all the drawbacks of his two moves, while winning little more than the advantages of one.

1827
—

Much of what has now been said answers, by anticipation, Canning's letter of May 3, 1827, in which he replies to the statement in the Duke of Wellington's speech in the House of Lords on May 2, containing the grounds, which the Duke conceived he could publicly produce, to justify his grievance against Canning.

In this letter, Canning does not seem to meet the complaint of deficiency in courtesy in an altogether satisfactory manner, the pretension that the complaint had no foundation in fact cannot fairly be allowed.

Canning's observations as to whether the person employed to form an Administration must *inevitably* be supposed to stand at its head, likewise lack strength and conclusiveness. Nothing is produced to show that the point was otherwise than open and unsettled. He only alleges that he had made up his own mind that, in forming an Administration, there should be no mistake as to himself being at its head—a resolution doubtless of the utmost importance, but he omits to mention when and where he signified this irreversible determination to the Duke. He had intimated that he would not tolerate an 'anti-Catholic' Premier; but he had not excluded the idea of a First Lord of the Treasury other than himself, only provided he held 'Catholic' views; and, in admitting the idea of a 'Catholic' First Lord of the Treasury, he had certainly not excluded the idea of a nominal Premiership remaining in that contingency at the Treasury. Here, then, occurred the occasion for the question, who was to be at the 'head of the Government.' The Duke honestly remained free under the circumstances to suppose, without insult, that Canning might, with a view to mitigate Tory hostility, be content with the Foreign Office only, and tolerate as Prime Minister some one, after the fashion of Lord Liverpool, like Mr. Robinson, who had actually been under discussion for the Treasury, even granting a separation between the Treasury and the Premiership.

The Duke's historical references certainly proved undeniable, when he asserted that gentlemen had been engaged in forming, or trying to form, Administrations, who did not pretend to be Prime Ministers, *eo nomine*, seeking colleagues, but who only acted as negotiators of high consideration essaying to reconcile conflicting claims.

Canning's language in his letters must be allowed to be somewhat ambiguous and indirect; due, no doubt, to the fact, of which the Duke was well aware, and which at once weakened Canning's position and irritated his temper, that he had *not* been formally appointed Prime Minister.

Being empowered to form 'a scheme' for an Administration, he meant himself for that post, and his 'scheme' might place him

1827 there ; but before the King's acceptance of his 'scheme' he was *not* there.

Further, the Duke could urge some plausible arguments in defence of his inquiry as to the Premiership, in the way of claiming a right of usage to confound it with the headship of the Treasury. The Duke might assert the existence of a distinction between the functions of the person forming an Administration, and those of the person eventually placed at the head of it, and he could at the same time plausibly protest an ignorance of a further distinction, between the headship of the Treasury and the headship of the Administration ; and if Canning, being at the Foreign Office, omitted to mention the item of his own translation to the Treasury, what insult was there in asking who was to be at the head of the new Government, meaning at the head of the Treasury ?

One can only perceive that the Duke was pleased to consider the Treasury and the Premiership inseparable, while Canning considered himself and the Premiership inseparable ; neither theory, when reasonably treated, being inadmissible.

Canning retorts that the Duke declined to submit to a 'Catholic' First Lord of the Treasury, and inquires how the Duke could expect him (Canning) to submit to an 'anti-Catholic' nominee of the Duke, or the Duke himself, in that post ; stigmatising the Duke's line of hostility as one of 'ostracism,' desired to be imposed on all holding Catholic opinions.

This particular point is not on the face of the controversy ; in touching on it, Canning apparently travelled 'behind' the rules of the game.

It is more than likely that Canning, aware of the strength of the Liberal forces upholding the 'Catholic claims,' aimed at fastening on his rival, with a view to his rival's political embarrassment in the future, an imputation of irreconcilable hostility to those claims ; and this imputation, though well deserved in conflict, does not appear correct in fact, as, if any one reads the Duke's speech and letter to Canning carefully, he will perceive that his Grace did not commit himself ; and that his guarded expressions aimed at justifying his conduct, not on broad political grounds, but on the narrow *quasi*-constitutional doctrine that, as far as possible, the King's personal views should prevail in the policy of his Government ; and on the inference that, if they did not so prevail, serious difficulties must arise : the corollary being that his Majesty's views being then adverse to Catholic emancipation, a Government policy in favour of that measure must necessarily give occasion for such difficulties to appear.

Within twenty-four hours of the Duke's resignation becoming known, Lords Westmoreland, Bexley, Bathurst, and Eldon followed suit. These noble lords repudiated the idea of combination in this coincident action, and the question deserves no argument. Each probably, when conversing with his sympathising colleagues, had reserved to himself liberty of action, as a precautionary provision against unknown and perhaps irresistible pressure to remain : nevertheless, they all agreed in following Wellington and deserting Canning ; so that when Canning became fairly mounted in the saddle, it required no further intercourse in common to prompt each severally to instant withdrawal from the Government. For all practical purposes the effect was that of combination ; though it happens to be perfectly possible that no combination actually shaped itself at the precise conjuncture, when it apparently prevailed.

Of course it irritated the King, and perhaps vexed Canning ; but the latter had probably long foreseen and discounted this desertion.

Peel was lost openly and without doubt, Wellington kept the game up longer, but Canning gave him no chance of remaining ; the retirement of the other four was no loss, but only lightened the ship. Though, perhaps, when nine members of the Government not in the Cabinet followed suit, the defection became serious by mere aggregation of numbers.

These gentlemen seem acting quite in their right in retiring, and deserve no censure. Canning tried to maintain that, so long as the Catholic question remained an open question, and Ministers holding opposite opinions thereon consented to unite in one Administration, the side taken by the First Minister ought to be regarded as a matter of indifference.

This proposition may be plausible enough for use in hasty political conflict, but cannot be deemed tenable in earnest.

Both Canning and Wellington, in their struggle, had pointed out how the Premier wielded an extraordinary degree of power : with the good-will of the Sovereign and the power of the Government in the House of Lords he could perform remarkable acts of authority.

Lord Liverpool, backed by the King and the House of Lords, had for years refused the repeated demands of the House of Commons for Catholic emancipation. Should the direction in which all this weight of authority operated be changed, further resistance to Catholic emancipation might become hopeless.

Further, if instead of a man of moderate abilities, moving under the restraints of advancing age and a seat only in the House of Lords, this place of power became occupied by a man of first-rate abilities, still in middle life, and of extraordinary authority in the

1827

House of Commons, what chance might the opponents of Catholic emancipation reasonably expect to have of holding their own under such adverse circumstances ?

The Duke of Wellington, in a private letter to Lord Bathurst of April 15, printed at page 642 of 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii., uses strong language : 'The fact is this, that the whole system is founded on fraud, to which I believe the King is willing quietly to submit. But both he and Mr. Canning knew that it could not be carried on while I should be in office without his Majesty knowing of it. Therefore I was to be forced out,' &c. The imputation of 'fraud' probably refers to the genuine but impracticable idea of Canning, that he could trim the opposing weights of Catholic and anti-Catholic feeling, so that neither should predominate in the Cabinet, of which he should be head. Wellington argued strenuously that, with Canning at the head, an even balance *must* be unattainable.

The correspondence above referred to between Mr. Canning and the Duke of Wellington at the time fell into the hands of the author of the 'Political Life' to deal with, and for some reason was not published with the first edition of that work when the Duke was First Minister, but appeared in the second edition ; but between the dates of the two editions, the Duke of Wellington had gone out of office. The reason for withholding the publication at the earlier date was the simple one of irresistible Government pressure brought to bear to prevent its publication. This fact was well known privately, and publicly may now be accepted on the strength of the record in Lord Ellenborough's Diary, lately published, from which it appears that the question of the threatened publication of the correspondence, and the possible injury it might do the Duke of Wellington's administration, was discussed in the Cabinet, and the resolution to enforce a suppression was regularly adopted, and acted upon.

It may well be asked, what particular injury could the publication of this correspondence bring upon the Duke's Government ?

The answer is twofold.

After deserting Canning upon the ostensible pretext of hostility to his 'Catholic' opinion, circumstances had driven Wellington and Peel within two short years to surrender their opposition on this very point. They were not to blame for the surrender : Wellington really cared little about the question ; genuine feeling had led him to attempt to imitate Pitt, and shield his master the King from an odious submission on the point ; but an honourable horror of being called upon to suppress by force an extensive insurrection in Ireland overcame his first sentiment, and impelled him to force on a reluc-

tant King the very measure from which he hoped to be the person to protect him.

1827

Peel, unlike Wellington, may be credited with an honest dislike in the first instance to Catholic emancipation. [See Peel's letter to Mr. Canning of April 17, 1827, printed at page 644 of 'Wellington Correspondence,' vol. iii.] But, under pressure of difficulties, he could not mentally keep his place; his mind slipped, as it were, and he constantly found, to his surprise, his judgment some distance off from his feelings. The separation came about involuntarily, and probably embarrassed him, but operated none the less effectually.

It has been observed that Wellington's language did not commit him 'body and soul' to an 'anti-Catholic' attitude; he perpetually swore allegiance to the external proofs of the anti-Catholic principle, but scarcely committed himself deeply to the principle itself.

When the two Statesmen had made up their minds to surrender the point, they must have been fully prepared for the nature of the attacks they might expect to encounter, and the taunts of tergiversation and desertion of Canning appeared the commonplaces of political warfare, to the strength of such attacks this correspondence could add little.

But there was one point, personal to the Duke on his most sensitive side, which might be expected considerably to damage his political position. As the first *Soldier* in the kingdom he had disclaimed ambition to be also the first *Civil Official*; he nevertheless had subsequently not shrunk from combining both exalted positions in himself; not of course that he remained nominal head of the army, but that he could not help being the virtual first Soldier in the kingdom; the other, he permitted himself to attempt, and to win.

The correspondence of 1827 gave strong emphasis to his original disclaimer, and equal emphasis to Canning's acceptance of the disclaimer, and solemn record of protest against any such political ambition on the part of the Duke. The consequence of its publication might be justly feared; and, indeed, the effects of the note it struck on the public mind may be reasonably traced, as a leading element, in the storm of unpopularity which shortly afterwards burst on the great soldier's head.

By April 13 the 'anti-Catholic' secession from the Government had pretty well worked itself out.

There were seven vacancies in Cabinet offices—the Great Seal, the Privy Seal, the Admiralty, the Ordnance, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office.

The perhaps not altogether expected effect on the King of the Duke of Wellington's proceedings had been to procure the instant

1827 regular appointment, on April 12, of Canning to be Prime Minister, with the genuine support of his Majesty.

On April 13 Mr. Canning secured the sanction of the heir presumptive, the Duke of Clarence, who accepted the Admiralty, and thereby without doubt contributed material help to the new Government at this early stage of its existence.

At p. 632, vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence,' is printed Lord Londonderry's memorandum dated April 13 of his interview with the King on the subject of the political arrangements. On the one hand it looked encouraging for the Tory party that the King should hold strong Protestant language ; but, on the other hand, his Majesty gave no sign of deserting Canning—on the contrary, adopted a tone of upbraiding the seceders. It is curious that Lord Londonderry was unable to record any expression used by the King laudatory of Canning in public affairs. Whether his Majesty really abstained from all comment, or whether Lord Londonderry did not choose to record it when made, must remain matter of speculation.

During the next few days Canning essayed with poor success to place a certain number of anti-Catholic friends of the new Government in the vacant places, his aim being firstly, of course, to satisfy the King ; and secondly, to justify, if possible, his theory of a continuance of a Cabinet fairly balanced on a Catholic question ; but the accessions of Sir J. Copley as Chancellor and Lord Anglesey at the Ordnance helped very slightly to give effect to his wishes.

He appears to have made another attempt to win back Peel, (see his letter of April 15, printed p. 590 of 'Life and Times,') and elicited only the able, but not really relevant, letter already mentioned of April 17, 1827, in which Peel dilates on their mutual incompatibility on the score of the Catholic question, and the undue predominance Canning's Premiership would give the 'Catholic' party in a mixed Cabinet. It may be taken for granted that Peel wrote this to be seen by, and to affect the feelings of, the King ; the Tory discontent with Liberal Canning on general grounds, the 'really relevant' element of the position, being unnoticed.]

THE EARL OF HARROWBY TO MR. CANNING.

April 16, 1827.

Dear Canning,—I hear, from what I conceive to be good authority, that the King told the Archbishop of Canterbury that he was as firm a Protestant as ever, and would have a Cabinet of only nine, of whom five should be Protestants. My informant did not add anything similar to his reported conver-

sation with Lord Londonderry. If the report of that conversation be not incorrect, and if you have not authority to disavow it, my present impression is that no person holding our opinions can be expected to join or to remain. Could we, in honour as servants of the Crown, perform the farce of pressing Parliament to pass a measure to which we should know, and all the world would know that we knew, there was an insuperable bar?

Yours truly,

HARROWBY.

I will call, as you desire, at eleven to-morrow.

[This foregoing letter shows the discouragement and alarm beginning to prevail amongst Canning's adherents, at the numerous secessions from the Ministry, at the reported language of the King, and at the delay experienced in filling up the vacant offices.

Another account of the Archbishop's interview with the King will be found in Colonel Trench's letter to the Duke of Wellington printed at p. 651 of vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence,' where we find it confirmed that the King habitually used at this conjuncture strong anti-Catholic language.

In truth, the difficulties in the way of reorganising the Government, on the same lines as it had existed under Lord Liverpool, were apparently every day becoming greater, and threatening to be insuperable; and Canning, by no means inclined to relinquish his task and admit himself to be defeated, began to think of invoking the aid of the friendly Whigs.

About three or four weeks before the date which we have now reached, Sir Robert Wilson, a distinguished, but somewhat erratic and romantic, soldier, had taken upon himself to write to Mr. Brougham, as a leading Liberal on the Whig side, to ascertain Mr. Brougham's views in respect of Canning, and the Liberal elements in the remains of Lord Liverpool's Government. Sir Robert elicited a very strong expression of opinion in favour of Canning, Robinson, and Huskisson, and no very hostile language about Peel. He accordingly consulted Lord Lansdowne as to whether he might use this manifestation of good-will, if need be, in aid of Canning, and obtained decided but guarded opinion, that nothing forbid him to utilise the assurances given by Brougham, if expedient for the support of Canning.

These are the letters referred to in the footnote at page 95 of the 'History' of the 'Annual Register' for 1827.]

1827

MR. H. BROUGHAM TO SIR R. WILSON.

York: March 26, 1827.

1827

My dear W.,—I have got here, somewhat refreshed by my journey across the high country after the fatigues of Lancaster. I have had the pleasure of Normanby's passing a day with me, which he stopped here on purpose to do, on his way to Mulgrave, as he goes abroad soon. He is a very excellent person, and I should be puzzled to name a dozen for whom I have the same regard. His feelings are all amiable and honourable, and his principles the very best and safest, and such as in ten years and less will be those of all in England, except a few crazy Radicals on the one extreme, and a handful of Ultras on the other and worse side.

It has been to me, revolving the state of public affairs of late times, an unspeakable comfort to find the increased popularity of sound and liberal views among men of real weight and influence; for the passing shade thrown over us by some corn prejudices among our friends I regard not, aware that they soon must be dispersed.

Among these hopes the greater part are certainly at this time connected with Cauning, in whom and Robinson and Huskisson I place very great confidence. C had, I own, made me angry or (to speak more properly) vexed, and hurt me by what I thought yielding to the Chancellor in 1822; but all I have since seen of him, including his indignation when I attacked him (in a moment of anger), has satisfied me he is disposed to act a high, manly, and honourable part, and to secure to himself permanent power by risking temporary loss of place: not that I think it could possibly lead to that even for a session—I think I know enough of King, Duke, and all, to speak confidently on this.

He is in a position of some delicacy and difficulty; but he thinks I suspect that there are more difficulties than really exist. I am pretty sure that he supposes himself to be unfavourably thought of by some of our people. This feeling did exist; late events I know have put an end to all such ideas, and I can answer for the most cordial dispositions towards him amongst all he needs to care about, as soon as they are thoroughly convinced he is disposed to risk what he ought, in order to do his duty, and obtain his just rights.

1827

As to his difficulties on his own side, they are comprised in one word—Peel. These, too, I am sure he greatly magnifies if he thinks any of our folks are hostile to Peel : for we may think him an ordinary man, and far inferior to C. ; yet we respect him, and value the victories he has gained over his prejudices, and I hope good things from his pushing those victories still further. In truth, the Catholic question (on which Peel has always been a fair adversary) is the only point of very great difference.

As I am talking in this way, and, as it were, thinking on paper (to relax me after reading much brief—much *carta inepta*, fit only to wrap up pepper, &c., in), I may add that for myself I am only anxious to see a right system of Government on liberal and moderate principles, established and flourishing ; and I shall zealously support it if I conscientiously can, and my support will be all the more effectual, that it will be wholly disinterested : for I should now say (what I intimated in 1820–22, when much nearer some arrangement) that I shall not easily, if at all, be induced to be more than a warm friend to any good Government. I know there are many unworthy womanish prejudices in certain quarters, and I don't wish to thwart them. But, moreover, I am better pleased to be out of office. I have (I know full well) a very considerable influence in the country, which would be injured by taking place ; and like to use it for purposes which your men in office rather laugh at than assist. Besides, with an ample income, professional and private, I have no temptations to change my course of life.

Yours ever truly,

H. B.

[Setting aside the characteristic egotism and 'swagger' of the letter, it furnishes a handsome and manly tribute to Mr. Canning's political worth ; and though of course commendation from Brougham must needs mean condemnation from the Tories, much remains over that redounds to the honour and credit of Canning.]

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR R. WILSON.

B. Square : Sunday, March 25,¹ 1827.

Dear Sir Robert,—In considering the question which you put to me when you called here early this morning, I feel no

¹ Either one of the dates of these letters must be erroneous, as it is clear Lord Lansdowne's must have been written after, and two or three days after, Brougham's letter to which his lordship refers.

1827
—

difficulty in saying that there does not appear to me to be any objection to your communicating in the quarter, where it has been desired, not only the substance, but the precise terms of the letter you have received from Brougham.

I feel the less hesitation in giving this opinion, because the sentiments it contains are strictly conformable with those which he has very lately, and more than once, expressed to me in the most unreserved manner, and which I was glad to find upon the whole subject in perfect union with my own views and feelings; indeed, I may add that I should have felt myself authorised to state them with as much confidence as I should my own, on any proper occasion that offered.

More than this I am sure you will think it unnecessary for me to say upon the present, unable as I am to judge how far a more explicit and confidential communication from me would be found useful or thought desirable at this moment.

I remain, &c.,

LANSDOWNE.

[This simply encourages Sir R. Wilson to avail himself of Brougham's letter to help Canning.

The 'Annual Register' remarks, 'The opposition both in Parliament and from the press aided the cause of the Foreign Secretary, and "offered their vows for his success."'

Wellington made, once or twice, severe comments on the injury he suffered about this time from 'a corrupt press,' but it would seem a little hard to accuse a whole Opposition press, faithfully representing its party, as 'corrupt.'

However, of course the support of the Opposition only helped to widen the breach now gaping between Canning and the Tory leaders.

The Duke of Wellington was, as a rule, a temperate-minded and self-controlled man, but his exasperation with Canning at this crisis appears unbounded. It is worth while to quote a few words from his letter to Lord Londonderry, dated April 20, 1827, printed p. 654, vol. iii. of 'Wellington Correspondence':—

'Matters have been brought to this state,' (mischief threatened to the Crown,) 'in which they are, by a man (for after all there is but one man) who does not possess a particle of any one of those qualities' (*videlicet*, 'moderation, consistency, firmness, and good temper').

The Duke evidently meant to describe his own ideal character, but his judgment erred conspicuously in denying any share of these valuable qualities to his great rival.

The historical questions which now open up themselves may be stated as follows :—

Did Canning, in accepting the aid of the Whigs to form an Administration under the circumstances, thereby forfeit his character for consistency and political honour? Did he, in so doing, apart from the moral question, compromise his political future, and render it impossible for him to continue to act up to the Conservative principles he had so long professed?

It has already been pointed out that Canning and his adherents had for some years professed, and been enabled to carry out, a policy liberal in the following most important respects: a foreign policy equal in its treatment of Continental States, but never shrinking from advocating the cause of the weak against the strong, and of the oppressed against the oppressor, when the fitting occasion called for such advocacy; a policy in Ecclesiastical matters moving in the direction of unrestricted freedom of thought and conscience, not excluding Roman Catholics from the benefit of the policy; a policy in Irish matters disposed to conciliate and consult the wishes of the Irish population, in matters of general trade, as far as possible; a policy of free trade in respect of British agriculture without altogether denying the principle of Protection; a policy of adjusting the Protective duties with a view to diminish to the utmost any possible pressure on the consumer.

Such a breadth of Liberal policy might well attract the strong Liberal elements of the Whig Opposition.

But, on the other hand, Canning claimed to represent Pitt, and accordingly denounced Parliamentary Reform, and abjured the *camarilla* of the Whig aristocracy.

But forming parts of the Whig party there were to be found a section of the aristocratic element inheriting the tradition of Shelburne at the beginning of Pitt's career, and of the Duke of Portland after the French Revolution, and holding itself untrammelled by the pure Whig tradition, and therefore capable of co-operating with Liberal Tories on certain occasions; also a second section, that professed the active political liberalism of ordinary life, likewise capable of detachment from the Whig *camarilla*, and at this time greatly influenced and led by Brougham.

Both these sections might move over to a Liberal Tory group, such as Canning's, with hardly any departure from the general direction of their political march.

1827

Only there remained the question of Parliamentary Reform.

It was certainly not a 'burning question' at the moment ; but it was latent in all politics, and might at any moment reveal the great divergence between Canning's uncompromising opposition to Reform, and the men to whom it appeared at all times expedient, and even then within the range of practical politics.

It has become a commonplace of English history to show that Reform of Parliament at that epoch could not possibly be avoided. A great localised growth of wealth and population had altered the proportions of the weights in the balance ; the existing constituencies, taken in the mass, had ceased to represent the whole body of the nation taken in the mass. Granted that the unreformed constituencies should be regarded as themselves only a representative body, (which was Canning's great argument,) acting as a modifying medium between the general sense of the nation and the legislators at Westminster even then the actual components of the national life had come to differ intolerably from the components of their supposed representative medium.

In fact, a state of unstable equilibrium had gradually come into being, which could not possibly last long without a tendency spontaneously arising in the body politic to recover stability.

In 1827 the people at large were disposed to look at reform of Parliament mainly as a means to an end. If their wishes were carried out ; if the course of legislation relaxed the bands painfully felt to be keeping down some national growth of national wealth, and readjusted the general administrative machine to meet the altered circumstances of new generations ; if they felt that their rulers exhibited a willing tendency to yield to the calls of the public voice, and a sympathy with the struggles and necessities of the working classes, there was no overwhelming popular outcry to break up the old Constitution.

The want, or at any rate the mere appearance of the want, of elasticity in the Government, and of responsiveness in the rulers of the country, had in 1820 generated that blind rage in the masses of the country, which is so constantly found in nations, and individuals ; seizing any pretext, however irrelevant to their real grievances, as an occasion for an outburst of passion. It is expedient on such occasions not to examine and marvel at the small and frivolous occasion of the manifestation, but to search out the causes of the antecedent profounder irritation, which has already inflamed the mind, and exposed it defenceless to the final maddening impulse of some contemptible provocation.

The state of London after Queen Caroline's trial approached

nearly to revolution. The causes of the excitability of the public mind were no doubt the stubborn aspect of immovable persistence in the Government, and the apparent hopelessness of obtaining any amendment in its policy by constitutional means.

It happened however not to be actually quite so hopeless as it looked ; and the popular discontent led Lord Liverpool to adopt various means to liberalise his Government ; the presence of Canning, Huskisson, Robinson, Wynn, and even Peel, (when Peel was left to himself,) and the active measures taken to amend the law, and respond to public opinion, greatly satisfied the people, and the cry for reform and the danger of revolution alike died rapidly away.

But the people of England, strange to say, had found satisfaction in something nobler than the gratification of their own personal feelings in domestic government ; they sympathised with the popular cries on the Continent ; the feeling that their self-denial and struggles, in the last years of the Napoleonic war, had promoted the freedom of other nations, had enabled them to submit to heavy burdens and losses. The boys and young men, who at the most impressionable period of life had breathlessly watched that arduous and successful effort for freedom, had also seen, with inexpressible disappointment and regret, the dark clouds of cruel despotism in a few short years again settle over the Continent, and, worst of all, Great Britain timorously consenting, or ineffectually and feebly protesting.

A man would not risk his direct personal interests, or his life, to overthrow a Government so hopelessly indifferent to the independence of nations, but he could feel anger and contempt, and could show it.

The return of Canning to the Foreign Office excited some hopes, but a long course of policy cannot be easily turned into another direction, and its consequences cannot possibly be averted, though they may sometimes be mitigated ; so at first Canning's reappearance suggested only hopes.

The occupation of Spain by France brought matters to the lowest point ; after that, the tide turned. Step by step, under the consummate handling of the Foreign Secretary, the headstrong and arbitrary energies of the despotic Powers found themselves checked ; everywhere Liberalism began to look up, and reasonable hopes and aspirations arose ; outlets and prospects, unconnected with cruel violence and revolutionary madness, opened out in different directions ; it became no longer necessary for a Liberal to despair : and all this was Canning's work ; and the English Liberals, and working classes, gladly accepted Canning's sympathetic and generous administration as worth many Reform Bills.

1827

If this man, who pleaded for disfranchised Irish Roman Catholics at home, and who strove with unwearied patience and wisdom for the interests of the Greek, the Portuguese, the Spaniard, and the Spanish American colonist abroad, and whose close friends and allies legislated, as Huskisson legislated, for English trade and commercial interests—if this man objected from old traditions to Parliamentary Reform, the English people would make no objection—Reform could wait ; the opportunity of a Canning must be seized, and held at once.

Canning appreciated the extraordinary power of the responsive voice he had evoked from the people, and no doubt felt confident that while this lasted—and its term he could not discern—he had no occasion to fear an outcry for Reform.

But where an unstable equilibrium exists, there at any moment involuntary efforts as it were may take place to restore stability ; and if it be an object to preserve an existing unstable balance, the means thereto can only be found in a nice adjustment of the weights ; very slight changes may produce a convulsion. Canning, supported by the Tory party, and accepted for special reasons of administration by a powerful section of the Liberal party, would have occupied a position of singular power. Not so, however, when, deserted by the Tory party, he became obliged to ‘depend’ to a degree upon Liberal aid. In the first case, he bestowed benefits out of the plentitude of his power, and commanded admiration and support ; in the second case, he unavoidably owed recompense in return for service, and became a seeker instead of a commander of support.

His Liberal supporters might lay aside reform for a time ; but Canning’s power of resistance necessarily became indefinitely weakened, if ever circumstances should induce them to renew the cry : and the attitude of resistance being dependent upon a state of things intrinsically illogical, and consequently difficult to defend, Canning would probably have been hard put to it to maintain his consistency had he lived.

Probably his ideas, in April 1827, led him to hope that, notwithstanding the total defection of the Tory leaders and a partial defection of the rank and file, he yet might hope eventually to rally up the general mass of the Tory party in sufficient strength to enable him to overawe and control his new Whig allies ; but all that lay in the remote future ; his position remained critical in the extreme, both in the present and in the immediate future ; and the Whig support, while enabling him to stand for a moment independently of the Tory party brought with it most serious dangers and liabilities of its own.

1827
—

Having honestly won the Liberal voice by his own proper policy when a Tory Minister, the temptation to utilise what he had fairly obtained must have been very great ; and if he yielded to it, he can scarcely be condemned. And yet, the wearer of Pitt's mantle, the leader of the House of Commons in Lord Liverpool's Government, the denunciator of Reform, does not look quite at his best when driven to rely on his old foes.

Amongst the minor troubles of his position may be cited, that it lay politically between a cross fire of enemies on opposite sides ; each hostile body possessed a strong political cry of its own to hold it together, and animate it against the intermediate array. On the one side stood 'anti-Catholics,' on the other 'Reformers' ; each, moreover, was led by a captain unfortunately possessed by personal dislike of Canning. Lord Grey, the leader of the irreconcilable Whigs, hardly hated him more than did the Duke of Wellington, the leader of the Tory defection.

Referring back to the questions at the beginning of the foregoing remarks, the answers may perhaps now be ventured that, under the circumstances, Canning in no wise forfeited his character for consistency and political honour in accepting the immediate support of a section of the Whig party, but that, in so doing, he did seriously compromise his political future, and render it extremely unlikely that he would be able for long to continue to act up to the Conservative principles he had hitherto advocated.

On April 18, Canning decided to open negotiations with the friendly Whigs, and on the 19th he saw Lord Lansdowne, whose letter some time before, pointing at such a junction, has been printed above.

A trustworthy account, in brief, of the negotiations between Canning and the Whigs is given at pp. 337-342 of the 'Political Life,' vol. iii.

Lords Lansdowne and Holland and Messrs. Tierney and Brougham worked in favour of Canning ; Lords Grey, Althorpe, and John Russell against him.

The trimming Whigs concurred in temporarily sinking the questions of Reform and of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, but on the 'Catholic' question there occurred some difficulty. The King desired a 'Protestant' Lord Lieutenant. Canning, by no means anxious to neglect in practice the theory of his Government being a mixed Government, had no particular wish to prevent it ; a Lord Lieutenant does not interfere with Parliamentary warfare ; but the Whigs insisted upon a 'Catholic' Viceroy. They desired, further, a Catholic Irish Secretary, and Lord Lansdowne urged his claim to

1827
—

lead in the House of Lords. Lord Lansdowne's claims happened to be effectually blocked by the promotion of Mr. Robinson to the Peerage as Viscount Goderich. With regard to the Irish Government, Mr. Stapleton says that Canning 'could not make (and this 'was the real difficulty) any concession, *in principle*, with respect 'to the composition of the Government of Ireland ;' which means of course that the King had bound Canning over to preserve an anti-Catholic preponderance in the composition of the Irish Government, or at least an equal balancing of opinions.

By a curious coincidence of circumstances Canning found himself forced to hazard the loss of Whig support on this point on the mere theory of the appointments, while in practice his arrangements fulfilled the Whig demands ; for it was settled that the 'Catholic' Marquis Wellesley should continue Lord Lieutenant to the end of the year ; and, 'from the absolute impossibility of finding an anti-Catholic to fill the post of Irish Secretary, he was subsequently 'forced to nominate an individual friendly to the Catholics to that 'situation,' who was no other than the Hon. W. Lamb, afterwards Viscount Melbourne.

On these points, it is recorded, the negotiations with the Whigs broke off ; but the clamour of the Whig section which represented the popular voice for the time being at this disappointment became so great that, it appears, the two parties, Canning and the friendly Whig leaders, renewed their negotiations, and arrived at a provisional settlement ; by which the actual junction remained postponed to the end of the session, when Cabinet office was promised for Lords Lansdowne and Carlisle, and for Mr. Tierney ; an earnest of the mutual good-will and benevolent intentions of the contracting parties being given by the appointments of the Duke of Portland to be Privy Seal, the Duke of Devonshire to be Lord Chamberlain, and Mr. Scarlett to be Attorney-General.

In agreeing upon a temporary arrangement of this kind, no doubt several parties aimed at giving Canning time to feel his way, and to ascertain the exact value of his position—a value at the moment not easy to be discerned by any politician.

On April 27 the negotiations came to a conclusion, and the different appointments were made known to the public.

A remark may here be hazarded on the nature of the political situation roughly described above, and on the character of the several parties who, individually or collectively, in alliance or in opposition, shared in the action.

It is easy and commonplace to write down all the leaders as self-interested, and their transactions as intrigues ; and, on reading their

correspondence and private records, it may seem sometimes difficult to avoid such condemnation.

1827

Nevertheless, unlike many previous Ministerial crises, and in anticipation of the representative character of future Ministerial changes, the crisis in the first four months of 1827 depended remarkably on *public*, as distinguished from *personal*, considerations.

Wellington and Grey each equally represented powerful divergent opinions on public affairs ; and Canning and Brougham and Lansdowne honestly and unequivocally represented still more powerful convergent views of large bodies of the nation.

The personal rivalry of Wellington and Canning rather originated in the conscious strength of the representative position of each, than in the private ambition of either, though this personal rivalry and jealousy happened to be none the less real.

Equally Lord Grey especially disliked Canning. It may be easily referred to some little creditable motive, yet the public relations of the two statesmen are amply sufficient to explain their hostilities : one earnestly advocated the cardinal measure of a Reform of Parliament ; the other had consistently opposed it, and, by his ability and power, threatened to secure its postponement for an indefinite period.

Great questions bite into the mind of great statesmen far deeper than the ordinary man of the world, or ordinary writer, can realise ; and from sheer assimilation they often assume a too personal aspect in the mouths and conduct of such statesmen, which in truth misrepresents the latent sincerity of their faith.

The student of later generations may reasonably credit the great men of past days with large stores of honest public spirit, and read with suspicion the commonplace cant, which analyses all their proceedings into every kind of mean device to secure mere personal advantage. More truth often is discoverable on the surface of history, when carefully scanned, than can be exhumed by any amount of excavation and research amidst the loose and malicious gossip of contemporaneous records.]

MR. STAPLETON TO SIR CHARLES BAGOT.

F. O. : April 27, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Mr. Canning is gone out riding. After incessant labour, he has at last satisfactorily settled the Cabinet, as you will see by the enclosed list. Whether Lord Anglesey is to be in the Cabinet is doubtful. It just depends on his vote on Corn, on which he entertains some doubts.

1827

Mr. Canning desires me to say, that the insignia of the Garter belonging to the late Lord Hastings has not been returned by his son to the King, who ought to have done so before he left England. It is a great omission. But his Majesty will graciously please to dispense with his personal attendance if he will forthwith take measures for returning it. The vacant Garter cannot be disposed of till it is returned.

Mr. C. is very well.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This letter reports the successful formation of an Administration with the exception of Lord Anglesey, who hesitated on the question of 'Corn,' or rather, as the question was known later, of 'Protection.'

It also sends a reproof to be conveyed to Lord Hastings for not returning his father's 'Garter' to the King.]

SIR CHARLES BAGOT TO MR. STAPLETON.

Brussels: April 30, 1827.

My dear Sir,—The mail of Friday arrived in the night, and brought me your letter enclosing to me a list of the new Government, as it has been finally arranged. I am greatly obliged to you for it, as it has removed all the anxieties and suspenses in which, like the rest of the world, I have been living for these last ten days. I confess that I did not expect to hear of a final arrangement till the next post, for Prince Schwartzenburg came into my box last night at the play, and told me that he was at Lady Jersey's till twelve o'clock on Friday night, and that he had understood that, at that time, matters were not settled. I gave my Lady Jersey credit for being better informed in all 'intrigues de Cabinet.'

Pray tell Canning that I am very much obliged to him for his information respecting Lord Hastings' Garter, and that the anecdote is remarkable, but how the d—l it concerns me I am totally at a loss to conceive—unless, indeed, it is meant as a delicate apology for not giving me the Garter in question, the moment it became vacant. Viewed in this light, I consider it as a pretty attention on the part of the new Prime Minister, and he may reckon upon my support. Seriously, do you suppose

Lord Hastings to be in this country? He may be, but as yet I have heard nothing of him.

1827

Yours, my dear Sir, very truly,

CHARLES BAGOT.

[Expresses satisfaction at Canning's success in forming an Administration, and 'chaffs' the idea of his knowing anything about Lord Hastings and the Garter.]

MR. STAPLETON TO SIR CHARLES BAGOT.

F. O.: May 6, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Mr. Canning desires me to say, in answer to your letter of the 30th ult., that he does believe that Lord Hastings is in your country, and would therefore be obliged to you to endeavour to discover him.

Believe me, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Canning believed Lord Hastings to be in Sir Charles Bagot's country, and desires him to be traced out.]

On May 1 Parliament reassembled, and the usual explanations were given of the various changes.

The substance of all the speeches appears somewhat disingenuous, except that of Mr. Brougham.

Mr. Peel enlarged on the topic of the Catholic question, and the impossibility of tolerating the ascendancy of a Catholic Premier. Wellington exaggerated the coldness of the overtures made to him to join the Ministry into a charge of marked discourtesy against Canning. Canning pretended the utmost astonishment at the defection of so many of his late colleagues. Neither side desired to create an irreparable breach. Both concurred in avoiding all reference to the serious secret divergence of opinion in respect of foreign affairs, and many most important domestic questions.

The length of time, during which the Tory chiefs, silently fuming, had sanctioned by their presence in the Government a continued course of Liberal policy, forbade them to bring before the public the real sources of their discontent and irritation. While Canning, equally anxious to avoid destroying future possibilities of recovering his authority with the Tory party, referred with some dissimulation to the years during which he had worked, so he said, 'cordially and harmoniously' with his Tory colleagues; in fact, it was vital to Canning's position to minimise the rupture as far as he possibly could; he

1827 — accordingly took full advantage of his adversaries' embarrassment, and publicly treated their *hidden* grievances as non-existent.

Brougham alone, to justify the acceding Whigs, pointed out with annoying emphasis the liberal nature of all Canning's policy, and its approximation rather to Whig principles, than to the views of his late Tory colleagues.

On the subsequent debates in Parliament little need be said ; the ' Annual Register ' touches a point nearly when it refers to the ' suddenness and unexpected nature ' of the partial Whig junction with Canning. No doubt the Tories, leaders and rank and file, expected that their secession would soon bring Canning to his bearings, and compel him if he desired to remain in office, and retain any control over Foreign Affairs, to accept such a Prime Minister, be it Wellington or Peel, as the party chiefs might select. It was naturally extremely disappointing and provoking to see him accept the Premiership, and construct an Administration apart from their aid.

Lord Grey had the mortification of seeing his followers, already not excessive in numerical strength, divided, and a part of them tempted and satisfied by the near prospect of place and power.

Taunts and gibes arose from both sides of the House.

The Cabinet minute laying down the terms of the coalition in respect of the Catholic question is printed at p. 657, vol. iii. of ' Wellington Correspondence,' and dated April 23. It simply stipulated entire personal independence of action on the question.

The Tory chiefs held aloof from the daily petty assaults on the new Government ; they feared the King, and they feared a discovery of the realities of the political situation. They did know, and the Whigs and general public did not know, the actual breadth of the estrangement in sympathy, which had long existed, in theory and practice, between the Canningites and the old Tories in the late Government, and that the present breach with them was long due, just as Canning's junction with the moderate Whigs was virtually far from premature.

Lord Grey politically carried on the tradition of Liberal policy in the *Party* sense ; indifference to British predominance in foreign affairs, and an excessive belief in the immediate urgency of domestic improvement in the laws of the country. Fox's admiration for Napoleon, and the general Whig hostility to the French war, strongly mark this, the least favourable, side of Whig doctrine. Lord Palmerston, in a high-handed and somewhat unprincipled manner, carried his private Tory tradition into the Whig camp, and for a generation overrode the Whig doctrine. Mr. Gladstone has revived it with doubtful success (1884). So Lord Grey, passing over the solid bands of

1827
—

sympathy between the Canningite policy and true Whig Liberalism, hammered away industriously, and with some craftiness, on the Conservative elements in Canning's opinion ; but Canning had quite the courage of his opinions, and knew what he was about, as has been already shown ; and on May 3 did not shrink from reiterating his public objections alike to Reform of Parliament, and to the repeal of the Test Acts ; but his Whig supporters meant to postpone for the present insisting on these measures, and to content themselves with the sound general Liberalism and splendid foreign policy of the new Minister.

Assuredly, politically speaking, Lord Grey was the narrow-minded statesman, and Lord Lansdowne and Brougham and their followers the true Liberals at this conjuncture.

Canning always continued anxious to retain his hold over the Tories. The Duke of Buckingham had exerted himself greatly against the new Government, (see his Grace's letters to the Duke of Wellington) ; but Lord Chandos was much more amenable to the Grenville tradition ; and as Charles Wynn continued in the Cabinet, a marked division must have taken place in the Grenville camp. Canning accordingly took pains to conciliate Lord Chandos, and the beneficial effects of a conciliatory attitude, and a promise of future employment, are seen in the following letter from Mr. R. Ward to Canning.]

MR. R. WARD TO MR. CANNING.

Whitehall: May 5, 1827.

My dear Sir,—I think it right to tell you for your guidance (in the event of anything arising to make it necessary) that I have just seen Lord Chandos, to whom I communicated the good opinion you lately expressed of him ; and, in fact, all that you said in our late interviews in regard to any wishes he might entertain towards public employment hereafter. I thought myself authorised to do so because he seemed to me not to be aware of your respect for him, which rather surprised me after my letters to the Duke.

Though I have no reason to fear you will blame me for this, I should not trouble you upon it but for the effect which my communication evidently had upon him ; so much so that, expressing his sense of your handsome mention of him, of which he was before perfectly ignorant, he said it would influence his conduct to you personally, and that, meaning as he did to attack some of your supporters, he should certainly abstain from all

1827

allusions to yourself, which otherwise he had not intended to do. In truth, he seemed pleased with my communication, which was quite new to him ; and as I conceive you would wish in a time like this to know the movements of mind in all persons of any consequence, I trust you will excuse this intrusion, immaterial as it may seem.—Much, my dear Sir,

Your sincere and obliged

R. WARD.

[It is rather amusing to see the effect of these friendly blandishments (as reported) on the young man, and pleasant to think that, instead of assailing the great leader, he proposed to content himself with an attack on some of Canning's supporters only.]

On May 19 Lord Lansdowne was formally introduced to the King on being nominated to a seat in the Cabinet, and Lord Carlisle kissed hands as First Commissioner of Woods and Forests, and Mr. Tierney kissed hands as Master of the Mint.

On May 21, 1827, Canning having reported to the King some departmental assistance afforded by the Duke of Wellington to his military friends, now co-operating with the Government, the King wrote to the Duke to renew the offer of the command of the army, which Canning accompanied by a friendly note. The Duke refused on the next day, expressing his devotion to the King, recounting his military services, and referring for his reasons for declining to his original reasons for resigning, which his Grace promptly forwarded to Mr. Canning to submit to the King (pp. 596–99 of 'Life and Times').]

MR. CANNING TO THE KING.

Downing Street : May 25, 1827.

Mr. Canning presents his most humble and affectionate duty to your Majesty, and humbly submits for your Majesty's perusal the draft of a letter which he proposes to write to the Duke of Wellington, in consequence of his Grace's allusion (in his letter to your Majesty of the 22nd) to a passage in his Grace's answer to Mr. Canning's letter of the 5th.

It occurred to Mr. Canning, in reflecting on the Duke of Wellington's unaccountable refusal of your Majesty's most gracious and condescending overture, that it would be expedient to strip that refusal of any collateral

1827

pretexts, with which it might be attempted to disguise it ; and Mr. Canning has therefore prepared the accompanying letter for the purpose of withdrawing that pretext respecting his past correspondence with Mr. Canning, which the Duke puts forward in his letter to your Majesty. Mr. Canning's letter is not gone ; it is therefore liable to any alterations or omissions.

[Canning was clearly somewhat nettled at the unhesitating refusal of the Duke, and here submits for the King's consideration a draft letter to the Duke.

The Duke spoke in explanation of his resignation on May 1 ; on May 3, Canning answered it by letter ; on May 6, Wellington rejoined with a detailed defence of his conduct : to this Canning sent no argumentative reply at the time.

The draft is unfortunately not with the papers.

It might be doubted, whether leaving the Duke's letter practically unanswered might not give him and others the impression that it was unanswerable. Canning evidently thought that the Duke, referring the King to this letter of his Grace's, implied that his Grace cherished the idea that Canning could not answer it. He therefore made up his mind to answer it, and prepared a draft accordingly, and submitted it to the King.]

MR. CANNING TO THE KING.

Downing Street : May 25, 1827 (4 P.M.)

Mr. Canning presents his humble duty to your Majesty.

Some circumstances which have come to Mr. Canning's knowledge, since he humbly submitted to your Majesty this morning the draft of his proposed letter to the Duke of Wellington, induce Mr. Canning to defer writing to the Duke, until he shall have had an opportunity of paying his duty to your Majesty.

The necessity of being early in the House of Commons prevents him from waiting upon your Majesty to-day.

[This withdraws from the idea of writing as above mentioned, on account of ' certain circumstances ' that had happened, until Canning had seen the King, and no argumentative letter seems to have been

1827

addressed to the Duke as at first suggested. What the 'circumstances were is not positively known ; but it may be reasonably conjectured that the speeches and votes of the Duke's adherents in the House of Lords on the debate and division, in the evening of that same day, conveyed the assurance to Canning of the Duke's active and deliberate hostility to the Government, and thereby negated the idea of any useful result being possible from further controversy. It was evidently wisest to leave the matter alone ; the Duke knew the realities, and a wordy warfare on the present point could hardly be anything but ineffective and unreal.

The general effect of the debates in Parliament during the short remains of the session, while Canning was Premier, is open to the world, and has been amply abstracted, and fully discussed, by all writers on the history of these times.

Assuming that the reader, therefore, knows something of the bitter hostility of the extremists of both parties against Canning, of the overthrow of the Corn Bill, of the provisional and somewhat inadequate nature of the Budget, and of the collateral attacks on the credit of his foreign policy, a few remarks may be offered on the nature of the situation in the eight weeks during which Canning confronted his political foes in Parliament.

A recent historian (Walpole's History of England, vol. ii. p. 459) has observed (parenthetically, by way of 'guarding' his compliment to the personal prestige of the Premier), 'The utter failure of his short 'administration in no way affected this conclusion.'

The expression is not apparently meant to decry Canning, but only as a rhetorical device to provide an adequate background for honourable compliment.

'Utter failure' seems an absolute, whereas it is only a relative, condemnation.

A statesman may aspire to pass great acts of legislation for the benefit of his country within a given time, or he may limit his hopes to obtaining a high degree of control over the Legislature within such time ; or he may be satisfied if, in the face of persistent and vehement hostility, he succeeds in holding his own, and maintaining without further advancement, though without losing ground, a position of great power and authority within the same time.

Positive success or failure in attaining these ends must be matter of fact ; but, nevertheless, the quantity of resisting force overcome in approximating to success, though not always manifest on the surface, is the real measure of the solid value of such degree of success as may be visibly obtained.

The time in which the political action had in the present case to

1827

he worked out was no more than nine weeks at the utmost ; the Catholic question by general consent had been shelved since the debate and division before Easter.

The Whig measures of Reform of Parliament, and repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, were avowedly not before Parliament, and were repudiated by the Prime Minister.

The Corn Bill became a wreck in the House of Lords, where Canning could not get at it, entirely owing to an unnecessary and, grammatically speaking, remarkably obscure sentence in a letter of Huskisson to the Duke of Wellington.

Allowing every weight to Huskisson's obscurity of language and Wellington's conduct, which up to a certain point appears quite justifiable in this business, there can be no reasonable doubt but that Wellington's amendment conflicted most seriously with the prevailing intention of the measure. It interposed a permanent barrier to the home consumption of warehoused corn after the passing of the Bill, whenever the price was below 66s. a quarter ; which meant that, at whatsoever times after the passing of the Bill the price fell below 66s., the entry of warehoused corn for home consumption would be stopped entirely, and the sliding scale provided by the Bill would cease to operate. This simply restored the pernicious system sought to be amended.

Huskisson, to avoid an unfair glut of the market after the passing of the Bill, conceded that the corn, whatever the quantity warehoused, after the passing of the Bill, should not be entered for home consumption until the price reached 66s. Then that particular body of corn, warehoused between the date of the Act and the date of the legal price of 66s. being arrived at, would be released, and thenceforward the sliding scale proposed by the Bill would operate on all foreign corn.

Whether, therefore, in the controversy Wellington or Huskisson was right, the simple fact remained perfectly clear that Wellington's amendment would operate to frustrate the essence and principle of the Bill.

The point may be allowed to be a little obscure. Wellington was a soldier, Huskisson a financial statesman : perhaps Huskisson used language capable of misconstruction, and Wellington was not to blame if he misconstrued it ; but when the error was corrected and the confusion cleared up, when it had been made plain to any ordinary intellect that the Duke's amendment did truly contradict the whole policy of the Bill, then persistence in the amendment was more than an act of misapprehension ; it became a deliberate act of departure in principle from the cardinal lines of a measure settled by Lord Liverpool, whose opinions Wellington still professed

1827

to respect, and sanctioned by the Cabinet of which Wellington had been a member.

The Bill had been amply authorised by the House of Commons ; Wellington, as a member of the Cabinet, at its introduction shared the responsibility of its provisions ; yet he refused to see that his amendment completely upset the principle of the Bill, and gathering round him the Tory Peers, succeeded in carrying it in the teeth of all protests and explanations.

The Bill had marked one of Canning's triumphs of persuasion in the House of Commons : it was certainly Liberal in policy ; its miscarriage necessarily impaired the credit of his administration ; and Wellington's position contained just then too many invidious elements to make it worthy of him to retract his original sanction, to affect ignorance of the incompatibility of his amendments with the principle of the Bill, and to use his influence to destroy its value.

Nevertheless, the soldier-like nature of the Duke's character even in this awkward conjuncture carried him through, but somewhat at the expense of his discernment.

And Canning only gave utterance to a general impression when he asserted his belief that the Duke had, in doing what he did, only been 'an instrument in the hands of others.'

For the statement may be taken not as a rhetorical flourish, or disguised imputation of insincerity, but as a simple allegation of matter of fact.

So much for the wreck of the Corn Bill.

But how about the debate on May 5 ? when General Gascoigne moved for a select committee to inquire as to the present distressed state of the commercial shipping ; when Huskisson responded by scattering General Gascoigne's case to the four winds, and by successfully defending the principle of a free trade policy. Huskisson carried the House with him, and won a great moral victory in respect of one of the corner-stones of the policy of the Government. There was no great sensation, no outbursts of oratory, no dramatic division, but the victory was not a whit the less real and decisive.

In fact, in the divisions in the House of Commons Canning held an ample majority.

In the country his popularity continued unbounded. He preserved his righteous influence over the King.

And though his attention was for a while diverted from active energising of the foreign policy of the country, profound respect for his name kept the Continent in most peaceful order.

The angry ebullitions of the Duke of Newcastle, of Lord Grey, and of Sir Thomas Lethbridge, and the hasty vote of the House of

Lords in following the Duke of Wellington, do not go within a long distance of neutralising the reality of the actual power swayed by Canning at the end of the session. And this is an 'utter failure' ! How many Prime Ministers would be grateful for the tenth part of the success contained in this 'utter failure' !

It is true on the Penryn Election Bill division in the House of Commons on May 28, Canning certainly voted in the minority, but he did so professedly on principle, and in no expectation of carrying a majority, the vote being declared a non-party question.

On an attempt to repeal one (the Blasphemy one) of the celebrated repressive 'six Acts,' the minority for the repeal voting against the Government was only ten.

He carried his vote for Portugal without a division.

He carried his budget without a division.

He neutralised his double defeat in the Lords on the Corn Bill by a vote taken on June 18, of 238 in favour of resolutions affirming the principles of his original Bill, against 52 in support of Sir T. Lethbridge's more protectionist resolution.

The Dissenters' Marriage Bill was carried, on June 26, in the Lords by a majority of seven, though subsequently dropped, for lack of time to carry it through.

One of the most splendid testimonials to the value of Mr. Canning's foreign policy will be found in Sir James Mackintosh's speech on the Portuguese vote on June 8.

Assuredly, as far as his administration went, under all the conditions of a third of a session only left to act in, of the acknowledged difficulty common to all new Governments of Ministers suddenly placed in novel, and comparatively speaking unknown, official surroundings, of bitterly hostile Tories on one hand and equally bitter Whigs on the other, it can be called nothing but an almost unqualified success. At the end of the session Canning still commanded the confidence of the King, of the Commons, of the public press, and of the popular voice ; and of a powerful body, though not amounting to a safe majority, in the House of Lords.

He had not sought the Whigs ; they had sought him. When his firm adherence to the conditions on the 'Catholic' question agreed upon with the King had broken off the negotiations for official combination with the friendly Whigs, it was the outcry of the Whig rank and file at their centres of political organisation, like Brooks's Club, which reanimated the failing negotiations, and finally carried them through ; and withal he never surrendered one jot of his principles on the Reform of Parliament or on the repeal of the Test Acts, where he most seriously differed from his new friends.

1827
—

Brougham obtained no office, but lent his cordial aid and admiration to Canning ; and the veteran Whig philosopher and statesman Sir James Mackintosh eloquently supported his cause.

Meanwhile the wiser and better Tories, like Peel, remained dumb ; and it was left to Canning's great rival Wellington to misuse his authority in the House of Lords, and to throw out a Bill sanctioned by Lord Liverpool's Government, and carried in the Commons with amazing triumph over opposition and prejudice, long before Canning had been placed in the Premiership.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE SPEAKER.

Downing Street : May 31, 1827.

Dear Sir,—Mr. Canning desires me to write to you to say that he has signed the Report of the Caledonian Canal Commission, in confidence that, as you have signed your name, he has done right in signing his.

He wished you to know that it was in confidence, as he has not had time to look into the details.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This note illustrates what often happens in busy official life where one statesman, overwhelmed with his own work, has to trust to a confidential friend that all will be safe if he sanctions with his name some official production which requires his signature, but on a subject as to which he has had no time to inform himself in detail. There is no fraud in this ; public business would simply stand still if this could not be done.]

MR. CANNING TO THE DUKE OF CLARENCE.

Downing Street : June 2, 1827.

Sir,—Immediately upon the receipt of your Royal Highness's gracious letter of the 31st ult. I desired to see Sir George Cockburn ; and finding that the members of the Cabinet had not read, or, if they had read, had omitted to record their opinions upon the paper referred to in your Royal Highness's letter, I have sent the paper in circulation among the members of the Cabinet ;

and I will not fail to submit it to your Royal Highness as soon as it comes back. 1827

I am, with profound respect and attachment, Sir,
your Royal Highness's

Devoted and faithful servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[This refers to a proposal of H.R.H. which was to be brought before the Cabinet.]

MEMORANDUM BY MR. STAPLETON OF A REMARK MADE BY
MR. CANNING.

London : June 3, 1827.

Being in Downing Street to-day with Mr. Canning, Lord Morley, and Mr. Planta, the state of the Corn Bill in the House of Lords was the subject of discussion. Mr. Canning said that, if the Lords persisted in the Duke of Wellington's amendment, the Bill would be thrown out in the Commons, and then, what price agriculturists would get next year, he would not answer for. For himself, the most he should try for in their favour would be 50s. Upon Lord Morley's saying the House of Lords would never consent to that, Mr. Canning lighted up, and said, 'It is a great misfortune that the Lords take so narrow a view of their present situation, that they cannot see that we are on the brink of a great struggle between property and population ; that such a struggle is only to be averted by the mildest and most liberal legislation. Mark my words,' said he, 'that struggle will some day come, when probably I may be removed from the scene ; but if the policy of the Newcastles and the Northumberlands is to prevail, that struggle cannot be staved off much longer.'

A. G. S.

[This records a prescient foreboding of a future conflict between property and population ; at the present date (1884) the conflict thus revealed to Canning's intuition appears rapidly overshadowing the nation ; and it is a matter for thankfulness that the full bitterness of the struggle, though yet far from its highest point, promises to be greatly assuaged by the ' mild and liberal legislation ' of the last half-century]

MR. GORDON (AT RIO DE JANEIRO) TO MR. CANNING.

Rio de Janeiro: June 8, 1827.

1827

My dear Sir,—My anxiety lest you should suppose that I have been mediating with partiality for Brazil in the affair of the preliminary convention, which has happily been signed here with M. de Garcia, forces me to trouble you with a copy of the private account, which I have rendered to Lord Ponsonby, of my views and proceedings upon this question, in which everything appears to have been gained by Brazil, and lost to Buenos Ayres, whereas I sincerely believe the reality of the affair will turn out to be the very reverse. I do not mean to say that Brazil will not be benefited by the peace, but certainly not by her protectorship of the Banda Oriental.

I am aware, although not officially so, that my despatches of this date are not destined to be opened by your hands, wherefore I will not longer intrude upon your higher vocation.

It affords me no small gratification to reflect that, during my short residence in this hemisphere, I have had to announce the success under your guidance of three very important negotiations to England—viz. that of peace with Buenos Ayres, and of the Treaties for the Slave Trade Abolition, and of Commerce. I add the last, because I feel confident of being able to transmit it, concluded and signed according to your project, by the next packet.

I remain, &c. R. GORDON.

[This is a private note of an apologetical character, relative to the preliminaries of peace settled by M. Garcia in behalf of the Argentine Republic between that state and the Empire of Brazil.

The matter required explanation, as Garcia, in defiance of his instructions, had practically surrendered, in his Treaty with Brazil, the independence of the provinces of the Banda Oriental; a proceeding which (as subsequent history shows) excited the liveliest indignation on the side of the Buenos-Ayorean people; and this surrender was attributed to the influence of Great Britain exerted through Mr. Gordon: and hitherto it had been understood that the British Government, without taking part on either side, inclined to advise Brazil to forbear from interfering with the independence of the Banda Oriental.

However, as a commercial treaty between Great Britain and

Brazil was signed on August 17 following, and also an Anti-Slave Trade Convention, Mr. Gordon had some grounds for self-gratulation at the success of the diplomacy in which he took a part.]

1827
—

THE DUKE OF CLARENCE TO MR. CANNING.

Admiralty: June 17, 1827.

Dear Sir,—I feel the less difficulty of applying to you in favour of young Seymour, the son of Lord George Seymour, at present Secretary of Legation to the Court of Stutgardt, because I have the pleasure of enclosing two strong letters from my sisters the Queen of Wurtemberg and the Landgravine of Homburg, respecting the merits of my young friend. In the event of changes and necessary alterations that may occur amongst his Majesty's Ministers employed at foreign courts, I venture most anxiously to recommend to your powerful and kind notice young Seymour, whose public conduct and discretion I am confident will be found of use to the King's service, as he may through your consideration be permitted to rise.—Ever believe me, dear Sir,

Yours most truly,

WILLIAM.

[The young gentleman on behalf of whom his Royal Highness so kindly pleads, and whose subsequent success amply justified the recommendations of his royal patrons, appears to have been Mr. George Hamilton Seymour, afterwards a most distinguished diplomatist.]

MR. CANNING TO THE DUKE OF CLARENCE.

Downing Street: June 17, 1827 (4 P.M.).

Sir,—I have this instant received your Royal Highness's letter of this morning, and I hasten to answer it, the rather as I am under the painful necessity of submitting to your Royal Highness reasons, of which I am sure your Royal Highness's candour and judgment will acknowledge the force, why it would not be in my power to take any active part in favour of any member of the family, to which your Royal Highness's *protégé* belongs at the present moment.

Lord Hertford left England ten days ago, on an

1827 — embassy to which the King appointed his lordship as a mark of special distinction.

On Friday last Lord Hertford's proxy was given in the House of Lords against the King's Government.

I presume and believe such an instance to be without example, and I cannot but feel, (and trust that your Royal Highness will feel with me,) that the promotion of a near connection of Lord Hertford's in the diplomatic line, following upon such conduct, would be as disgraceful to the King's Government, as it would be detrimental to the King's service.

The letters in Mr. Seymour's behalf were written under circumstances so very different from those which have since occurred, that I flatter myself the illustrious writers of them cannot consider it as any disrespect to them, that the wishes expressed in them are not immediately complied with.

I am, with the most profound respect and attachment, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most obedient and
devoted servant,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning here bases his refusal to promote Mr. Seymour on the ground of the treacherous conduct of Mr. Seymour's first cousin, and head of his house, the Marquis of Hertford; who after accepting employment from the Government had, on Tuesday, June 12 (not 'Friday last,' as stated by Canning), given his proxy against the Government on the most important division on the Corn Bill, when the disaffected Tories under Wellington were doing their best to strike a deadly blow at the new Administration.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Downing Street: June 17, 1827.

My dear Granville,—It is very easy to say 'you must write to me,' but if you will be so good as to recollect, what my way of life was when you were here,

1827
—

and to add to the occupations of which you witnessed the intensity, the necessity of attending the H. of C. daily at five o'clock, and the multitude of morning consultations which the business of Parliament brings with it, you may then judge whether I can command opportunities of writing private letters until the tyranny of the session be overpast.

We have lost our Corn Bill in the Lords, but I yesterday launched a new one in the H. of C., which I trust will serve the present purpose, and which, if the Lords are not absolutely mad with faction, must pass that House too.

The necessity of this substitution delays the session about a week. I hope we may still prorogue on Saturday, the 30th. The D. of Wellington, I am afraid, has greatly lowered his high estimation by his trickery, or dupery, (I will not venture to pronounce which) upon the Corn Bill.

Huskisson's speech last night contained an *exposé*, (rendered necessary for self-defence,) which will open the eyes of the country, if indeed they were closed, to the contrivances and designs of the promoters of the Duke's amendment.

Dudley sends you the information which you desire, upon the amount of our force in the Levant.

I will send to you, for yourself and Villèle, a confidential paper thereupon by the next courier.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

Morpeth spoke last night in a manner which added to his former credit

[This letter shows the Prime Minister in the whirl of his new duties, he can find no time while Parliament sits for writing letters even to his oldest and best friends.

His language about the Duke of Wellington and the House of

1827

Lords is very severe ; but the Duke and the Opposition had not been sparing, as their published records show, in sharp and bitter censure of Canning and his Government.

And it is not unfair to place the mutual recriminations in juxtaposition, as, without pronouncing Canning to be blameless throughout, the balance appears on the whole to incline greatly in his favour.]

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE.

THE QUEEN OF WURTEMBERG TO MR. CANNING.

Louisbourg: January 26, 1827.

Sir,—I cannot think of Lord Erskine's returning to England without troubling you with a few lines, and at the same time repeating my thanks for the very feeling letter, you were so obliging as to send me on the demise of my beloved brother the Duke of York, whose loss will be daily more felt by his family and country.

I am very much afraid that the King's health has suffered by the severe affliction which has befallen us, and wish that his Majesty may be persuaded to try sea air and bathing before he settles in London, as I believe it is the only means of avoiding the gout, from which he has suffered much of late years.

It gives me pleasure to be able to assure you, sir, that Lord Erskine is both liked and respected at Stutgardt, and I have reason to esteem a nobleman who seizes on every occasion to pay me attention, and particularly so on that last melancholy event, on which he showed much feeling as well as attachment to the King and royal family.

I beg my compliments to Mrs. Canning, and remain, with regard and esteem, Sir,

Your sincere Friend, CHARLOTTE.

PRINCE LEOPOLD TO MR. CANNING.

(Private.)

Naples: January 29, 1827.

My dear Sir,—I rally my strength, having been more than a fortnight ill with a tenacious bilious fever, to answer your melancholy communication announcing the fatal termination of the long and painful illness of my dear uncle the Duke of York. I have been deeply and sincerely afflicted by his loss, having been truly attached to him, and he having been very constant

1827

in his kindness to me. Have the goodness to forward the enclosed to the King. I am truly sensible of his Majesty's favour expressing a wish that the melancholy event might not interfere with my travelling plans. I return at all events as early as I can in the spring. Should, however, my presence at home be deemed necessary sooner, I should be ready. Might I appeal to your friendship that, if such a case should arise, you would be so kind as to let me hear of it? Before I conclude I must commend to your kindness and protection my sister and niece: you have ever been kind to them; my sister deeply feels it; but they are surrounded by hostile interests. I add no more. Believe me, with sentiments of the highest esteem and truest regard,

Yours most faithfully, LEOPOLD.

THE D'ALBIAC CORRESPONDENCE.

[The following correspondence illustrates many phases of the lower political life in foreign affairs, where police spies, gulls, and mercenary newspaper writers mix up the most laudable professions with the least satisfactory practice.

The English officer and gentleman, Major d'Albiac, well connected, with distinguished acquaintances, and blamelessly reported on by the British Minister at Brussels, fell into the snares of a French adventurer, and, with the courage of a British soldier, beset Canning with letters and enclosures in support of his own honour, as to which there can be no doubt, and of the honesty of M. Julian, which was another matter. The latter was a Frenchman, who desired to tender his services to the British Government in respect of influencing French and Belgian journals, and also in the more questionable respect of furnishing information, privately obtained, of French military intrigues and movements in the direction of the Spanish frontier. However, Major d'Albiac in his straightforwardness, and M. Julian in his cunning, encountered a most guarded and chilling reception from the veterans of the Foreign Office; in fact, their overtures were entirely rejected, but as they had drawn attention to themselves, the necessary results were inquiries made through Sir Charles Bagot, British Minister at Brussels.

The reports cleared Major d'Albiac of any sinister designs, but M. Julian's character came out at last in questionable colours; in fact, it appears he was an ingenious and plausible French police spy, flying at the highest game, and attempting to open up direct

1827
—

communication with the British Foreign Office, with the full intention of selling, to the best of his ability, all he could learn to the French Foreign Office.

However, in those days the British Foreign Office was not quite so easily deceived.]

MAJOR D'ALBIAC TO MR. CANNING

London: May 9, 1827.

Sir,—I have taken the liberty of leaving the enclosed papers for your perusal, and if you will honour me with a private audience after maturely weighing their nature and import, I shall feel myself infinitely obliged. I left Brussels, sir, last week, and return thither on Saturday next. I declare, Mr. Canning, in the face of heaven, that my journey to this country was more with a view of serving you than of benefiting myself.

I have not been brought up in a school of dishonour, and, as I respectfully stated in a letter I ventured to address you at Paris in September last, I never have entrapped any man, and I never will. I have spoken and written much politically during the last seven long (and to me) most painful years, and I should be ashamed to address you, as I now take the liberty of doing, had I ever once during that period mentioned your name but with feelings of high respect and confidence.

It is easy, Mr. Canning, for any humble individual like myself to play a political part, when he has his party at his elbow, and his task by heart; but when a man left to himself, and *isolé* as it were, takes a line, and that a correct one, solely through the uninfluenced impulse of a strong moral feeling, that man, I trust, will in the end have credit with the wise, the generous, and the just.

On the other side, sir, is a list of distinguished individuals, some of whom have known me a very long time. I wish with all my soul you would refer to any or to all for my character and conduct.

I have, &c.

GEORGE D'ALBIAC.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who brought me home from Hanover in 1802, on whose personal staff I was in 1807 and 1808 previous to the Peninsular campaigns.

H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester.

1827

His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, who I am sure would be happy to serve me as the first cousin of his late most confidential adviser, Mr. Robert Wilks, whose brother, Mr. M. Wilks, is now a very large freeholder in Kent and in Surrey, well known to 'Mr. Herries.'

Mr. Charles Dundas, the member for Berkshire, who has known me from a child.

Lord George Cavendish, whose acquaintance I had first the honour of forming in 1820, and who, I am quite sure, would feel happy in promoting my welfare, for he well knows I am a sound and a loyal man, both in thought, word, and deed

Lord Saye and Sele, who has honoured me with his friendship since the year 1799.

I could, sir, name many others whom I firmly believe would rejoice in any good fortune that might befall me.

[Major d'Albiac in London requests an interview, affirms his honourable intentions, and gives references, but allows it to be seen that he seeks advancement.]

MAJOR D'ALBIAC TO MR. CANNING.

599 Place St. Michel, à Bruxelles.

Sir,—I take much blame to myself for having presumed to ask of you the honour of a private audience. It ought to have occurred to me, and I should have felt (as I now do) intensely how little is the time which you can have at your own disposal.

I take the liberty of enclosing, herewith, my address at Brussels.

Should it please Mr. Canning at any time to honour me with any communication, I can only assure him there is no man living more disposed honestly and zealously to serve him than myself. All I hope and desire is that a zeal, which springs from a heartfelt conviction, may receive that direction without which the best intentions but too often fail in their object.

That you may be enabled, sir, to defeat the lurking hostility of open and concealed opposers, and to turn the hearts of 'lukewarm and temporising friends,' and that you may long, very long, have the power to direct the councils of England, and thereby control the destinies of the world, is the sincere wish of, Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

GEORGE D'ALBIAC.

1827
—

[Major d'Albiac, back at Brussels, apologises for having asked an interview, but still hopes for employment in rendering the services which the Major thinks he can usefully offer.]

MAJOR D'ALBIAC TO MR. CANNING.

Brussels: June 1, 1827.

Sir,—Nothing but the anxious desire of being useful to my country and my country's First Minister could induce me again to take the liberty of addressing you. I have the honour herewith to transmit a note from my friend Mr. de Julian. It contains, I know, a direct offer of his services. Had I not the most perfect conviction of Mr. de J.'s sincerity, and of the means he possesses of affording you much valuable and important information, no power on earth should tempt me to risk my own honour and reputation, which I certainly should do were I to become the channel of conveying to one in your exalted situation vague, unmeaning, and unconnected reports. I have, thank God, a character unsullied in the world, and I would stake that character, which is dearer to me than my life, upon the purity of the motives by which my friend is actuated. As for the part I am acting, I am uninfluenced, Mr. Canning, so help me God, by any sordid views of self-interest; and if I never have any credit for it, I shall reflect upon the good I had endeavoured to effect with an approving conscience. The original of the enclosed document I have from Mr. de Julian. I copied it from Galabert's own handwriting; he gave it to Mr. de J. in 1820.

Far be it from me, sir, to presume to know or to dive into the State secrets of my own Government, or those of any foreign state; never would I be backward (as far as my own country is concerned) in holding out to the execration and contempt of mankind the man who should seek to violate that secrecy which should ever be sacred in the breast of those upon whom their King and their country confer a serious responsibility. I say this that in transmitting you this paper my intentions may not be misunderstood. My idea is this: 'should the views of the French Government in regard to Spain be opposed to your own, it may be important you should be informed what sort of person Mr. de Villèle has selected for his confidential agent in that country.' This Colonel Louis Galabert has just obtained the ostensible appointment of 'Entrepreneur' of the Canal of

1827

Languedoc. It is given him to cover his communications with Spain; he is near the Pyrenees, and Mr. de Julian tells me he could inform you of the object of his mission, and of the persons with whom he is in correspondence. From his account a more enterprising, dangerous (I mean dangerous as an enemy) character does not exist; the fellow's head, I understand, is a perfect volcano. His life has been one of uninterrupted intrigue, for since the year 1789 he figures as the secret agent of States, and of men desperately bent on doing England all the harm they could. He was, I hear, a red-hot Bonapartist, but is a man without any political principle in the real sense of the words.

His father was under great obligations formerly to Mr. de Julian's; they both resided at and were of Montpellier, and that led to the intimacy of the sons. In fact, this military-political adventurer has in early life looked up to Mr. de J. as a friend and adviser.

I wish with all my soul, sir, should circumstances render aid, such as Mr. de J. proffers, to be considered by you useful, that you would so far rely upon my word and honour as to see him yourself.

To me, I own, it seems as if Providence, viewing the present momentous crisis of human affairs, had interposed to strengthen, by means which no mortal sagacity can penetrate, the hands of legitimate power, where that power is generous and is wise; and that, by shielding the genius of rational and defined freedom, it had intended to destroy for ever the demon of illiberal, perverse, and wicked faction.

I have, &c.

GEORGE D'ALBIAC.

[The Major now introduces the name of his friend M. Julian into the correspondence, and describes the qualifications of that gentleman for being of use to Canning.]

MR. CANNING TO MAJOR D'ALBIAC.

Downing Street: June 4, 1827.

Mr. Canning has been prevented by the urgency of public business from sending an earlier reply to Major d'Albiac's communications last month on behalf of M. de Julian.

Mr. Canning now returns all the enclosures which

1827

Major d'Albiac transmitted to him, and in so doing must beg leave, he hopes without offence, to decline availing himself of M. de Julian's offers.

[Returns all enclosures, and declines M. Julian's offer.]

MR. STAPLETON TO SIR CHARLES BAGOT.

Downing Street: June 4, 1827.

My dear Sir,—In the beginning of the month of May, a Major d'Albiac, who is now residing at No. 599 Place St. Michel, at Brussels, sent to Mr. Canning a variety of documents (which are contained in the enclosed packet) tendering the services to Mr. Canning of M. de Julian (likewise resident at Brussels), and containing divers specimens of M. de Julian's talents of composition, and divers assertions of his (M. de J.'s) being well known to distinguished characters in England and France.

The pressure of business has prevented Mr. Canning from looking into these papers, but on my showing them to him yesterday, and telling him their contents and the nature of the proffered services—viz., to direct three of the Paris journals, and the like number of those of the Pays Bas—he told me to return them to Major d'Albiac through you, to request you to procure a receipt for their delivery, and at the same time to decline the offer.

I have troubled you with all this history, thinking it possible that this offer of M. de Julian's may be worth more than appears from the voluminous document transmitted by the Major: and what I would ask of you is, before you cause the packet to be delivered, that you would make some inquiries respecting the individuals in question; and should those inquiries lead you to think that there is anything in their proposition worth consideration, to suspend the delivery of the packet till I have again shown the papers to Mr. Canning, and till he has more thoroughly examined them.

Mr. Canning bears all his fatigue astonishingly well. His Budget speech appears to have given great satisfaction.

I have, &c.

A. G. STAPLETON.

1827

[Requests some private inquiry as to Major d'Albiac ; at the same time forwards Canning's note, above given, in order that it and the sealed packet of enclosures may be given to the Major by Sir Charles Bagot, and a receipt for the enclosures obtained.

These precautions, it will be seen, were not uncalled for.]

SIR CHARLES BAGOT TO MR. STAPLETON.

Brussels: June 11, 1827.

My dear Sir,—After the best inquiry which I could quietly make, and after much reflection, I have determined to deliver Mr. Canning's packet into the hands of Major d'Albiac, and I herewith enclose to you his receipt for it.

Mr. Julian is certainly a man of considerable attainments, great knowledge of the affairs of France, and of the leading people in that country for the last thirty years, and I believe of a very good private character. But I am almost sure that he undertakes far more than he can perform when he proposes to guide the press of Paris, and this country, to the extent which he promises.

Major d'Albiac is a Sussex man, a friend of the late Duke of Norfolk's, and well known to Lord George Cavendish. He took a very prominent part in 1820 in some Sussex elections, when he somehow or other burnt his fingers or his pockets. I know nothing whatever against him, but he loves a bit of politics, and is a very likely man to become *engoué* with any of the clever but scampy politicians of other countries, who come in shoals to this town; and there is such danger in getting mixed up in any of the proceedings of these men—even the best of them—that I shun them like rattlesnakes.

M. Julian was the editor of the '*Constitutionnel de Bruxelles*'—a pretty violent paper, and which at last fell from having but little circulation.

The Paris papers may be worth something; but I should think that the papers of this country were scarcely worth having upon any terms.

Yours, my dear Sir, &c.

CHARLES BAGOT.

Brussels: June 11, 1827.

Received of Sir Charles Bagot a packet to my address directed and sealed by the Right Honourable George Canning.

GEORGE D'ALBIAC.

Brussels: June 19, 1827.

1827
—

My dear Sir,—Since I wrote to you last, and reported that through Major d'Albiac, I had declined, in Mr. Canning's name, the offer made to him by M. Julian, Major d'Albiac has called upon me for the purpose of communicating to me the enclosed letter which he had received from M. Julian after acquainting him with the interview which he had had with me.

There is nothing in this letter which alters the opinion which I expressed of the inexpediency of entering into further *pour-parlers* with M. Julian, but the letter certainly does him credit; and as Major d'Albiac made it over to me to make what use I might please of it, I suppose that he intended that I should bring it somehow or other to Mr. Canning's knowledge. You will do what you may judge best with it.

There is, I believe, no doubt that M. Julian is in, at least weekly, correspondence with M. Casimir Périer, the Duc de Broglie, *et id genus omne*.

Yours, &c.

CHARLES BAGOT.

ENCLOSURE.

Lundi, soir, 11 Juin.

Vous m'avez témoigné ce matin, mon cher Major, le désir de savoir ce que je pensais du refus fait par M. C. d'accepter les offres que, dans mon profond dévouement aux nobles et généreux principes politiques et religieux de cet homme d'État illustre, j'avais cru devoir lui soumettre; je ne veux pas retarder jusqu'à mon retour de la campagne, quelque prompt que soit ce retour, l'explication que vous désirez: elle sera aussi courte que possible.

Je ne doute pas, mon cher ami, d'après la lettre que vous m'avez communiquée ce matin et votre entretien avec Sir C. B., que des considérations de la plus haute importance, et dont j'apprécie la puissance et la solidité, n'ayent déterminé le refus du M., refus accompagné d'ailleurs de toutes les formes qui pourraient le rendre moins sensible, si j'avais agi dans des vues d'intérêt personnel. A cette expression franche de mes sentimens j'ajouterai seulement une réflexion grave, et qui, bien que je ne la croye nullement applicable à la circonstance, m'échappe cependant malgré moi: je n'ignore pas qu'à diverses époques des

1827

misérables jouant, sous le gouvernement de Napoléon, un rôle double et infâme, ont cherché et réussi plus d'une fois à surprendre la confiance de votre gouvernement; j'ai donc pu penser qu'il n'était pas impossible, qu'il était même très naturel, que cédant, peut-être même involontairement, au souvenir de ces antécédens, M. C. eût cru devoir agir avec la plus extrême circonspection, dans une circonstance qui, au premier aspect, semble avoir quelque rapport avec celles auxquelles je fais allusion, quoique, en effet, il n'en existe aucun, et que je ne puisse en aucune manière me trouver atteint par de semblables craintes. En premier lieu, les tems, les hommes, la politique, les intérêts, tout est changé; en second lieu, j'écrivais dans les journaux Français et Belges, avec l'admiration et le dévouement que m'inspirent les sublimes principes professés par le premier ministre de la Grande-Bretagne, *dix-huit* mois avant que je pusse penser qu'une occasion se présenterait un jour de soumettre à ce ministre, devenu aujourd'hui l'organe et l'arbitre des intérêts du monde et de l'humanité, l'offre de mettre à sa disposition tous les moyens que trente-cinq ans d'expérience, des amis puissans et influens, une longue et constante connaissance des affaires de la France, de l'Espagne, de l'Italie et de quelques autres Etats de l'Europe où j'ai résidé, m'ont mis à portée d'acquérir: et de donner en même tems, sur ma personne, par des relations communes, toutes les garanties qu'il eût été de son devoir d'exiger. Vous me rendrez cette justice, mon cher Major, qu'aucune vue d'intérêt n'est jamais entrée dans les projets que je vous ai communiqués, et que je n'ai jamais considéré cette haute question comme celle d'un Français, qui offre à un gouvernement étranger ses services contre son pays. Juger ainsi ma proposition serait complètement dénaturer mes sentimens et ma pensée, laquelle doit être strictement réduite à l'expression suivante: tous les grands intérêts de la France doivent être en parfait accord avec ceux de l'Angleterre, depuis que, grâce à M. C., une haute et sage politique, en proclamant *la liberté civile et religieuse pour toute la terre*, a réconcilié le Cabinet de Londres avec le genre humain et l'humanité. Je hais et je méprise à un égal degré l'administration anti-nationale, fallacieuse, hypocrite, inepte et parjure aux vrais intérêts de la Couronne, qui opprime, tourmente et avilit aujourd'hui la France, en détruisant pièce à pièce

1827

l'édifice constitutionnel élevé par la sagesse de Louis XVIII, et dont ce prince n'avait que trop bien prévu quel serait le sort lorsqu'il aurait cessé de vivre. C'est parce que je connais trop bien, par moi-même et par quelques-uns des nobles collègues, qui ont été associés pendant quelque tems à cette administration, les desseins pervers et secrets qui dirigent la majorité des membres qui la composent, que je la considère comme en état de guerre *contre la France*; contre tout pays gouverné par des institutions constitutionnelles, et contre l'humanité tout entière. C'est cette connaissance intime, d'abord partagée par l'excellent Duc Mathieu de Montmorency, et qui vient enfin de l'être par le Duc de Doudeauville, qui a décidé ces deux nobles et vénérables personnages, dont les principes politiques et religieux différaient d'ailleurs si essentiellement des miens en plusieurs points, mais qui ne transigeaient point avec le respect dû aux sermens et les obligations contractées par eux, en acceptant les portefeuilles des affaires étrangères et de la maison du Roi, à rompre l'association flétrissante pour leur caractère, qui les unissait à des hommes diffamés et en horreur à la France, aussitôt qu'il ne leur a plus été permis de se méprendre aux vues de ces hommes, et aux moyens adoptés par eux pour parvenir à leur accomplissement. Je vous renvoie à cet égard à mes 'Notes sur la biographie des Ministres Français,' imprimées à Bruxelles en janvier 1826, et qui se trouvent chez le libraire Grignon. Voilà, mon cher Major, l'explication fort incomplète, sans doute, que je crois devoir vous donner relativement à la communication, que vous m'avez faite ce matin, et à laquelle je n'ai répondu alors que par quelques mots. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que cette communication ne change, et ne peut rien changer, aux sentimens d'admiration et de dévouement que je professerai toute ma vie pour votre illustre premier Ministre, quel que soit l'avenir que la fortune réserve à un si haut caractère et à de si nobles intentions; avenir qui, je l'espère autant pour la prospérité et la gloire de la Grande-Bretagne, que pour le bonheur de l'humanité, ne trompera aucune de nos espérances. Je me repose sur vous, mon cher Major, du soin de bien faire connaître à cet égard tous mes sentimens: ils sont invariables. Faites de cette lettre l'usage que vous jugerez convenable. Je ne vous demande le secret pour aucun des points qu'elle renferme, m'en remettant, en tout point, à votre amitié, à votre dis-

création et à votre prudence : et c'est de grand cœur que j'y joins ma signature, pour qu'elle puisse être considérée comme ma profession de foi politique et m'être reproduite dans tous les tems.

1827

JULIAN.

Adieu, mon cher Major, à Vendredi.

[Reports result of inquiries, which are favourable as to the genuine nature of d'Albiac's position as a gentleman and as to Julian's abilities, but unfavourable in respect of both being mixed with a set of 'scampy politicians' in Brussels.]

COLONEL D'ALBIAC TO MR. CANNING.

Brussels: July 6, 1827.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive through the medium of Sir Charles Bagot the papers I took the liberty of forwarding you. That in French I requested M. de Julian to permit me to transmit, because having made use of his name I feel anxious you should be in possession of all I knew myself relating to him. M. de Julian says that papers relating to the part he acted at the period to which this document refers and a long correspondence he then had with the existing Ministry ought to be in the Foreign Office. The Mr. Marshal, the secret agent who betrayed him, was, he says, in correspondence with Lord Grey at the very time he was in constant communication with Lord Castlereagh.

He is ignorant if this person was any relation to Mr. Marshall the Consul at Calais.

In a letter I took the liberty, sir, of addressing you from Calais last year I alluded to ——, formerly of the Foreign Office. I believe I said, speaking of the chapel business, 'I could not but consider how much a cause was likely to suffer by being in the hands of a man whose conduct while holding an official situation, I well knew, was not without reproach.' I have no hesitation in now saying openly what I meant, and I am prompted to this by a conviction that presses strong upon my mind that this same —— has been an instrument in the hands of some persons for furnishing information, with the base view of turning that information against Lord Londonderry's successor in office. A man that could be capable of carrying on gambling

1827
—

transactions in the stocks with a gentleman, whom he admitted up the back stairs, and to whom he furnished official information to induce his gull to furnish money and thus defraud him out of 2,000*l.*, is capable of anything. The gentleman in question was a — well known to the Duke of Clarence, and was my first cousin; his executor never has got one shilling from Mr. —: he promised to pay him, and then left the kingdom.

The second document, sir, is a letter to my brother, General d'Albiac, which I shall feel essentially obliged by your taking the trouble to read, and then allow to be forwarded to its address.

Upon my honour, sir, as an officer and a gentleman, no living soul shall know the channel through which I forward it. There are one or two things of substantial interest that I wished you to see, but that I need not address to you. I hope—indeed, I believe firmly—you give me credit for honest motives; rely upon it you are not deceived.

The other papers are a correspondence, the late Lord Sheffield honoured me with, on the Corn question in 1820. I think it may be interesting to you to see the connection that subsists between the language used by Lord Sheffield, (who I believe meant well,) and that of some noble peers who have lately opposed the Corn Bill sent up from the House of Commons. A party in Sussex who belong to a political coterie furnished Lord Sheffield with his materials, and they have furnished noble lords lately with the same. It all comes, sir, from the same shop.

With every sentiment of sincere respect, sir, and more than ever disposed, (as is my friend M. de Julian,) to act in every way that I may consider most conducive to your interest, in which the public good is so essentially interwoven,

I have, &c.,

GEORGE D'ALBIAC.

[The indomitable Colonel, not to be rebuffed, takes another shot at maintaining communications with the First Minister. He again pushes his friend M. Julian into notice. For himself, he accuses a former member of the Foreign Office of deceiving his first cousin in respect of some Stock Exchange gambling. He asks Canning to forward a letter to his brother, General d'Albiac, and finally sends some correspondence about the political proceedings of Lord Sheffield.]

MR. CANNING TO COLONEL D'ALBIAC.

Downing Street: July 10, 1827.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Colonel d'Albiac, and in returning the accompanying papers and letters, begs leave to express a hope that no more will be sent to him, as it is utterly impossible for Mr. C. to find time to read them. 1827

[Colonel d'Albiac's means of rendering service to the British Government were much too shadowy, and his personal qualifications for delicate negotiations, as evinced by his letters, too slight for him to be encouraged to hopes for employment ; so the present decisive snub was administered to him.]

SIR CHARLES BAGOT TO MR. CANNING.

Brussels: July 30, 1827.

My dear Canning,—I received the enclosed this morning and immediately saw the writer. He denounced M. St. Julian as the person to whom his letter referred. M. St. Julian, as you will recollect, is the person whose papers were transmitted to you through Major d'Albiac, and who also furnished me with the memoir upon the canal of the Pyrenees which I sent you a short time ago.

I have now no doubt that he is a spy of the French police. He was a friend of Fréron—the Toulon Fréron, and an agent of Fouché's. He has latterly, I believe, been more immediately employed by the Duc Doudeauville. He talks, I hear, of going soon to London, in which case he may require a little looking after. Villerot, who writes the enclosed letter, is not unknown to you. He had some communications with you about the month of March 1826. I never saw or heard of him till this morning.

Yours, my dear Canning, most affectionately,

C. B.

ENCLOSURE.

Vieille-Halle—1408. 29 Juillet 1827.

Sir,—Je sais qu'une police secrète de la France est établie à Bruxelles, et qu'un de ses anciens agens cherche à entretenir une correspondance directe avec votre Ministre des Affaires Étrangères : c'est pourquoi je crois de mon devoir comme Belge,

1827 — d'après la conviction que l'ennemi de l'Angleterre est celui de ma patrie, de demander une entrevue à Votre Excellence, afin de faire connaître cette personne.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

CARTON DE VILLEROT, Lt.-Colonel.

[This report winds up the d'Albiac Julian episode. Colonel d'Albiac, an honest British soldier and gentleman, is not mentioned. He, no doubt, had been simply imposed upon, but Julian comes out in the character of a professional spy of long standing in the French secret police.

The reader can now appreciate the utility of the extremely guarded manner in which Canning met the overtures of service proffered by Colonel d'Albiac.]

MR. W. JAMES TO MR. CANNING.

Perry Vale, near Sydenham, Kent: January 9, 1827.

Sir,—Allow me to present you with a copy of the new edition of my 'Naval History of Great Britain.' Of the merits of the work as a faithful record of facts, many distinguished naval officers have expressed opinions highly flattering to its author; and of such of those opinions as have been communicated by letter, I beg to enclose transcripts for your perusal.

The menacing tone of the American President's message is now the prevailing topic of conversation, more especially among the mercantile men in whose company I daily travel to and from town. One says, 'We had better cede a point or two than go to war with the United States.' 'Yes,' says another, 'for we shall get nothing but hard knocks there.' 'True,' adds a third; 'and what is worse than all, our seamen are more than half afraid to meet the Americans at sea.' Unfortunately this depression of feeling, this cowed spirit, prevails very generally over the community, even among persons well informed on other subjects, and who, were a British seaman to be named with a Frenchman or Spaniard, would scoff at the comparison. Whence has this arisen? Principally from the extensive circulation in this country of the American accounts [of the last American War], official and non-official, and their remaining for months uncontradicted, and then but partially and indirectly denied by a letter from the captured British

1827
—

officer—a letter not seen by a tithe of those who read the American accounts, and when read, (the subject being stale, and an opinion upon it already recorded in the mind,) productive of comparatively slight effect. My first work published in 1817 was written with the view, by sifting the American accounts and giving authentic details of the different actions, to remove an impression so derogatory from the national honour, to restore the public confidence, thus in a manner shaken by the misrepresentations and plausible tales of one party, and the feeble attempts at denial and tacit admissions of the other.

That the Board of Admiralty were of opinion, that my manner of handling the subject was likely to prove beneficial to the country, is clear, because they sent to thank me for the ‘able manner in which I had drawn up the statements of the different actions of the American war,’ and were pleased unsolicited to take forty copies of the work. But allowing every copy of the 1,500 printed of my ‘Naval Occurrences of the late American War,’ and of the 1,000 printed of each edition of my larger work, to change the sentiments of a misinformed or prejudiced reader, what will that amount to in the immense population of the British Isles?

Believing as I most religiously do that all my accounts of the American naval actions are founded on fact, I wish they could be made as public as the captivating stories of the Waverley novels.

There is one mode by which the general result of my statements, if not the statements themselves, may acquire a publicity immeasurably greater than they have hitherto attained. I would first say, Pray, sir, read over my accounts of American warfare. As I know how fully occupied your time is, and how valuable every portion of it, I would not presume to ask this, did I not believe that a case will soon occur when as a statesman you will feel it necessary to touch upon American affairs, were I not convinced that a sentence falling from your lips in Parliament, expressive of a conviction that, in the late war between this country and the United States, so far from British seamen having evinced any want of spirit, they had afforded indubitable proofs of bravery and devotedness, would tend very much to dissipate those ill-founded alarms spread over the country. It is defeat

1827

oftener than victory that tries the stamina of a seaman or soldier. See how the Americans behaved on board the 'Chesapeake,' the 'Argus,' and the ship-sloop 'Frolic.' Look, again, at the behaviour of the British in the majority of the actions in which they were unsuccessful; mark the unconquerable intrepidity of 'Reindeer's' men (vol. vi. p. 429); there was a crew! Can one instance be adduced in which the Americans have evinced as much *bottom* (that truly British word), even as the French, in many of their actions with us? Pardon me, sir, for repeating my request that you will read my accounts of the American operations; also my preface, as that is in some measure a key to the plan of the work and explains my motives for having undertaken it.

The neutral character, which I imposed upon myself while writing my naval history, prevented me from submitting more than a remark or two upon the general management of the American war. But surely, sir, there never was a war so badly conducted at its commencement, and so unseasonably brought to a termination. In spite of Sir John Warren in the 'Chesapeake' and Sir George Prevost in the 'Canadas,' all would have ended well had the peace been delayed another year. The Americans at sea were getting not only shy but unskilful, while our seamen were improving in gunnery, and our ships in general becoming better equipped, and more numerous manned. Then as to operations on shore, we had troops in abundance, and Sir George Murray had already arrived in the 'Canadas' as the successor of the feeble and unfortunate Sir George Prevost.

The American President displays, as if *in terrorem*, the present force of his navy; in doing so he displays his weakness, not his strength. If he goes to war he will require 40,000 men to man his ships, not 6,000 as at the commencement of the last war. Where is he to get such a number from without pressing? Let him begin that, and the charm of his service is dissolved. The food on board American ships of war is less in quantity and worse in quality, and the general treatment more severe, than in the British navy. It is the short duration of service that is the temptation.

Much of the disaster that attended our arms in the last war arose from the misinformation, or rather the want of information,

1827
—

of our Government respecting the United States: we knew comparatively little of their military resources, and of the approaches and defences of their ports; and we relied too much upon the pretended friendship or neutrality of the 'federal' or 'Puritanical' party. The only ports fit for line-of-battle ships which the Americans own are Newport in Rhode Island, and Pensacola in West Florida. The latter is perhaps the best harbour on that continent, and the forests in its neighbourhood are the emporium of live-oak timber, from which the Americans build their navy. From Pensacola the Americans would annoy, and almost annihilate, our West India commerce; and from there also, if it were deemed an object, they would fit out an expedition against the island of Cuba. In the event of war, both these ports should be the first object of attack; and with promptitude and address they might be taken, and I believe maintained.

One reason that the Americans are so angry with you for shutting out their vessels from the British West Indies is, that it deprives them of a nursery for their seamen. The American coasting trade is not of that consequence it used to be, because of the prevalence of steam navigation. Keep the Americans from the fisheries, and from trading with the British possessions in the provinces and the West Indies, and you will clip their means of becoming formidable at sea.

But in my opinion the Americans never will be a naval power of any magnitude. Even if the depth of water in their ports would permit them the circumstances, that their coast population is already at its acme or nearly so, that their future growth must increase in a westerly or landward direction, and that, long before the republic becomes formidable from density of population, it will separate into two or more sovereignties, present to my mind an insuperable obstacle. The temperaments, disposition, and wants of the people are also essentially different. Look at the true Yankee or East Englander, the Buckskin or Virginian planter, and the Kentuckian backwoodsman. In my opinion the cabinet at Washington will by-and-by have enough to do to keep down turbulent spirits; especially if, when Mr. Adams's presidency expires, General Jackson is not elected his successor. This step, however, would tend more than anything to alienate the north-eastern from the southern States. The British

1827
—

navy never was in so fine a state as it is at this moment. Believe me, sir, we are intrinsically stronger with 600 ships, than when we had (and I might almost say *if* we had) upwards of 1,000. Formerly, when a rupture was threatened between us and a foreign power, ships had to be repaired and in some cases almost rebuilt before they could be sent to sea; now almost every ship in ordinary has only to receive her stores and crew on board, and away she goes to fight the battle of her country. Nor, such is the present ameliorated state of the naval service, are seamen by any means so scarce as the public in general is led to believe. The pressing system and excessive punishment are now (for which I take some credit to myself) seldom spoken of in the service except to be reprobated; and the men are so plentifully fed, that I question if every mess of five could not afford an ample meal for a sixth.

When I look upon the length of my letter, and reflect upon the press of business in which you must be engaged, I scarcely know how to apologise to you; I have, however, a Briton's feelings on the subject, and strong ones too; and on that I must rest my hopes of excuse. With sentiments of the highest respect,

Believe me, &c.,

WILLIAM JAMES.

MR. CANNING TO MR. JAMES.

Brighton: January 10, 1827.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the honour of your letter of yesterday accompanying a copy of your 'Naval History.'

I am satisfied that the best return which I can make for your kind attention and acceptable present is to promise you that I *will* find time to read at least those parts of your 'History' which you have marked; and that I have read with great interest your explanation of the object with which you do me the honour to recommend them to my perusal.

I am, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[This is a curious exposition of the value of James's Naval History, and Canning showed by a cordial acknowledgment that he duly appreciated the correctness of the estimate.

The personal feelings of our naval historian led him to protest earnestly against the idea, that the undeniable success of the United States in the last war with Great Britain implied any permanent deterioration in the naval energy of his native country. His arguments went to maintain the position, that the physical resources of our republican cousins wanted many of the most essential elements for permanent success in naval warfare.

The United States Government, stimulated by their own, still recent, successes in a conflict with Great Britain, by the successes of the various separated colonies of Spain and Portugal in the two Americas, by jealousy of the persistent predominance of the British flag at sea, of the credit won by Great Britain in sheltering the newly won independence of the revolted Spanish colonies, and lastly by the continuance of the Canadian Dominion on their northern frontier, had fomented a tone of somewhat foolish defiance, which found adequate occasion for display on the question of the Oregon boundary.

The futurity of the interests involved lent a general haziness to the matters in contention, though both sides were thoroughly aware of their reality and eventual importance.

In monarchical or aristocratical England, a Foreign Minister trusted like Canning could wield the whole power of the State even to war, without being harassed by incessant questioning, or feeling responsible to millions of ignorant constituents.

The United States Statesmen, leading a smaller nation, spread over an infinitely vaster territory, needed every kind of appeal of the coarsest kind to collect, and direct, the quantum of force necessary to give full weight to their language in the negotiations. Hence an amount of 'spread-eagleism' in political utterances which sounded foolish enough in British ears, but, in truth, scarcely raised power adequate to sustain them in their arduous duty. And, moreover, at this time, their patriotic adjurations no doubt actually lost greatly in weight, owing to Canning's reputation for a truly liberal foreign policy. When the hot-headed Latin republican insurgents from Mexico to Patagonia could not say enough for him, it was difficult to persuade the English-speaking Teutons of the United States that they had much to fear from the warm-hearted and brilliant Statesman, about whom they probably felt, in the curious jealous way that citizens of the United States *do* feel in regard to illustrious

1827 Englishmen, a sincere and sympathetic admiration, as if he were one of their own born countrymen.

No doubt our cousins will think none the worse of our spirited naval historian for his anxious wish to inspire Canning with a sense of the permanence of British pluck and energy, if wanted for a war with their most formidable rivals.

Mr. James's forebodings of the ultimate result of the dissimilarity between North and South came true enough to a certain point ; but he could not foresee the unremitting obstinacy and perseverance with which the North, finally, as in our own Civil War, bore down the *quasi-chivalry* of the South.]

LE MARQUIS DE CROY TO MR. CANNING (FEB. 8, 1827).

[This nobleman, of most distinguished descent, announces that he has just arrived from Madrid, and has a communication of the first importance to make to Canning.

From the subsequent correspondence, it appears clear that M. de Croy bore a secret message from King Ferdinand of Spain.

The resolute guardedness of Canning prevented the delivery of the message, so that there is no record amongst the papers of its purport ; but the determination of both sides on the point of a personal interview, which constitutes the interest of this short correspondence, can be elucidated to a considerable degree by the known facts of the state of Spain, and the position of the Spanish king at the time.

In truth, King Ferdinand, having yielded himself an instrument into the hands of the Absolutist party, found himself nevertheless despised as an unworthy instrument of the great cause.

The Carlist rivalry alienated the King from the Extremists, and the sense of his alienation inflamed their jealousy at his coldness towards their political aims.

The power of the Absolutists appeared, indeed, considerable ; their response to the British expedition to the Tagus was, firstly, a manifesto from the War Office at Madrid to the Spanish army, proclaiming the apprehensions entertained by Spain as to the designs of Constitutional Portugal, accompanied by expressions of unlimited admiration of the sentiments of the Portuguese deserters ; secondly, an assembly of about 15,000 troops, in two divisions, at separate points of the Portuguese frontier.

The Spanish treasury was exhausted ; but the funds for this military effort came in from the contributions of the Church, and of the Ecclesiastical party, throughout the country. This again placed the King at a disadvantage.

1827

Ferdinand mainly supported himself at this conjuncture by means of the presence of French troops in Spain, who represented the neutral and dynastic side of the French Government: the positive and aggressive side could be traced in the Absolutist intrigues which linked together the violent Monarchists of Paris and Madrid. But his position remained full of impotence and discomfort.

The mission of the Marquis de Croy from an august 'personage 'at Madrid' to Canning, which required a secrecy of the strictest kind, may be conjectured to have been despatched with a view to ascertain how far Canning would be disposed to back Ferdinand, if the King finally threw over the treacherous Absolutists, and, fairly accepting the Constitution, joined hands with England and Portugal in repressing the violence of the *Parti Prêtre*.

Danger beset the overture on all sides—personally to the Spanish King, politically to the English Government, who had not the slightest intention of compromising their political independence, and satisfactory relations with France, on the faith of such an utterly untrustworthy person as Ferdinand.

But no doubt Canning had heard from Madrid of the Marquis's mission, and knew all about it beforehand, and had determined that until Ferdinand's secret envoy had fully committed himself and his principal, Canning would risk absolutely nothing, not even an interview, which, as he justly urged, unless checked by a written record, might be effectually and seriously misrepresented. Spies of the Absolutist party probably attended every step the Marquis had taken since he left Madrid, and only waited to see him enter Canning's house to let loose on Europe the most violent falsehoods possible to be started from the occurrence.]

THE MARQUIS DE CROY TO MR. CANNING.

Brighton ce 8 février 1827.

Monseigneur,—Arrivant de Madrid et ayant des communications de la plus haute importance à faire à Votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de lui demander de vouloir bien m'accorder une audience pour aujourd'hui ou demain.

J'attends sa réponse, et suis avec les sentimens de la plus haute distinction, &c.

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

[Pursuing Canning to Brighton, the Marquis opens his business by a letter couched in the most formal terms demanding an instant audience 'aujourd'hui ou demain.' It appears he only saw Mr. Stapleton, the private secretary, who promised an early answer.]

THE MARQUIS DE CROY TO MR. CANNING.

Brighton, le 10 février 1827.

1827

Monseigneur,—J'eus l'honneur de faire dire hier soir à Votre Excellence, que j'avais reçu l'ordre le plus positif de ne communiquer qu'à elle seule l'important objet de ma mission. M. votre Secrétaire me promit une réponse immédiate : je l'ai vainement attendue.

J'ose donc vous prier, de vouloir bien me fixer le jour et l'heure, si votre santé pourra vous permettre, de me recevoir.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une haute considération, &c.,

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

[We know that at this time Canning was extremely ill, and unequal even to urgent business (see Mr. Stapleton's letter to Lord Granville of February 9, already given amongst the papers of this year) This had been explained to the Marquis, as we find from his allusion to Canning's health in the present letter ; but he nevertheless presses hard for a personal interview.]

THE MARQUIS DE CROY TO MR. CANNING.

Brighton, le 10 février 1827.

Monseigneur,—Après avoir de nouveau consulté mes instructions, je trouve qu'il m'est impossible de communiquer les pièces relatives à ma mission à tout autre qu'à Votre Excellence, personnellement.

Je retournerai donc à Londres demain matin, pour y soigner quelques affaires particulières et reviendrai, *mercredi prochain*, à Brighton, où j'espère qu'alors Votre Excellence sera en état de me recevoir.

Si pourtant il lui convenait mieux de fixer un autre jour, elle m'obligerait de me l'apprendre *Brunswick Hotel, Jermyn Street*, à Londres.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération, &c.,

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

[The Marquis must have been encumbered, in reply to his second letter, with a fresh appeal to deliver his credentials through an intermediate hand to Canning ; for he positively declines the idea ; but temporarily checked, he announces his intention to go to London, but promises an early return with a view to another appeal for an interview.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE MARQUIS DE CROY.

Brighton · February 11, 1827.

1827

Monsieur le Marquis,—I am desired by Mr Canning to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of yesterday's date, and in reply to the last of them to request that you will on no account think of returning to Brighton on Wednesday next for the purpose of seeing him.

It is a rule invariably observed by Mr. Canning not to receive from a gentleman, who is a stranger to him, any communication by word of mouth, much less one of so delicate a nature as you describe yours to be. From the misconceptions or imperfect recollections, of what has passed at personal interviews, he has experienced the greatest inconvenience. I am authorised, however, to assure you that any conditions of secrecy respecting this communication, which you may think proper to require, will be strictly complied with by Mr. Canning.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[The alarming threat of a return of the Marquis to Brighton evoked from the Minister something more of the terms on which he would consent to receive the communication desired to be imparted to him.]

THE MARQUIS DE CROY TO MR. CANNING.

Londres ce 14 février 1827.

Monseigneur,—En réponse à la lettre de M. votre Secrétaire, qui me requiert de ne point retourner à Brighton pour l'honneur de voir Votre Excellence, à cause de la règle invariable observée par elle de ne point recevoir un gentilhomme qui lui est étranger, à cette objection j'ai l'honneur de lui répondre que le nom que je porte n'est pas plus étranger en Europe, par son antiquité et son illustration, que celui de Monsieur Canning par son génie et la noblesse de ses sentimens. C'est cette conviction, qui m'a fait oublier de m'adresser à un de ses honorables amis, qui se serait empressé de me présenter et de me recommander. Je n'aurais point manqué à cette étiquette, si je n'avais été entraîné dans ma démarche que par le désir naturel de connaître un grand ministre; mais en me présentant seul, et en sollicitant une conférence personnelle, c'est que j'ai des communications

1827
—

de la plus haute importance à faire. Quelle que soit l'issue d'une première audience, il n'en peut point résulter de malentendus ou des souvenirs imparfaits, ainsi que M. votre Secrétaire paraît le craindre : j'y soumettrai à Votre Excellence les pouvoirs authentiques, et les instructions, qui m'ont été confiés ; après qu'elle en aura pris connaissance, ce sera à elle-même à décider si les suites de nos relations deviendront ou verbales ou écrites, et en même tems, si elle pense que son gouvernement puisse accepter les offres, et accorder la protection, que je suis chargé de lui demander. Je laisserai entre ses mains le double de mes pouvoirs et de mes instructions.

La nature de ma mission et les communications, que je suis chargé de faire à Votre Excellence, ne lui laisseront aucun doute que l'auguste personnage, au nom duquel je me présente, a la plus haute confiance dans sa loyauté et son honneur : mais en même tems je suis persuadé, par la noblesse des principes professés et observés par Votre Excellence, qu'elle-même me blâmerait (lorsqu'elle aura reçu mes communications), si j'en remettais les documens autrement, qu'entre ses propres mains.

C'est par tous ces motifs, et dans l'intime conviction que Votre Excellence à ma place agirait comme moi, que je la prie de nouveau de vouloir bien m'accorder un moment d'audience, aussitôt que sa santé lui permettra de me recevoir.

Couvrir de la protection de son gouvernement un grand Prince, consolider le bonheur de tout un peuple, enfin ajouter peut-être à la prospérité de sa patrie, tel est le parti glorieux que le génie de Mr. Canning peut tirer de ma mission : c'est du moins dans cette pensée que je me suis présenté à Votre Excellence, que j'attends avec confiance sa réponse, et que je la prie d'agréer le nouvel hommage de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

LE MARQUIS DE CROÿ.

[The Marquis, it appears, felt personally hurt at the distrust manifested by Canning, and appealed to his grand descent, and dwelled upon the importance of his mission ; but it never struck him that without satisfactory credentials it is impossible to feel assured of the identity of any man professing himself to be a person of rank and dignity.

However, in the last letter he again refers to the fact that his

1827

mission emanated from an 'auguste personnage,' and he points out that his mission would give Canning an opportunity 'de couvrir de la protection de son gouvernement un grand Prince, consolider le bonheur de tout un peuple, enfin ajouter peut-être à la prospérité de sa patrie.'

Looking at the situation of Ferdinand at the moment in question, it was not difficult for Canning to divine what the mission of the Marquis would turn out to be when disclosed.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE MARQUIS DE CROÿ.

Brighton: February 16, 1827.

Monsieur le Marquis,—The letter which you addressed to Mr. Canning dated on the 14th inst. was only delivered at his house at nine o'clock last night.

I am desired by Mr. Canning to assure you in answer to it, that his refusal to admit a stranger to a personal interview has nothing whatever to do with that stranger's rank or character.

Mr. Canning does not receive an ambassador from whatever sovereign until copies of his credentials have been previously placed in his hands. However important, therefore, the object of your mission may be, Mr. Canning, without meaning the slightest incivility, before he can decide finally as to your request for a personal interview, must have communicated to him copies of the Powers with which you are entrusted.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Canning is firm; before he grants an interview he must have copy of the Marquis's credentials.]

THE MARQUIS DE CROÿ TO MR. CANNING.

Londres ce 20 février 1827.

Monseigneur,—En réponse à la lettre de Mr. Stapleton en date du 16 qui me confirme l'invariable usage de Votre Excellence de ne point recevoir un étranger, ou un envoyé, avant qu'il ne lui ait fait parvenir ses lettres de créance, j'ai l'honneur de lui témoigner de nouveau tout le regret que j'éprouve de ne pouvoir pas, d'après la nature de mes instructions, me conformer à cet usage. En conséquence, d'après la promesse, qui m'a été faite par Mr. Stapleton au nom de Votre Excellence, de me conserver le secret, non seulement de mes communications (si elles avaient lieu), mais encore de mes démarches pour arriver à ce

1827 but, je la prie de vouloir bien brûler mes lettres, ou me les
— — renvoyer.

C'est plein de confiance dans cette promesse, et dans l'honneur et la loyauté de Votre Excellence, que je la prie d'agréer le nouvel hommage de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

P.S.—Ayant été malade, je n'ai pu avoir l'honneur de répondre plus tôt à Votre Excellence.

[The Marquis now treats the obstacles to attaining an interview as insuperable, and begs that his letters may be burnt—a kind of retaliatory demonstration of mistrust.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE MARQUIS DE CROY.

Brighton: February 23, 1827.

Monsieur le Marquis,—I am directed by Mr. Canning to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th inst., in which you request him to burn or to return the letters which you have addressed to him

Mr. Canning desires me, in answer to this request, to say that if you have not kept copies of these letters, certified copies shall be sent to you if you desire it.

But that, being a responsible Minister, he neither can consent to burn or to return letters which, without any seeking on his part, have been written to him.

If you will take the trouble to refer to the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 11th inst., you will perceive that the offer which Mr. Canning authorised me to make to you was, that he would, if you wished it, keep secret the 'important communications,' if made in writing, which you described yourself as being desirous of making to him—not, as you seem to suppose, that Mr. Canning would keep secret *les démarches* which you were taking to induce him to receive that communication in person.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[This reply could not be exactly pleasant reading; for the Marquis had committed himself without guarantee up to a certain

point, and the Foreign Secretary could not surrender the advantages of the freedom of his position with regard to the Marquis up to that point; and, after all, De Croy had begun the correspondence, and then declined to bestow the full confidence demanded by Canning.]

1827

THE MARQUIS DE CROY.

Londres ce 28 février 1827.

Monseigneur,—Le mauvais état de ma santé m'ayant empêché de répondre avant le 20 à la lettre de Mr. Stapleton du 16, j'attends encore une dernière réponse de Votre Excellence, avant que je me détermine à quitter l'Angleterre.

J'ai l'honneur de témoigner de nouveau à Votre Excellence tous mes regrets de ne pouvoir lui remettre mes instructions qu'après un premier entretien. Ainsi si Votre Excellence croit toujours devoir persister dans son refus, je la prie de vouloir bien me conserver le secret promis par Mr. Stapleton sur mes premières démarches envers elle, et en même temps m'accorder la grâce que je lui demande dans ma dernière du 20, de brûler ou de me renvoyer mes lettres.

En attendant cette dernière détermination, j'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération, &c.,

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

P.S.—J'aurai l'honneur d'envoyer chez Votre Excellence pour prendre sa réponse.

[De Croy had not received the last letter of Feb. 23, and reiterates the requests in his letter of Feb. 20]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE MARQUIS DE CROY.

Foreign Office: February 28, 1827.

Monsieur le Marquis,—I had the honour to address to you on the 23rd inst. a letter which was sent to the Brunswick Hotel, Jermyn Street, at which place I understood that you were residing. The answer given at that hotel was that you were gone to Paris, whither the letter has been forwarded. But as it appears by your letter of to-day that you are still in London, I beg leave to transmit to you a copy of it.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

[Explains the miscarriage of the letter of Feb. 23.]

VOL. II.

A A

THE MARQUIS DE CROÿ TO MR. CANNING.

Londres ce 28 février 1827.

1827

—

Monseigneur,—Dans ma lettre du 14, en réponse à la vôtre du 11, j'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire 'que la nature de ma mission et les communications que je suis chargé de faire à Votre Excellence ne lui laisseront aucun doute que l'auguste personnage 'au nom duquel je me présente a la plus haute confiance dans sa 'loyauté et son honneur, &c.'

Actuellement Mr. Stapleton me mande qu'il m'a promis en votre nom le secret sur mes communications, et non sur mes démarches pour arriver à ce but : à cette réponse, à laquelle j'étais loin de m'attendre, car qui promet le plus doit tenir le moins, j'ai l'honneur de répliquer que je m'en réfère entièrement à ma lettre du 14, dont je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre de nouveau lecture, en l'assurant que je suis encore tout disposé à tenir, envers elle, tous les engagements que j'y prends ; mais en même tems je crois qu'il me suffira de l'avertir que, si elle juge convenable de donner communication de mes démarches soit par l'ambassadeur de sa Cour à Madrid, soit par celui de la Cour de Madrid à Londres, elle compromettra avec une égale gravité et d'Augustes Existences et l'influence de son gouvernement dans la Péninsule, &c.

Actuellement si Votre Excellence persiste à refuser les offres, que je lui fais dans ma lettre du 14, de lui laisser le double de mes pouvoirs et de mes instructions après une première entrevue, et qu'elle ne veuille pas cependant considérer, à cause de sa responsabilité, mes démarches jusqu'à ce jour comme nulles, j'ai l'honneur de la prévenir que je suis obligé de retourner à Madrid pour y faire moi-même part de ses objections, et y obtenir l'autorisation de faire des communications écrites avant une première conférence personnelle : quelle que soit la détermination qu'on y prendra, je m'empresserai d'avoir l'honneur de la faire connaître à Votre Excellence : à laquelle je témoigne de nouveau tous mes regrets que la délicatesse de ma mission soit telle que je ne puisse pas m'écarter de la lettre de mes instructions, malgré toute ma confiance dans la dignité et la loyauté du caractère de Mr. Canning, confiance dont je suis sûr que je n'aurai jamais à me repentir, puisqu'elle a été inspirée par les nobles sentimens professés par lui jusqu'à ce jour.

J'attends donc une nouvelle lettre de Votre Excellence avant

de partir pour Madrid, dans laquelle je désire qu'elle veuille bien me dire l'usage, qu'elle a déjà fait, ou qu'elle veut faire de mes démarches ; je désire surtout que sa réponse soit de nature à me procurer l'honneur de l'assurer de vive voix des sentimens de haute considération avec lesquels je suis toujours, &c.

LE MARQUIS DE CROY.

P.S.—Si l'original de la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait écrire le 23, et dont elle m'envoie copie aujourd'hui, a été adressé à Paris par la voie de l'ambassade, je la prie de l'y faire parvenir à mon adresse, Rue Neuve du Luxembourg, No. 1, ou bien de me mander où je dois la faire réclamer ; car j'étais tellement inquiet de n'avoir pas de réponse à ma lettre du 20, que j'étais allé moi-même à Brighton, où je suis arrivé au moment du départ de Votre Excellence.

[The Marquis feels rather uneasy at the state of his negotiation, and warns Canning of the danger to his (De Croy's) principal, if the fact of overtures should transpire. He proposes to return to Madrid to obtain powers to communicate his errand in writing to Canning.]

MR. STAPLETON TO THE MARQUIS DE CROY.

Foreign Office : March 1, 1827.

Monsieur le Marquis,—I am desired by Mr. Canning, in answer to the question contained in your letter of yesterday's date—as to what use Mr. Canning has made or intends to make of your letters—to say that he has not made, and does not intend to make, any use of them. His reason for refusing either to burn or to destroy them is, that if, at any future time, any circumstances should arise which might make it necessary for him to state what has passed between you and him, he should not be obliged to trust to his memory merely for a correct statement of facts, but should have the letters themselves to refer to for the accuracy of that statement.

Mr. Canning has no intention of communicating your *démarches* either to the British Minister at the Court of Madrid, or to the Spanish Minister in London, but he cannot be responsible for their being kept secret after the fact of your arrival in England and your journey to Brighton having been

1827
—

announced in more than one daily paper, which at the same time stated that you were charged with some important mission from Madrid.

I have, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

P.S.—I will take measures to have returned from Paris the letter of which I had the honour to send you a copy yesterday.

A. G. S.

[The Marquis's errand had transpired in the newspapers, and Canning points out that the movements of De Croy to bring about a meeting must necessarily have already obtained an amount of publicity, which divested his precautions of much value or significance.

This concludes the correspondence, which is rather amusing, and illustrates the necessity of extreme caution in dealing with secret overtures of the kind carried by M. de Croy.

Such was the hostility with which the Absolutists of Spain and France at this time regarded Canning, that either Court might without injustice be considered perfectly capable of devising any kind of trap with a view to entangle their formidable opponent.]

SIR ROBERT KER PORTER TO MR. CANNING.

City of Caracas: March 27, 1827.

Sir,—Allow me the honour of begging your acceptance of the accompanying drawing, the production of my own pencil, which represents the hero of South American liberty, General Bolivar! I shall indeed feel truly gratified as well as flattered by your condescending to receive it, and I offer it not only as a humble mark of my gratitude and respect, but likewise (from its having been drawn from the Liberator himself) as the most faithful portrait extant. His Excellency is so highly pleased with the sketch that he requested me to oblige him with a copy of it, which he purposes forwarding to England to have engraved for the gratification of his Peruvian friends.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT KER PORTER.

[This letter is endorsed as 'received on July 13, 1827.'

No reason is assigned for the delay, but 107 days appears an extraordinary time for a communication from the city of Caracas to London.

Bolivar offered the nearest approach to a Washington that the

separating Spanish colonies could boast ; no doubt he merited the high esteem with which the Spanish Americans regarded him ; and if anybody's, certainly his portrait came near to symbolise the spirit of the great revolt.

That Sir Robert Ker Porter considered his painting of the insurgent general appropriately bestowed if sent to Canning, only helps us to understand how deeply sensible the newly recognised South American states felt of the value of Canning's efforts in their behalf.]

1827

MR. TURNER TO MR. CANNING.

Bath : March 10, 1827.

My dear Sir,—I have the painful task to announce to you that what we have been so long apprehensive of has taken place this morning. It is consolatory to add, with less apparent suffering to my much valued friend than might have been expected considering the nature of her disease.

I have, &c.,

J. TURNER.

MR. CANNING TO MR. TURNER.

Downing Street : March 11, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Your melancholy letter of yesterday finds me laid up in bed, with a return of the rheumatic attack which kept me in my bed at Brighton, from the time of my return there from Bath to the beginning of the present. I wrote to Bath on Saturday, in a tone calculated to prevent alarm if the letters had met the maternal eyes—which, alas ! were closed before its arrival. But what grieves me most in my now helpless state is the improbability—I fear I may say almost impossibility—that I should be well enough to execute the purpose which I mentioned to you when I had the pleasure of seeing you at Bath—of attending my poor mother to the grave. God knows I would wish to do so, but I much fear that I cannot. As I am now, I could not undertake a journey of a hundred yards—to the H. of C. A week—I suppose that will be about the time—may fit me to return to my public duty. But I

1827

have no conception that it would enable me to encounter a journey of two hundred miles for such an object.

If I could hope to be well enough to do so, I might have ventured to suggest Sunday morning as the time at which I could most conveniently attend—I mean as to public claims upon me. But it is so hopeless that I hardly feel justified in any suggestion. I need not say that my desire is that everything may be conducted respectably and quietly; and that I rely upon your good offices kindly to assist Mr. and Mrs. Road in the arrangements.

Believe me, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[The first is the letter announcing to Mr. Canning the death of his mother Mrs. Hunn at Bath. The second is his reply lamenting and explaining his inability to attend the funeral.

Nobody who has appreciated, from what is printed in these pages, the incapacitating nature of Canning's severe illness in February of this year, and the way in which it interfered with the most cherished purposes of his political position, can doubt for an instant that pure physical indisposition alone prevented him from attending his mother's funeral; and if the letter appears somewhat stiff, it must be remembered that the recipient was only the local medical man, and that to him Canning desired to make it clear that genuine difficulties of the most serious kind forbade his travelling to Bath on the sad occasion.

This is pointed out particularly, as neglect of his mother, for whom he always preserved the most solicitous and dutiful affection, is one amongst the minor (or major, as it may be regarded) calumnies with which opponents personally assailed him.]

MR. HAYDON TO MR. CANNING.

58 Connaught Terrace : March 10, 1827.

Mr. Haydon takes the great liberty of presenting his respects to Mr. Canning, and begs permission to state that he has just concluded a picture of 'Alexander and Bucephalus' for Lord Egremont, which he (Mr. Haydon) would be most happy to have the honour of showing Mr. Canning, as it has been approved by Lord Farnborough, at any hour and on any day

Mr. Canning would condescend to appoint, should he be disposed to overlook the liberty Mr. Haydon has taken in making such a request, and should he have leisure to pay any attention to it.

1827
—

MR. CANNING TO MR. HAYDON.

Foreign Office: March 20, 1827.

Mr. Canning is obliged to Mr. Haydon for the offer made in his letter of the 10th inst. of showing to Mr. Canning the picture of 'Alexander and Bucephalus'; but Mr. Canning's occupations will not allow him to avail himself of it.

[This well-known, but unsuccessful and unfortunate, painter constantly appealed to the leading statesmen of the time for official support to his idea of promoting a grand school of historical painting, and in particular he solicited their patronage for himself as a living and active disciple in that style of art.

Nothing strikes one as more pathetic than the story recounted in his published life of poor Haydon's continuously unsuccessful efforts to give adequate expression to his ideas on canvas, and of his brain eventually breaking under the disappointment, and finishing his mortifying career by self-destruction.

In the light of the published revelations of Haydon's secret struggles, much can be forgiven of what then appeared as irrepressible self-conceit and self-assertion; but at the time, with a knowledge of his persevering efforts to influence statesmen as he wished, and the feeling that it was really necessary to repress his misdirected energies, Canning may perhaps be excused for the brevity of his reply to the unfortunate painter. It should also be remembered that the statesman's temperament and temper were being strained to the uttermost at this moment: ill-health, loss of a near and beloved relative, political anxieties in public, conflict with political intrigues in private, may be admitted to count as immense palliations in meeting charges of want of feeling or temper.

The endorsement of Haydon's appeal is rather amusing, with a touch of Canning's never-failing humour; it is as follows: 'I am no judge of (1) pictures or (2) horses, and have no time for the fine arts.' But of course that never reached the painter.

Canning's confession of ignorance of horseflesh and pictures furnishes at any rate one instance of a cultivated and imaginative genius satisfying itself with the dry husks of politics, and failing to appreciate, at any rate, one of the highest methods by which imagination imparts great and refined ideas to mankind.]

MR. R. WARD TO MR. CANNING.

Hyde House, Bucks : April 8, 1827.

1827
—

My dear Sir,—I had no thought to have troubled you with any letter of mine, but the conduct of others has made it a duty, which on that account I entreat you to excuse. Indeed, I seldom remember to have been so vexed and annoyed as by the article in the 'Literary Gazette,' which I have just read, and which you probably may see, respecting '*De Vere*.' As that publication has been fixed upon me by too many proofs (growing out of the indiscretion of friends in regard to 'Tremaine'), it would be useless to deny, though I do not publicly acknowledge it; and to you (confessing it thus to be mine) I cannot describe my regret that the officiousness of the reviewer (whoever he may be, and however sincere in his admiration of yourself) may implicate me in your mind in a charge of impertinence and indelicacy, of which I feel really and wholly innocent. And yet, notwithstanding the seeming justice, as I allow them to be, of the applications of the imaginary character of 'Wentworth' to yourself as a public man, I hardly think, I certainly hope it is not necessary to vindicate myself from the imputation that I had advisedly been guilty aforethought of the intention of holding up a living Secretary of State, and one to whom I feel under great personal obligations, as the hero of a novel. However difficult it perhaps may be now to convince the world of the contrary, the truth of the matter is this: having in my retirement from public affairs found it the greatest gratification to my leisure to indulge in the literary pursuits now before the world, I had in this last last work conceived the design of showing the strong and honourable contrast that has existed ever since the time of Mr. Pitt, between the former maxims of our statesmen and those of himself and of his school. In doing this it perhaps is not wonderful that I should have propounded to myself a sort of *beau idéal* of the endowments and virtues of an English Minister perfectly patriotic, in the same manner as Bolingbroke (though with very different motives) conceived and published his idea of a patriot king. This alone was my aim; nor had I a thought, when I sat down, of representing any individual person whatever: much less was I guilty of the impertinence of designing beforehand to do what this busy reviewer has supposed me to have

1827

done—taken yourself as a model to present to the world. I earnestly hope I shall have the consolation of knowing, that I am acquitted of (to say the least of it) this indecorum. At the same time I perhaps cannot deny that without this preconceived design, when I found it necessary to describe (what in writing to you I check myself in detail), there were many things which, though I had unconsciously drawn them, I was not unconscious might fairly belong to you, in common with Mr Pitt. So far, therefore, I may not be able honestly to deny the justness of the remarks of the reviewers, and probably of the rest of the world. What I do deny is the annoying supposition, so broadly promulgated, that I have intended in painting Wentworth to paint yourself. It is true it was for my purpose to describe a very lofty, a very virtuous, and a very patriotic character, to say nothing of many adjuncts all to its advantage ; and when finished, I own the truth, it struck me, as it struck some others, that I had made a compound of many qualities applicable, as I have observed, to yourself and Mr. Pitt. But was I on that account (and even though conscious that I had done so) to strike it out of my work, in which it was so essential that the whole nature and character and the very conduct of the story would be altered by such a proceeding? I trust you will have the candour to think that I was not called upon to do this, and that you will forgive my abruptness if I say that, in painting many things belonging to an exalted and pathetic character necessary for my design, if what belonged to yours presented themselves to my view, I could not help it.

My only anxiety, however, after all arises from the sort of work in which this portrait appears, namely, a novel. Were any one in his retreat to indulge himself, as I might myself do, in composing a history of the last thirty years, you have been too conspicuous and too imposing a character, and have united too many of the suffrages of your countrymen in your favour, to make it possible to avoid such delineations by name ; and as it is, the untoward and I may say unjustifiable conduct of the reviewer, in fixing upon me an impertinent design which I never entertained, has made it necessary for me to enter into this explanation. Beseeching you to forgive it on the score of feelings which I have been, I assure you, much wounded by this too zealous

1827

critic, however just and sincere his opinions in regard to yourself,

I am, &c., R. WARD.

I will be obliged to you to observe that though I have felt compelled thus in form to acknowledge 'De Vere' to yourself, I mean not to do so to the public. Though I shall be in London on Thursday I have not been able to refrain a single post from venturing upon the liberty of this explanation. I beg leave on many accounts also to add, that the extracts from the character of 'Wentworth' given in the *Gazette* were drawn up six months ago. I am ashamed of sending you such a scrawl, but the subject is a most difficult one, and I have been not a little agitated by it.

MR. CANNING TO MR. R. WARD.

F. O.: April 9, 1827.

My dear Sir,—If your letter of yesterday was difficult to write, I assure you I find it no less difficult to answer at once to your satisfaction and to my own.

While I concur with you in regretting the indiscretion of the editor of the 'Literary Gazette,' would it be honest in me not to own that, with the single alloy of that regret (and that chiefly on your account), the feelings with which I read the extract from 'De Vere' on Saturday were unmixed with anything of offence or displeasure?

Would it be honest not to add that the avowals of your letter of yesterday are as gratifying as the apologies are superfluous?

I must be very sensitive if, after thirty-three years of Parliamentary life, any allusions of the press, in good or evil part, could seriously affect my equanimity; but I must be callous beyond all stoicism if I could affect to be indifferent to such allusions as those of the author of 'De Vere.'

Believe me, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—Be assured that it is not I who betray your secret. Your name was mentioned to me on Saturday before I had seen the ‘Literary Gazette,’ or opened the volumes for which I am indebted to your kindness.

1827

[Mr. Ward wrote and published a novel under the title of ‘De Vere’; in this he portrayed what he imagined would be the character of an ideal statesman of the time under the name of ‘Wentworth.’ The ‘Literary Gazette’ stated broadly that ‘Wentworth’ was meant for Canning. As apparently the character in question was meant to embrace all that was God-like, it might have been supposed that Canning would submit to be identified with the portraiture in question with tolerable grace. But the author affected to be shocked at the idea that he could have committed the solecism of describing a living statesman under a feigned name in a romance, so he seized the opportunity to apologise to the illustrious original in very flattering terms. Canning received the homage graciously enough.]

MEMORANDUM OF OFFICIAL INCOME OF FIRST LORD OF
THE TREASURY AND CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,
PROBABLY PREPARED IN APRIL 1827.

	Deductions			Gross Salary per Annum			Net		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
First Commissioner of the Treasury	4,022	0	0			
Deduct for Land Tax	653	12	0						
„ Shilling Duty	201	2	0						
„ Sixpenny Duty	100	11	0						
				955	5	0	3,066	15	0
Commissioner of the Treasury	1,600	0	0			
Deduct for Land Tax	260	0	0						
„ Shilling Duty	80	0	0						
„ Sixpenny Duty	40	0	0						
				380	0	0	1,220	0	0
							4,286	15	0
Out of the incidents of the Treasury to make up £5,000 per annum	713	5	0
Total salary of the First Lord of the Treasury	£5,000	0	0			

1827

	Deductions			Gross Salary per Annum			Net		
	£	s	d.	£	s	d.	£	s	d.
Chancellor of Exchequer, Great Britain . . .				1,800	0	0			
Deduct for Shilling Duty . . .	98	14	0						
„ Sixpenny Duty . . .	49	7	0						
				148	1	0			
							1,651	19	0
Exchequer Fees (uncertain in amount), average of 3 years . .							663	17	10½
							2,315	16	10½
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ireland . . .				1,200	0	0			
The Deductions from which amount to (about) ¹ . . .				100	0	0			
				1,100	0	0			
Compensation for Fees per Act 6 Geo. IV. cap. 55 . . .				600	0	0			
							1,700	0	0
							£4,015	16	10½
Total salary as First Commissioner							5,000	0	0
„ „ Chancellor of the Exchequer							4,015	16	10½
							£9,015	16	10½
As First Lord and Commissioner of the Treasury . . .							5,000	0	0
As Chancellor of the Irish and English Exchequers . . .							4,015	0	0
							£9,015	0	0

¹ N.B.—A particular account of the Deductions in Ireland is not yet arrived.

This income is not the full income of Lord Liverpool and Lord Goderich united, because they both received as Lords of the Treasury 1,220 pounds each, whereas you can only receive the salary of a single Lord.

A. G. S.

MR. MULOCK TO MR. CANNING.

Newcastle, Staffordshire: March 31, 1827.

Sir,—On looking over (with the intention of consuming) such remaining papers as I possessed referring to circumstances which I am desirous of forgetting, I find a note and memorandum which I now respectfully return to you. Nothing has ever fallen from your pen in correspondence with me which would not in my opinion redound to your credit, but it will conduce to my contentment to send you the papers now enclosed; nor is there in existence a single line of yours addressed to me, with the exception of a long letter transmitted

by me more than two years since to Mr. North, with whom (by my own request) I have long ceased to have any correspondence. With felicitations on your improved health,

1827

I have, &c.,

THOMAS MULOCK.

[If the reader will refer back to the dates of December 23 and 25, 1823, he will find a letter from Mr. Mulock warmly recommending his friend Mr. North for advancement on the score of his eloquence. Canning fully admitted the justness of the grounds of the recommendation, but had no means at the time of promoting the object in question.

There is a memorandum returned by Mr. Mulock in the present communication, dated February 19, 1824, noting a vacant borough in Cornwall, which could at that time be utilised to introduce Mr. North into Parliament.

There is no record amongst the papers of the upshot of this negotiation, but Mr. Mulock, now in 1827, appears to have utterly cast off his former friend, and returns Canning's letter and memorandum in order to destroy all links with the past. The letter he returns is Canning's letter of December 25, 1823, already printed.

Canning's acknowledgment of this letter is not with the papers.]

MR. MULOCK TO MR. CANNING.

Newcastle, Staffordshire : April 14, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Can you withdraw yourself for a moment from the clash of opinions and the conflict of parties, to listen to the still small voice of Christian counsel, proceeding from one of the most disinterested and not the least faithful of your friends?

I am this day possessed of the fact that you are Prime Minister of England, and I am, moreover, acquainted with the rumour that eight of your late colleagues in the Government have declined to co-operate with you. If this latter report be even partially true you are in a predicament singularly perplexing, one that demands the highest boldness secured by the deepest discretion.

The sole question on which your fortunes will turn is this: Have you been called to pride of place by the spontaneous selection of the King? If so, I solemnly affirm that you have

1827

the supreme succour of God to calculate upon and confide in. I assume this to be the case, for if otherwise—*i.e.* if mere ambition urged you to grasp at unoffered authority—I would shrink from communication with you. I write to you on the presumption that his Majesty has invited you to preside over his councils, in the full persuasion of your superior fitness for so eminent a station. Your course is clear. Select from such materials, as the defection of your former associates constrains you to resort to, such an administration as you can assemble. Do not be deterred by the aristocratic array or confederated ability of your adversaries, because the unity of purpose, which must spring from your acknowledged headship, will more than compensate for all the apparent advantages enjoyed by your opponents.

And now a word of still more vigorous wisdom. If the vast influence of the recent possessors of power shall oversway the popular branch of the Legislature, and by consequence thwart the peculiar policy and just measures of Government, arm your mind for a crisis requiring an energetic effort, of which the real prudence might be concealed by the seeming peril. Cast yourself upon the country by an immediate dissolution of Parliament. I have the honour to be, dear sir,

Your sincere friend,

THOMAS MULOCK.

Sunday, April 15, 1827.

P.S.—Should you desire to hold further communication with me and yet feel reluctant to write, I will, on your wish being signified to me, repair to London for a week—not as your guest, not as a suitor for others, not as even a possible sharer myself of things being wholly out of the pale of my proper pursuits; but simply as your friend, willing to offer cheering counsel at an exigent time to one whose permanent promotion I (at present) conceive to be connected with the prosperity of the empire. Let me add that I shall construe (though with respectful regret) your silence into an intelligible intimation that our intercourse can never be renewed.—T. M.

[In somewhat peculiar phraseology Mr. Mulock recommends Canning to maintain a firm hold of the Premiership, and to appeal to the country by a dissolution of Parliament if necessary.

1827

Mr. Mulock must have been rather deficient in the ordinary knowledge of life, and a trifle self-conceited (to say the least), for he makes no difficulty in proposing, 'simply as Canning's friend, 'willing to offer cheering counsel,' 'to repair to London for a week.' This was alarming; a week of what a gentleman like Mr. Mulock would call 'cheering counsel,' supervening on the real political perplexities of the new Prime Minister, would have ended badly for the Minister.]

MR. BACKHOUSE TO MR. MULOCK.

London: April 17, 1827.

My dear Sir,—Mr. Canning directs me to acknowledge in his name your letter of the 14th instant, and to assure you that he takes your counsel in very good part—not excepting the concluding part of it. The measure to which it alludes had already occurred to Mr. Canning's mind; but he trusts that the extreme case which could alone justify it will not arise. He is placed in his present difficult situation by the spontaneous favour of the King; and he is determined not to shrink from the arduous duties which are thus imposed upon him.

You will easily suppose that Mr. Canning's time is too much occupied at this conjuncture to admit of the possibility of his finding leisure for private correspondence, and will accordingly excuse his availing himself of another hand to thank you for the friendly interest which you express in his welfare.

I am, &c.,
J. BACKHOUSE.

[This is a soothing letter, and calculated to put a stop to the design of a visit to London.]

MR. JERDAN TO MR. CANNING.

Grove House, Brompton: April 19, 1827.

Sir,—I occupy a singular position in the literary world, and may claim the merit of some tact and discretion, if not of some talent, in having made my journal so widely influential. The result is that from the highest to almost the lowest class of public writers I am of sufficient importance to possess a very considerable weight with them. From book authors, through

1827
—

all gradations of the periodical press, it is not a boast to assert that I could do much to modify opinions, heat friends, and cool enemies. I am on terms of personal intimacy with forty-nine out of fifty of those who direct the leading journals of the day; and I can from time to time oblige them all. Thus situated, I need not assure you that I have not failed to do what I could, where your interests were involved. But I am convinced that I could do much more, and without a compromise of any kind imperceptibly. I insensibly exercise a very desirable influence over these organs of public opinion. Why I cannot do all I wish, without troubling you, is simply on account of my want of time and sufficient fortune to execute what I purpose. My Gazette nets nearly five thousand pounds a year, of which I have rather more than one-third; but every moment of my life is laboriously devoted to it. Should you think well of what I have stated, and find me eligible for any mark of favour which would enable me to associate an efficient coadjutor in the 'Literary Gazette,' and take myself a somewhat higher station in society, I would without doubt or fear of success undertake to produce very beneficial consequences throughout the whole machinery of the press. It requires but cultivation.

I have, &c.,

W. JERDAN.

I come even at this moment because I consider no time should be lost in meeting a bitter opposition, and rallying supporters against it.

MR. JERDAN TO MR. CANNING.

Grove House, Brompton: May 5, 1827.

Sir,—In a conversation with Mr. Backhouse yesterday he had the kindness to advise me to address you explicitly, and request you would do me the favour to consult Mr. Canning on the subject of my letter as early as convenient. This advice, and the assurance of Mr. Canning's favourable disposition towards me which accompanied it, in addition to having had my humble services called for after the explanation of my views, encourage the hope that they are thought worthy of being entertained and acted upon. I am sure that every day produces

1827
—

something to strengthen that impression, and point out the expediency of losing no time in arraying and directing our battle. The enemy has already been at work, and is gaining followers in the field.

In the value of brevity I know you will excuse my writing with plainness and candour.

I am in a situation to render Mr. C. more efficient aid by influencing the public press than any other person whomsoever. It is well known generally that I have been ardently devoted to him, ever since I had a pen to write or a word to speak; and therefore my utmost exertions now are looked for by all my friends and acquaintances. But my time is completely occupied, and I need also a vantage-ground to give weight to my endeavours. For this I sue to Mr. Canning. I beg of him an obvious and substantial mark of his favour and confidence, which I most sincerely promise to employ entirely in his cause. I trust it will be felt that this is not a selfish petition, for in order to do what I wish I should give up a considerable portion of income, and risk the principal on which it is founded. But I am not, on the other hand, insensible to the benefit which it might be to me and mine, if I were thought worthy to be brought forward at this stirring period. I am earnestly desirous to devote every energy in my nature to the service of one, whom (at whatever distance) I heartily love, and greatly admire; and from him I seek the opportunity and means of proving my faith.

I hope it may be anticipated that I would proceed with delicacy and discretion. My connection with the press being altogether literary renders me liable to no suspicion; and my usual daily intercourse with almost all those, who work this powerful engine, affords me natural facilities which could neither be purchased nor found elsewhere.

My present station in life is such that I flatter myself no objection could be urged against my eligibility for any appointment, with which Mr. C. might think it right to honour me; and if (as I remember sometimes happened) a more public ground for the distinction might be desired, I respectfully beg leave to recall to remembrance the circumstances of my seizing the murderer of Mr. Percival—the fact of my being (I have reason to believe) the originator of the secret cypher now employed in

1827 — the Foreign Office—and several years of zealous political exertion in support of Government in the stormy times from twenty to ten years ago. But though I mention these points, it is on my attachment to Mr. Canning alone that I would claim consideration for my propositions. I am persuaded that I could be essentially useful to his Administration, and from the bottom of my soul I desire to be so. I delight myself with the idea that he entertains friendly sentiments towards me, and therefore that the present question could only be defeated, if unfortunately deemed open to improper construction. For myself I am convinced the arrangement might be effected without a scruple or a whisper, that the after course would follow not only naturally, but as an inevitable consequence, and that I might enjoy the constant satisfaction of knowing that my efforts contributed to the strength and popularity of a Minister, to whom I have always been and ever will be devoted.

If Mr. C. could grant me a few minutes' audience, any point here unexplained might be fully elucidated. It is painful to write about oneself, but the object contemplated is in my mind of infinite importance, and every hour delayed is a disadvantage.

Pray pardon this letter, and believe me to be, &c.,

W. JERDAN.

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. JERDAN.

Downing Street: May 7, 1827.

Sir,—I have laid before Mr. Canning your letter of the 5th inst., to which he has given every attention. He has come, however, to the conclusion that considering that one of the great grounds of attack on the Government is the influence possessed by it over the press, it is absolutely necessary that he should have it in his power to deny in the House of Commons as distinctly as he now can do, and as Lord Goderich has desired in the House of Lords, that the influence of the Government has been employed to induce the press to support it.

You will easily perceive how impossible it would be for Mr. Canning to do this after consenting to adopt the project which you recommended.

I am, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

1827
—

[Mr. Jerdan owned and edited the 'Literary Gazette,' which had a large circulation at the time. He no doubt faithfully followed all Canning's political judgments. When he found that his leader (apparently hitherto not personally acquainted with him) had become Prime Minister, he conceived the notion that his literary and journalistic influence might be considered lawfully available resources to aid the Minister in the political conflict; that, as he believed himself to have such influence at command, he might fairly place it at the disposal of Canning, and that Canning might think it worth while to provide for him in such way, as to relieve him from the ordinary drudgery of a journalistic profession, and leave him free to utilise his influence at large, and to 'make the fighting' on the higher lines of general influence. Jerdan was a truly honest man, and may be believed, without undue credulity, to have realised to himself a genuine idea of service faithfully rendered to an admired chief, and of reward honourably bestowed in return.

But Jerdan under-estimated the liability of the proposed transaction to suffer from malicious misrepresentation. It might be, in reality, a most creditable arrangement; on the other hand, it might be described as a most corrupt bargain. He also over-estimated his power of retaining his journalistic influence in the face of any official promotion conferred upon him. The ordinary experience of life teaches that, political principle apart, mere jealousy would, if he had obtained an office, have dissolved nine-tenths of the influence on the strength of which he pleaded for the promotion.

Wellington's severe language about a 'corrupt press' had been echoed in public, and afforded Canning adequate reason for declining Mr. Jerdan's application.

There is no trace of any pecuniary, corrupt, or improper transaction whatever, and, as far as this particular offer goes, the reader may assure himself that, whatever motives might have actuated the parties concerned, Canning did not try to corrupt the press, and was quite content to entrust the advocacy of his cause to the natural influence of a general popularity, which could not fail to affect the language of the press, as a rule ever reflecting and rarely guiding public opinion.

It may be worth while under the present head to call attention to the fact that on June 7, 1827, Lord Ellenborough challenged the amounts voted for secret service money, and pointed out that the total during the four years for 1823 to 1827 had reached 203,000*l.*, while the total during the preceding four years, 1819 to 1823, came to only 145,000*l.*, showing an excess during Canning's Ministry of 58,000*l.*, or at the excess rate of 14,500*l.* a year. Lord Ellen-

1827
—

borough said, somewhat poetically, that the four years of Canning's Ministry had been 'distinguished for the uninterrupted tranquillity 'which prevailed in Europe;' while the preceding four years, when the vote had been lost, had been marked by the national revolutions on the Continent, whence apparently his lordship meant to infer that the occurrence of these convulsions tended to increase the demand for secret service money; but, however that may be, the inquiry aimed at giving voice to the accusation, that Canning had bought the public press in England.

It may first be said that Lord Dudley, the next following Foreign Minister, promptly stated that he had examined the accounts, and pledged his word that 'not one shilling had been applied for the 'purpose of influencing any portion of the press of this country.'

It may next be remarked, in answer to Lord Ellenborough, that at no time is it less necessary to expend secret service money in purchasing information than at a time when a nation is occupied in a domestic revolution; at such times men move most often from terror and rarely from calculation, and information as to their uncertain and precarious intentions is not worth purchasing; also the most important actions are violent and public, and well known beforehand. Lastly, a nation suffering from revolutionary delirium rarely feels inclined to disturb its neighbour, finding ample occupation within its own frontiers, the great French Revolution constituting a well-accounted-for exception to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Finally, as to the peace of Europe during Canning's four years' ministry of foreign affairs, it may be mentioned that the following great Powers, not revolutionary, but moving in despotic secrecy, and whose secrets were well worth purchasing, menaced the peace of Europe. Turkey was suppressing the Greek insurrection; Russia was threatening Turkey; Russia was threatening Persia; Austria occupied Italy; France occupied Spain; Spain threatened Portugal; Spain threatened her revolted South American provinces; the United States threatened Great Britain in respect of the Oregon question, and indirectly threatened, by force of the 'Munro doctrine,' the independence of Mexico, and the other American states.

Domestic revolutions on the Continent count for less in the general political complications than such a universal concurrence in times of menace to the liberties of the world; for on reading the above list it will easily be seen that the menacing Powers were all Absolutist Powers except the United States, and that Canning, at the head of liberal England, literally stood alone between the menaced countries, and the overbearing power of their adversaries.

But what an unparalleled compliment to Canning's policy, and

to his investment of secret service money, appears in his adversary's public and unconscious testimony, which, neglecting the facts just mentioned, assumed as an undisputed reality that the period during which the British Government disbursed this paltry extra 60,000*l.*, coinciding with Canning's foreign administration, was 'distinguished 'by the unexampled tranquillity which prevailed in Europe' []

1827
—

SIR WILLIAM ELFORD TO MR. CANNING.

Washbourne House: April 22, 1827.

Sir,—As the only evil that can arise from my writing to you must accrue to myself by being thought to have taken too great a liberty, I still venture to do so in order that I may inform you, what I am quite sure is the general feeling within the limited circle of my present observation, which is, a most earnest and ardent wish to see the King supported in the choice of his First Minister and the Administration which he may form; and those sentiments arise from a prevalent notion, that certain persons conceive they can by their conduct control his Majesty's intentions, and compel him to abandon them. I can say with the utmost confidence that this feeling is general wherever my observation extends; that it exists independent of, although of course powerfully aided by, your own great and well-earned popularity.

I have, &c.,

WILL. ELFORD.

[This must interest the sympathiser in Canning's difficulties when the Duke of Wellington marched away at the head of the high Tories, as affording an instance of the disinterested public feeling roused by the political situation, and which pressed forward to support the new Premier.]

MR. LALLY-TOLENDAL TO MR. CANNING.

Paris, 1 Mai 1827.

Chère Excellence,—Sir James Wedderburn, mon cousin du même nom que la Marquise de Sully (née Wedderburn-Halkett, nièce à la mode de Bretagne du feu Comte de Rosslyn), fait aujourd'hui un saut de Paris à Londres, et je saisis aux cheveux cette occasion pour vous faire parvenir tardivement, mais sûrement, l'hommage que par conviction, comme par amitié, je me suis complu à vous rendre, et à notre tribune mystérieuse des Pairs, et dans notre *Forum* public. Aujourd'hui,

1827

plus que jamais, il faut être avare de paroles avec le Premier Ministre de la Grande Bretagne : il en a de si nombreuses à entendre, et de si précieuses à dire ! Vous savez d'ailleurs, chère Excellence, sans que j'aie besoin de vous l'exprimer, avec quelle anxiété j'ai suivi toutes les phases de votre résolution, moins lunaire cependant que solaire, par combien de vœux je vous ai porté, et avec quelle satisfaction je vous sais (seulement d'hier) arrivé au zénith où je vous voulais. J'ai senti et je vous dis tout cela en ami de l'humanité autant pour le moins qu'en ami de Monsieur Canning—en ami de la Grèce, il faut bien que dans une lettre, qui est l'épanchement du cœur, je vous dise un petit mot de ce que vous savez être ma grande passion. Daignez vous rappeler notre dernier dîner chez le Baron Fagel précédé d'un autre chez M. de Villèle. Eh bien ! Je crois toucher au moment où nous pourrions pleinement *parler grec*. Vous ne songerez plus apparemment à poser une garde sur vos lèvres quand toutes les bouches de l'orient, de l'occident et du nord (je ne dis pas du midi) chanteront votre bienfait et votre gloire. En attendant, je suis Moïse qui prie, vous êtes Aaron, qui combat et qui va triompher. Mes humbles vœux et vos grandes actions sont dans l'accord le plus parfait pour la France, pour l'Angleterre, pour l'Irlande, pour le Portugal, pour la Grèce :—

Utrumque nostrum incredibili modo consentit astrum.

Voilà des souvenirs horatiens qui viennent se joindre à nos souvenirs virgiliens, et voilà encore qu'Horace m'avertit 'ne longo sermone morer tua tempora, Cæsar' ; je lui obéis et me renferme, non sans effort, dans l'hommage tant de fois renouvelé de la plus haute considération, admiration, affection, avec lesquelles j'ai l'honneur d'être, pour la vie, très honorable ami et très chère Excellence,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LALLY-TOLENDAL.

P.S.—J'ai travaillé vainement à finir ma lettre dans une seule page : au moins je n'ai pas excédé de beaucoup. Mais en me relisant, un autre scrupule me vient. Ai-je été suffisamment poli en nommant la France la première dans la nomenclature des contrées, que j'ai passées en revue ? D'un autre côté, si l'œil du Prince de Polignac m'eût vu nommer l'Angleterre avant la

1827
—

France, n'aurais-je pas été une fois de plus accusé d'*Anglomanie*? Je pense trop tard que j'aurais pu dire: nos deux pays. Le Punctilio était sauvé. Je me rappelle un madrigal de mon jeune temps. Deux sœurs étaient également puissantes par leurs charmes et leurs perfections de tout genre. Elles partageaient l'hommage indécis d'un jeune prétendant. Une d'elles lui reprocha de dire à sa sœur les mêmes choses qu'à elle. Il se défendit par un madrigal qui se terminait ainsi:—

Sans elle, il est bien vrai, je n'aimerais que vous;
Mais sans vous, je n'aimerais qu'elle.

Je suis un peu comme ce jeune Monsieur entre l'Angleterre et la France. Et surtout je demande au Ciel qu'elles restent toujours sœurs pour leur bonheur, et pour celui du monde.

Comme j'ai entendu Mr. Fox dans un discours à la chambre des Communes, à propos de la paix toujours promise, et jamais effectuée, citer à Mr. Pitt les deux derniers vers du sonnet de Molière:—

Belle Philis, on désespère
Alors qu'on espère toujours,

je ne puis pas craindre que la citation épistolaire que je viens de me permettre soit accusée d'inconvenance.

[A tribute of admiration from a Frenchman, somewhat unkindly endorsed in pencil—'Twaddle—but mind answer it in good form.' The answer is not with the papers.]

MR. JERDAN TO MR. STAPLETON.

Grove House, Brompton: May 7, 1827.

Sir,—I am of opinion that Lord Lowther has got the start in influencing the 'John Bull.'

The 'Morning Post,' I am inclined to believe, has some friend of the Duke of Wellington at its side.

I quote the Duke of Somerset's words respecting the Literary Fund, as conveyed to me by Sir B. Hobhouse:—

'I shall be very glad to have it announced at the anniversary, on the 9th, that Mr. Canning has consented to take the chair on the following anniversary. Under almost any circumstances it might have done the charity some good, but under present circumstances it may be expected to be extremely beneficial.'

I am, &c., W. JERDAN.

1827
—

[This excellent and good-hearted *littéraire* writes most probably primarily with a view to bring his personality again before Canning ; secondly, to mark his useful knowledge of the movements in the 'press' world ; lastly, to try to help in inducing Canning to take the chair at the meeting of the Literary Fund.]

MR. WILLIMOTT TO MR. STAPLETON.

Fife House : May 17, 1827.

My dear Mr. Stapleton,—The following extract from Lord L.'s letter to Dr. Gray on the occasion to which I referred will perhaps answer Mr. Canning's purpose, but if you would wish to have a copy of the whole letter I will, of course, send it to you. There can, in fact, be no reason why I should not.

'There will be no objection to your retaining the stall at Durham, but it will be expected that you should give up the living of Wearmouth which you now hold.'

Mr. Canning is probably aware that Wearmouth was given to Dr. Wellesley. It is a very valuable living—not less than 3,000*l.* a year.

When Lord L. wrote to the Bishop of Bristol offering him the bishopric of Lincoln, after stating the value of that bishopric, he added, 'I say nothing of your Regius Professorship, upon which I leave you to do what, under all the circumstances, you may think to be most proper.'

Ever sincerely yours,

ROB. WILLIMOTT.

[This letter illustrates what is more fully set out in Yonge's Life of Lord Liverpool—the care and conscientiousness with which that able and excellent Prime Minister distributed the Church patronage of the Crown, for which his advice was responsible.]

MR. JAMES T. SMITH TO MR. CANNING.

General Newspaper Office, Merchants' Hall,
Edinburgh : May 17, 1827.

Right honourable Sir,—I had the honour of addressing you confidentially on the 23rd ultimo, and sincerely hope that in so doing no offence was given. It was dictated from the purest motives, and proceeded from the best and kindest feelings of my heart.

It now affords me the highest satisfaction in being able to

1827
—

inform you that through the influence I formerly mentioned I intended to use with my correspondents, and the means adopted since that period, the whole of the public press of Scotland, with the exception of a very few indeed, have come boldly forward, and are now embarked in the support of the measures adopted by the First Minister of the Crown, and I have every reason to believe will continue to do so, unless any of them be restrained by the interference of some who are unfriendly to the government of that enlightened statesman, to whom this nation is laid under such a deep debt of gratitude. But it occurs to me that there are other means that might likewise be adopted here, which, if found to be expedient, would prove, in my humble opinion, highly beneficial—such as calling public meetings, &c., with a view to address the King on the wisdom and firmness displayed by his Majesty in the choice of his Ministers on the late trying occasion.

A public meeting of this kind was held to-day by the highly respectable Company of Merchants of this city (with which I am particularly connected), when a very loyal and grateful address was voted to his Majesty, and which will be transmitted tomorrow to the Secretary of State, to be by him presented to the King, which it is hoped will tend to strengthen the hands and encourage the hearts of his Majesty's Ministers.

As this incorporation generally takes the lead in public matters here, its example might be made to influence other public bodies, not only in this city, but throughout the whole of Scotland. It would be gratifying to know if such measures would be considered calculated to answer the end in view; if so, such means could then be adopted as might be conceived wise and prudent, which, under the blessing of Providence, might prove to be of essential service. With the utmost confidence,

I have, &c.,

JAMES T. SMITH.

MR. STAPLETON TO MR. J. T. SMITH.

Downing Street: June 7, 1827.

Sir,—I am desired by Mr. Canning to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo, and at the same time to thank you for the obliging nature of its contents.

1827
—

But it is quite impossible for Mr. Canning to give any opinion upon the point submitted to him for his consideration.

I am, &c.,

A. G. STAPLETON.

MR. JAMES T. SMITH TO MR. STAPLETON.

Hunter Square, Edinburgh: June 12, 1827.

Sir,—I was duly favoured with yours of the 7th instant, and beg to assure you it affords me very great satisfaction in being serviceable in any measure to that highly distinguished and worthy individual to whom this country (under Providence) is so deeply indebted, and shall ever consider it not only my incumbent duty, but my highest privilege, to do what lies in my power to merit his approbation and esteem.

I have, &c.,

JAMES TAYLOR SMITH.

[This correspondence may be usefully considered in several respects: the testimony it bears to the extensive popularity of Canning even in the politically critical country of Scotland, the indifference apparently sincerely felt by Canning as to taking advantage of an opening to conciliate the public press of Scotland; lastly, the good part in which his rather severe snub was taken by the Pressman.

It is truly disheartening to think of the profuse politeness with which, at the present date, such an overture would be received by even the most illustrious of our statesmen, and the mingled contempt and humiliating applause, with which our newspapers receive their nervous and muddled appeals to the popular ear.]

MR. PARKER TO MR. CANNING.

Retford: May 19, 1827.

Sir,—Permit me, sir, although a stranger to you, to congratulate you on the high and distinguished honour, you have merited, in having the entire confidence of our King and country, and I humbly pray your administration may be long and prosperous.

As senior alderman of the borough and corporation of East Retford, I think it my duty to acquaint you that our borough is very ancient, and has received many privileges from different kings. His Grace the Duke of Newcastle many years ago returned a member for our borough. And for one parliament, Lord Grenville, on my application to his lordship to know his

1827

pleasure respecting Retford—desired me then to use all my interest for his Grace of Newcastle, and we returned him two members that election; but since which time, in consequence of his Grace's ingratitude to Lord Grenville for favours received, we supported him no longer in the borough, and we applied to Earl Fitzwilliam to send us a member. The last election we returned two of Earl Fitzwilliam's friends, Dundas and Wrighton; but the Duke has contrived, with his associate Sir Henry Wright Wilson, to get three or four low freemen voters for Sir Henry, men of bad characters, to swear they received money themselves the last two elections before this; and his Grace is now endeavouring to get the borough thrown open either to the town or the hundred, which, in either case, will give the borough into the hands of his Grace, which we wish to avoid, as all the freemen dislike his Grace, and won't elect a member of his nomination. I have drawn up a petition which I have given to Lord Milton, which I should be proud if you would condescend to read; and if approved by you, you would have the goodness to allow it to be presented to the House. Every word there stated is true, at least the substance, and the petitioners could swear to the same if required. I, as senior alderman, earnestly request you will use your endeavours to preserve our borough, and the burgesses of East Retford will be ever grateful for the same, and ever anxious to support your administration. Should it be your wish to break all boroughs we will submit with pleasure, but for a disappointed candidate to petition not to seat himself, but turn out an honest candidate, we cannot brook.

I am, &c.,

JOHN PARKER.

[This history of the borough of East Retford tells its own tale. A wretched little helpless corporation had become a mere shuttlecock between the powerful houses of the Duke of Newcastle and Earl Fitzwilliam. The party struggles over the condign punishment of this convicted sinner seriously affected the politics of the period for some years after.]

MR. J. W. FRESHFIELD.

New Bank Buildings: May 26, 1827.

Sir,—It was my intention to ask the favour of an interview, but recollecting the extreme value of your time, I determined to

1827

trouble you with a short statement upon a subject very interesting to me.

A report has been circulated that it is your intention to allow the borough of Penryn to be disfranchised. I therefore feel it due to the electors to assure you that they suffer from an ill name—raised by the conduct of persons who are no more, and maintained by the measures of a disappointed party ; that those are no facts to warrant the charge of general corruption, and that several of those stated in the report of the late election committee are positively untrue. There is, for instance, a statement by a witness that Stanbury was heard to say I had promised him 1,300*l.* for the transfer of his interest to Mr. Manning. Stanbury has denied that hearsay allegation, and I pledge my word of honour in the most solemn manner, that I neither paid nor agreed to pay one shilling to that person, nor to any other for any purpose connected with the election ; and at the time it is said to have been done a man must have bribed as matter of taste if he really had bribed, because the election was completely in our hands ; Lord Percival had exhausted his strength and had polled his chairman, his treasurer, the secretary of his committee, &c., while Mr. Manning's direct partisans remained unpolled.

The state of Penryn is perfectly new, and no former evidence can be fairly applied. There are now between five and six hundred electors ; but in 1807 the number did not exceed two hundred, and in 1819, I believe there were not three hundred. In a severe contest in 1824, the number of voters was under 350 ; and although with that number bribery must have been more practicable, yet there was no petition ; but the great increase of the stone trade in that part has added nearly 200 voters, so as to make the whole number too considerable to be bribed ; and accordingly with reference to the last election there is nothing deserving the name of evidence to show any extent of bribery, still less to prove general corruption.

I have canvassed Penryn four times, and have from the commencement proceeded upon a belief that personal attention and kindness to the poorer class would eradicate every expectation even from the few, whose misery might render it material, and I retain that conviction ; but the borough is attacked because

1827

Stanbury, a notorious jobber, has been operating upon the poor for three years on behalf of Mr. Weeding; and Lord Percival's agents for about the same time have endeavoured to raise an artificial interest. My honest opinion is that if the present Bill fails the character of the borough will gradually improve, and the electors will find that they have something to maintain. At present there is no system of bribery existing, and yet the electors have not the merit of abstaining from corrupt practices.

My earnest entreaty to you, sir, is that you will be kind enough to look to the evidence, and to judge the great body of electors by their own conduct, and not that of their great-grand-fathers, and that the vast majority may not suffer for the acts of a few. If you should wish any information from me I shall be proud to wait upon you.

I have, &c.,

J. W. FRESHFIELD.

[This appears to have been written in the hopes of influencing Canning towards a lenient view in dealing with the case of the borough of Penryn, which was now before the House of Commons.

A Bill had been introduced which, after providing for the punishment of past and proved corruption, proposed to swamp the tainted constituency by adding a large body of voters, dwellers in the adjacent hundreds of Cornwall.

The House knew that the measure would give the representation over to certain great landed proprietors in the neighbourhood.

Lord John Russell, who was making the question of reform his own, moved for a total disfranchisement of Penryn, and a transfer of the forfeited seats to Manchester.

Canning probably disapproved of Lord John Russell's proposal on its merits; but one may suppose that Mr. Freshfield's appeal contributed to strengthen his disapprobation, and to fortify him in making a speech against it.

The debate took place on May 28.

The Whig supporters of the Government could not for consistency's sake vote against Lord John's amendment, particularly in a private member's measure, when the existence of the new Administration did not depend on the issue.

The Tory vote, though agreeing in Canning's views, could not bring themselves to strengthen his ascendancy by giving him a decisive majority.

1827

So Canning and his immediate followers found themselves in the minority on the division.

Canning endorses Mr. Freshfield's letter in pencil (probably written after the division), 'It was not to be saved, though I believe the sentence is a hard one.'

The pith of Canning's speech is contained in the following sentences :—

'He did not think that such a degree of guilt was established as to warrant a total disfranchisement.

'As to the case of Grampound, he had only to observe that when it was judged proper to resort to a measure of this kind, and to a certain extent to trench upon the franchises of any particular places, the most constitutional mode was not to adopt an entirely new representation, but to confine as much as possible the franchise, which, though strictly speaking a public privilege, was still in an innocent sense a valuable private possession, to the same description of interest as that from which it was taken.'

Now there are two senses in which the word 'franchise' or 'franchises' may be used : the one refers to the individual voter, the other to the incorporated inhabited locality to which the individual voter is allotted. Speaking apparently of the latter, Canning calls the right of returning members to Parliament 'a public privilege,' 'but in an innocent sense a valuable private possession.'

The Bill proposed to disfranchise the individual voters reported as guilty of receiving bribes, and to diminish the proportional value of the remnant of borough voters by merging the borough constituency in the neighbouring hundreds : neither the borough nor the unreported voters were to be actually disfranchised, but were to be mulcted both corporately, and individually, of at least two-thirds of the previous value of their vote.

The difference between this proposal and that of a total disfranchisement appears analogous to that between a heavy fine of two-thirds of an estate set against entire forfeiture ; and we may not be far wrong if we understand Canning to uphold in a great degree the proprietary conception of the franchise, of the same kind as that by which the members of the House of Lords hold their legislative functions, in both cases by proprietary right, destitute of responsibility to any mortal tribunals, excepting always in the case of serious offences against the law ; felony tainting the individual, treason tainting the blood, but both institutions dependent for their utility on the circulation of influences of the instincts of sound sense and freedom

through them, as through organisms, to bring them in process of time into harmony with the general sense of the community.

The very delay and friction attending the process offered the appearance, and the reality, of protection against the casual predominance of any sudden and otherwise overwhelming outburst of popular feeling.

A culprit constituency ought, therefore, to be dealt with as a culprit Peer would be dealt with. If hopes survived of a redeeming stock—if, as it were, the family were not hopelessly corrupted, heavy fines only should be inflicted ; *i.e.* the value of the voter's vote should be diminished : but total forfeiture should be avoided ; *i.e.* the voter's franchise should not be absolutely destroyed.

This view of the proprietary nature of the franchise, whether vested in a Peer, or in a large, or in a small constituency, had been strongly confirmed by Pitt's Reform Bill, which undisguisedly proposed to buy out the close boroughs as so much property, for which, if taken by Parliament, adequate compensation was justly due.

It is positively amusing to read the wasted indignation of modern Liberals alike at this theory and its practical results. The system worked admirably for about five generations, during which the internal growth and development of the country, though great, did not reach that density of population, that facility of internal communication, that enlargement of empire and imperial ideas, that extension of trade abroad and manufacture at home, at all of which it had arrived about the date of Canning's Premiership, and which advance in prosperity at last made the nation impatient of the delay and friction experienced before the popular wish could find expression in the House of Commons.

A sensitive and liberal-minded statesman, like Canning, in high office, satisfied the public feelings by his sympathy and appreciation of their tendency ; the success of his foreign policy diverted the public mind from domestic heart-burnings ; it all acted as a lightning-conductor, and carried off and safely dispersed any irritation at the slowness of the regular channels to give expression to public opinion.

While this lasted the nation were content with practical results, and remained indifferent to the rusty state of the machinery. In fact, their ideas about Parliamentary reform were not yet formulated, and for some period of time Canning might be expected to be able by the power of his genius to retain his hold on the nation, and fend off the crisis ; but even with Canning it may be doubted whether it could last long. Lord John Russell and the malcontent Whigs were rapidly feeling their way to some scheme by which they

1827
—

hoped to suit the public expectation, and at the same time subvert Tory domination.

Canning's death let in Wellington ; and Wellington absolutely failed to give any expression to popular feelings, except in the (for him and his party) disastrous concession of Catholic emancipation.

This illustrious 'non-conductor' of the wishes of the people operated to accumulate such a store of public impatience and energy, that the nation came well out of the subsequent political convulsion with only the Reform Bill of 1832, and a narrow escape of revolution.

The Whig doctrine about this time practically amounted to a proclamation of *the right* of great interests in the nation to acquire corporate franchises, and to take them by way of substituting themselves in the place of the decayed and dying interests previously possessed of them.

This substitution was to be effected by the supreme powers of Parliament ; but, however the substitution came to pass, the theory and the practice alike contradicted the doctrine of proprietary rights in the franchise.

The difficulty in the statement of the theory of the 'rights' of interests to representation lay in its self-contradiction, when, to give effect to the claims of one great interest, the rights of a small interest were to be taken away. 'Rights' cannot be affected by questions of size ; and Naboth's freehold in his vineyard was not diminished by the superior power and possessions of the neighbouring Ahab. If the franchise is a 'right,' justice could not sanction the despoiling of Penryn for the benefit of Manchester.

And to Canning's logical mind the difficulty of disfranchising Penryn for the benefit of Manchester appeared equally great, whether the rights of Penryn were viewed as purely proprietary, or as inherent rights of Englishmen to a voice in the constitution of their Legislature.

The lofty doctrine that the franchise is a trust deposited by the community at large, with separate sections of its constituents, to be exercised by the trustee, not for its own benefit, but for the benefit of the community at large, and liable to be forfeited for breach of trust and transferred to a worthier trustee, does not appear to be touched upon at this time. No doubt such doctrine acts in a highly Conservative sense ; nevertheless in its application it would instantly have solved the whole question of the unworthy trustee of the franchise in the borough of Penryn, and the untried but competent claimant of the borough of Manchester to be allowed to take up Penryn's forfeited trust.]

‘ PRINCESS OLIVE ’ TO MR CANNING.

3 Portland Place, Borough Road July 11, 1827.
(Ruler of the King's Bench.)

1827

Sir,—I am at this Lodging preparing to go into the walls of the King's Bench, and enable myself to make an assignment to my creditors to obtain my freedom after a cruel captivity of six years, ENDURED so long because to the last moment of suffering I was anxious not to give any offence to His most gracious Majesty as to *acts of Publicity in my Affairs*—and other important matters which I have faithfully and loyally held secret for His Majesty's Private knowledge. I addressed you, Sir, on my affairs solely. I also named my present indigence and the long and Dangerous illness, which I endured last winter, as I have been honoured with no reply at present, I shall be obliged if any communication is addressed for me to the care of Mr. Sonds my Landlord 3 Portland Place his and his wife's humane respect and attachment to my welfare has been LONG—and is STILL evinced in my Distress.

Kindly Sir make known my distress to His Majesty—and His benevolence and Justice will not sleep in my cruel case. But as Religion still supports me from Despair, I can only say may *God's will be done* in all my affairs!

OLIVE CUMBERLAND, &c. &c.

Do me the favour Sir to excuse this Paper—it is not used through disrespect but necessity.

Will you Sir assist me as a Fellow Being in Distress with a Loan of five Pounds—enclosed by 2d Post in the enclosed—Directed by myself to prevent any trouble to you as to Etiquette.

The Almighty will repay your humanity—TENFOLD.

OLIVE.

[The case of the ‘ Princess Olive ’ has been so often explained and discussed in historical publications, that it is unnecessary to enter upon it here. The verdict has been unanimous against her. The present letter only proves that she tried to utilise her visionary if not fraudulent claims for purposes of mendicancy, even towards statesmen high in office like Canning. Imposture and delusion get curiously mixed up in these cases of personation.]

MR. CANNING TO MR. ———.

Downing Street: July 23, 1827.

1827
—

Sir,—I have received in the usual course through the Home Office your petition to the King, praying that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to grant to you, and to your sisters, the titles and precedence which belong to the sons and daughters of an earl.

It appears to me that I could not advise his Majesty to grant the prayer of this petition, without being prepared to advise the re-establishment of lapsed dignities in every instance in which there has occurred or may occur hereafter a chasm in the direct succession, which I certainly should not think it right to do.

The instances in which this special favour has been granted by the Crown are extremely rare; and such of them as I have had the means of ascertaining have been forwarded on very special circumstances, which do not apply to yours.

I am, &c., G. CANNING.

[This notifies the rule under which special precedence is granted in certain cases by the Crown, and may be interesting to some if meditating any such application.]

THE BARON DE ROSENKAMPFF TO MR. CANNING.

St. Pétersbourg ce 21 Juillet, v. st., 1827.

Monsieur,—J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 11 Juillet.

Quoiqu'il paroisse, Monsieur, d'après le renvoi que vous me faites des deux mémoires que j'avais pris la liberté de vous communiquer, que les objets dont il y est question n'ont pas cet intérêt pour vous que j'aurais désiré, je ne puis prendre sur moi de renoncer à l'espoir que j'ai nourri, que vous ne me refuseriez pas d'accepter l'exemplaire imprimé de mon ouvrage, que je vous avais destiné, et qui est le résultat de vingt ans d'études et de travail; ce n'est donc plus qu'à ce titre que je prends la liberté de vous répéter la prière de lui accorder une place dans votre bibliothèque.

1827

Il est vrai que j'aurais été très heureux si les manuscrits, auxquels les mémoires se réfèrent, eussent pu vous convenir, mais ces pièces n'ont point de rapport à l'envoi des livres, dont j'avais pris la liberté de vous prévenir dans ma lettre.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'expression réitérée de la haute et respectueuse considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE BARON DE ROSENKAMPFF.

MR. DISBROWE (AT ST. PETERSBURG) TO MR. CANNING.

St. Petersburg: ^{July 28}_{August 10}, 1827.

Sir,—By the steamer *George IV*. I enclose a letter which I have been requested to forward to you by Baron Rosenkamppff.

The letter is accompanied by a large case of books—upwards of 100 volumes, I believe—on Russian law; but as I find the expense of sending them by the steamboat will be considerable, and they will probably be liable to a heavy duty in England, I have ventured to detain them until I know what your wishes on the subject are, as I conceive that the delay of six weeks will not be of any consequence; and should you wish to receive them by the steamboat, she will make another trip this year, so they may be forwarded by any merchant vessel.

I shall be most happy to execute your commands on this or on any other subject, and I have, &c.,

E C. DISBROWE.

MR. BACKHOUSE TO MR. STAPLETON.

Foreign Office: August 22, 1827.

My dear Stapleton,—I enclose to you a letter from Mr. Disbrowe at St. Petersburg, with its enclosure, from a Baron Rosenkamppff, who appears to have been in correspondence with Mr. Canning, and who (in spite of the discouraging manner in which it appears that his first advances have been received,) desires to offer the homage of his work on Russian law, extending to more than 100 volumes, to Mr. Canning's library.

Of course under present circumstances there is but one answer to be returned to the Baron, which I will write if necessary, but which, perhaps, had better go from you, especially as

1827

you will recollect what was the nature of the previous correspondence.

Pray offer my best respects to Mrs. Stapleton, and believe me, &c.,

J. BACKHOUSE.

[This embarrassing tribute to Canning's greatness probably never reached this country, as Mr. Backhouse's note is written under the circumstances of Canning's death.]

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

The present most imperfect collection of papers supplies no further information as to Canning's Ministry and death, than what is already well known and published in the works expressly dealing with the subject.

It is impossible, however, to refrain from essaying to extract from that interesting storehouse of history, the second series of the Wellington despatches and correspondence, some information as to his Grace's actions and feelings towards his illustrious rival from May 25, when, as has been already stated, Canning resigned all idea of attaining to a reconciliation, down to the Duke's acceptance of the Command of the Army after Canning's death.

As on a previous occasion when the Duke's conduct might possibly appear questionable to hostile critics, the gaps in the series are very suggestive.

After the breakdown of the negotiations in May, the last dates of that month being May 22, the next letter of the Duke's is dated June 13. During this time the insignificant question of the Corn Bill, which shook the Government most severely, the disposal of the secret service money, and the expedition to Portugal had been under discussion in a keenly partisan spirit in the House of Lords; but his Grace, it appears, either abstained from writing, or it has not been thought expedient to publish the letters.

Then comes, (amongst letters from other people,) a letter to Sir William Clinton of June 20, and another to the Duke of Cumberland of June 25, reiterating the Duke's grievances against Canning; not, it may be said, without betraying bitterness against him.

The deficiencies of the series continue remarkable till we come to half a dozen letters of the Duke, ranging from July 14 to August 1, relative to his visit to the King about July 22, and the dis-

1837
—

turbance the visit caused in the political atmosphere ; as to which the Duke evinces a boyish delight in the alarm and consternation he had caused, without however compromising the honesty of his position.

Canning died on August 8.

From page 70, under date of August 1, to page 96, under date of August 17, covering a space of 26 closely printed pages, and a period of seventeen days of acute ministerial crisis, there is only one letter from the Duke. It is addressed to Lord Bathurst, dated August 10, and printed at page 76.

The first of the above-mentioned letters only related to the visit to Windsor and to the command of the army.

The last accepts from the King the Command of the Army.

The intermediate letter contains a summary of the baldest political news of the hour, without a word of kindness or pity for his vanished rival, and winds up with the postscript—

‘ I hear that Dr. Farr says that it was Canning’s temper that ‘ killed him ’

Considering the greatness of Canning’s genius and position, the frailty of his health, the unmerciful badgering he had suffered from the Duke’s friends, this sentence need scarcely have been written, and if written, for the Duke’s sake had perhaps better not have been published.

The Duke’s character stands so high, and strikes one as so even and noble, that if at this period he allowed evil influences to impel him out of his usual illustrious course, no blame attaches to his representatives for suppressing the correspondence which might betray the less worthy emotions of his mind.

But in writing about Canning, who was violently attacked at the time, it may be guessed from the omissions in the series of the Duke’s correspondence, and from the above-mentioned significant touch in a letter written at a crisis, that no common animosity distorted the Duke’s view of his rival, and that Wellington’s nature, patient as a rule under provocation, must have been warped by some overmastering wrath ; and of all passions, none can surpass an acute seizure of jealousy, and pure jealousy no doubt hindered Wellington from being able to realise or express those generous feelings, which a great man usually finds himself impelled to utter, when he sees a distinguished and worthy competitor struck down in mid-career by the hand of death.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GREECE AND TURKEY.

1827

The story of the negotiations relating to this question was left off (p. 12) about the date of January 21, when a draft treaty arrived in London from Paris to give binding effect to the provisions of the Protocol, on the basis of which Great Britain, Russia, and France contemplated proceeding.

Canning's illness, followed by Lord Liverpool's total withdrawal from public business ; the interregnum during which domestic questions, such as Corn and Catholic Emancipation, fully occupied the leader of the House of Commons ; the struggle for the Premiership ; and the promotion of the new Government, bring matters down towards the end of May before Canning could again address himself to foreign affairs ; and then only in the capacity of supervisor, for Lord Dudley had succeeded to the Foreign Office.

The Great Powers willingly awaited the result of the domestic effervescence in Great Britain, but the state of matters in Greece had changed most seriously for the worse during the four months of Canning's slackened grasp of foreign affairs.

After a few successes, the Greeks, led by General Church and Lord Cochrane, incurred on May 6 a heavy defeat in an attempt to succour the besieged garrison in the Acropolis of Athens. This disaster destroyed all hope of succouring the garrison, and totally discouraged the insurgents throughout the rest of the country. It equally, of course, elated the Turks, and stimulated them to further defiance of the sympathies of Russia and England, while it excited the anger of the Russians to an equal degree.

The reduction of the Protocol into a treaty became a matter of instant importance.

This celebrated Greek treaty provided for the intervention of the three Powers to obtain as results, firstly, an armistice ; secondly, a mediatory negotiation on the basis of the following terms : on the Turkish side, suzerainty, a tribute, a 'determinate voice' in the choice and nomination of the authorities, who in other respects were to be chosen and nominated by the Greeks themselves for their own self-government, and a fair indemnification to Turkish proprietors ousted from their property by the new method of government : on the other hand, for the Greek side nothing is in terms stipulated except the simple words, 'They shall be governed by authorities whom they 'shall themselves choose and nominate.' This stipulation, in truth, carried everything for which the Greeks thought it worth while to

contend. The pith and marrow of the treaty appeared in the shape of an accidental condition slightly modifying one item in the catalogue of the supremacies of Turkey ; in fact, the 'substance' was the practical independence of Greece. The 'accidents' were the qualification and limitations imposed to satisfy the pride and sovereign rights of Turkey. In diplomatic phraseology the relative importance of these aspects became reversed.

Next came a 'self-denying' article on the part of the high contracting Powers. Lastly, the 'secret' article provided for a partial recognition of the independence of Greece by way of accrediting to Greek authorities consular agents, and for a forcible intervention on the part of the mediatory Powers to secure an interval for discussion of the foregoing terms of pacification ; and, in the event of the failure of negotiation in persuading either party peaceably to accept the terms proposed, to 'resort to ulterior measures' in prosecuting the work of pacification.

Now, as regards the precise value of the terms of the award which these self-constituted arbitrators proposed to enforce on the contending parties, no occasion presents itself for comment ; the only point of importance, and of the highest importance, depends on the validity of the grounds on which these three Powers held themselves justified to intervene.

In what way could this intervention be proved to differ from that of Austria in Italy, and of France in Spain ?

The expediency of intervention for the benefit of the intervening Powers might be the same in all the cases, but how could Canning, who had won such commanding influence by unwearied protest in the one case, defend himself on just and reasonable principles for adopting the objectionable policy in the other and present case ?

Mr. Stapleton, in his 'Political Life,' vol. iii. pp. 274, 289, offers the only known defence of adequate authority for Canning's policy.

The excitement of the Russian nation, the defiant attitude of the Porte, the urgent necessity of moving, as far as possible, *pari passu* with Russia, in order to protect the independence of Turkey, afforded sufficient justification of the use of force to obtain a pacification so far as political *expediency* can go, and it only remains to point out the political *rights* in virtue of which Canning deemed he might lawfully resort to 'ulterior measures to obtain pacification' ; in other words, to give independence to the Greek insurgents.

As for the past, it appears there can be no difficulty in proving a straightforward and sincere national neutrality on the part of Great Britain, which the irrepressible activity of certain private

1827
—

adventurers and Greek sympathisers could not fairly be alleged effectually to negative.

The two public grounds on which Canning justified a concerted action with Russia to enforce a pacification were—(1) the unredressed and irredressible grievance caused by the Greek pirates in their indiscriminate hostility on the innocent traders of British, and all other countries in the Levant; and (2) the outrage on Christendom and humanity of allowing the Egyptian auxiliaries of the Turks to carry on without let or hindrance their atrocious practice of destroying all adults in the warfare, and carrying the women and children into slavery in Egypt.

Now, either Turkey or Greece might be held responsible for the piracy; in the case of Algiers, Great Britain connived at an exoneration of the Porte, and deliberately treated the province as temporarily independent. On such an assumption regular negotiations took place between the Dey of Algiers and the representatives of Great Britain; but negotiations of this kind, *ad hoc*, could not possibly take place with Greece: theoretically, because instead of tacitly conceding an independent responsibility to the Greeks, the Turks were violently protesting against any such idea; and practically, because the violence and power of the Turks made it impossible to arrive at any legitimate separate understanding with the insurgent province. This left, accordingly, no alternative but to hold Turkey directly responsible for Greek piracy, which continued to flourish and was not put down. As this piratical grievance had lasted some years, and had not become abated, Great Britain acquired precisely the right of using forcible means, and of using, moreover, any such forcible means, even to open war, as would obtain adequate redress from the responsible Government for the losses of British commerce. And as war is an *ultima ratio* which may include conquest or national extinction, a right to war necessarily includes the minor extremity of insisting on the cession or independence of any particular province, which an aggrieved and successful assailant may think expedient to demand.

Hence, on ordinary grounds, Canning could justify his action in a way and with a rightfulness which are obviously absent from the pleas of the Holy Alliance and of France in their recent acts of aggression.

The second ground is more sentimental apparently, but it depends partly on the sympathy of Christians, and partly on the principle that there does exist a degree of murderous and cruel violence, particularly when perpetrated by a people of a race and creed different from the victims, which, without creating an obligation, amply sup-

plies a justification for an interference on the part of the bystanders, were it only on the bare grounds of common humanity.

The atrocities perpetrated by the Egyptian contingent, though denied by the Porte, had been amply established in the general belief of the world, and particularly in that of the British Government.

On these two grounds, quite foreign to the excuses offered for the violence of the Holy Alliance, Canning ventured to think himself fully warranted in taking a course of action, which the situation of affairs likewise recommended as expedient.

The extreme Liberal party in Europe probably cared little for the cautious methods pursued by the British Government ; they only saw a chance opening up for the Greeks, and applauded accordingly.

The high Tory party and the Duke of Wellington anticipated the necessity of hostile operations to coerce the Porte, and objected to war on any pretence, and most emphatically to war for the purpose of rescuing a democratic and rebellious race. Probably the Duke argued that, if left alone, Russia would settle the matter, and England would reap the benefit. As to the prospect of Russia gaining undue aggrandisement in the course of such an 'errand of mercy,' it would be quite sufficient to trust to the self-denying professions of the Czar, and there would be no just reason for alarm, but rather the contrary, even if this great Power found itself involuntarily compelled to exceed its profession of disinterestedness in this instance, and to accept unsolicited enlargement of territory.

Of course Wellington had not really blinded himself to the ambition of Russia ; but on principle he deemed it a safe general rule to suppress and discourage insurgents against an established Government, even in a case where the domination, though of ancient date, was acquired by conquest, and prevailed only for the advantage of infidels of one race over Christians of another and vehemently protesting race ; and, as a matter of expediency, the Duke utterly mistrusted the 'staying power' of the English nation to bear the burdens of another serious war. If Great Britain became entangled in a great war, the responsibility for its military guidance would inevitably devolve upon Wellington, and the veteran of fifty-five years of age might honourably protest against a policy which appeared to hazard great wars as if they were trifles, when a war could only thrust the military responsibility upon himself, and to employ a menace of hostilities as a legitimate move in politics, without, as it appeared to Wellington, sufficiently attending to the frightful risk involved therein.

Canning had already once run the risk of a great war with France and Spain, and now was incurring the risk of a formidable war with Turkey

1827

— The Portuguese expedition filled the Duke with apprehension ; his letters at the time teem with suggestions of the dangerous possibilities which might arise in its progress.

The Greek treaty exasperated him as another instance of Canning's recklessness ; but his feelings were milder. The hostilities must necessarily be maritime, where British strength could be most effectually used with the least possible strain on the national resources ; besides, for this purpose we stood side by side with two great military Powers, Russia and France ; and it was due to the nature of the locality and consequent character of the warfare, that Great Britain could with confidence hold up her head between these military giants.

Canning's political insight being keener than Wellington's, Canning could forecast the precise value of the risk he ran, and judged with sufficient discernment that the chances of a great war were in each case immensely less than Wellington believed. But Wellington's view, within its horizon, may be accounted most wise and reasonable, and only paling before the superior political genius of Canning.

The death of Canning limits the extent of these observations, but the Greco-Turkish episode would not be complete unless mention is made of the historical facts that on August 16 the Ambassadors of the three Powers brought the treaty formally before the Porte ; the Porte trifled with the notification until considerable preparations for open war had become ready, and the Egyptian reinforcements had arrived. Some degree of open defiance then began to break the monotony of the sullen silence of the Turks, but the instructions held by British naval authorities in the Greek waters, founded on the terms of the treaty, led to the decisive battle of Navarino, which, by annihilating the Turkish naval resources, opened the way directly for Greek independence. Hence the impulse given by the dying hand of Canning, eleven weeks after his death accomplished the stroke which delivered Greece. Well may his memory be venerated by the people for whom, under the hand of Providence, his genius wrought posthumously so great a deliverance.

PORTUGAL.

As regards Portugal, the British expeditionary force remained there all through the year 1827. Its presence secured two objects : on the one hand it restrained Spain from interfering in the domestic affairs of Portugal, either by her own armies or by equipping or permitting the equipments of Portuguese deserters organised to invade and harass their native country ; on the other hand, it

encouraged loyal Constitutionalists in Portugal, giving them a confidence in their position, and enabling them to hold their own with hope against the ubiquitous intrigues of the Absolutists.

No power on earth could avail to assuage the intestine discord of the country ; the antagonism of parties permeated the whole nation, from the prince to the peasant ; and the Constitutionalists only just managed to retain their position. The illness of the Infanta regent who supported their cause, the aversion of the young Queen who sympathised with her uncle Don Miguel, and with the opposite and Absolutist cause ; the mistakes of Saldanha, the most spirited leader of the Constitutionalists ; and the danger menaced to Constitutionalism by the ever-impending return of Don Miguel—all kept affairs on a precarious and uncertain footing ; still, at the time of Canning's death Portugal remained under a constitutional form of Government, which, however tottering under domestic dissension, at any rate had not been subverted by the external violence of foreign power.

SPAIN.

In Spain the effects of Mr. Canning's policy only operated indirectly on the affairs of the country. The attacks on Portugal being foiled, and the support of France becoming doubtful, the Camarilla found themselves left alone with a monarch whose perseverance in the paths of Catholicism and Absolutism appeared rather doubtful. His removal from the throne now entered more than ever into the plan of their designs, and the ' Absolutists ' became ' Carlists,' and organised open rebellion.

As has been shown under the head of the letters of the Marquis de Croy, Ferdinand's apprehensions as to a Carlist insurrection led him to try to open up special friendly relations with Great Britain—not impossibly an appeal for material support in case he found it advisable to separate from the Absolutists, and revert to a Constitution. This overture contained too many elements of danger to Canning's honour and credit for that statesman to entertain.

The Absolutists had used their official power to denude those parts of Spain, where they happened to be strongest, for the purpose of forming a useless army of observation on the frontier of Portugal. They were thus enabled to contrive a mild insurrection in Catalonia in April, which nevertheless the Government easily suppressed, but afterwards treated with great if not reprehensible lenity. However, during May, June, and July the Apostolics brewed a fresh storm in Catalonia. Ferdinand in the end quelled all these disturbances for a time ; but such intestine commotions left Spain destitute of means

1827
—

to command respect, and only gave Europe an opportunity of seeing what the aims and methods of policy of the Absolutists would prove to be, wherever they held the upper hand and had power to carry them into execution.

FRANCE.

France in external affairs had, as already shown, been content to co operate with Canning. She had supported the policy of his Portuguese expedition, and entered into a common course with Great Britain and Russia on the Greek question, which promised immediate succour for unfortunate Greece, and held out no remote prospect of obtaining for her eventual independence.

Villèle, however, though able to guide the French Court in the foregoing respects by appeals to their dynastic interests, found himself destitute of influence for home politics, and unable to resist the violent and repressive measures forced upon him by the Absolutist party. The unpopular laws for gagging the press gave evidence of this unfortunate bias ; and the general policy of the Court assumed a character so displeasing to moderate men, that the Government discovered itself in the curious predicament of meeting with more support for their violent measures from the elective Chamber of Deputies, than from the non-elective but more moderate and independent Chamber of Peers. There were ample reasons for this curious result, but it does not concern the present work to analyse them.

The labour of analysing the action and reaction of public feeling in Great Britain and France is quite beyond the scope of these much-abbreviated observations, but the conjecture may be hazarded that the strong popular voice which supported Canning in the newspapers, and was so heartily condemned by the Duke of Wellington, evoked an unusual sympathetic expression of feeling in favour of Liberalism in the French journals, thereby stimulating the French Government to repressive violence, and leading indirectly to the political commotion which burst forth in the French nation during this year ; also that, on the other hand, the separation of the Duke of Wellington and high Tory party from Canning led the Apostolical party to forecast the overthrow of the Liberal Minister, and the approach of a potent Tory reaction in the Government of Great Britain, which might be expected to reverse and neutralise the predominance of the Liberal influence in the foreign affairs of Europe.

GERMANY.

1827

Metternich guided the two great military Powers of Austria and Prussia—the former directly, the latter indirectly ; in either case the circumstances of their position, both internal and external, forbade the idea of the possibility of their entertaining any liberal conceptions in their foreign policy. Metternich represented, perhaps more than any other statesman in Europe at this time, a precisely formulated feeling of antagonism to Canning and his policy. The two German Powers had no world-wide and maritime interests like Great Britain, Russia, France, Spain, and Portugal, to enlighten their understandings. Influenced by the natural and perpetual strain of holding their own with extreme difficulty against jealous neighbours, large and small, and subject peoples writhing under their domination, it is difficult to blame them, and hard to see how their policy could be otherwise. No nations suffered more severely than they had done from the recent frantic ebullition of French discontent and fury, when the force thereby generated came under the guidance of the military genius of Napoleon ; and Metternich, who had lived through it all in the midst of disaster and humiliation, may be well excused if he viewed with horror and dismay the liberal propaganda of Europe rising into power again, not as a dreadful monster to be at once denounced and destroyed, but as a recognised and honourable tendency, fostered in the first instance by the authority of England, and secondarily winning credit and power with the dynastic Absolutisms of certain others of the Continental Powers.

Canning's power must, therefore, be recognised in the way in which he could hold down the German anti-Liberal opposition, and neutralise the weight of the authority of the German Powers in the counsels of Europe.

And at the date when Canning died, Metternich could do no more than lament over the 'insane and revolutionary' policy of Great Britain, which may be reckoned ample victory for Canning.

THE UNITED STATES.

Canning's firm protest against the Munro doctrine, and his energetic resistance to attempts to overawe Great Britain in respect of the Oregon boundary question, may be fairly quoted to prove that no mob popularity or theoretical Liberalism inspired his policy, but only a keen sense of justice, and a fixed determination that, whether he had to deal with a republic or an empire, the interests of the country committed to his charge should in no wise suffer injury.

1827 — This sounds a platitude to the mere student of history : to the practical politician it implies a great deal more ; so strong is the temptation to grant favour apart from equity to the power most in sympathy with the statesman guiding the policy of the nation.

BRAZIL.

Nothing particular requires to be noticed in respect of this new-born empire, except that, notwithstanding the powerful influence of the slave interest, the weight of British authority succeeded in concluding a treaty for the future suppression of the slave trade.

In the struggle between Brazil and Buenos Ayres with regard to the sovereignty of the Banda Oriental, Canning never interfered to any appreciable extent : no vital principle or great interests were concerned which would lead the British Government to undertake the vain and fruitless task of pacifying two Powers standing by themselves in a vast and almost unpeopled continent, both bankrupt, with no one but themselves to blame or harm.

THE END

STANDARD HISTORICAL WORKS.

MACAULAY'S (Lord) HISTORY of ENGLAND, from
the ACCESSION of JAMES the SECOND.

Student's Edition, 2 vols crown 8vo. 12s. | Cabinet Edition, 8 vols post 8vo. 48s.
People's Edition, 4 vols crown 8vo. 16s | Library Edition, 5 vols 8vo £4.

MACAULAY'S (Lord) ESSAYS:

• Student's Edition, 1 vol. crown 8vo 6s. | Cabinet Edition, 4 vols. 8vo. 24s.
People's Edition, 2 vols crown 8vo. 8s. | Library Edition, 3 vols. 8vo 36s.

MACAULAY'S (Lord) COMPLETE WORKS. Edited by
Lady TREVELYAN. Cabinet Edition, 16 vols. post 8vo. £1. 16s., Library
Edition, 8 vols demy 8vo. £5. 5s

HISTORY of ENGLAND from the FALL of WOLSEY
to the DEFEAT of the SPANISH ARMADA. By JAMES A. FROUDE
POPULAR EDITION, 12 vols crown 8vo. £2 2s.
CABINET EDITION, 12 vols. crown 8vo. £3. 12s

The ENGLISH in IRELAND in the EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY. By JAMES A. FROUDE 3 vols. crown 8vo. 18s.

SHORT STUDIES on GREAT SUBJECTS. By JAMES
A. FROUDE. 4 vols. crown 8vo. 24s

HISTORY of ENGLAND from the ACCESSION of
JAMES I. to the OUTBREAK of the GREAT CIVIL WAR. By S. R.
GARDINER. 10 vols crown 8vo 6s each.

HISTORY of the GREAT CIVIL WAR, 1642-1649. By
SAMUEL R GARDINER, LL D. &c. (3 vols.) Vol. I. 1642-1644 8vo 21s

HISTORY of ENGLAND in the EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY. By W E. H. LECKY. 8vo. Vols I. and II 1700-1760, 36s.
Vols. III. and IV. 1760-1784, 36s. Vols. V. and VI. 1784-1793, 36s.

The CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY of ENGLAND since
the ACCESSION of GEORGE III. 1760-1870 By Sir T. ERSKINE MAY,
3 vols. crown 8vo. 18s.

HISTORY of ENGLAND from the CONCLUSION of
the GREAT WAR in 1815 to the YEAR 1858 By SPENCER WALPOLE.
(5 vols.) Vols. I and II. 1815-1832, 36s. Vol. III. 1832-1841, 18s. Vols.
IV. and V. 1841-1858, 36s.

A JOURNAL of the REIGN of QUEEN VICTORIA from
1837 to 1852. By C. C. F. GREVILLE, late Clerk of the Council. 3 vols.
8vo. 36s

A JOURNAL of the REIGN of QUEEN VICTORIA from
1852 to 1860. By C. C. F. GREVILLE, late Clerk of the Council. 2 vols.
8vo 24s.

London · LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

STANDARD HISTORICAL WORKS.

A HISTORY of TAXATION and TAXES in ENGLAND,
from the EARLIEST TIMES to the PRESENT DAY. By STEPHEN DOWELL,
Assistant Solicitor of Inland Revenue. 4 vols. 8vo. 48s.

The ENGLISH in AMERICA: Virginia, Maryland, and
the Carolinas. By J. A. DOYLE, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. 8vo 18s.

The ENGLISH in AMERICA: the Puritan Colonies. By
J A DOYLE, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford 2 vols 8vo 36s.

HISTORY of the PAPACY during the REFORMATION.
By the Rev M CREIGHTON. 8vo. Vols. I. and II. 1378-1464, 32s. Vols.
III. and IV. 1464-1518, 24s.

The HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY of EUROPE. By
EDWARD A. FREEMAN. With 65 Maps. 2 vols. 8vo. 31s 6d.

HISTORY of the ROMANS under the EMPIRE. By
DEAN MERIVALE. 8 vols post 8vo. 48s.

HISTORY of CIVILISATION in ENGLAND and
FRANCE, SPAIN and SCOTLAND. By H. T. BUCKLE 3 vols. crown
8vo. 24s.

The HISTORY of EUROPEAN MORALS from
AUGUSTUS to CHARLEMAGNE. By W. E. H. LECKY. 2 vols. crown
8vo. 16s.

HISTORY of the RISE and INFLUENCE of the SPIRIT
of RATIONALISM in EUROPE. By W. E. H. LECKY. 2 vols. crown
8vo 16s.

DEMOCRACY in EUROPE: a History. By Sir T.
ERSKINE MAX. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s.

DEMOCRACY in AMERICA. By A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Translated by H. REEVE. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 16s.

The HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY, from Thales to Comte.
By G. H. LEWES. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s.

The HISTORY of ISRAEL. By Professor HEINRICH
EWALD. Translated from the German. (8 vols.) 8vo. Vols: I. and II. 24s.
Vols. III. and IV. 21s. Vol. V. 18s. Vol. VI. 16s. Vol. VII. 21s.
Vol. VIII. 18s.

The ENGLISH CHURCH and its BISHOPS, 1700-1800.
By CHARLES J. ABBEY. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s.

The ENGLISH CHURCH in the EIGHTEENTH CEN-
TURY. By CHARLES J. ABBEY and JOHN H. OVERTON Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

LIFE in the ENGLISH CHURCH, 1660-1714. By JOHN
H. OVERTON, 8vo. 14s.

London: LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

